Skip to content

armgit / cindy

Public Imported from GitHub
0

Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。

fix(auth): 隔离独立 MCP 请求的行动授权上下文

ficowangc0025a2caf87
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts
index 5ae251c2dd..aaada52385 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { createOrcaMcpServer } from '../../../../../../packages/lizi-mcps/src/or
import type { AgentInputQueuedMessage } from '../../../shared/agentInputQueue.js';
import {
approvedTaskDelegation,
+ assertTaskActionCurrent,
bindTaskActionInput,
createTaskActionAuthorizer,
taskActionInputGuard,
@@ -882,3 +883,60 @@ describe('teammate turn principal', () => {
expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, ownerTaskWrites[0], async () => 'changed')).toBe('changed');
});
});
+
+// A bare allow must not reuse an outer action's authority, even through the
+// in-process MCP path. Existing Desktop fixtures called the gate at top level.
+// Production Desktop admission + guards; unit tier, in-memory Host facts.
+describe('independent Desktop tool invocation', () => {
+ it('rechecks an ordinary call without inheriting stale authorization or forcing its queue', async () => {
+ const outer = fixture(true);
+ const h = desktopFixture('private');
+ h.caller.botId = null;
+ h.caller.source = 'desktop';
+ await withToolCallAuthority(outer.authorize, call('start_session_task'), async () => {
+ outer.revoke();
+ const result = await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, {
+ ...call('send_to_session'), sessionId: 'ordinary-task',
+ }, async () => {
+ await assertTaskActionCurrent();
+ expect(hasTaskActionAuthorization()).toBe(false);
+ expect(approvedTaskDelegation('companion')).toBeUndefined();
+ return 'sent';
+ });
+ expect(result).toBe('sent');
+ // Isolation must not clear the outer scope or its revocation checks.
+ await expect(assertTaskActionCurrent()).rejects.toThrow('revoked');
+ });
+ expect(h.confirm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ it('keeps concurrent admitted callers separate across awaits', async () => {
+ const h = desktopFixture('private');
+ let release!: () => void;
+ const bothEntered = new Promise<void>((resolve) => { release = resolve; });
+ let entered = 0;
+ await Promise.all(['first-task', 'second-task'].map((sessionId) =>
+ withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, { ...call('send_to_session'), sessionId }, async () => {
+ if (++entered === 2) release();
+ await bothEntered;
+ await assertTaskActionCurrent();
+ expect(hasTaskActionAuthorization(sessionId)).toBe(true);
+ expect(hasTaskActionAuthorization(sessionId === 'first-task' ? 'second-task' : 'first-task')).toBe(false);
+ }),
+ ));
+ expect(entered).toBe(2);
+ expect(hasTaskActionAuthorization()).toBe(false);
+ });
+
+ it('does not use a valid outer grant to bypass rejection of the current caller', async () => {
+ const outer = fixture(true);
+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');
+ const effect = vi.fn(async () => 'sent');
+ await withToolCallAuthority(outer.authorize, call('start_session_task'), async () => {
+ const result = await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, call('send_to_session'), effect);
+ expect(JSON.stringify(result)).toContain('NEEDS_OWNER_REQUEST');
+ expect(effect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ expect(approvedTaskDelegation('companion')).toBeDefined();
+ });
+ });
+});
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts
index a0600c63cc..b60ced7496 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts
@@ -196,6 +196,28 @@ export async function assertTaskActionCurrent(): Promise<void> {
await actionContext.getStore()?.assertCurrent();
}
+/** An independent inbound request must not inherit the action that lazily started
+ * its shared transport. This clears only task-action evidence, not MCP routing;
+ * the request still passes the normal token, caller and per-tool authorization. */
+export function runTaskActionRequest<T>(operation: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+ return actionContext.exit(operation);
+}
+
+/** Cover in-process callers too: authorize this invocation without ambient evidence,
