Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。
TypeScript agentai-agentai-assistantandroidclaude-codecodexelectroniosllmmacosreact-nativetypescriptwindows
fix(plugins): review delegated scope before trusted MCP shortcuts
Dashd6e1d3cb4cf7
diff --git a/docs/dev-rules/plugin-task-api-implementation.md b/docs/dev-rules/plugin-task-api-implementation.mdindex 3d85f337b0..6671e38913 100644--- a/docs/dev-rules/plugin-task-api-implementation.md+++ b/docs/dev-rules/plugin-task-api-implementation.md@@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ Host 只接受经绑定插件身份写入的自有创建收据;已登记计划明确带任务范围的所有动作(包括读取)均检查范围;不会仅凭工作目录安全而忽略插件的禁读条款。明确的 Host 续行凭据在 SQL 限量前过滤,避免频繁协调消息挤走真实用户限制;空字符串凭据仍保留,因为用户只发送附件时也可能没有文字。用户消息携带新资源时,沿用普通任务规则,先清除旧指代授权再追加该行可信原话;不以可编辑的 origin 判定作者。缺凭据的旧卡片保守标记历史不完整。+Host 信任的 MCP 工具也先经过现有委派上下文复核;只有复核后的普通任务可跳过模型审阅。+同一判据覆盖 Claude 本地/SSH、Codex MCP elicitation/Host dynamic tool、Pi 主进程/持久子代理;+保留真实工具参数、审阅前后 Host 核验及最后的意图/缓存/目录时效检查。+Host 快捷放行标志计入既有审阅缓存键;Pi 子代理未成功投递的 Auto allow 再次投递前重走现有核验,+不把旧决定当成持久授权。普通任务的可信 MCP 快捷放行、非 Auto 档位及故障 ask/unavailable 语义保持。+验证入口:`pluginTaskReviewContext.test.ts`、`pluginTaskService.test.ts`、`taskSlot.test.ts`、`auto-review-context.test.ts`、Pi/Claude Code 审批接线回归以及 `eval-auto-approval.mts` 的`delegated-*` 正反对照(后者需要真实审阅模型,当前拆分 PR 未运行付费验证)。主机身份校验是确定性边界,动作与任务是否相符仍由 Auto 审阅,diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/__tests__/mcp-approval-policy.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/__tests__/mcp-approval-policy.test.tsindex 688248a666..804dc3f000 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/__tests__/mcp-approval-policy.test.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/__tests__/mcp-approval-policy.test.ts@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import type {TurnPermissionPolicy,} from '../../base-agent.js';import type { PermissionMode } from '../../../types/common.js';+import type { AutoReviewRequest } from '../../shared/auto-review-decision.js';import type { CapabilityRoutingPolicy } from '../../../types/capability-routing.js';import type { AuthAdapter } from '../../../interfaces/auth-adapter.js';import type { InteractionDecision, InteractionRequest } from '../../../types/events.js';@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ async function startSession(}>;turnChangeCapture?: AgentDeps['turnChangeCapture'];getMcpToolApprovalPresentation?: AgentDeps['getMcpToolApprovalPresentation'];+ reviewAutoPermissionAction?: AgentDeps['reviewAutoPermissionAction'];resolveClaudeSubagentModelAccess?: AgentDeps['resolveClaudeSubagentModelAccess'];resolveVerifiedContextWindow?: AgentDeps['resolveVerifiedContextWindow'];availableModels?: NonNullable<AgentDeps['capabilityAdditions']>['availableModels'];@@ -227,6 +229,7 @@ async function startSession(deps.capabilityRouting = options?.capabilityRouting;deps.turnChangeCapture = options?.turnChangeCapture;deps.getMcpToolApprovalPresentation = options?.getMcpToolApprovalPresentation;+ deps.reviewAutoPermissionAction = options?.reviewAutoPermissionAction;deps.resolveClaudeSubagentModelAccess = options?.resolveClaudeSubagentModelAccess;deps.resolveVerifiedContextWindow = options?.resolveVerifiedContextWindow;deps.capabilityAdditions = options?.availableModels@@ -1433,6 +1436,49 @@ describe('remote sessions share the same permission semantics', () => {};}+ describe.each(['local', 'remote'] as const)('delegated trusted MCP %s', (transport) => {+ it.each(['ordinary', 'allow', 'block', 'ask', 'revoked', 'unavailable', 'late-revoke', 'late-scope'] as const)(+ 'keeps live authorization before the Host shortcut: %s', async (scenario) => {+ let active = scenario !