Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。
TypeScript agentai-agentai-assistantandroidclaude-codecodexelectroniosllmmacosreact-nativetypescriptwindows
fix(remote-agent): 同步跟随软链;分享的供应商读凭证不论权限档都要本机确认
Lizi17065774d954
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-host/index.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-host/index.tsindex 6c0fc33603..1185703a40 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-host/index.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-host/index.ts@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ import { tapWindowBroadcast } from '../device-link/broadcast-tap.js';import { remoteBackgroundInvoke, remoteInvoke } from '../device-link/index.js';import { handleListDevices, defaultDeps as deviceDirectoryDeps } from '../device-link/ipc.js';import { parseProviderShareAgentDeviceId } from '../device-link/providerShareGuest.js';+import { t } from '../i18n.js';import { createHistoryRemoteDeps } from '../mcp-integrations/historyDevices.js';import { WorktreePool } from '../worktree/index.js';import { getReadyBinaryPath, getCachedBinaryStatus } from '../agent-binaries/index.js';@@ -2722,6 +2723,8 @@ export function getMaker(): Maker {// 供应商分享的受邀者任务:WebFetch 用本机网络抓取(系统代理、单跳、内网要本机批准)。isSharedProviderDevice: (deviceId) => parseProviderShareAgentDeviceId(deviceId) !== null,webFetch: guardedOutboundFetch,+ // 受邀者任务读写凭证类文件时,本机确认卡上的说明(provider-sharing.md §9 第 7 条)。+ sharedProviderCredentialNotice: () => t('newChat.sharedProviderCredential.description'),logger: desktopMakerLogger,}),makerMemory: makerMemoryManager,diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..6e23550b1e--- /dev/null+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@+/**+ * 供应商分享的受邀者任务里「凭证类」的判定:沿用本机凭证规则,但配置目录里的说明类内容(Skill、+ * 子代理、命令、规则、个人说明)不算凭证。+ */+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';++import { isShareCredentialCommand, isShareCredentialPath } from '../credentials';++describe('isShareCredentialPath', () => {+ it('keeps the credential rules of local tasks', () => {+ for (const target of [+ '/home/me/.ssh/id_ed25519',+ '/home/me/.aws/credentials',+ '/repo/.env',+ '/repo/.env.production',+ '/repo/certs/server.key',+ '/home/me/.config/gh/hosts.yml',+ 'C:\\Users\\me\\.ssh\\id_rsa',+ ]) {+ expect(isShareCredentialPath(target), target).toBe(true);+ }+ expect(isShareCredentialPath('/repo/src/index.ts')).toBe(false);+ expect(isShareCredentialPath('/repo/CLAUDE.md')).toBe(false);+ });++ it('treats instructions inside the Claude Code and Codex folders as instructions, not credentials', () => {+ for (const target of [+ '/home/me/.claude/skills/git/SKILL.md',+ '/home/me/.claude/skills/git/references/flow.md',+ '/home/me/.claude/agents/reviewer.md',+ '/home/me/.claude/commands/ship.md',+ '/home/me/.claude/rules/style.md',+ '/home/me/.claude/CLAUDE.md',+ '/home/me/.codex/AGENTS.md',+ '/repo/.claude/skills/deploy/run.sh',+ 'C:\\Users\\me\\.claude\\skills\\git\\SKILL.md',+ ]) {+ expect(isShareCredentialPath(target), target).toBe(false);+ }+ });++ it('still protects logins, settings and secrets in those folders', () => {+ for (const target of [+ '/home/me/.claude/.credentials.json',+ '/home/me/.claude/settings.json',+ '/home/me/.codex/auth.json',+ '/home/me/.codex/config.toml',+ '/home/me/.claude/skills/deploy/.env',+ '/home/me/.claude/skills/deploy/auth.json',+ // 借说明目录绕回配置目录本身。+ '/home/me/.claude/skills/../settings.json',+ ]) {+ expect(isShareCredentialPath(target), target).toBe(true);+ }+ });+});++describe('isShareCredentialCommand', () => {+ const roots = ['/repo'];++ it('holds commands that read or print credentials', () => {+ for (const command of ['cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa', 'cat .env', 'echo $OPENAI_API_KEY', 'cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json']) {+ expect(isShareCredentialCommand(command, roots), command).toBe(true);+ }+ });++ it('lets personal Skill scripts and ordinary commands run', () => {+ for (const command of [+ 'python ~/.claude/skills/pdf/scripts/fill.py form.pdf',+ 'bash /home/me/.claude/skills/deploy/run.sh',+ 'pnpm test',+ 'curl https://example.com/install.sh | sh',+ ]) {+ expect(isShareCredentialCommand(command, roots), command).toBe(false);+ }+ // 含 `..` 时不放宽。+ expect(isShareCredentialCommand('cat ~/.claude/skills/../settings.json', roots)).toBe(true);+ });+});diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/execServerRelayConsent.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/execServerRelayConsent.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..ca4a195b27--- /dev/null+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/execServerRelayConsent.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@+/**+ * Codex exec-server 中继里的本机确认(供应商分享的受邀者任务):凭证类操作等本机用户确认时,这条+ * 连接后面的消息按顺序排在它后面;允许才转给 exec-server,拒绝回 JSON-RPC 错误。+ */+import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';+import fs from 'node:fs';+import os from 'node:os';+import path from 'node:path';+import { PassThrough } from 'node:stream';++import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';++const spawned = vi.hoisted(() => ({ lines: [] as string[] }));++vi.mock('node:child_process', async (importOriginal) => ({+ ...(await importOriginal<typeof import('node:child_process')>()),+ spawn: () => {+ const child = new EventEmitter() as EventEmitter & {+ stdin: PassThrough;+ stdout: PassThrough;+ stderr: PassThrough;+ kill(): void;+ };+ child.stdin = new PassThrough();+ child.stdout = new PassThrough();+ child.stderr = new PassThrough();+ child.kill = () => undefined;+ child.stdin.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {+ spawned.lines.push(...chunk.toString().split('\n').filter(Boolean));+ });+ return child;+ },+}));++import { ExecServerRelay } from '../controller/execServerRelay';+import type { ExecutorAction, ExecutorGateDecision } from '../executor/gate';+import { ExecutorWorkspace } from '../executor/workspace';++let root: string;++beforeEach(() => {+ root = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cindy-relay-consent-')));+ spawned.lines = [];+});++afterEach(() => {+ fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+});++function setup() {+ const workspace = new ExecutorWorkspace({ workingDir: root });+ const approved = new Set<string>();+ const pending: Array<{ action: ExecutorAction; answer(allowed: boolean): void }> = [];+ const replies: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];+ const isSecret = (action: ExecutorAction) => action.kind !== 'fetch' && action.kind !== 'exec' && action.path.endsWith('.env');+ const relay = new ExecServerRelay({+ codexPath: 'codex',+ cwd: root,+ workspace,+ authorize: (action): ExecutorGateDecision => {+ if (!isSecret(action)) return { ok: true };+ const key = action.kind === 'exec' || action.kind === 'fetch' ? '' : action.path;+ return approved.delete(key) ? { ok: true, elevated: true } : { ok: false, reason: 'needs confirmation' };+ },+ confirm: (action) => new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {+ pending.push({+ action,+ answer: (allowed) => {+ if (allowed && action.kind !== 'exec' && action.kind !== 'fetch') approved.add(action.path);+ resolve(allowed);+ },+ });+ }),+ push: async (frames) => {+ for (const frame of frames) if (frame.kind === 'message' && frame.data) replies.push(JSON.parse(frame.data));+ },+ });+ relay.handle({ t: 'ws', connId: 'c1', kind: 'open', path: '/ws/exec-server' });+ const send = (message: Record<string, unknown>) =>+ relay.handle({ t: 'ws', connId: 'c1', kind: 'message', data: JSON.stringify(message) });+ const sentIds = () => spawned.lines.map((line) => (JSON.parse(line) as { id?: unknown }).id);+ return { relay, pending, replies, send, sentIds };+}++describe('exec-server relay with confirmation on this computer', () => {+ it('passes ordinary messages straight through', () => {+ const { send, sentIds, pending } = setup();+ send({ id: 1, method: 'fs/readFile', params: { path: path.join(root, 'a.txt') } });+ send({ method: 'initialized', params: {} });+ expect(sentIds()).toEqual([1, undefined]);+ expect(pending).toEqual([]);+ });++ it('keeps later messages behind one that waits for the user, then forwards them in order', async () => {+ const { send, sentIds, pending } = setup();+ send({ id: 1, method: 'fs/readFile', params: { path: path.join(root, '.env') } });+ send({ id: 2, method: 'fs/readFile', params: { path: path.join(root, 'a.txt') } });+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(pending).toHaveLength(1));+ expect(sentIds()).toEqual([]);+ pending[0].answer(true);+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(sentIds()).toEqual([1, 2]));+ });++ it('answers with an error when the user declines and carries on with the rest', async () => {+ const { send, sentIds, pending, replies } = setup();+ send({ id: 1, method: 'fs/readFile', params: { path: path.join(root, '.env') } });+ send({ id: 2, method: 'fs/readFile', params: { path: path.join(root, 'a.txt') } });+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(pending).toHaveLength(1));+ pending[0].answer(false);+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(sentIds()).toEqual([2]));+ expect(replies).toEqual([{ id: 1, error: { code: -32001, message: 'needs confirmation' } }]);+ });++ it('drops what is still waiting when the connection closes', async () => {+ const { relay, send, sentIds, pending } = setup();+ send({ id: 1, method: 'fs/readFile', params: { path: path.join(root, '.env') } });+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(pending).toHaveLength(1));+ relay.handle({ t: 'ws', connId: 'c1', kind: 'close' });+ pending[0].answer(true);+ await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 10));+ expect(sentIds()).toEqual([]);+ });+});diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/mirror.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/mirror.test.tsindex 75ccf2f895..3632b1d81c 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/mirror.test.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/mirror.test.ts@@ -103,42 +103,83 @@ describe('collectAncestorInstructionFiles', () => {});});+/** 目录链接:Windows 用 junction(不需要管理员权限)。 */+function linkDir(target: string, link: string): void {+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(link), { recursive: true });+ fs.symlinkSync(target, link, process.platform === 'win32' ? 