+ * then execute under only the returned admission. A bare allow intentionally keeps
+ * ordinary-task semantics (no Bot delegation evidence or forced queue). */
+export function isolateTaskActionAuthorizer(authorize: ToolCallAuthorizer): ToolCallAuthorizer {
+ return (call) => runTaskActionRequest(async () => {
+ const decision = await authorize(call);
+ if (!decision.ok) return decision;
+ return {
+ ok: true,
+ run: <T>(operation: () => Promise<T>) => runTaskActionRequest(() =>
+ decision.run ? decision.run(operation) : operation()),
+ };
+ });
+}
+
/** Host lifecycle only: durable completion delivery is not another invocation
* of the tool that started the task. Its caller must validate the persisted
* delegation/run and recipient; this does not authorize any Agent task action. */
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts
index 2dd2ec52d0..a7f03339a3 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import { readChannelToolScope } from '../im/shared/channelToolScope.js';
import { BUILTIN_ROUTINE_SCHEDULE_PREFIX } from '../../shared/botAutonomy.js';
import {
admitTaskAction,
+ isolateTaskActionAuthorizer,
createTaskActionAuthorizer,
DELEGATED_TASK_ACTIONS,
NEEDS_OWNER_REQUEST,
@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
scheduleId: origin?.kind === 'scheduler' ? origin.scheduleId : undefined,
});
};
- return async (call) => {
+ return isolateTaskActionAuthorizer(async (call) => {
if ((call.server === 'cindy_helper' && TEAMMATE_STANDING_GRANT_TOOLS.has(call.tool))
|| (call.server === 'cindy_scheduler' && TEAMMATE_SCHEDULER_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.tool))) {
if (!call.sessionId) return { ok: true };
@@ -472,5 +473,5 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
})(call);
return rejectedDecision ?? (decision.ok && admittedScope
? admitTaskAction(call, admittedScope, fingerprint) : decision);
- };
+ });
}
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/__tests__/codexHttpBridge.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/__tests__/codexHttpBridge.test.ts
index bd6c080f78..3b4c72a8de 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/__tests__/codexHttpBridge.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/__tests__/codexHttpBridge.test.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
import { createXdtHelperMcpServer, getLiziMcpSessionContext } from '@cindy/mcps';
import type { Logger } from '@cindy/maker-core';
+import { withToolCallAuthority } from '../../../../../../packages/lizi-mcps/src/tool-call-authority.js';
+import { admitTaskAction, assertTaskActionCurrent, createTaskActionAuthorizer, hasTaskActionAuthorization } from '../../maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.js';
import {
computeRemoteMcpFingerprint,
selectRemoteInjectableServerNames,
@@ -158,6 +160,77 @@ describe('codexHttpBridge', () => {
bridge = null;
});
+ // Regression: lazy bridge startup inside an admitted action must not attach that
+ // action to later requests. Existing routing tests started outside any action.
+ // Real HTTP/MCP entry, loopback ephemeral port, unit tier; no account or device IO.
+ it('isolates a stale bridge creator while enforcing each current tool authorization', async () => {
+ let creatorCurrent = true;
+ let allowCurrent = true;
+ let guardedCurrent = false;
+ let currentValid = true;
+ const authorize = createTaskActionAuthorizer({
+ capture: async () => guardedCurrent || !allowCurrent ? {
+ key: 'current-input', ownerInput: false, delegated: allowCurrent,
+ assertCurrent: async () => {
+ if (!currentValid) throw new Error('current-call-revoked');
+ },
+ } : null,
+ confirm: async () => false,
+ });
+ const creator = await admitTaskAction({
+ sessionId: 'bridge-creator', server: 'cindy_helper', tool: 'send_to_session', args: {},
+ }, {
+ key: 'creator-input', ownerInput: true, delegated: false,
+ assertCurrent: async () => {
+ if (!creatorCurrent) throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ },
+ });
+ if (!creator.ok || !creator.run) throw new Error('missing creator admission');
+ bridge = await creator.run(() => startCodexHttpBridge({
+ serverFactories: { cindy_helper: () => {
+ const server = createTestServer();
+ server.tool('send_to_session', {}, async () => withToolCallAuthority(authorize, {
