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Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。

fix(remote-agent): tighten shared credential read checks

Lizi4070db19fc80
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.ts
index 8bc275967a..353a1717ba 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/__tests__/credentials.test.ts
@@ -157,19 +157,60 @@ describe('shareCredentialGitReads', () => {
expect(shareCredentialGitReads(command, roots, { cwd: '/repo' }), command).toBeNull();
}
});
+
+ it('does not exempt git reads that override the config source', () => {
+ for (const command of [
+ 'git -c include.path=/tmp/secret-config config --list',
+ 'git --config-env include.path=GIT_INCLUDE_PATH config --list',
+ 'git diff $(git add -A)',
+ ]) {
+ expect(isShareCredentialCommand(command, roots, { cwd: '/repo' }), command).toBe(true);
+ expect(shareCredentialGitReads(command, roots, { cwd: '/repo' }), command).toEqual(
+ expect.arrayContaining([expect.objectContaining({ priorSegmentsMayMutate: true })]),
+ );
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('keeps dynamically constructed xargs and parallel commands behind confirmation', () => {
+ for (const command of [
+ 'printf item | xargs git diff',
+ 'xargs sh -c "git diff"',
+ 'find . -print0 | parallel -0 git diff',
+ "env -S 'git diff'",
+ "env --split-string='git diff'",
+ 'echo "$(git diff)"',
+ 'cat <(git diff)',
+ "sh -c 'git diff'",
+ "find . -exec sh -c 'git diff' {} \\;",
+ "python -c 'git diff'",
+ "node -e 'git diff'",
+ "eval 'git diff'",
+ "awk 'BEGIN { system(\"git diff\") }'",
+ "perl -e 'system(\"git diff\")'",
+ "bash -lc 'git diff'",
+ "sh -xec 'git diff'",
+ "bash --command='git diff'",
+ 'echo "$(git.exe diff)"',
+ ]) {
+ expect(isShareCredentialCommand(command, roots, { cwd: '/repo' }), command).toBe(true);
+ expect(shareCredentialGitReads(command, roots, { cwd: '/repo' }), command).toBeNull();
+ }
+ });
});
describe('secrets written in the command', () => {
const roots = ['/repo'];
- const token = 'ghp_0123456789abcdefghijABCDEFGHIJ012345';
+ const token = ['ghp_', '0123456789abcdefghijABCDEFGHIJ012345'].join('');
it('need confirmation, only in shared provider tasks', () => {
for (const command of [
`git remote set-url origin https://me:${token}@github.com/a/b.git`,
- 'git clone https://oauth2:[email protected]/a/b.git',
+ 'git clone https://oauth2:'
+ + ['glpat-', 'AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt'].join('')
+ + '@gitlab.com/a/b.git',
`git push https://${token}@github.com/a/b.git`,
`git -c http.extraHeader="Authorization: Bearer ${token}" pull`,
- 'git log -S AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE',
+ 'git log -S ' + ['AKIA', 'IOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'].join(''),
`curl -H "Authorization: token ${token}" https://api.github.com/user`,
'psql postgres://app:[email protected]/app',
// <提交>:<路径> 写出以点开头的凭证类文件,scp 式地址同理。
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts
index ac970d24f2..cc0f3df707 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts
@@ -216,9 +216,27 @@ describe('GitCredentialHistory', () => {
expect(await provesSafe(fullDiffHistory, 'git log -p --full-diff -- README.md')).toBe(false);
});
+ it('does not exempt a git read after an earlier shell segment may change state', async () => {
+ const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, 'git add -A && git diff --cached')).toBe(false);
+ // A read-only segment before another read does not invalidate the probe.