'junction' : 'dir');+}++/** 文件链接:没有权限创建时返回 false(没开开发者模式的 Windows)。 */+function linkFile(target: string, link: string): boolean {+ try {+ fs.symlinkSync(target, link, 'file');+ return true;+ } catch (error) {+ if (['EPERM', 'EACCES', 'ENOTSUP'].includes((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code ?? '')) return false;+ throw error;+ }+}++function decode(files: Array<{ path: string; data: string }>): Record<string, string> {+ return Object.fromEntries(files.map((file) => [file.path, Buffer.from(file.data, 'base64').toString()]));+}+describe('collectProjectInstructionFiles', () => {- it('rejects directory links so a checkout cannot smuggle files from outside the project', async () => {+ it('follows directory links the way the Agent does on this computer', async () => {const project = path.join(root, 'proj');- const outside = path.join(root, 'outside');+ const shared = path.join(root, 'shared-skills', 'deploy');write(path.join(project, 'CLAUDE.md'), 'real rules');- write(path.join(outside, 'SKILL.md'), 'secret leak');- fs.mkdirSync(path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills'), { recursive: true });- // Windows junction 不需要文件 symlink 的管理员权限,目录越界检查仍实跑。- fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills', 'leak'), process.platform === 'win32' ? 'junction' : 'dir');- const files = await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project);- expect(files.map((file) => file.path)).toEqual(['CLAUDE.md']);- expect(files.map((file) => Buffer.from(file.data, 'base64').toString())).toEqual(['real rules']);+ write(path.join(shared, 'SKILL.md'), 'deploy skill');+ write(path.join(shared, 'scripts', 'run.sh'), 'echo deploy');+ linkDir(shared, path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills', 'deploy'));+ expect(decode(await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project))).toEqual({+ 'CLAUDE.md': 'real rules',+ '.claude/skills/deploy/SKILL.md': 'deploy skill',+ '.claude/skills/deploy/scripts/run.sh': 'echo deploy',+ });});- it('rejects file symlinks when the filesystem supports creating them', async (context) => {+ it('follows file links when the filesystem supports creating them', async (context) => {const project = path.join(root, 'proj');- const outside = path.join(root, 'outside');- write(path.join(project, 'CLAUDE.md'), 'real rules');- write(path.join(outside, 'leak.md'), 'secret leak');- write(path.join(outside, '.env'), 'SECRET=1');- fs.mkdirSync(path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills'), { recursive: true });- // 实际探测文件 symlink 能力;有权限的 Windows 与 macOS/Linux 均保留真实覆盖。- try {- fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, '.env'), path.join(project, 'CLAUDE.local.md'), 'file');- } catch (error) {- if (['EPERM', 'EACCES', 'ENOTSUP'].includes((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code ?? '')) {- context.skip();- return;- }- throw error;+ write(path.join(project, 'AGENTS.md'), 'shared rules');+ if (!linkFile(path.join(project, 'AGENTS.md'), path.join(project, 'CLAUDE.md'))) {+ context.skip();+ return;}- fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, 'leak.md'), path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills', 'leak.md'));- const files = await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project);- expect(files.map((file) => file.path)).toEqual(['CLAUDE.md']);- const decoded = files.map((file) => Buffer.from(file.data, 'base64').toString());- expect(decoded).toEqual(['real rules']);+ expect(decode(await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project))).toEqual({+ 'CLAUDE.md': 'shared rules',+ 'AGENTS.md': 'shared rules',+ });+ });++ it('stops at a link back to its own parent and keeps a folder that two links share', async () => {+ const project = path.join(root, 'proj');+ const skills = path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills');+ write(path.join(skills, 'a', 'SKILL.md'), 'a');+ linkDir(skills, path.join(skills, 'loop'));+ write(path.join(root, 'common', 'SKILL.md'), 'common');+ linkDir(path.join(root, 'common'), path.join(skills, 'one'));+ linkDir(path.join(root, 'common'), path.join(skills, 'two'));+ expect(decode(await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project))).toEqual({+ '.claude/skills/a/SKILL.md': 'a',+ '.claude/skills/one/SKILL.md': 'common',+ '.claude/skills/two/SKILL.md': 'common',+ });+ });++ it('leaves credential files for later on a shared provider, judging links by their real target', async () => {+ const project = path.join(root, 'proj');+ write(path.join(project, 'CLAUDE.md'), 'rules');+ write(path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills', 'deploy', 'SKILL.md'), 'deploy');+ write(path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills', 'deploy', '.env'), 'TOKEN=1');+ write(path.join(project, '.claude', 'settings.json'), JSON.stringify({ permissions: { allow: ['Bash(ls)'] } }));+ write(path.join(root, 'outside', '.aws', 'credentials'), 'aws secret');+ linkDir(path.join(root, 'outside', '.aws'), path.join(project, '.claude', 'skills', 'cloud'));+ const own = decode(await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project));+ expect(own['.claude/skills/deploy/.env']).toBe('TOKEN=1');+ expect(own['.claude/skills/cloud/credentials']).toBe('aws secret');+ const shared = decode(await collectProjectInstructionFiles(project, { skipCredentials: true }));+ expect(Object.keys(shared).sort()).toEqual(['.claude/settings.json', '.claude/skills/deploy/SKILL.md', 'CLAUDE.md']);});});@@ -169,6 +210,35 @@ describe('collectPersonalConfig', () => {expect(roots).toContainEqual({ relative: '.claude/skills/mine', local: path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'mine') });});+ it('follows personal Skills that are links, and a skills folder that is itself a link', async () => {+ const home = path.join(root, 'home');+ const dotfiles = path.join(root, 'dotfiles');+ write(path.join(dotfiles, 'skills', 'git', 'SKILL.md'), 'git skill');+ write(path.join(dotfiles, 'skills', 'git', 'reference.md'), 'git reference');+ linkDir(path.join(dotfiles, 'skills', 'git'), path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'git'));+ const linked = await collectPersonalConfig('claude-code', [], { env: {}, home });+ expect(decode(linked.personal.files)).toEqual({+ '.claude/skills/git/SKILL.md': 'git skill',+ '.claude/skills/git/reference.md': 'git reference',+ });+ expect(linked.roots).toEqual([{ relative: '.claude/skills/git', local: path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'git') }]);++ const stowed = path.join(root, 'stowed');+ write(path.join(stowed, '.claude', 'CLAUDE.md'), 'personal memory');+ linkDir(path.join(dotfiles, 'skills'), path.join(stowed, '.claude', 'skills'));+ const whole = await collectPersonalConfig('claude-code', [], { env: {}, home: stowed });+ expect(whole.personal.memory).toBe('personal memory');+ expect(Object.keys(decode(whole.personal.files)).sort()).toEqual(['.claude/skills/git/SKILL.md', '.claude/skills/git/reference.md']);+ });++ it('leaves credential files in personal Skills for later on a shared provider', async () => {+ const home = path.join(root, 'home');+ write(path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'deploy', 'SKILL.md'), 'deploy');+ write(path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'deploy', '.env'), 'TOKEN=1');+ const { personal } = await collectPersonalConfig('claude-code', [], { env: {}, home, skipCredentials: true });+ expect(decode(personal.files)).toEqual({ '.claude/skills/deploy/SKILL.md': 'deploy' });+ });+it('honours CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR and syncs nothing when there is no personal config', async () => {const configDir = path.join(root, 'custom-claude');write(path.join(configDir, 'CLAUDE.md'), 'from custom dir');diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/plumbing.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/plumbing.test.tsindex e21da6e8a0..99d23ff1f3 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/plumbing.test.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/plumbing.test.ts@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ import WebSocket from 'ws';import { mapClaudeHostedEvent } from '../controller/eventMap';import { execServerActions, execServerCommand } from '../controller/execServerRelay';import { collectProjectInstructionFiles } from '../controller/projectFiles';-import { approvalActionsFor, innerShellScript } from '../controller/proxyHandle';-import { takeGroupSwitchState } from '../controller/startRemote';+import { approvalActionsFor, createRemoteAgentHandle, innerShellScript } from '../controller/proxyHandle';+import type { RemoteAgentRunClient } from '../controller/runClient';+import { credentialConfirmation, takeGroupSwitchState } from '../controller/startRemote';import { EventLog, LineSplitter } from '../eventLog';import { ExecutorWorkspace } from '../executor/workspace';import { createRunTunnel } from '../host/tunnel';@@ -114,6 +115,45 @@ describe('tunnel', () => {});});+describe('confirmations raised on this computer', () => {+ it('use the Agent confirmation channel and accept only a one-time allow', async () => {+ let next = 0;+ const controller = createRemoteAgentHandle({+ client: {} as RemoteAgentRunClient,+ started: { id: 'sdk-1', agentKind: 'claude-code', model: 'm', shadowDir: '', methods: [], state: {} },+ workspace: new ExecutorWorkspace({ workingDir: root }),+ recordApproval: () => undefined,+ newId: () => `req-${(next += 1)}`,+ dispose: async () => undefined,+ });+ const env = path.join(root, '.env');+ const request = credentialConfirmation({ kind: 'read', path: env }, 'goes through the sharer');+ // 交互还没接上:按拒绝处理。+ expect(await controller.confirm(request)).toBe(false);+ const seen: unknown[] = [];+ let behavior: 'allow' | 'deny' = 'allow';+ controller.handle.setInteractionResolver(async (incoming) => {+ seen.push(incoming);+ return { kind: 'permission', behavior };+ });+ expect(await controller.confirm(request)).toBe(true);+ expect(seen).toEqual([{+ kind: 'permission',+ requestId: 'req-1',+ toolName: 'Read',+ input: { file_path: env },+ description: 'goes through the sharer',+ metadata: { hostOwnedConfirmation: 'shared_provider_credential' },+ }]);+ behavior = 'deny';+ expect(await controller.confirm(request)).toBe(false);+ expect(credentialConfirmation({ kind: 'exec', command: 'cat .env', cwd: root }, 'x')).toMatchObject({+ toolName: 'Bash',+ input: { command: 'cat .env' },+ });+ });+});+describe('exec-server relay gate', () => {it('maps exec-server requests to the actions checked on this computer', () => {expect(execServerCommand(['/bin/zsh', '-lc', 'echo hi'])).toBe('echo hi');diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/execServerRelay.