+ sessionId: getLiziMcpSessionContext()?.sessionId,
+ server: 'cindy_helper', tool: 'send_to_session', args: {},
+ }, async () => {
+ await assertTaskActionCurrent();
+ return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: hasTaskActionAuthorization()
+ ? 'current-admission' : 'ordinary-current-call' }] };
+ }));
+ return server;
+ } }, logger: noopLogger(),
+ }));
+ creatorCurrent = false;
+ const current = bridge;
+ current.registerThreadContext('current-thread', {
+ agentKind: 'codex', sessionId: 'current-task', workingDir: '/test',
+ });
+ const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+ authorization: `Bearer ${current.token}`, accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream',
+ 'content-type': 'application/json',
+ };
+ let id = 0;
+ const request = (method: string, params: unknown) => fetch(current.url('cindy_helper'), {
+ method: 'POST', headers, body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: ++id, method, params }),
+ });
+ const initialized = await request('initialize', {
+ protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'auth-test', version: '1' },
+ });
+ headers['mcp-session-id'] = initialized.headers.get('mcp-session-id')!;
+ await initialized.text();
+ const invoke = async () => readRpcResponse(await request('tools/call', {
+ name: 'send_to_session', arguments: {}, _meta: { threadId: 'current-thread' },
+ }));
+ expect(await invoke()).toMatchObject({ result: { content: [{ text: 'ordinary-current-call' }] } });
+ allowCurrent = false;
+ expect(JSON.stringify(await invoke())).toContain('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED');
+ allowCurrent = true;
+ guardedCurrent = true;
+ expect(await invoke()).toMatchObject({ result: { content: [{ text: 'current-admission' }] } });
+ currentValid = false;
+ expect(JSON.stringify(await invoke())).toContain('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ });
+
it('scopes startup tools/list before thread registration without authorizing execution', async () => {
bridge = await startCodexHttpBridge({
serverFactories: { cindy_helper: () => {
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/codexHttpBridge.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/codexHttpBridge.ts
index a221facafe..f260bd8c02 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/codexHttpBridge.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/codexHttpBridge.ts
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import {
} from './codexMcpThreadContextStore.js';
import { isFrozenBuiltinPluginAllowed, isFrozenMcpServerAllowed } from './codexBuiltinToolPolicy.js';
import { appServerIds } from '../mcp-apps/runtime.js';
+import { runTaskActionRequest } from '../maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.js';
const SERVER_HEADER = 'Lizi_MCPS/1.0';
const MCP_PATH_PREFIX = '/mcp/';
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ export async function startCodexHttpBridge(
const sessionTokenBySessionId = new Map<string, { token: string; generation: number }>();
let nextTokenGeneration = 0;
- const httpServer = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
+ const httpServer = http.createServer((req, res) => runTaskActionRequest(async () => {
res.setHeader('Server', SERVER_HEADER);
try {
@@ -419,7 +420,7 @@ export async function startCodexHttpBridge(
res.end(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Internal server error');
}
}
- });
+ }));
// streamable-http 是长连接 SSE 流;默认 5s keep-alive 会切断 codex 连接。
httpServer.keepAliveTimeout = 0;
diff --git a/docs/product-rules/agent-user-parity.md b/docs/product-rules/agent-user-parity.md
index c4025962d9..a736615106 100644
--- a/docs/product-rules/agent-user-parity.md
+++ b/docs/product-rules/agent-user-parity.md
@@ -143,3 +143,10 @@ Host 不因当前输入缺少主人标记再追加行动同意判定。只认运
已有委托的执行权不依赖自动观察规则的开关;仅凭普通 Orca Lead 的当前 team 回报只延续原 team 范围。
跨电脑任务互发要求双方支持
行动回执,旧端明确提示不支持;未增加观察数据权限。实机多端验收仍待完成。
+
+2026-10-24 修订:每个独立 MCP 请求隔离启动共享传输时遗留的行动上下文,
+再按绑定的当前调用方执行原有权限判定;进程内调用沿同一隔离边界。
+普通任务获准后不继承旧调用的行动证据,也不因此强制排队。
+当前调用的委托、权限撤销和延迟交付检查继续保留;不恢复过期授权,不自动重发。
+实现见 `maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts`、`taskActionHost.ts` 与
+`mcp-integrations/codexHttpBridge.ts`;回归见各自授权及 HTTP 桥接测试。