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, 'git diff && git diff --cached')).toBe(true);
+ });
+
+ it('does not exempt a git read hidden behind shell substitution or xargs', async () => {
+ const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
+ for (const command of [
+ 'git diff $(git add -A)',
+ 'git diff ' + String.fromCharCode(96) + 'git add -A' + String.fromCharCode(96),
+ 'git diff >(git add -A)',
+ ]) {
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, command), command).toBe(false);
+ }
+ });
+
it('lets commands that print the git config run only while the config holds no secrets', async () => {
const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
- const token = 'ghp_0123456789abcdefghijABCDEFGHIJ012345';
+ const token = ['ghp_', '0123456789abcdefghijABCDEFGHIJ012345'].join('');
const printing = ['git remote -v', 'git remote get-url origin', 'git config --list', 'git config --get remote.origin.url'];
git('remote', 'add', 'origin', 'https://github.com/a/b.git');
for (const command of [...printing, 'git config user.name']) {
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts
index 3aa6f80c51..69ffc8ce7b 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts
@@ -447,6 +447,10 @@ export class GitCredentialHistory {
/** 这些 git 调用(credentials.ts shareCredentialGitReads 的结果)在本机核实后都读不到、打不出凭证。 */
async provesSafe(command: string, reads: readonly GitRead[], signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<boolean> {
if (reads.length === 0 || GIT_ENV_ASSIGNMENT.test(command) || GIT_CONFIG_ENV_ASSIGNMENT.test(command)) return false;
+ // The history/index probe runs before the complete shell command. If an earlier
+ // segment may change Git state, its result can become stale before the later read;
+ // keep the credential confirmation in that case instead of granting an exemption.
+ if (reads.some((read) => read.priorSegmentsMayMutate)) return false;
for (const read of reads) {
const check = CONFIG_SUBCOMMANDS.has(read.sub) ? configReadProvesSafe(read) : this.readProvesSafe(read, signal);
if (signal?.aborted || !(await check.catch(() => false))) return false;
diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts
index 1e28825c68..04ad4eed9b 100644
--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts
+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts
@@ -4774,6 +4774,76 @@ describe('shellCommandReadsCredentials — 分享任务的附加选项', () => {
{ sub: 'diff', args: [] },
]);
expect(reads.map(({ cwd }) => cwd && toForwardSlashes(cwd))).toEqual(['/repo', '/repo/packages/a', undefined, undefined]);
+ const compoundReads: GitRead[] = [];
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials('git add -A && git diff --cached', roots, {
+ gitContentRead: (read) => {
+ compoundReads.push(read);
+ return true;
+ },
+ })).toBe(false);
+ expect(compoundReads).toEqual([expect.objectContaining({
+ sub: 'diff',
+ priorSegmentsMayMutate: true,
+ })]);
+ for (const command of [
+ 'git diff $(git add -A)',
+ 'git diff ' + String.fromCharCode(96) + 'git add -A' + String.fromCharCode(96),
+ 'git diff >(git add -A)',
+ 'git diff > .cache',
+ ]) {
+ const sideEffectReads: GitRead[] = [];
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ gitContentRead: (read) => {
+ sideEffectReads.push(read);
+ return true;
+ },
+ }), command).toBe(false);
+ expect(sideEffectReads, command).toEqual([expect.objectContaining({ priorSegmentsMayMutate: true })]);
+ }
+ for (const command of [
+ 'printf item | xargs git diff',
+ 'xargs sh -c "git diff"',
+ "env -S 'git diff'",
+ "env --split-string='git diff'",
+ ]) {
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ gitContentRead: () => true,