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/execServerRelay.tsindex b0d56cb110..7a1633842d 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/execServerRelay.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/execServerRelay.ts@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@* `codex exec-server --listen stdio://`,命令、读写文件、补丁都在本机执行。** 每个请求转给 exec-server 之前先过本机权限上限(与 Claude Code / Pi 同一个闸门):- * 凭证类路径与高危命令只认本机用户批准过的同一操作;不通过就直接回 JSON-RPC 错误。+ * 凭证类路径与高危命令只认本机用户批准过的同一操作;不通过就直接回 JSON-RPC 错误。供应商分享的+ * 受邀者任务里,凭证类操作没有批准时先在本机弹确认卡,等待期间这条连接后面的消息排在它后面。*/import { spawn, type ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams } from 'node:child_process';import path from 'node:path';@@ -35,6 +36,8 @@ export interface ExecServerRelayDeps {cwd: string;workspace: ExecutorWorkspace;authorize(action: ExecutorAction): ExecutorGateDecision;+ /** 凭证类操作在本机补问(供应商分享的受邀者任务);允许后再 authorize 一次即放行。 */+ confirm?(action: ExecutorAction): Promise<boolean>;push(frames: RemoteAgentPushFrame[]): Promise<void>;env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;log?: { warn(message: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>): void };@@ -44,6 +47,8 @@ interface Connection {child: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams;buffer: string;closed: boolean;+ /** 有消息在等本机确认时,后面的消息按顺序排在它后面。 */+ queue?: Promise<void>;}/** `["/bin/zsh","-lc","cmd"]` → `cmd`;其它形态按空格拼接。 */@@ -226,21 +231,61 @@ export class ExecServerRelay {} catch {message = null;}+ let actions: ExecutorAction[] = [];if (message && typeof message.method === 'string' && message.id !== undefined) {message.params = mapExecServerParams(message.params, this.deps.workspace, message.method);data = JSON.stringify(message);- for (const action of execServerActions(message.method, message.params, this.deps.cwd)) {- const decision = this.deps.authorize(action);- if (!decision.ok) {- this.sendMessage(connId, JSON.stringify({- id: message.id,- error: { code: -32001, message: this.deps.workspace.mapTextForAgent(decision.reason ?? 'Not allowed in this workspace.') },- }));- return;- }+ actions = execServerActions(message.method, message.params, this.deps.cwd);+ }+ const id = message?.id;+ const line = `${data}\n`;+ if (connection.queue) {+ this.enqueue(connection, () => this.deliver(connId, connection, id, line, actions));+ return;+ }+ for (const [index, action] of actions.entries()) {+ const decision = this.deps.authorize(action);+ if (decision.ok) continue;+ if (!this.deps.confirm) {+ this.reject(connId, id, decision);+ return;}+ // 等本机用户确认(凭证类):这一条与之后的消息都按顺序等它。已放行的操作不再检查(批准只能用一次)。+ const rest = actions.slice(index);+ this.enqueue(connection, () => this.deliver(connId, connection, id, line, rest));+ return;}- connection.child.stdin.write(`${data}\n`);+ connection.child.stdin.write(line);+ }++ private enqueue(connection: Connection, task: () => Promise<void>): void {+ const next = (connection.queue ?? Promise.resolve()).then(task).catch((error: unknown) => {+ this.deps.log?.warn('remote agent: exec-server message failed', { error: String(error) });+ });+ connection.queue = next;+ void next.then(() => {+ if (connection.queue === next) connection.queue = undefined;+ });+ }++ private async deliver(connId: string, connection: Connection, id: unknown, line: string, actions: ExecutorAction[]): Promise<void> {+ for (const action of actions) {+ let decision = this.deps.authorize(action);+ if (!decision.ok && this.deps.confirm && await this.deps.confirm(action)) decision = this.deps.authorize(action);+ if (connection.closed) return;+ if (!decision.ok) {+ this.reject(connId, id, decision);+ return;+ }+ }+ if (!connection.closed) connection.child.stdin.write(line);+ }++ private reject(connId: string, id: unknown, decision: ExecutorGateDecision): void {+ this.sendMessage(connId, JSON.stringify({+ id,+ error: { code: -32001, message: this.deps.workspace.mapTextForAgent(decision.reason ?? 'Not allowed in this workspace.') },+ }));}private projectOutbound(line: string): string {diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/projectFiles.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/projectFiles.tsindex d644b94bde..eac2948194 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/projectFiles.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/projectFiles.ts@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@* - 项目上级目录里的说明文件:本机任务里 Agent 会沿目录向上加载它们;* - 你这台的个人配置(用户级说明、Skill、子代理、命令与权限规则):个人配置以你这台为准,* 那台电脑只提供登录、供应商与网络。+ *+ * 符号链接一律跟随,与本机 Agent 加载时一致(CLAUDE.md -> AGENTS.md、链到 dotfiles 的个人 Skill 等)。+ * 供应商分享的受邀者任务(skipCredentials):内容会经过分享者的电脑,凭证类文件(按链接目标的真实路径+ * 再判一次)不在启动时带过去;Agent 用到时经工具回到这台读取,由受邀者在确认卡上允许+ * (docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md §9 第 7 条)。*/import fs from 'node:fs/promises';import os from 'node:os';@@ -16,6 +21,7 @@ import path from 'node:path';import type { RemoteAgentKind } from '@cindy/device-link';+import { isShareCredentialPath } from '../credentials';import {ANCESTOR_INSTRUCTION_FILES,MAX_ANCESTOR_LEVELS,@@ -32,21 +38,32 @@ const MAX_FILE_BYTES = 512 * 1024;const MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;const MAX_DEPTH = 6;+export interface CollectOptions {+ /** 供应商分享的受邀者任务:凭证类文件不在启动时带过去。 */+ skipCredentials?: boolean;+}+interface Budget {files: number;bytes: number;+ skipCredentials: boolean;}-async function readLimited(file: string, budget: Budget, root: string): Promise<Buffer | null> {+function newBudget(options: CollectOptions = {}): Budget {+ return { files: 0, bytes: 0, skipCredentials: options.skipCredentials === true };+}++/**+ * 读一个文件(跟随链接)。超出数量与大小上限、不是普通文件,或受邀者任务里的凭证类文件返回 null。+ * `sanitized`:内容随后只保留权限规则(项目设置),不按凭证类跳过。+ */+async function readLimited(file: string, budget: Budget, sanitized = false): Promise<Buffer | null> {if (budget.files >= MAX_FILES) return null;try {- // 不跟随符号链接:项目里的链接可能指向工作目录外(如 ~/.ssh、.env),一旦跟随,- // 越界字节会被序列化后带到运行 Agent 的那台电脑上。用 lstat 先拒掉链接本身。- const stat = await fs.lstat(file);- if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile() || stat.size > MAX_FILE_BYTES || budget.bytes + stat.size > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) return null;- // 规范路径仍须落在真实根目录内(防 `..` 与目录链接借道)。- const [realFile, realRoot] = await Promise.all([fs.realpath(file), fs.realpath(root)]);- if (realFile !== realRoot && !realFile.startsWith(`${realRoot}${path.sep}`)) return null;+ const stat = await fs.stat(file);+ if (!stat.isFile() || stat.size > MAX_FILE_BYTES || budget.bytes + stat.size > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) return null;+ if (budget.skipCredentials && !sanitized+ && (isShareCredentialPath(file) || isShareCredentialPath(await fs.realpath(file)))) return null;const data = await fs.readFile(file);budget.files += 1;budget.bytes += data.length;@@ -56,6 +73,14 @@ async function readLimited(file: string, budget: Budget, root: string): Promise<}}+/** 目录链接不能把整个磁盘或用户目录带进来:指向文件系统根、用户目录或其上级时不走。 */+function isTooBroad(realDir: string): boolean {+ if (path.dirname(realDir) === realDir) return true;+ const home = path.resolve(os.homedir());+ const relative = path.relative(realDir, home);+ return relative === '' || (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative));+}+async function walk(root: string,relative: string,@@ -63,26 +88,40 @@ async function walk(budget: Budget,out: RemoteAgentWireFile[],rename: (relative: string) => string = (value) => value,+ ancestors: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(),): Promise<void> {if (depth > MAX_DEPTH || budget.files >= MAX_FILES) return;+ const dir = path.join(root, relative);+ let realDir: string;let entries: import('node:fs').Dirent[];try {- entries = await fs.readdir(path.join(root, relative), { withFileTypes: true });+ realDir = await fs.realpath(dir);+ entries = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });} catch {return;}+ // 链接绕回自己的上级目录会无限展开;只看这条路径上的上级,同一个目录被两个链接引用时都照常带上。+ if (ancestors.has(realDir) || isTooBroad(realDir)) return;+ const inside = new Set(ancestors).add(realDir);for (const entry of entries) {if (entry.name === '.git' || entry.name === 'node_modules') continue;- // 目录与文件的符号链接都不跟随:目标可能落在项目外,readLimited 的根内校验拦不住- // “整棵目录是链接”的借道,这里直接跳过。- if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) continue;const child = `${relative}/${entry.name}`;const full = path.join(root, child);- const isDir = entry.isDirectory();- const isFile = entry.isFile();- if (isDir) await walk(root, child, depth + 1, budget, out, rename);+ let isDir = entry.isDirectory();+ let isFile = entry.isFile();+ if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {+ // 链接按指向的目标处理(与本机 Agent 加载时一致);目标不存在的跳过。+ try {+ const target = await fs.stat(full);+ isDir = target.isDirectory();+ isFile = target.isFile();+ } catch {+ continue;+ }+ }+ if (isDir) await walk(root, child, depth + 1, budget, out, rename, inside);else if (isFile && isSafeProjectFilePath(rename(child))) {- const data = await readLimited(full, budget, root);+ const data = await readLimited(full, budget);if (data) out.push({ path: rename(child), data: data.toString('base64') });}}@@ -100,15 +139,19 @@ function sanitizeClaudeSettings(raw: Buffer): Buffer | null {}}-export async function collectProjectInstructionFiles(workingDir: string): Promise<RemoteAgentWireFile[]> {- const budget: Budget = { files: 0, bytes: 0 };+export async function collectProjectInstructionFiles(+ workingDir: string,+ options: CollectOptions = {},+): Promise<RemoteAgentWireFile[]> {+ const budget = newBudget(options);const out: RemoteAgentWireFile[] = [];for (const name of TOP_LEVEL_FILES) {- const data = await readLimited(path.join(workingDir, name), budget, workingDir);+ const data = await readLimited(path.join(workingDir, name), budget);if (data) out.push({ path: name, data: data.toString('base64') });}for (const name of SETTINGS_FILES) {- const data = await readLimited(path.join(workingDir, name), budget, workingDir);+ // 项目设置只带权限规则,受邀者任务也照常同步。