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TypeScript agentai-agentai-assistantandroidclaude-codecodexelectroniosllmmacosreact-nativetypescriptwindows
/**
* Remove credentials and credential-like values from user-visible or persisted
* error text while keeping the surrounding diagnostic context.
*/
export function redactSensitiveText(input: string): string {
if (!input) return input;
// Authorization values may use non-Bearer schemes (for example
// `Basic <base64>`). Scan these fields directly so an attacker cannot make
// a regex retry an unbounded value match at many `authorization(` offsets.
let output = redactCredentialHeaderFields(input);
// `token` is intentionally conservative here: error payloads frequently
// carry credentials under this generic name. This may redact non-secret
// cursors, but avoids leaking an unknown token-shaped credential. `key` is
// included for opaque custom-provider keys and OAuth client secrets that do
// not use a known prefix.
output = output.replace(
/((?:["']?)key(?:["']?)\s*(?:\([^)\r\n]{0,256}\)\s*)?(?:=|:)\s*)(?:sk|pk|rk)-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{6,}\b/gi,
'$1[REDACTED_KEY]',
);
output = output.replace(
/((?:["']?)(?:x-api-key|api[-_ ]?key|access[-_ ]?token|refresh[-_ ]?token|id[-_ ]?token|proxy[-_ ]?token|client[-_ ]?secret|received\s+api\s+key|key\s+hash|key|secret|password|passwd|token)(?:["']?)\s*(?:\([^)\r\n]{0,256}\)\s*)?(?:=|:)\s*)(?!\[REDACTED(?:_KEY)?\])(?:"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|<[^>]*>|Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+|[^\s,;}\]]+)/gi,
'$1[REDACTED]',
);
output = output.replace(/\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/gi, 'Bearer [REDACTED]');
output = output.replace(/\b(?:sk|pk|rk)-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{6,}\b/g, '[REDACTED_KEY]');
output = output.replace(
/([?&](?:api[-_]?key|access[-_]?token|refresh[-_]?token|token)=)[^&#\s]+/gi,
'$1[REDACTED]',
);
// Gateway principals (`aigw:...`) are stable per-user identifiers; quota and
// routing errors embed them verbatim. Strip the whole value so persisted or
// displayed errors cannot leak an internal user id. The negative lookahead
// keeps this idempotent: without it a second pass matches `aigw:[REDACTED`
// (`]` is in the excluded set) and grows the placeholder to `[REDACTED]]`.
output = output.replace(/\baigw:(?!\[REDACTED\])[^\s"'`,;)\]}]+/gi, 'aigw:[REDACTED]');
return output;
}
/**
* Recursively apply `redactSensitiveText` to every string leaf of an unknown
* structure, preserving keys and shape.
*
* Why this exists: error rows are persisted as `{ message, reason?, sdkError?,
* toolLoop?, providerId? }` but only `message` / `sdkError` pass through
* `redactSensitiveText` on the write path — `reason` is stored verbatim. Any
* exit that hands error rows to another process or device must therefore
* redact on the way out, otherwise raw operator-visible strings can leave the
* controlled device.
*
* Non-string leaves (number / boolean / null / undefined) are returned as-is;
* the intent is masking, not coercion. Input is expected to come from
* JSON.parse, so reference cycles are not handled.
*/
export function redactSensitiveTextDeep(input: unknown): unknown {
if (typeof input === 'string') return redactSensitiveText(input);
if (Array.isArray(input)) return input.map((item) => redactSensitiveTextDeep(item));
if (input && typeof input === 'object') {
const output: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(input as Record<string, unknown>)) {
output[key] = redactSensitiveTextDeep(value);
}
return output;
}
return input;
}
export interface NonSecretErrorSignals {
errorStatus?: 401 | 429 | 529;
usageLimit: boolean;
}
const DETERMINISTIC_USAGE_EXHAUSTION_PATTERNS = [
/\binsufficient[-_ ]?quota\b/i,
/\binsufficient.{0,12}\b(?:balance|credit|funds)\b/i,
/\bquota\b.{0,24}\b(?:exhausted|exceeded)\b/i,
/\b(?:exhausted|exceeded)\b.{0,24}\bquota\b/i,
/\busage\s+limit\b/i,
/\b(?:exceeded[-_]?budget|budget[-_]?exceeded)\b/i,
/\b(?:account|session|usage)\s+budget\b.{0,16}\b(?:exhausted|exceeded)\b/i,
/\b(?:exhausted|exceeded)\b.{0,16}\b(?:account|session|usage)\s+budget\b/i,
// ChatGPT workspace member spend cap (Codex): "You hit your spend cap set by the
// owner of your workspace". The owner must raise it; waiting does not help.