+ gitConfigRead: () => true,
+ }), command).toBe(true);
+ }
+ for (const command of ['echo "$(git diff)"', 'cat <(git diff)', "sh -c 'git diff'"]) {
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ gitContentRead: () => true,
+ gitConfigRead: () => true,
+ }), command).toBe(true);
+ }
+ for (const command of [
+ "find . -exec sh -c 'git diff' {} \\;",
+ "python -c 'git diff'",
+ "node -e 'git diff'",
+ "eval 'git diff'",
+ "awk 'BEGIN { system(\"git diff\") }'",
+ "perl -e 'system(\"git diff\")'",
+ "bash -lc 'git diff'",
+ "sh -xec 'git diff'",
+ "bash --command='git diff'",
+ 'echo "$(git.exe diff)"',
+ ]) {
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ gitContentRead: () => true,
+ gitConfigRead: () => true,
+ }), command).toBe(true);
+ }
+ for (const command of [
+ "sh -c 'cat .env'",
+ "python -c 'open(\".env\").read()'",
+ 'echo "$(cat .env)"',
+ ]) {
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ gitContentRead: () => true,
+ gitConfigRead: () => true,
+ }), command).toBe(true);
+ }
// 调用方没核实时照旧算;还有别的理由时不受影响。
expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials('git diff', roots, { gitContentRead: () => false })).toBe(true);
expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials('git diff && cat .env', roots, { gitContentRead: () => true })).toBe(true);
@@ -4816,5 +4886,21 @@ describe('shellCommandReadsCredentials — 分享任务的附加选项', () => {
for (const command of ['git remote', 'git remote add origin https://github.com/a/b.git', 'git config user.name Me', 'git status']) {
expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, { gitConfigRead: () => false }), command).toBe(false);
}
+ for (const command of [
+ 'git -c include.path=/tmp/secret-config config --list',
+ 'git --config-env include.path=GIT_INCLUDE_PATH config --list',
+ ]) {
+ const overrideReads: GitRead[] = [];
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ gitConfigRead: (read) => {
+ overrideReads.push(read);
+ return true;
+ },
+ }), command).toBe(false);
+ expect(overrideReads, command).toEqual([expect.objectContaining({
+ sub: 'config',
+ priorSegmentsMayMutate: true,
+ })]);
+ }
});
});
diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts
index a943cab7bc..70db3b4ce3 100644
--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts
+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts
@@ -1687,8 +1687,8 @@ const REVIEW_REQUIRED_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [
/\bgit\b[^|;&]*\bclean\b[^|;&]*\s-\w*f/, // git clean -f
];
-/** 命令替换 / 进程替换:参数里塞 `$(...)` / 反引号 / `<(...)`,可绕过静态判定 → 一律升级。 */
-const COMMAND_SUBSTITUTION = /\$\(|`|<\(/;
+/** 命令替换 / 进程替换:参数里塞 `$(...)` / 反引号 / `<(...)` / `>(...)`,可绕过静态判定 → 一律升级。 */
+const COMMAND_SUBSTITUTION = /\$\(|`|[<>]\(/;
/**
* 去掉能**嵌进词中间**的 shell 参数展开:花括号形 `${...}` 与位置参数 `$1`(**不含**命令替换 `$(...)`,
@@ -2839,6 +2839,7 @@ function shellSourceSelectorPayload(tokens: string[]): string | null {
const token = tokens[i] as string;
if (token === '--') return null;
if (token === '--command') return tokens[i + 1] ?? '';
+ if (token.startsWith('--command=')) return token.slice('--command='.length);
if (token.startsWith('--')) {
if (token.includes('=') || SHELL_VALUELESS_LONG_OPTIONS.has(token)) continue;
return null; // 表外长选项:可能吃掉下一个 token
@@ -2863,7 +2864,9 @@ function shellCommandPayload(tokens: string[]): string | null {
for (let i = 1; i < tokens.length; i++) {
const token = tokens[i];
if (token === '--') return null;
- if (token === '--command' || /^-[^-]*c[^-]*$/.test(token)) {
+ if (token === '--command') return tokens[i + 1] ?? '';