+ const data = await readLimited(path.join(workingDir, name), budget, true);const sanitized = data ? sanitizeClaudeSettings(data) : null;if (sanitized) out.push({ path: name, data: sanitized.toString('base64') });}@@ -120,8 +163,11 @@ export async function collectProjectInstructionFiles(workingDir: string): Promis* 项目上级目录里的说明文件(不含文件系统根):本机任务里 Claude Code 与 Pi 会沿目录向上加载。* Codex 经执行环境在你这台直接读取,不需要同步。*/-export async function collectAncestorInstructionFiles(workingDir: string): Promise<RemoteAgentWireAncestorFile[]> {- const budget: Budget = { files: 0, bytes: 0 };+export async function collectAncestorInstructionFiles(+ workingDir: string,+ options: CollectOptions = {},+): Promise<RemoteAgentWireAncestorFile[]> {+ const budget = newBudget(options);const out: RemoteAgentWireAncestorFile[] = [];let dir = path.resolve(workingDir);for (let up = 1; up <= MAX_ANCESTOR_LEVELS; up += 1) {@@ -129,7 +175,7 @@ export async function collectAncestorInstructionFiles(workingDir: string): Promiif (parent === dir || path.dirname(parent) === parent) break;dir = parent;for (const name of ANCESTOR_INSTRUCTION_FILES) {- const data = await readLimited(path.join(dir, name), budget, dir);+ const data = await readLimited(path.join(dir, name), budget);if (data) out.push({ up, name, data: data.toString('base64') });}}@@ -164,16 +210,16 @@ export interface CollectedPersonalConfig {export async function collectPersonalConfig(kind: RemoteAgentKind,projectFiles: readonly RemoteAgentWireFile[],- options: { env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; home?: string } = {},+ options: CollectOptions & { env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; home?: string } = {},): Promise<CollectedPersonalConfig> {const env = options.env ?? process.env;const home = options.home ?? os.homedir();- const budget: Budget = { files: 0, bytes: 0 };+ const budget = newBudget(options);const personal: RemoteAgentWirePersonal = { files: [] };const roots: CollectedPersonalConfig['roots'] = [];if (kind === 'claude-code') {const configDir = claudeConfigDir(env, home);- const memory = await readLimited(path.join(configDir, 'CLAUDE.md'), budget, configDir);+ const memory = await readLimited(path.join(configDir, 'CLAUDE.md'), budget);if (memory) personal.memory = memory.toString('utf8');const projectEntries = new Set(projectFiles.map((file) => file.path.split('/').slice(0, 3).join('/')));for (const dir of PERSONAL_CLAUDE_DIRECTORIES) {@@ -197,7 +243,7 @@ export async function collectPersonalConfig(if (stat.isDirectory()) {await walk(configDir, `${dir}/${entry.name}`, 1, budget, personal.files, (value) => `.claude/${value}`);} else if (stat.isFile()) {- const data = await readLimited(local, budget, configDir);+ const data = await readLimited(local, budget);if (data) personal.files.push({ path: relative, data: data.toString('base64') });}if (personal.files.length > before) roots.push({ relative, local });@@ -218,7 +264,7 @@ export async function collectPersonalConfig(const codexHome = codexHomeDir(env, home);// 与 Codex 的读取顺序一致:AGENTS.override.md 优先于 AGENTS.md。for (const name of ['AGENTS.override.md', 'AGENTS.md']) {- const data = await readLimited(path.join(codexHome, name), budget, codexHome);+ const data = await readLimited(path.join(codexHome, name), budget);if (data && data.toString('utf8').trim()) {personal.instructions = data.toString('utf8');break;diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/proxyHandle.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/proxyHandle.tsindex 254c9e8a00..a4434b957d 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/proxyHandle.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/proxyHandle.ts@@ -195,12 +195,20 @@ export interface RemoteHandleDeps {takeGroupNewRound?(): boolean;}+/** 本机自己发起的确认的内容(确认卡上显示的工具、参数与说明)。 */+export type LocalConfirmation = Omit<Extract<InteractionRequest, { kind: 'permission' }>, 'kind' | 'requestId'>;+export interface RemoteAgentHandleController {handle: AgentSessionHandle;onEvent(event: unknown): void;onState(state: Record<string, unknown>): void;onRequest(request: RemoteAgentReverseRequest): Promise<RemoteAgentReply> | null;onClosed(reason: string, message?: string): void;+ /**+ * 本机自己发起的确认(不是 Agent 发来的):走与 Agent 确认同一个确认卡通道,桌面、手机远控与 IM 都能+ * 处理。只认这一次「允许」,不接受「总是允许」;交互还没接上或任务已结束时按拒绝处理。+ */+ confirm(request: LocalConfirmation): Promise<boolean>;}export function createRemoteAgentHandle(deps: RemoteHandleDeps): RemoteAgentHandleController {@@ -432,6 +440,11 @@ export function createRemoteAgentHandle(deps: RemoteHandleDeps): RemoteAgentHand}return null;},+ async confirm(request) {+ if (!resolver || disposed) return false;+ const decision = await resolver({ ...request, kind: 'permission', requestId: deps.newId() });+ return !disposed && decision.kind === 'permission' && decision.behavior === 'allow';+ },onClosed(reason, message) {// 'superseded':同一任务被重新打开、旧实例让位给新实例,不是错误,静默收起。if (reason !== 'closed' && reason !== 'detached' && reason !== 'ended' && reason !== 'superseded') {diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/service.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/service.tsindex a06702c53c..6836c33d6c 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/service.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/service.ts@@ -72,9 +72,16 @@ export interface DeviceAgentServiceDeps {isSharedProviderDevice?(deviceId: string): boolean;/** 受邀者任务在本机抓取网页的出站通道(WebFetch)。 */webFetch?: GuardedFetch;+ /** 受邀者任务里凭证类操作确认卡上的说明(按界面语言)。 */+ sharedProviderCredentialNotice?(): string;logger: Logger;}+/** 没有提供界面语言的说明时用的英文说明。 */+const SHARED_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_NOTICE =+ "This task uses a provider shared with you, so what the agent reads passes through the sharer's computer. "+ + 'This involves a credential file, so it needs your confirmation.';+function mcpTargets(extra: PiExtraSpawnConfig | null): Map<string, LocalMcpTarget> {const targets = new Map<string, LocalMcpTarget>();const bridge = extra?.mcpBridge;@@ -158,8 +165,13 @@ export function createDeviceAgentStarter(deps: DeviceAgentServiceDeps) {const sessionId = opts.sessionId;const groupSwitch = sessionId && deps.groupSwitch ? deps.groupSwitch : null;const switchToken = groupSwitch && sessionId ? groupSwitch.takeForOpen(sessionId) : undefined;- // 受邀者任务:Agent 自带的 WebFetch 在分享者电脑上已关闭,改由本机抓取。同账号任务不提供。- const webFetch = deps.webFetch && deps.isSharedProviderDevice?.(input.deviceId) ? deps.webFetch : undefined;+ // 受邀者任务(分享来的供应商):内容会经过分享者的电脑。+ // - Agent 自带的 WebFetch 在分享者电脑上已关闭,改由本机抓取;+ // - 凭证类文件不随启动同步,任务中读写凭证类文件、执行读取凭证的命令不论权限档都要本机确认。+ // 同账号任务都不提供。+ const shared = deps.isSharedProviderDevice?.(input.deviceId) === true;+ const webFetch = deps.webFetch && shared ? deps.webFetch : undefined;+ const collect = { skipCredentials: shared };return startRemoteAgentSession(input.agentKind, opts, {invoke: poller.invoke,poller,@@ -176,6 +188,9 @@ export function createDeviceAgentStarter(deps: DeviceAgentServiceDeps) {}: {}),...(webFetch ? { webFetch } : {}),+ ...(shared+ ? { credentialConsent: { description: deps.sharedProviderCredentialNotice?.() ?? SHARED_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_NOTICE } }+ : {}),prepareMcp: async ({ kind, opts: startOpts, vendorOptions }): Promise<PreparedRemoteMcp> => {const extra = await deps.prepareMcpBridge(deps.mcpProviders(), deps.logger, {agentKind: kind,@@ -204,10 +219,12 @@ export function createDeviceAgentStarter(deps: DeviceAgentServiceDeps) {noteOpaqueWrite: () => deps.noteOpaqueTurnChange({ sessionId, provider, cwd: startOpts.workingDir }),};},- collectProjectFiles: collectProjectInstructionFiles,+ collectProjectFiles: (workingDir) => collectProjectInstructionFiles(workingDir, collect),// Codex 经执行环境在本机直接读取项目与上级目录的说明,不必同步。- collectAncestorFiles: input.agentKind === 'codex' ? undefined : collectAncestorInstructionFiles,- collectPersonal: (kind, projectFiles) => collectPersonalConfig(kind, projectFiles),+ collectAncestorFiles: input.agentKind === 'codex'+ ? undefined+ : (workingDir) => collectAncestorInstructionFiles(workingDir, collect),+ collectPersonal: (kind, projectFiles) => collectPersonalConfig(kind, projectFiles, collect),isGitRepo,...(deps.extractPdfText ? { extractPdfText: deps.extractPdfText } : {}),mapEvent: deps.mapEvent ?? remoteAgentEventMapper,diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/startRemote.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/startRemote.tsindex a5ff4bbb7b..ae18a7bb03 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/startRemote.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/controller/startRemote.ts@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import type { AgentEvent, AgentSessionHandle, StartSessionOptions } from '@cindyimport { RemoteExecutor, type ExecutorCaptureHooks } from '../executor/executor';import type { PdfTextExtractor } from '../executor/files';-import { ExecutorGate, executorGateModeFor } from '../executor/gate';+import { ExecutorGate, executorGateModeFor, type ExecutorAction } from '../executor/gate';import type { GuardedFetch } from '../executor/webFetch';import { ExecutorWorkspace } from '../executor/workspace';import type {@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import {createRemoteAgentHandle,localizeRemoteError,parseStartedInfo,+ type LocalConfirmation,type RemoteAgentHandleController,} from './proxyHandle';import { ExecServerRelay } from './execServerRelay';@@ -76,6 +77,12 @@ export interface StartRemoteAgentDeps {* WebFetch 在对方电脑上已关闭)。缺省时不提供。*/webFetch?: GuardedFetch;+ /**+ * 供应商分享的受邀者任务(docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md §9 第 7 条):读写凭证类文件、执行读取+ * 凭证的命令不论权限档都要本机用户确认,没有批准时在本机弹确认卡;`description` 是卡上的说明。+ * 同账号任务不提供。+ */+ credentialConsent?: { description: string };/** 改写来自对方的事件(如工具名)。 */mapEvent?: (kind: RemoteAgentKind) => ((event: AgentEvent) => AgentEvent) | undefined;/** 本机 Codex 程序(给对方的 Codex 提供 exec-server 执行环境);缺省时不提供。 */@@ -163,6 +170,23 @@ export function shadowAliases(return aliases;}+/** 凭证类操作的确认卡:用与 Agent 自带工具同名的工具显示本机路径或命令。 */+export function credentialConfirmation(action: ExecutorAction, description: string): LocalConfirmation {+ const base = { description, metadata: { hostOwnedConfirmation: 'shared_provider_credential' } };+ switch (action.kind) {+ case 'exec':+ return { ...base, toolName: 'Bash', input: { command: action.command } };+ case 'write':+ return { ...base, toolName: 'Write', input: { file_path: action.path } };+ case 'fetch':+ return { ...base, toolName: 'WebFetch', input: { url: action.url } };+ default:+ return action.scope === 'tree'+ ? { ...base, toolName: 'Grep', input: { path: action.path } }+ : { ...base, toolName: 'Read', input: { file_path: action.path } };+ }+}+function shellName(): string {if (process.platform === 'win32') return 'bash';return (process.env.SHELL ?? '/bin/bash').split('/').pop() || 'bash';@@ -180,7 +204,11 @@ export async function startRemoteAgentSession(let writableDirs = [...new Set(opts.writableDirs ?? [])];const workspace = new ExecutorWorkspace({ workingDir: opts.workingDir, extraDirs: [...extraDirs, ...writableDirs] });const applyDirs = () => workspace.setExtraDirs([...new Set([...extraDirs, ...writableDirs])]);- const gate = new ExecutorGate(workspace, executorGateModeFor(opts.permissionMode, opts.planMode === true));+ const credentialConsent = deps.credentialConsent;+ const gate = new ExecutorGate(workspace, executorGateModeFor(opts.permissionMode, opts.planMode === true), Date.now, {+ confirmCredentials: credentialConsent !== undefined,+ });+ let controller: RemoteAgentHandleController | null = null;const executor = new RemoteExecutor({workspace,gate,@@ -189,6 +217,12 @@ export async function startRemoteAgentSession(...(deps.extractPdfText ? { extractPdfText: deps.extractPdfText } : {}),// 只有 Claude Code 经 cindy_exec 使用这组工具。...(kind === 'claude-code' && deps.webFetch ? { webFetch: deps.webFetch } : {}),+ ...(credentialConsent+ ? {+ confirm: async (action: ExecutorAction) =>+ controller?.confirm(credentialConfirmation(action, credentialConsent.description)) ?? false,+ }+ : {}),});let permissionMode = opts.permissionMode;let planMode = opts.planMode === true;@@ -199,7 +233,6 @@ export async function startRemoteAgentSession(});const router = createReverseHttpRouter({ executor, mcpTarget: (name) => mcp.servers.get(name) });- let controller: RemoteAgentHandleController | null = null;let personalRoots: Array<{ relative: string; local: string }> = [];let projectionReady = false;const early: Array<{ type: 'event' | 'state'; value: unknown }> = [];@@ -213,6 +246,7 @@ export async function startRemoteAgentSession(cwd: workspace.workingDir,workspace,authorize: (action) => executor.check(action),+ ...(credentialConsent ? { confirm: (action: ExecutorAction) => executor.confirm(action) } : {}),push: async (frames) => {await pushFrames?.(frames);},diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.tsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..52320236aa--- /dev/null+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@+/**+ * 供应商分享的受邀者任务里「凭证类」的判定(控制端)。+ *+ * 受邀者任务的对话与 Agent 读到的文件内容会经过分享者的电脑。凭证类文件(密钥、.env、云与工具的+ * 登录凭证)不论权限档,都要受邀者在本机确认后才发出:启动时不随项目说明同步,任务中读取时弹确认卡+ * (docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md §9 第 7 条)。+ *+ * 规则沿用本机任务的凭证规则(isSensitiveCredentialPath),只有一处不同:Claude Code / Codex 配置目录里+ * 的说明类内容(Skill、子代理、命令、规则、个人说明)不算凭证。本机规则把整个配置目录算作敏感,是为了+ * 保护里面的登录与设置,不是这些说明文字;不放开的话,个人 Skill 的每个参考文件都要确认。+ */+import { isSensitiveCredentialPath, shellCommandReadsCredentials } from '@cindy/maker-core';++/** 配置目录里的说明类子路径:`/.claude/skills/…`、`/.codex/AGENTS.md` 等(两种分隔符都认)。 */+const CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_SEGMENT =+ /([\\/])\.(claude|codex)(?=[\\/](?:(?:skills|agents|commands|rules|prompts)(?:[\\/]|$|[^\w.-])|(?:CLAUDE|AGENTS)(?:\.override)?\.md(?![\w.-])))/gi;++/** 路径或命令里的 `..` 段:可能借说明目录绕回配置目录本身(`~/.claude/skills/../settings.json`)。 */+const PARENT_SEGMENT = /(^|[\\/\s'"=])\.\.(?=[\\/\s'"]|$)/;++/** 本机规则只在特定目录下认的登录文件,放开配置目录后在说明目录里也要认。 */+const LOGIN_FILE = /(?:^|[\\/])(?:auth|\.credentials)\.json$/i;++/** 把配置目录里说明类子路径的目录名换掉,让本机凭证规则不再因为「在配置目录里」命中。 */+function withoutConfigInstructionDirs(text: string): string {+ if (PARENT_SEGMENT.test(text)) return text;+ return text.replace(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_SEGMENT, '$1_$2');+}++/** 路径是否为凭证类文件(调用方对链接目标的真实路径也要各判一次)。 */+export function isShareCredentialPath(target: string): boolean {+ if (typeof target !== 'string' || !target) return false;+ return isSensitiveCredentialPath(withoutConfigInstructionDirs(target)) || LOGIN_FILE.test(target);+}++/** 命令是否读取或打出凭证(只看命令文本:脚本文件里读的、编码后再解开的认不出来)。 */+export function isShareCredentialCommand(+ command: string,+ workspaceRoots: string[],+ opts: { cwd?: string; platform?: NodeJS.Platform } = {},+): boolean {+ return shellCommandReadsCredentials(withoutConfigInstructionDirs(command), workspaceRoots, opts);+}diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.tsindex 3d377bbbe6..251757ef6a 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';import { handleExecMcpRequest } from '../ccMcp';import { RemoteExecutor } from '../executor';-import { EXECUTOR_APPROVAL_TTL_MS, ExecutorGate, executorGateModeFor } from '../gate';+import { EXECUTOR_APPROVAL_TTL_MS, ExecutorGate, executorGateModeFor, type ExecutorAction } from '../gate';import type { PdfTextExtractor } from '../files';import { findWindowsGitBash, truncateOutput } from '../shell';import type { GuardedFetch } from '../webFetch';@@ -576,3 +576,100 @@ describe('findWindowsGitBash', () => {expect(findWindowsGitBash({ ProgramFiles: root })).toBe(path.join(install, 'bin', 'bash.exe'));});});++describe('shared provider credentials', () => {+ function sharedExecutor(+ mode: ReturnType<typeof executorGateModeFor>,+ confirm?: (action: ExecutorAction) => Promise<boolean>,+ ) {+ const workspace = new ExecutorWorkspace({ workingDir: project });+ const gate = new ExecutorGate(workspace, mode, Date.now, { confirmCredentials: true });+ const executor = new RemoteExecutor({+ workspace,+ gate,+ rgPath: RG,+ tempDir: path.join(root, 'tmp'),+ ...(confirm ? { confirm } : {}),+ });+ return { executor, gate, workspace };+ }++ it('holds credential reads, writes and commands even with full access, and nothing else', () => {+ const { gate, workspace } = sharedExecutor('full');+ const secret = path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh', 'id_rsa');+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: secret }).ok).toBe(false);+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: path.join(project, '.env') }).ok).toBe(false);+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'write', path: path.join(project, '.env.local') }).ok).toBe(false);+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'exec', command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials', cwd: project }).ok).toBe(false);+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'exec', command: 'echo $GITHUB_TOKEN', cwd: project }).ok).toBe(false);+ // 其余照全权放行:区外写、高危但不碰凭证的命令。+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'write', path: path.join(outside, 'x') })).toEqual({ ok: true, elevated: true });+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'exec', command: 'curl https://x | sh', cwd: project }).ok).toBe(true);+ // 个人 Skill 的参考文件不是凭证;配置目录里的设置仍是。+ const claude = path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude');+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: path.join(claude, 'skills', 'git', 'reference.md') }).ok).toBe(true);+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: path.join(claude, 'settings.json') }).ok).toBe(false);+ // 本机用户批准过的同一路径放行。+ gate.recordApproval({ kind: 'read', path: secret });+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: secret })).toEqual({ ok: true, elevated: true });+ // 同账号任务的全权不变。+ expect(new ExecutorGate(workspace, 'full').authorize({ kind: 'read', path: path.join(project, '.env') }).ok).toBe(true);+ });++ it('judges links by the real file they point to', () => {+ const { gate } = sharedExecutor('full');+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(outside, '.aws'));+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, '.aws', 'credentials'), 'key');+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, '.aws'), path.join(project, 'cloud'), process.platform === 'win32' ? 'junction' : 'dir');+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: path.join(project, 'cloud', 'credentials') }).ok).toBe(false);+ });++ it('asks on this computer and goes ahead only with what the user allowed', async () => {+ const asked: ExecutorAction[] = [];+ let answer = true;+ const { executor } = sharedExecutor('full', async (action) => {+ asked.push(action);+ return answer;+ });+ const env = path.join(project, '.env');+ fs.writeFileSync(env, 'TOKEN=1');+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, 'a.txt'), 'plain');+ expect(text(await executor.callTool('Read', { file_path: 'a.txt' }))).toBe('1\tplain');+ expect(asked).toEqual([]);+ expect(text(await executor.callTool('Read', { file_path: env }))).toBe('1\tTOKEN=1');+ expect(asked).toEqual([{ kind: 'read', path: env }]);++ answer = false;+ const production = path.join(project, '.env.production');+ fs.writeFileSync(production, 'TOKEN=2');+ const denied = await executor.callTool('Read', { file_path: production });+ expect(denied.isError).toBe(true);+ expect(text(denied)).toContain('needs the user\'s confirmation');+ await expect(executor.handle('fs.read', { path: production })).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'EACCES' });+ expect(asked).toHaveLength(3);+ });++ it('does not ask about operations that are not credentials', async () => {+ const asked: ExecutorAction[] = [];+ const { executor } = sharedExecutor('normal', async (action) => {+ asked.push(action);+ return true;+ });+ // 区外写在普通档要本机批准,但不是凭证类:不在这里补问,照旧拒绝。+ const result = await executor.callTool('Write', { file_path: path.join(outside, 'x.txt'), content: 'x' });+ expect(result.isError).toBe(true);+ expect(asked).toEqual([]);+ });++ it('leaves credential files out of Pi searches unless the searched path itself was allowed', async () => {+ const { executor } = sharedExecutor('full', async () => true);+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, '.env'), 'API_KEY=secret\n');+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, 'config.ts'), 'const key = process.env.API_KEY;\n');+ const grep = (await executor.handle('pi.grep', { params: { pattern: 'API_KEY' } })) as { text: string };+ expect(grep.text).toContain('config.ts:1:');+ expect(grep.text).not.toContain('secret');+ expect(grep.text).toContain('1 credential file(s) left out');+ const direct = (await executor.handle('pi.grep', { params: { pattern: 'API_KEY', path: '.env' } })) as { text: string };+ expect(direct.text).toContain('secret');+ });+});diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.tsindex 4eb81fda4c..32c9a85127 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@* NotebookEdit(Claude Code 的自带文件与命令工具关掉后由它顶替);供应商分享的受邀者任务另有* WebFetch(自带的 WebFetch 对受邀者关闭,改在本机抓取)。