/\bspend(?:ing)?[-_ ]?cap\b/i,
/余额不足|欠费/i,
];
/**
* Match only explicit account/quota/budget exhaustion text whose recovery
* requires more capacity or a reset. Unlike `usageLimit` below, this strict
* signal deliberately excludes transient rate limiting (`429`, `Too Many
* Requests`, `rate limit`) and retry-budget exhaustion.
*/
export function matchesDeterministicUsageExhaustionText(input: string): boolean {
return DETERMINISTIC_USAGE_EXHAUSTION_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(input));
}
/**
* Preserve explicit, non-secret routing signals before the surrounding error
* text is redacted. Requiring a field/phrase boundary avoids interpreting
* status-like fragments inside opaque credentials such as `tok-401-x`.
*/
export function extractNonSecretErrorSignals(input: string): NonSecretErrorSignals {
const statusMatch =
/(?:^|[\s,{;])["']?(?:status(?:[-_ ]?code)?|http(?:[-_ ]?status)?|code)["']?\s*(?:[:=]\s*)?["']?(401|429|529)["']?(?=$|[\s,;:}\]])/i.exec(
input,
) ?? /\brequest\s+rejected\s*\(\s*(401|429|529)\s*\)/i.exec(input);
const usageLimit =
/(?:^|[\s,{;])(?:rate\s+limit(?:ed|s|ing)?|usage\s+limit(?:ed|s|ing)?|too\s+many\s+requests|quota(?:["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?|\s+)(?:exhausted|exceeded)|(?:["']?(?:code|type|error|message)["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?)?(?:rate_limit_exceeded|insufficient_quota|exceeded[-_ ]?budget|budget[-_ ]?exceeded))\b/i.test(
input,
);
return {
...(statusMatch ? { errorStatus: Number(statusMatch[1]) as 401 | 429 | 529 } : {}),
usageLimit,
};
}
function redactCredentialHeaderFields(input: string): string {
return redactHeaderFields(
redactHeaderFields(input, ['www-authenticate', 'authorization', 'proxy-authorization'], true),
['set-cookie', 'cookie'],
false,
);
}
function redactHeaderFields(
input: string,
names: readonly string[],
stopAtSemicolon: boolean,
): string {
let output = '';
let copyFrom = 0;
let cursor = 0;
while (cursor < input.length) {
const valueStart = matchHeaderField(input, cursor, names);
if (valueStart === null) {
cursor += 1;
continue;
}
let boundary = valueStart;
while (
boundary < input.length &&
(!stopAtSemicolon || input[boundary] !== ';') &&
input[boundary] !== '\r' &&
input[boundary] !== '\n'
) {
boundary += 1;
}
output += input.slice(copyFrom, valueStart);
output += '[REDACTED]';
copyFrom = boundary;
cursor = boundary;
}
return copyFrom === 0 ? input : output + input.slice(copyFrom);
}
function matchHeaderField(
input: string,
start: number,
names: readonly string[],
): number | null {
const quote = input[start];
const quoted = quote === '"' || quote === "'";
const nameStart = quoted ? start + 1 : start;
const maxNameLength = names.reduce((max, candidate) => Math.max(max, candidate.length), 0);
const lower = input.slice(nameStart, nameStart + maxNameLength).toLowerCase();
const name = names.find((candidate) => lower.startsWith(candidate)) ?? null;
if (!name) return null;
let cursor = nameStart + name.length;
if (quoted) {
if (input[cursor] !== quote) return null;
cursor += 1;
}
while (/\s/.test(input[cursor] ?? '')) cursor += 1;
if (input[cursor] === '(') {
let closing = -1;
for (let offset = 1; offset <= 256 && cursor + offset < input.length; offset += 1) {
if (input[cursor + offset] === ')') {
closing = cursor + offset;
break;
}
}
if (closing < 0) return null;
cursor = closing + 1;
while (/\s/.test(input[cursor] ?? '')) cursor += 1;