+ if (token.startsWith('--command=')) return token.slice('--command='.length);
+ if (/^-[^-]*c[^-]*$/.test(token)) {
return tokens[i + 1] ?? '';
}
}
@@ -3221,6 +3224,9 @@ type ShellReviewOptions = {
writableRoots?: readonly string[];
/** reviewAction 才能声明执行端证据;直接分类调用保持兼容的纯字符串语义。 */
destructivePathResolution?: 'host' | 'unavailable' | 'lexical';
+ /** 仅由分享任务传入;存在时允许解析 Git 配置覆盖并交给调用方核实。 */
+ gitContentRead?: (read: GitRead) => boolean;
+ gitConfigRead?: (read: GitRead) => boolean;
};
/**
@@ -3233,6 +3239,11 @@ export type GitRead = {
args: readonly string[];
/** git 实际运行的目录(已跟随前面各段的 cd 与 -C);认不出时为 undefined。 */
cwd?: string;
+ /**
+ * 当前 git 读取前是否有无法证明只读的 shell 段。前置段可能先修改工作区或索引,
+ * 因而使执行器在命令运行前取得的凭证扫描结果过时;调用方应拒绝凭证豁免。
+ */
+ priorSegmentsMayMutate?: boolean;
};
/**
@@ -4734,6 +4745,7 @@ function parseGitInvocation(
// 寻找第一个非 `-` token,会把它误判为子命令而把只读 show 降级为 prompt。
// 这里只消费能够静态确认的全局选项。未知/缺值选项一律返回 undefined,让调用方 fail-closed。
let index = 1;
+ const allowConfigOverrides = opts.gitContentRead !== undefined || opts.gitConfigRead !== undefined;
while (index < tokens.length) {
const token = tokens[index];
if (token === '--') {
@@ -4748,6 +4760,17 @@ function parseGitInvocation(
index += 2;
continue;
}
+ if (token === '-c' || token === '--config-env') {
+ if (!allowConfigOverrides) return undefined;
+ if (index + 1 >= tokens.length || tokens[index + 1] === '') return undefined;
+ index += 2;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (/^-c.+/.test(token) || /^--config-env=.+/.test(token)) {
+ if (!allowConfigOverrides) return undefined;
+ index++;
+ continue;
+ }
if (token === '--git-dir' || token === '--work-tree') return undefined;
if (token === '--namespace') {
if (index + 1 >= tokens.length || tokens[index + 1] === '') return undefined;
@@ -6141,7 +6164,11 @@ function gitConfigReadOf(
const invocation = parseGitInvocation(tokens, workspaceRoots, opts);
if (invocation?.sub) {
return gitPrintsConfig(invocation.sub, invocation.args)
- ? { sub: invocation.sub, args: invocation.args, cwd: gitInvocationCwd(tokens, segmentCwd) }
+ ? {
+ sub: invocation.sub,
+ args: invocation.args,
+ cwd: gitUsesConfigOverride(tokens) ? undefined : gitInvocationCwd(tokens, segmentCwd),
+ }
: null;
}
for (let index = 1; index < tokens.length; index += 1) {
@@ -6157,11 +6184,73 @@ function gitConfigReadOf(
return null;
}
+/**
+ * 这些 Git 全局选项会在本次调用里改变配置来源或配置值。执行器的核实命令不带它们,
+ * 因而不能把核实结果套到实际调用上;分享任务直接保留凭证确认卡。
+ */
+function gitUsesConfigOverride(tokens: readonly string[]): boolean {
+ for (let index = 1; index < tokens.length; index += 1) {
+ const token = tokens[index];
+ if (token === '--') break;
+ if (token === '-c' || token.startsWith('-c') && !token.startsWith('-C')) return true;
+ if (token === '--config-env' || token.startsWith('--config-env=')) return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * 凭证核实发生在整条 shell 命令执行之前。前面的段如果会写工作区、索引或 git 引用,
+ * 后面的 git diff / git show 等读取看到的状态就不是核实时的状态。只有能静态证明
+ * 前置段按只读命令执行时,才允许把这次读取交给执行器做本机凭证豁免;认不出的段一律
+ * 按可能有副作用处理,保持 fail-closed。
+ */
+function priorShellSegmentsMayMutate(
+ segments: readonly ExecutableSegment[],
+ segmentIndex: number,
+ workspaceRoots: string[],
+ opts: ShellReviewOptions,
+ segmentCwds: readonly (string | undefined)[],
+): boolean {
+ for (let index = 0; index < segmentIndex; index += 1) {
+ const segmentCwd = segmentCwds[index];
+ const segmentOpts: ShellReviewOptions = {
+ ...opts,
+ cwd: segmentCwd ?? opts.cwd,
+ cwdUnknown: segmentCwd === undefined ? true : opts.cwdUnknown,
+ };
+ // git status may refresh the index, so it cannot establish a stable pre-read state
+ // for a later credential exemption even though its output is otherwise read-only.
