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TypeScript agentai-agentai-assistantandroidclaude-codecodexelectroniosllmmacosreact-nativetypescriptwindows
/**
* Credential-bearing path patterns shared by every harness permission adapter.
*
* Keep the serializable `{ source, flags }` form as the source of truth: the Pi
* bridge runs in a standalone child process and embeds these specs into its
* generated extension instead of maintaining a second handwritten regex list.
*/
export const DOTENV_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPEC = {
source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/])\.env(?:\.[^\\/]+)?$`,
flags: "i",
} as const;
export const SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPECS = [
{
source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/\s'"~])\.(?:ssh|aws|gnupg|kube|docker|azure|claude|codex)\b`,
flags: "i",
},
{
source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/\s'"~])\.(?:netrc|npmrc|pgpass|pypirc|git-credentials)\b`,
flags: "i",
},
DOTENV_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPEC,
{ source: String.raw`[\\/]\.cargo[\\/]credentials(?:\.toml)?\b`, flags: "i" },
{
source: String.raw`[\\/]\.m2[\\/]settings(?:-security)?\.xml\b`,
flags: "i",
},
{ source: String.raw`\bapplication_default_credentials\b`, flags: "i" },
{ source: String.raw`\bcredentials\.json\b`, flags: "i" },
{
source: String.raw`[\\/](?:codex|claude|gcloud|containers)[\\/]auth\.json\b`,
flags: "i",
},
{
source: String.raw`[\\/]\.config[\\/](?:gh|hub|glab|op|gcloud)\b`,
flags: "i",
},
{ source: String.raw`/proc/[^\s]*/environ\b`, flags: "i" },
{
// 轮 30 HIGH-1:补 .key(TLS 私钥标配)与 .pfx(PKCS#12 Windows 习惯)。
// 自定义命名 SSH 私钥(无扩展名、非 id_*)无法靠文件名可靠区分, 属已知
// 盲区 —— 依赖 .ssh/ 目录规则与 magic-byte 检测(未来)。
source: String.raw`\bid_rsa\b|\bid_ed25519\b|\bid_ecdsa\b|\bid_dsa\b|\.pem\b|\.p12\b|\.pfx\b|\.key\b`,
flags: "i",
},
// 远端 agent home(CC/Codex 的 ~/.xdt-server/v1/ 亦然)由 Cindy 托管,内含
// daemon env-file、codex-home 凭证、cc-manager 配置等真值 —— LLM 无合法
// 读取场景,任一 harness 一律拦截(R5 安全审计 C-1)。
{ source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/\s'"~])\.xdt-server\b`, flags: "i" },
] as const;
/**
* Review tools receive structured file paths rather than arbitrary shell
* source, so they can safely treat dotenv files as credentials without
* misclassifying data expressions such as `jq .env`.
*/
export const REVIEW_SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPECS = [
...SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPECS,
// Git config can contain credential-bearing remote URLs, while object storage
// can reconstruct a sensitive tracked file even when its worktree path is
// denied. Review receives a sanitized diff and never needs raw .git access.
{ source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/])\.git(?:[\\/]|$)`, flags: "i" },
// Generated dependency trees are not delivery artifacts. Keeping them out of
// the Review read scope also keeps the full-workspace freshness fingerprint
// bounded without leaving readable ignored content outside that baseline.
{ source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/])node_modules(?:[\\/]|$)`, flags: "i" },
// Cindy's managed harness binaries and local build cache are executable
// runtime inputs, not reviewable source artifacts. A real Cindy worktree is
// larger than the bounded content fingerprint if these generated payloads
// remain readable, so every harness excludes the same paths.
{
source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/])apps[\\/](?:claude-code|codex|pi|ripgrep)-bin(?:[\\/]|$)`,
flags: "i",
},
{
source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/])tools[\\/]pi[\\/]updates(?:[\\/]|$)`,
flags: "i",
},
{ source: String.raw`(?:^|[\\/])\.vite(?:[\\/]|$)`, flags: "i" },
] as const;
/**
* File-search deny globs shared by Review harnesses.
*
* Path regexes protect explicit reads and symlink targets. Directory-wide
* Grep/Glob/Find tools need a second, execution/result-level boundary because
* their input can be only a granted directory with no concrete file selector.
*/
export const SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_GLOB_PATTERNS = [
"**/.env",
"**/.env.*",
"**/.ssh/**",
"**/.aws/**",
"**/.gnupg/**",
"**/.kube/**",
"**/.docker/**",
"**/.azure/**",
"**/.claude/**",
"**/.codex/**",
"**/.netrc",
"**/.npmrc",
"**/.pgpass",
"**/.pypirc",
"**/.git-credentials",
"**/.cargo/credentials",
"**/.cargo/credentials.toml",
"**/.m2/settings.xml",
"**/.m2/settings-security.xml",
"**/application_default_credentials*",
"**/credentials.json",
"**/codex/auth.json",
"**/claude/auth.json",
"**/gcloud/auth.json",
"**/containers/auth.json",
"**/.config/gh/**",
"**/.config/hub/**",
"**/.config/glab/**",
"**/.config/op/**",
"**/.config/gcloud/**",
"**/environ",
"**/*.pem",
"**/*.p12",
"**/*.pfx",
"**/*.key",
"**/id_rsa",
"**/id_ed25519",
"**/id_ecdsa",
"**/id_dsa",
"**/.xdt-server",
"**/.xdt-server/**",
] as const;
export const REVIEW_SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_GLOB_PATTERNS = [
...SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_GLOB_PATTERNS,
"**/auth.json",
"**/.git",
"**/.git/**",
"**/node_modules",
"**/node_modules/**",
"**/apps/claude-code-bin/**",
"**/apps/codex-bin/**",
"**/apps/pi-bin/**",
"**/apps/ripgrep-bin/**",
"**/tools/pi/updates/**",
"**/.vite/**",
] as const;
const DOTENV_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN = new RegExp(
DOTENV_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPEC.source,
DOTENV_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPEC.flags,
);
export function isDotenvCredentialPath(target: string): boolean {
return (
typeof target === "string" && DOTENV_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN.test(target)
);
}
export const SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] =
SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPECS.map(
({ source, flags }) => new RegExp(source, flags),
);
export function isSensitiveCredentialPath(target: string): boolean {
return (
typeof target === "string" &&
SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(target))
);
}
const REVIEW_SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] =
REVIEW_SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERN_SPECS.map(
({ source, flags }) => new RegExp(source, flags),
);
export function isReviewSensitiveCredentialPath(target: string): boolean {
return (
typeof target === "string" &&
REVIEW_SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERNS.some((pattern) =>
pattern.test(target),
)
);
}
/**
* File selectors are not concrete paths: glob metacharacters can hide a
* sensitive basename from an otherwise path-shaped check. Inspect each
* alternative and a metacharacter-free form before a Review search runs.
*/
export function isReviewSensitiveCredentialSelector(selector: string): boolean {
if (typeof selector !== "string") return false;
const candidates = [selector, ...selector.split(/[{},|]/)];
return candidates.some((candidate) => {
if (isReviewSensitiveCredentialPath(candidate)) return true;
const literalized = candidate.replace(/[*?[\]{}()!+@]/g, "");
return (
literalized !== candidate && isReviewSensitiveCredentialPath(literalized)
);
});
}