}
if (input[cursor] !== '=' && input[cursor] !== ':') return null;
cursor += 1;
while (/\s/.test(input[cursor] ?? '')) cursor += 1;
return cursor;
}
/**
* LiteLLM 虚拟 Key 401:请求带的网关 token 不在 VerificationTokenTable。
* 与 Claude.ai / Codex 订阅 401 不是同一类,不能当成「去重新登录第三方」。
*/
export const GATEWAY_PROXY_TOKEN_INVALID_REASON = 'gateway-proxy-token-invalid';
/** Cindy 内置网关:显式 `xd`,或旧会话未写 provider 的隐式默认来源。 */
export function isCindyGatewayProviderId(providerId: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return providerId == null || providerId === 'xd';
}
export function isGatewayProxyTokenInvalidError(message: string): boolean {
if (!message) return false;
return /invalid[\s_-]*proxy[\s_-]*server[\s_-]*token|LiteLLM_VerificationTokenTable/i.test(
message,
);
}
export function isCindyGatewayProxyTokenInvalidError(input: {
reason?: string | null;
message?: string | null;
providerId?: string | null;
}): boolean {
if (input.reason === GATEWAY_PROXY_TOKEN_INVALID_REASON) return true;
return (
isCindyGatewayProviderId(input.providerId) &&
isGatewayProxyTokenInvalidError(input.message ?? '')
);
}
/** The Lite transport rejects an omitted parallel-tool flag; this is a client request error, not auth. */
export function isResponsesLiteParallelToolCallsError(message: string): boolean {
return /X-OpenAI-Internal-Codex-Responses-Lite requires `?parallel_tool_calls`? to be false\./i.test(message);
}
/** UI-only recovery offer. A premature close does not establish an encryption failure. */
export function canOfferCodexHistoryRecovery(input: {
message: string;
agentKind?: string | null;
remoteHostId?: string | null;
agentDeviceId?: string | null;
running?: boolean;
}): boolean {
return input.agentKind === 'codex' && !input.remoteHostId && !input.agentDeviceId &&
!input.running && /stream disconnected before completion:\s*stream closed before response\.completed\b/i.test(input.message);
}
const AGENT_CHAT_ERROR_CODES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'SSH_HARNESS_SWITCH_UNSUPPORTED',
'MODEL_SELECTION_UNAVAILABLE',
'HARNESS_SWITCH_NOT_READY',
'DEVICE_LINK_BUSY',
'DEVICE_LINK_CONTROL_DISABLED',
'DEVICE_LINK_MEDIA_TRANSFER_FAILED',
'DEVICE_LINK_MEDIA_ACCESS_DENIED',
'AUTO_REVIEW_UNAVAILABLE',
'AUTO_REVIEW_CONFIRM_UNDELIVERED',
'MCP_APPROVAL_AUTO_BLOCKED',
'MCP_APPROVAL_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT',
'MCP_APPROVAL_CONFIRMATION_UNAVAILABLE',
]);
/** Parse the runtime envelope, including Electron and device-link IPC wrappers.
* A parsed code is only a translation candidate: unknown REMOTE codes must not
* promote their upstream fallback text into localized user-facing guidance.
*/
export function parseAgentErrorCode(message: string): { code: string; fallback: string } | null {
const match = /(?:^|: Error: )(?:\[IPC_ERROR\]\s*)?\[([A-Z0-9_]+)\]\s*([\s\S]*)$/.exec(message);
if (!match || (!/^REMOTE_[A-Z_]+$/.test(match[1]) && !AGENT_CHAT_ERROR_CODES.has(match[1]))) {
return null;
}
return { code: match[1], fallback: match[2] || message };
}
/** Resending unchanged content cannot fix these explicit configuration failures. */
export function requiresAgentErrorConfigurationChange(message: string): boolean {
const code = parseAgentErrorCode(message)?.code;
return code === 'REMOTE_LOCAL_ATTACHMENT_UNSUPPORTED'
|| code === 'REMOTE_COMPAT_MODE_UNSUPPORTED'
|| code === 'REMOTE_LOCAL_ONLY_PROVIDER'
|| code === 'DEVICE_LINK_CONTROL_DISABLED';
}