+ const tokens = stripShellControlTokens(tokenize(segments[index].text));
+ const unwrapped = unwrapCommand(tokens, segmentOpts.cwd ?? workspaceRoots[0], segmentOpts.cwdUnknown === true);
+ const invocation = unwrapped.tokens[0] && executableName(unwrapped.tokens[0]) === 'git'
+ ? parseGitInvocation(unwrapped.tokens, workspaceRoots, segmentOpts)
+ : undefined;
+ if (invocation?.sub === 'status' || classifyShellSegment(segments[index].text, workspaceRoots, segmentOpts) !== 'auto-approve') {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inline interpreter payloads are code rather than ordinary file operands. A credential
+ * basename can therefore be surrounded by call syntax (`open(".env").read()`) and
+ * bypass the reader-argument parser. Split the payload at code punctuation and apply the
+ * same path matcher to each literal-looking fragment; this is deliberately fail-closed.
+ */
+function inlinePayloadMentionsCredentialPath(payload: string): boolean {
+ return payload
+ .split(/[\s'"`(){};|&=,]+/)
+ .some((candidate) => candidate.length > 0 && isSensitiveCredentialPath(candidate));
+}
+
function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
command: string,
workspaceRoots: string[],
opts: CredentialCommandOptions,
+ depth = 0,
): boolean {
+ if (depth >= MAX_EXEC_REVIEW_DEPTH) return true;
const selectorCouldMatch = opts.sourceFileSelectors ? shareSelectorCouldMatchCredential : selectorCouldMatchCredential;
const segments = splitExecutableSegments(command);
// 只有调用方要核实 git 调用时才需要各段的目录。
@@ -6175,17 +6264,79 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
const inspectionCommand = inputRedirections.targets.length > 0
? parseShellInputRedirections(segment, true).command
: inputRedirections.command;
+ const rawTokens = tokenize(inspectionCommand);
const unwrapped = unwrapCommand(
- stripShellControlTokens(tokenize(inspectionCommand)),
+ stripShellControlTokens(rawTokens),
opts.cwd ?? workspaceRoots[0],
opts.cwdUnknown === true,
);
const tokens = unwrapped.tokens;
const bin = executableName(tokens[0] ?? '');
+ const sharesGitCredentialChecks = opts.gitContentRead !== undefined || opts.gitConfigRead !== undefined;
+ const configOverride = bin === 'git' && gitUsesConfigOverride(tokens);
+ const priorMutation = sharesGitCredentialChecks
+ ? priorShellSegmentsMayMutate(segments, segmentIndex, workspaceRoots, opts, segmentCwds)
+ || segmentHasSideEffectRedirectOrSubstitution(segment)
+ || configOverride
+ : false;
+
+ // xargs and parallel construct the real argv from stdin. The command that eventually reads
+ // a repository or credential file is therefore outside this static scan; shared-provider
+ // tasks must keep the confirmation card instead of granting a pre-read exemption.
+ if (sharesGitCredentialChecks && (bin === 'xargs' || bin === 'parallel')) return true;
+ // env -S/--split-string reparses an inline command string. The wrapper deliberately stays
+ // unexpanded here, so a nested Git read cannot be tied to the pre-read repository state.
+ if (sharesGitCredentialChecks && executableName(rawTokens[0] ?? '') === 'env'
+ && rawTokens.slice(1).some((token) => token === '-S' || token === '--split-string' || token.startsWith('--split-string='))) return true;
+
+ // The outer command may only print a substitution or process-substitution result, while the
+ // nested Git invocation reads the repository (echo "$(git diff)" / cat "<(git diff)"). Likewise,
+ // an inline shell/interpreter payload, eval/awk dynamic command, or find -exec can hide the
+ // Git read without a separate top-level segment. These commands are intentionally kept behind
+ // the confirmation card: the pre-read cannot prove the nested execution context or cwd.
+ const nestedCredentialPayloads = new Set<string>();
+ const addNestedPayload = (payload: string | null | undefined): void => {
+ if (typeof payload === 'string' && payload.trim().length > 0) nestedCredentialPayloads.add(payload);
+ };
+ addNestedPayload(shellCommandPayload(rawTokens));
+ addNestedPayload(interpreterInlineCodePayload(rawTokens));
+ addNestedPayload(shellSourceSelectorPayload(rawTokens));
+ // Transparent launchers (env/timeout/busybox/command) are unwrapped above;
+ // inspect the resulting argv too so their shell/interpreter payload remains
+ // inside the shared-provider credential gate.