* 写文件前通知「每轮改动对比」抓取改前内容;命令执行后登记一次无法预知范围的改动。+ * 供应商分享的受邀者任务里,凭证类操作没有本机批准时由这里直接在本机弹确认卡(confirm)。*/import path from 'node:path';@@ -56,6 +57,11 @@ export interface RemoteExecutorOptions {extractPdfText?: PdfTextExtractor;/** 提供 WebFetch(在本机抓取网页)所用的出站通道;缺省时不提供这个工具。 */webFetch?: GuardedFetch;+ /**+ * 在本机弹确认卡问本机用户(供应商分享的受邀者任务):凭证类操作没有本机批准时用它补问,允许后+ * 只放行这一个操作。缺省时这类操作直接拒绝。+ */+ confirm?(action: ExecutorAction): Promise<boolean>;}export class ExecutorRequestError extends Error {@@ -140,6 +146,26 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {return this.gate.authorize(action);}+ /**+ * 凭证类操作在本机补问一次(供应商分享的受邀者任务);本机用户允许后登记批准,调用方再检查一次即可+ * 放行。不是凭证类、没有确认通道或任务已结束时返回 false。+ */+ async confirm(action: ExecutorAction, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<boolean> {+ if (this.closed || !this.opts.confirm || !this.gate.needsCredentialConsent(action)) return false;+ const allowed = await this.opts.confirm(action).catch(() => false);+ // 等确认期间任务结束或请求被取消:不再执行。+ if (!allowed || this.closed || signal?.aborted) return false;+ this.gate.recordApproval(action);+ return true;+ }++ /** 检查上限;凭证类操作没有批准时先在本机问一次。 */+ private async decide(action: ExecutorAction, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<ExecutorGateDecision> {+ const decision = this.gate.authorize(action);+ if (decision.ok || !(await this.confirm(action, signal))) return decision;+ return this.gate.authorize(action);+ }+async close(): Promise<void> {if (this.closed) return;this.closed = true;@@ -164,8 +190,8 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {}}- private authorize(action: ExecutorAction): void {- const decision = this.gate.authorize(action);+ private async authorize(action: ExecutorAction, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {+ const decision = await this.decide(action, signal);if (!decision.ok) throw new ExecutorRequestError('EACCES', decision.reason ?? 'Not allowed.');}@@ -178,19 +204,19 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {switch (op) {case 'fs.read': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target }, signal);return { data: this.workspace.mapOutputForAgent(await rawReadFile(target)).toString('base64') };}case 'fs.access': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));const mode = body.mode === 'write' ? 'write' : 'read';- this.authorize({ kind: mode, path: target });+ await this.authorize({ kind: mode, path: target }, signal);await rawAccess(target, mode);return {};}case 'fs.write': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'write', path: target });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'write', path: target }, signal);if (typeof body.data !== 'string') throw new ExecutorRequestError('INVALID', 'data must be a base64 string');const data = this.workspace.mapInputFromAgent(Buffer.from(body.data, 'base64'));await this.writeHooks.beforeWrite(target);@@ -199,44 +225,49 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {}case 'fs.mkdir': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'write', path: target });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'write', path: target }, signal);await rawMkdir(target);return {};}case 'fs.stat': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target }, signal);return await rawStat(target);}case 'fs.readdir': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target, scope: 'tree' });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target, scope: 'tree' }, signal);return { entries: await rawReaddir(target) };}case 'fs.glob': {const cwd = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'cwd'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: cwd, scope: 'tree' });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: cwd, scope: 'tree' }, signal);const limit = Math.max(1, Math.floor(optionalNumber(body, 'limit') ?? 1000));return { paths: (await rawGlob(this.rg, str(body, 'pattern'), cwd, limit, signal)).map((item) => this.workspace.toAgentPath(item)) };}case 'fs.mime': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(body, 'path'));- this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: target }, signal);return { mime: await detectImageMime(target) };}case 'pi.grep': {const params = record(body.params) as unknown as PiGrepInput;if (typeof params.pattern !== 'string' || !params.pattern) throw new ExecutorRequestError('INVALID', 'pattern is required');const root = this.resolvePath(typeof params.path === 'string' && params.path ? params.path : '.');- this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: root, scope: 'tree' });- const result = await piGrep(this.opts.rgPath, root, params, signal);+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: root, scope: 'tree' }, signal);+ // 供应商分享的受邀者任务:凭证类文件的内容不进搜索结果(要看须单独读取并经本机确认)。+ // 本机用户刚批准过搜索的就是凭证目录或文件时不再过滤。+ const skipFile = this.opts.confirm && !this.gate.needsCredentialConsent({ kind: 'read', path: root })+ ? (file: string) => this.gate.needsCredentialConsent({ kind: 'read', path: file })+ : undefined;+ const result = await piGrep(this.opts.rgPath, root, params, signal, skipFile);return { ...result, text: this.workspace.mapTextForAgent(result.text) };}case 'exec.run': {this.workspace.virtualizeDirs([this.shell.getTempDir()]);const command = this.workspace.mapCommand(str(body, 'command'), resolveExecutorShell().dialect);const cwd = this.resolvePath(optionalString(body, 'cwd') ?? this.workspace.workingDir);- this.authorize({ kind: 'exec', command, cwd });+ await this.authorize({ kind: 'exec', command, cwd }, signal);const timeoutSeconds = optionalNumber(body, 'timeout');const timeoutMs = timeoutSeconds && timeoutSeconds > 0? Math.min(timeoutSeconds, PI_BASH_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) * 1000@@ -291,7 +322,7 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {}case 'Read': {const target = this.resolvePath(str(args, 'file_path'), this.shell.getCwd());- this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'read', path: target });+ await this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'read', path: target }, signal);return this.mapToolResult(await ccRead(target, {file_path: target,offset: optionalNumber(args, 'offset'),@@ -303,7 +334,7 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {const target = this.resolvePath(str(args, 'file_path'), this.shell.getCwd());const content = args.content;if (typeof content !== 'string') return textResult('content must be a string.', true);- this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'write', path: target });+ await this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'write', path: target }, signal);return this.mapToolResult(await ccWrite(target, this.workspace.mapTextFromAgent(content), this.readState, this.writeHooks, this.workspace.toAgentPath(target)));}case 'Edit': {@@ -311,7 +342,7 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {if (typeof args.old_string !== 'string' || typeof args.new_string !== 'string') {return textResult('old_string and new_string must be strings.', true);}- this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'write', path: target });+ await this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'write', path: target }, signal);return this.mapToolResult(await ccEdit(target, {old_string: this.workspace.mapTextFromAgent(args.old_string),new_string: this.workspace.mapTextFromAgent(args.new_string),@@ -324,7 +355,7 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {const cellType = args.cell_type === 'markdown' || args.cell_type === 'code' ? args.cell_type : undefined;const editMode = args.edit_mode === 'insert' || args.edit_mode === 'delete' || args.edit_mode === 'replace'? args.edit_mode : undefined;- this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'write', path: target });+ await this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'write', path: target }, signal);return this.mapToolResult(await ccNotebookEdit(target, {cell_id: optionalString(args, 'cell_id'),new_source: this.workspace.mapTextFromAgent(args.new_source),@@ -347,8 +378,8 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {}}- private authorizeTool(action: ExecutorAction): void {- const decision = this.gate.authorize(action);+ private async authorizeTool(action: ExecutorAction, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {+ const decision = await this.decide(action, signal);if (!decision.ok) throw new ExecutorDenied(decision.reason ?? 'Not allowed.');}@@ -382,7 +413,7 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {const rawCommand = args.command;if (typeof rawCommand !== 'string' || !rawCommand.trim()) return textResult('command is required.', true);const command = this.workspace.mapCommand(rawCommand, resolveExecutorShell().dialect);- this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'exec', command, cwd: this.shell.getCwd() });+ await this.authorizeTool({ kind: 'exec', command, cwd: this.shell.getCwd() }, signal);const timeout = optionalNumber(args, 'timeout');try {const result = args.run_in_background === truediff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.tsindex 9c337f0ab7..df8f74d200 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@* 电脑不可信时也不能绕过本机用户的目录授权;* - 抓取网页:本机地址、内网与云 metadata 这类地址(与本机任务里 WebFetch / curl 同一判定)* 只认本机用户刚批准过的同一地址;批准过的地址抓取时放开内网(域名也可能解析到内网);- * - 计划模式:只允许读取、抓取网页和静态可证只读的命令,其余同样要本机用户批准过。+ * - 计划模式:只允许读取、抓取网页和静态可证只读的命令,其余同样要本机用户批准过;+ * - 供应商分享的受邀者任务:内容会经过分享者的电脑,凭证类的读写与读取凭证的命令即使在全权下+ * 也只认本机用户批准过的同一操作(credentials.ts)。* 批准记录只在短时间内有效;命令与抓取的批准用一次即失效,路径批准在有效期内覆盖同一路径的读写* (编辑会先读后写)。*/@@ -20,7 +22,8 @@ import path from 'node:path';import { classifyShellCommand, reviewAction } from '@cindy/maker-core';-import type { ExecutorWorkspace } from './workspace';+import { isShareCredentialCommand, isShareCredentialPath } from '../credentials';+import { realPathOrAncestor, type ExecutorWorkspace } from './workspace';/*** 与本机任务权限对应的上限档位:`full` = 全权;`plan` = 计划模式;其余权限档统一为 `normal`@@ -87,6 +90,11 @@ function approvalOf(action: ExecutorAction): { kind: Approval['kind']; key: stri}}+export interface ExecutorGateOptions {+ /** 供应商分享的受邀者任务:凭证类操作不论权限档都要本机用户确认。 */+ confirmCredentials?: boolean;+}+export class ExecutorGate {private mode: ExecutorGateMode;private approvals: Approval[] = [];@@ -95,6 +103,7 @@ export class ExecutorGate {private readonly workspace: ExecutorWorkspace,mode: ExecutorGateMode = 'normal',private readonly now: () => number = Date.now,+ private readonly options: ExecutorGateOptions = {},) {this.mode = mode;}@@ -114,21 +123,36 @@ export class ExecutorGate {if (this.approvals.length > MAX_APPROVALS) this.approvals.splice(0, this.approvals.length - MAX_APPROVALS);}+ /**+ * 这个操作是否要按「凭证类」由本机用户确认(只在供应商分享的受邀者任务里):读写凭证类路径(链接按+ * 真实目标再判一次)、目录级读取的根本身是凭证目录,或命令读取 / 打出凭证。+ */+ needsCredentialConsent(action: ExecutorAction): boolean {+ if (!this.options.confirmCredentials) return false;+ if (action.kind === 'fetch') return false;+ if (action.kind === 'exec') {+ return isShareCredentialCommand(action.command, this.workspace.allRoots(), { cwd: action.cwd, platform: process.platform });+ }+ return isShareCredentialPath(path.resolve(action.path)) || isShareCredentialPath(realPathOrAncestor(action.path));+ }+authorize(action: ExecutorAction): ExecutorGateDecision {- if (this.mode === 'full') return { ok: true, elevated: true };+ const credential = this.needsCredentialConsent(action);+ if (this.mode === 'full' && !credential) return { ok: true, elevated: true };// 抓取网页:本机用户批准过这个地址就放开内网。公网样式的域名也可能解析到内网(公司内网域名),// 只看地址文本判定为不必问,但抓取时会按 DNS 结果被拦下。if (action.kind === 'fetch' && this.consume(action)) return { ok: true, elevated: true };- if (!this.requiresApproval(action)) return { ok: true };+ if (!credential && !this.requiresApproval(action)) return { ok: true };if (this.consume(action)) return { ok: true, elevated: true };- return {- ok: false,- reason: action.kind === 'exec'- ? 'This command needs the user\'s confirmation on the computer where the task runs, and it was not confirmed.'- : action.kind === 'fetch'- ? `Fetching ${action.url} needs the user's confirmation on the computer where the task runs, and it was not confirmed.`- : `Access to ${action.path} needs the user's confirmation on the computer where the task runs, and it was not confirmed.`,- };+ return { ok: false, reason: this.deniedReason(action) };+ }++ private deniedReason(action: ExecutorAction): string {+ return action.kind === 'exec'+ ? 'This command needs the user\'s confirmation on the computer where the task runs, and it was not confirmed.'+ : action.kind === 'fetch'+ ? `Fetching ${action.url} needs the user's confirmation on the computer where the task runs, and it was not confirmed.`+ : `Access to ${action.path} needs the user's confirmation on the computer where the task runs, and it was not confirmed.`;}private requiresApproval(action: ExecutorAction): boolean {diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/search.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/search.tsindex 77711cd31f..68e03f3171 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/search.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/search.ts@@ -50,11 +50,16 @@ interface RgEvent {};}+/**+ * `skipFile`:不输出其中内容的文件(供应商分享的受邀者任务里的凭证类文件:搜索结果会经过分享者的+ * 电脑,要看内容须单独读取并经本机确认)。+ */export async function piGrep(rgPath: string,root: string,input: PiGrepInput,signal?: AbortSignal,+ skipFile?: (absolutePath: string) => boolean,): Promise<PiGrepResult> {const stat = await fsp.stat(root);const rootIsDirectory = stat.isDirectory();@@ -75,6 +80,7 @@ export async function piGrep(let stderr = '';let lastPath: string | undefined;let lastLine = -1;+ const skipped = new Map<string, boolean>();await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {const child = spawn(rgPath, args, { cwd, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], signal });@@ -92,6 +98,14 @@ export async function piGrep(const file = event.data?.path?.text;const lineNumber = event.data?.line_number;if (!file || typeof lineNumber !== 'number') return;+ if (skipFile) {+ let skip = skipped.get(file);+ if (skip === undefined) {+ skip = skipFile(path.resolve(cwd, file));+ skipped.set(file, skip);+ }+ if (skip) return;+ }// rg 的路径在 Windows 上是 `.` 开头的反斜杠形式(`.\src\a.ts`),统一剥掉前缀并转正斜杠。const display = rootIsDirectory ? file.replace(/^\.[\\/]/, '').split(/[\\/]/).join('/') : path.basename(root);if (lastPath !== undefined && (display !== lastPath || lineNumber > lastLine + 1) && context > 0) {@@ -130,7 +144,11 @@ export async function piGrep(});});- if (matches === 0) return { text: 'No matches found' };+ const skippedFiles = [...skipped.values()].filter(Boolean).length;+ const skippedNotice = skippedFiles > 0+ ? `matches in ${skippedFiles} credential file(s) left out; reading such a file directly asks the user for confirmation`+ : null;+ if (matches === 0) return { text: skippedNotice ? `No matches found\n\n[${skippedNotice}]` : 'No matches found' };// 上下文模式下最后一条可能是命中后的上下文,按出现顺序保留。let output = outputLines.join('\n');let truncated = false;@@ -160,6 +178,7 @@ export async function piGrep(notices.push(`${formatSize(MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES)} limit reached`);details.truncated = true;}+ if (skippedNotice) notices.push(skippedNotice);if (notices.length > 0) output += `\n\n[${notices.join('. ')}]`;return { text: output, ...(Object.keys(details).length > 0 ? { details } : {}) };}diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/en/common.json b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/en/common.jsonindex 98408587dc..fc12faa42f 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/en/common.json+++ b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/en/common.json@@ -9774,6 +9774,9 @@"cancelEdit": "Cancel Editing","saveEdit": "Save Text"},+ "sharedProviderCredential": {+ "description": "This task uses a provider shared with you, so what the Agent reads passes through the sharer's computer. This step involves a credential file (such as a key or .env), so it continues only after you confirm."+ },"mediaDownload": {"title": "Download the generated media?","description": "The media has been generated and needs to be downloaded from the address below.",diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ja/common.json b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ja/common.jsonindex bb8a01a662..5a6f46a6b6 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ja/common.json+++ b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ja/common.json@@ -9752,6 +9752,9 @@"cancelEdit": "編集をキャンセル","saveEdit": "テキストを保存"},+ "sharedProviderCredential": {+ "description": "このタスクは共有されたプロバイダーを使っているため、Agent が読み取った内容は共有元のパソコンを経由します。この操作は認証情報のファイル(鍵や .env など)に関わるため、確認してから続行します。"+ },"mediaDownload": {"title": "生成されたメディアをダウンロードしますか?","description": "メディアが生成されました。以下のアドレスからダウンロードする必要があります。",diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ko/common.json b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ko/common.jsonindex 8b1aefa316..d3fd4a6592 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ko/common.json+++ b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/ko/common.json@@ -9752,6 +9752,9 @@"cancelEdit": "편집 취소","saveEdit": "텍스트 저장"},+ "sharedProviderCredential": {+ "description": "이 작업은 공유받은 제공자를 사용하므로 Agent가 읽은 내용이 공유한 사람의 컴퓨터를 거칩니다. 이 단계는 자격 증명 파일(키, .env 등)과 관련되어 있어 확인한 후에 계속됩니다."+ },"mediaDownload": {"title": "생성된 미디어를 다운로드할까요?","description": "미디어가 생성되었습니다. 아래 주소에서 다운로드해야 합니다.",diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.json b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.jsonindex f524d4bd17..f5dc2e2873 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.json+++ b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.json@@ -9752,6 +9752,9 @@"cancelEdit": "取消编辑","saveEdit": "保存文本"},+ "sharedProviderCredential": {+ "description": "这个任务用的是分享来的供应商,Agent 读到的内容会经过分享者的电脑。这一步涉及凭证类文件(如密钥、.env),需要你确认后才继续。"+ },"mediaDownload": {"title": "允许下载生成的媒体?","description": "媒体已生成,需要从下方地址下载。",diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-TW/common.json b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-TW/common.jsonindex 18079603c2..be24a9ac6e 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-TW/common.json+++ b/apps/desktop/src/renderer/i18n/locales/zh-TW/common.json@@ -9752,6 +9752,9 @@"cancelEdit": "取消編輯","saveEdit": "儲存文字"},+ "sharedProviderCredential": {+ "description": "這個任務用的是分享來的供應商,Agent 讀到的內容會經過分享者的電腦。這一步涉及憑證類檔案(如金鑰、.env),需要你確認後才繼續。"+ },"mediaDownload": {"title": "允許下載產生的媒體?","description": "媒體已產生,需要從下方位址下載。",diff --git a/docs/dev-rules/protocol-compatibility.md b/docs/dev-rules/protocol-compatibility.mdindex dd9abbf1f8..3619ede52b 100644--- a/docs/dev-rules/protocol-compatibility.md+++ b/docs/dev-rules/protocol-compatibility.md@@ -587,7 +587,9 @@ handler 无 sender 依赖;不加入共享任务访客白名单,不进入自`personal`(A 的个人配置:Claude Code 的 `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md`、`skills/agents/commands`、`settings.json`里的权限规则;Codex 的 `AGENTS(.override).md`;不含 hooks / env)。两者缺省按空处理。B 把影子目录按A 的真实路径逐级镜像在 `<runs>/workspaces/<控制端>/<任务>/fs/` 下,`open` 回包的 `mirrorRoot` 告诉 A- 镜像根,A 据此把影子路径逐级映射回真实路径;项目里已有的同名文件以项目为准。+ 镜像根,A 据此把影子路径逐级映射回真实路径;项目里已有的同名文件以项目为准。A 收集这些文件时跟随+ 符号链接(与本机 Agent 加载一致,只防链接绕回上级目录与指向整个用户目录);供应商分享的受邀者任务不把+ 凭证类文件放进载荷(`provider-sharing.md` §9 第 7 条)。载荷格式不变。- **本机虚拟工作区**:A 在 open 前先调用 caps,只有 B 回包声明virtualWorkspace: true 才发送 open;旧 B 或未声明能力的 B 直接提示升级,不能静默降级到暴露 A 真实路径的合同。支持时,B 使用不含 A 真实目录名的固定短父级层级,继续承载最多 24diff --git a/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md b/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.mdindex 33f5871322..feee1a7447 100644--- a/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md+++ b/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md@@ -262,6 +262,15 @@ Desktop「设置 → 模型供应商」的左栏(2026-10-08 用户裁决):会话记录与镜像文件,并请接过它任务的组内电脑清理([供应商组](provider-groups.md) §4)。7. **受邀者自己的权限**:受邀者电脑上的文件与命令操作仍由受邀者自己的任务权限档把关,分享不放宽受邀者本机的任何限制。+ **凭证类再收紧一档**(2026-10-10 裁决):对话与 Agent 读到的内容会经过分享者的电脑,因此+ - 凭证类文件(密钥、`.env`、云与工具的登录凭证,规则同本机任务;Claude Code / Codex 配置目录里的+ Skill、子代理、命令与说明文字不算)不随项目说明与个人配置在启动时同步,链接按真实目标判断;+ - 任务中读写凭证类文件、执行读取或打出凭证的命令,不论权限档(含完全访问)都要受邀者在本机确认卡上+ 允许,只放行这一次,与本机任务读凭证「每次都问」一致;Pi 的搜索结果不含凭证类文件的内容。确认卡与+ Agent 的确认走同一通道,手机远控与 IM 也能处理;+ - 命令只能按命令文本识别(脚本里读的、编码后再解开的认不出来),是防误发,不是防恶意。+ 同账号远程供应商不受影响:与本机一致,项目与个人配置里的符号链接一律跟随,不额外确认。+ 实现:`apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/{credentials.ts,executor/gate.ts,controller/projectFiles.ts}`。