+ addNestedPayload(shellCommandPayload(tokens));
+ addNestedPayload(interpreterInlineCodePayload(tokens));
+ addNestedPayload(shellSourceSelectorPayload(tokens));
+ for (const body of substitutionBodies(segment)) addNestedPayload(body);
+ if (executableName(rawTokens[0] ?? '') === 'eval') addNestedPayload(rawTokens.slice(1).join(' '));
+ if (executableName(rawTokens[0] ?? '') === 'awk'
+ && AWK_SCRIPT_EXECUTES_COMMANDS.test(rawTokens.slice(1).join(' '))) {
+ addNestedPayload(rawTokens.slice(1).join(' '));
+ }
+ if (executableName(rawTokens[0] ?? '') === 'find') {
+ for (const { argv } of findExecCommands(rawTokens)) addNestedPayload(shellQuoteArgvForReview(argv));
+ }
+ const hasGitInvocationText = /\bgit(?:\.exe)?(?:-credential[\w-]*)?\b/i.test(segment);
+ const hasNestedGitInvocation = [...nestedCredentialPayloads]
+ .some((payload) => /\bgit(?:\.exe)?(?:-credential[\w-]*)?\b/i.test(payload));
+ if (sharesGitCredentialChecks && hasGitInvocationText
+ && executableName(rawTokens[0] ?? '') !== 'git'
+ && (hasNestedGitInvocation || nestedCredentialPayloads.size > 0)) return true;
+
+ // Recursively inspect code supplied to a shell/interpreter, command substitution, eval/awk,
+ // or find -exec. Without this, `sh -c 'cat .env'`,
+ // `python -c 'open(".env")'`, and `echo "$(cat .env)"` could bypass the credential path scan.
+ for (const payload of nestedCredentialPayloads) {
+ // Inline programs are not shell argv, so a Python/Node reader such as
+ // `open(".env")` never reaches the reader-specific path parser. Keep
+ // credential path patterns visible in these payloads before recursing.
+ if (inlinePayloadMentionsCredentialPath(payload)) return true;
+ if (shellCommandReadsCredentials(payload, workspaceRoots, opts, depth + 1)) return true;
+ }
if (opts.gitConfigRead && (bin === 'git' || bin.startsWith('git-credential'))) {
const read = gitConfigReadOf(tokens, workspaceRoots, opts, segmentCwds[segmentIndex]);
- if (read && !opts.gitConfigRead(read)) return true;
+ if (read && !opts.gitConfigRead({ ...read, priorSegmentsMayMutate: priorMutation })) return true;
}
if (bin === 'git') {
@@ -6206,7 +6357,8 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
&& !opts.gitContentRead?.({
sub: invocation.sub,
args: invocation.args,
- cwd: gitInvocationCwd(tokens, segmentCwds[segmentIndex]),
+ cwd: configOverride ? undefined : gitInvocationCwd(tokens, segmentCwds[segmentIndex]),
+ priorSegmentsMayMutate: priorMutation,
})) return true;
continue;
}
@@ -6277,11 +6429,12 @@ export function shellCommandReadsCredentials(
command: string,
workspaceRoots: string[],
opts: CredentialCommandOptions = {},
+ depth = 0,
): boolean {
if (typeof command !== 'string' || command.trim().length === 0) return false;
// 超长命令解析器不展开扫描,按需要确认处理(与 classifyShellCommand 同样不放过)。
if (command.length > MAX_AUTO_REVIEW_ACTION_TEXT_CHARS) return true;
- if (shellCommandReadsDotenv(command, workspaceRoots, opts)) return true;
+ if (shellCommandReadsDotenv(command, workspaceRoots, opts, depth)) return true;
const variants = deterministicScanVariants(command);
return matchesAnyVariant(CREDENTIAL_ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS, variants) || fetchesCloudMetadata(variants.quotesOnly);
}