## 10. 与现有规则的关系@@ -288,7 +297,9 @@ Desktop「设置 → 模型供应商」的左栏(2026-10-08 用户裁决):分享者电脑上执行;Agent 自带工具里作用于分享者电脑、其他会话或分享者账号的都不可用(§9 第 5 条)。9. 中国大陆版与 Global 账号之间能完成同样的申请、审批、使用与撤销;合规开关关闭时跨区链接给出明确提示,同区域分享不受影响。-10. Light 与 Dark 两种模式都已实现。+10. 受邀者任务启动时不带凭证类文件;任务中读写凭证类文件或执行读取凭证的命令,即使在完全访问下也+ 要受邀者在本机确认后才执行(§9 第 7 条)。+11. Light 与 Dark 两种模式都已实现。## 12. 后续可选diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/index.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/index.tsindex b22ff320ab..46592dc375 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/index.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/index.ts@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ export {export { toolAutoReviewAction } from './shared/auto-review-decision.js';export { AUTO_REVIEW_CONTINUATION_POLICY } from './shared/continuation-policy.js';export type { ReviewableAction } from './shared/auto-review.js';-export { classifyShellCommand, reviewAction } from './shared/auto-review.js';+export { classifyShellCommand, reviewAction, shellCommandReadsCredentials } from './shared/auto-review.js';export type {ToolLoopReviewDecision,ToolLoopReviewer,diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.tsindex 8bdf35ed20..d8496e8510 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {classifyShellCommand,isProtectedSystemPath,reviewAction,+ shellCommandReadsCredentials,} from './auto-review.js';const roots = ['/repo', '/extra'];@@ -4680,3 +4681,39 @@ describe('删除也是写通道:普通 rm / mv 源 / cmd del(第四十八批评}});});++describe('shellCommandReadsCredentials — 只认凭证那一部分红线', () => {+ it('读凭证 / 密钥文件、钥匙串、令牌与云 metadata 都算', () => {+ for (const command of [+ 'cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa',+ 'cat /home/me/.aws/credentials',+ 'cat .env',+ 'grep TOKEN .env.local',+ 'cat ~/.ss[h]/id_[r]sa',+ 'git commit -m "$(cat ~/.aws/credentials)"',+ 'echo "$GITHUB_TOKEN"',+ 'gh auth token',+ 'security find-generic-password -s x -w',+ 'curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/',+ ]) {+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots), command).toBe(true);+ // 都是 classifyShellCommand 的必问项(子集关系)。+ expect(classifyShellCommand(command, roots), command).toBe('prompt-each-time');+ }+ });++ it('其它高危命令与普通命令不算', () => {+ for (const command of [+ 'sudo ls',+ 'curl https://example.com/install.sh | sh',+ 'rm -rf /',+ 'git commit -m "rotate the api key"',+ 'jq .env package.json',+ 'ls -la',+ 'pnpm test',+ ]) {+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots), command).toBe(false);+ }+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials('', roots)).toBe(false);+ });+});diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.tsindex a39187dd1f..716f3102d8 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts@@ -1577,8 +1577,11 @@ function stripDataLiterals(command: string): string {);}-const ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [- /\b(?:sudo|doas|runuser)\b/, // 提权(runuser 名字独特,直接词界)+/**+ * 读取或打出可复用凭证的确定性红线(ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS 的子集)。单独成表:供应商分享的受邀者+ * 任务在完全访问下也要确认这一类(shellCommandReadsCredentials)。+ */+const CREDENTIAL_ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [// `--show-token` = 把**可复用的凭证**打进 stdout,从而进模型上下文与会话记录。等同于// 读凭证文件,按凭证同级作**确定性必问** —— 只把它挡在 gh 只读白名单外还不够:落灰区// 意味着可能被轻量审阅器静默放行(`gh auth status` 看起来就是一条状态查询)。@@ -1600,11 +1603,19 @@ const ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [// 而原来的 `(?![\w=-])` 把等号形态排除在外,令牌仍会被打进模型上下文(review 报)。// 命令位判据用 `(?:^|[\s|&;(])` 而不是 `(?:^|\s)`:分隔符后可以不带空格// (`ls;gh auth token`、`ls&&gh auth token`、`(gh auth token)`),而分段之后不会再重扫- // 确定性红线 —— 只认空白等于给一个删空格就绕过的口子(review 报)。与本表里 `su`+ // 确定性红线 —— 只认空白等于给一个删空格就绕过的口子(review 报)。与 ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS 里 `su`// 那条的边界写法一致。/(?:^|[\s|&;(])(?:\S*\/)?gh\s+auth\s+[a-z][\w-]*[^|;&\n]*?\s-[a-zA-Z]*t[a-zA-Z]*(?:=[^\s|;&]*)?(?![\w-])/,// `gh auth token` 直接把令牌打到 stdout,与 `--show-token` 同级(同族一次收完)。/(?:^|[\s|&;(])(?:\S*\/)?gh\s+auth\s+token\b/,+ ...SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERNS, // 凭证/密钥路径(见上)+ /\bsecurity\s+(?:find|dump|export|add)-/, // macOS keychain+ /\$\{?[A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|APIKEY|_PAT)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\}?/i, // 敏感环境变量展开(echo "$API_KEY" 等)+];++const ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [+ /\b(?:sudo|doas|runuser)\b/, // 提权(runuser 名字独特,直接词界)+ ...CREDENTIAL_ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS, // 凭证文件、钥匙串、令牌(见上)// 裸 `su`(切换到其它用户/root)同属提权,但 "su" 常出现在无关文本里 → 只在命令位(段首/分隔符后,或// 已知启动器后)匹配,避免 `git commit -m "su"` 之类误升(自审补:sudo/doas 已红线,漏了同级的 su)。/(?:^|[\n|&;(]\s*|\b(?:sudo|doas|xargs|nohup|setsid|env|command|exec|time|timeout|nice|ionice|stdbuf|chrt|builtin|watch|flock)\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*)su\b(?![\w.-])/,@@ -1626,9 +1637,6 @@ const ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [/:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{.*\|.*&.*\}/, // fork bomb :(){ :|:& };:/\bchmod\b[^|;&]*\s(?:-R\s+)?[0-7]*7{2,3}\b/, // chmod 777 之类数字放宽权限/\bchmod\b[^|;&]*\s[ugoa]*[oa][ugoa]*[-+=][^\s]*w/, // chmod 符号型对 other/all 开放写(a+w / o+w / a+rwx)- ...SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_PATH_PATTERNS, // 凭证/密钥路径(见上)- /\bsecurity\s+(?:find|dump|export|add)-/, // macOS keychain- /\$\{?[A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|APIKEY|_PAT)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\}?/i, // 敏感环境变量展开(echo "$API_KEY" 等)];/**@@ -6019,6 +6027,69 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(return false;}+/**+ * 确定性红线的扫描面:结构上确定是数据的引号字面量先换成占位符(stripDataLiterals),再生成防拆词+ * 绕过的各个变体(各变体的用途见 classifyShellCommand 里的说明)。+ */+function deterministicScanVariants(command: string): {+ deEscaped: string;+ quotesOnly: string;+ deGlobbed: string;+ deExpanded: string;+ deExpandedGlob: string;+ deSubstituted: string;+} {+ const scannable = stripDataLiterals(command);+ const deEscaped = scannable.replace(/['"\\]/g, '');+ const quotesOnly = scannable.replace(/['"]/g, '');+ const deGlobbed = deEscaped.replace(/[[\]{}*?]/g, '');+ // deExpanded:抹掉参数展开(见 stripExpansions)—— 防 `s${X}udo`/`rm -r${X}f /` 这类把关键词拆开、+ // bash 展开成空后才成形的绕过。**必须从 deEscaped 派生**(保留 `${...}` 完整):若先去 glob 会把+ // `${X}` 的 `{}` 抹成 `$X`,再 stripExpansions 会把 `$Xudo` 整词吞掉、反而复原不出 `sudo`。+ // deExpandedGlob:再叠加去 glob,覆盖 `${X}` 与 `[h]` 混用的组合变形。+ const deExpanded = stripExpansions(deEscaped);+ const deExpandedGlob = deExpanded.replace(/[[\]{}*?]/g, '');+ // deSubstituted:把 `${X:-sudo}` 等默认值代入,让藏在展开默认值里的危险关键词现形(codex 报)。+ const deSubstituted = substituteDefaults(deEscaped);+ return { deEscaped, quotesOnly, deGlobbed, deExpanded, deExpandedGlob, deSubstituted };+}++/** curl / wget 抓云 metadata(读实例临时云凭证)。 */+function fetchesCloudMetadata(quotesOnly: string): boolean {+ for (const { text } of splitExecutableSegments(quotesOnly)) {+ const tokens = unwrapWrappers(tokenize(text));+ const bin = executableName(tokens[0] ?? '');+ if (bin !== 'curl' && bin !== 'wget') continue;+ if (tokens.slice(1).some((t) => isFetchTargetToken(t) && isCloudMetadataFetchTarget(t))) {+ return true;+ }+ }+ return false;+}++function matchesAnyVariant(patterns: readonly RegExp[], variants: ReturnType<typeof deterministicScanVariants>): boolean {+ const texts = Object.values(variants);+ return patterns.some((re) => texts.some((text) => re.test(text)));+}++/**+ * 命令是否静态可证地读取或打出可复用凭证:读凭证 / 密钥文件(含 .env)、钥匙串、令牌类环境变量、+ * `gh auth token`、抓云 metadata。是 classifyShellCommand「必问」判据里凭证的那一部分,供应商分享的+ * 受邀者任务在完全访问下也要确认这一类。只看命令文本:脚本文件里读的、编码后再解开的认不出来。+ */+export function shellCommandReadsCredentials(+ command: string,+ workspaceRoots: string[],+ opts: ShellReviewOptions = {},+): boolean {+ if (typeof command !== 'string' || command.trim().length === 0) return false;+ // 超长命令解析器不展开扫描,按需要确认处理(与 classifyShellCommand 同样不放过)。+ if (command.length > MAX_AUTO_REVIEW_ACTION_TEXT_CHARS) return true;+ if (shellCommandReadsDotenv(command, workspaceRoots, opts)) return true;+ const variants = deterministicScanVariants(command);+ return matchesAnyVariant(CREDENTIAL_ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS, variants) || fetchesCloudMetadata(variants.quotesOnly);+}+export function classifyShellCommand(command: string,workspaceRoots: string[],@@ -6046,18 +6117,7 @@ export function classifyShellCommand(// grep 搜索模式)先换成占位符,否则中文提交说明与 PR 回复正文会被当命令扫(见// stripDataLiterals)。执行面判定不用这份 —— highImpactExecutionNeedsConsent 已在上面// 按引号外的真实结构判过。- const scannable = stripDataLiterals(command);- const deEscaped = scannable.replace(/['"\\]/g, '');- const quotesOnly = scannable.replace(/['"]/g, '');- const deGlobbed = deEscaped.replace(/[[\]{}*?]/g, '');- // deExpanded:抹掉参数展开(见 stripExpansions)—— 防 `s${X}udo`/`rm -r${X}f /` 这类把关键词拆开、- // bash 展开成空后才成形的绕过。**必须从 deEscaped 派生**(保留 `${...}` 完整):若先去 glob 会把- // `${X}` 的 `{}` 抹成 `$X`,再 stripExpansions 会把 `$Xudo` 整词吞掉、反而复原不出 `sudo`。- // deExpandedGlob:再叠加去 glob,覆盖 `${X}` 与 `[h]` 混用的组合变形。- const deExpanded = stripExpansions(deEscaped);- const deExpandedGlob = deExpanded.replace(/[[\]{}*?]/g, '');- // deSubstituted:把 `${X:-sudo}` 等默认值代入,让藏在展开默认值里的危险关键词现形(codex 报)。- const deSubstituted = substituteDefaults(deEscaped);+ const { deEscaped, quotesOnly, deGlobbed, deExpanded, deExpandedGlob, deSubstituted } = deterministicScanVariants(command);// 仅按引号外的真实执行结构识别 pipe→解释器 / eval / 下载即执行,避免把打印示例文本误升级。if ([command, stripExpansions(command), substituteDefaults(command)].some((variant) => highImpactExecutionNeedsConsent(variant))) return 'prompt-each-time';@@ -6067,14 +6127,7 @@ export function classifyShellCommand(// 抓云 metadata = 读实例临时云凭证,静态可证的高危 → 与内置 WebFetch(reviewAction network)一致地// 确定性必问,不能一边硬问一边只给 shell curl 灰区(自审发现的两通道不一致)。// 只认 metadata,不含 localhost/私网 —— `curl localhost:3000` 是开发日常,硬弹窗会违反"尽量不打扰"。- for (const { text } of splitExecutableSegments(quotesOnly)) {- const tokens = unwrapWrappers(tokenize(text));- const bin = executableName(tokens[0] ?? '');- if (bin !== 'curl' && bin !== 'wget') continue;- if (tokens.slice(1).some((t) => isFetchTargetToken(t) && isCloudMetadataFetchTarget(t))) {- return 'prompt-each-time';- }- }+ if (fetchesCloudMetadata(quotesOnly)) return 'prompt-each-time';// 写系统/受保护目录(重定向 `cat x > /etc/hosts` 与参数写通道 `cp payload /etc/hosts`、// `| tee /etc/hosts`、`truncate -s 0 /etc/passwd`、`tar -C /etc` 等)= 高影响系统写,复用// file-write 的系统红线。**判定放在 scopedDestructionNeedsConsent 的分段循环里**,因为那里已经