== 'revoked';+ let revision = 'scope-1';+ const review = Object.assign(vi.fn(async (_request: AutoReviewRequest) => {+ if (scenario === 'late-revoke') active = false;+ if (scenario === 'late-scope') revision = 'scope-2';+ return { verdict: scenario === 'block' ? 'block' as const : scenario === 'ask' ? 'ask' as const : 'allow' as const };+ }), {+ prepareRequest: vi.fn(async (request: AutoReviewRequest): Promise<AutoReviewRequest> => {+ if (scenario === 'unavailable') throw new Error('storage unavailable');+ if (scenario === 'ordinary') return request;+ return active ? { ...request, delegatedTask: { source: 'approved-plugin', pluginId: 'eval', role: 'worker',+ task: 'Run the approved evaluation only', workingDir: request.workspaceRoots[0], authorizationRevision: revision } }+ : { ...request, authorizationError: 'Plugin authorization revoked' };+ }),+ });+ const deny = (): InteractionDecision => ({ kind: 'permission', behavior: 'deny' });+ const session = transport === 'local'+ ? await startSession(() => 'auto-approve', { permissionMode: 'auto', mcpServerNames: ['cindy_scheduler'], reviewAutoPermissionAction: review, decide: deny })+ : await startRemoteSession(() => 'auto-approve', { permissionMode: 'auto', mcpServerNames: ['cindy_scheduler'], reviewAutoPermissionAction: review, attachResolver: deny });+ try {+ await session.handle.send({ type: 'user', content: 'Run this evaluation; do not create schedules.' });+ const toolName = 'mcp__cindy_scheduler__call_tool';+ const input = { name: 'schedule_create', args: { prompt: 'outside task scope' } };+ const result = 'canUseTool' in session+ ? await session.canUseTool(toolName, input, { toolUseID: 'delegated-mcp' })+ : await session.onApprovalRequest({ requestId: 'delegated-mcp', kind: 'permission', toolName, input });+ expect(result.behavior).toBe(['ordinary', 'allow'].includes(scenario) ? 'allow' : 'deny');+ expect(review.prepareRequest).toHaveBeenCalled();+ expect(review).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ordinary', 'revoked', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 0 : 1);+ expect(session.seen).toHaveLength(['ask', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 1 : 0);+ if (review.mock.calls.length) {+ const request = review.mock.calls[0][0];+ expect(request.delegatedTask?.pluginId).toBe('eval');+ expect(JSON.parse((request.action as { description: string }).description)).toMatchObject({ toolName, input });+ }+ } finally { await session.handle.close(); }+ },+ );+ });+it.each(['http', 'sse'] as const)('forwards a selected custom %s MCP to a remote Bot without the host bridge', async (transport) => {process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR = await makeTempDir();const workingDir = await makeTempDir();diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/index.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/index.tsindex d7a7423bba..39a81172ee 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/index.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/claude-code/index.ts@@ -2399,7 +2399,7 @@ export class ClaudeCodeAgent extends BaseAgent {: normalizedAction;const directorySensitivePermission = builtinReviewAction?.kind === 'read'|| builtinReviewAction?.kind === 'file-write';- if (mutablePermissionMode === 'auto' && (mcpApprovalPolicy !== 'auto-approve' || turnPolicyForcePrompt)) {+ if (mutablePermissionMode === 'auto') {const workspaceRoots = [opts.workingDir, ...mutableExtraDirs, ...mutableWritableDirs].filter((d): d is string => typeof d === 'string' && d.length > 0,);@@ -2434,6 +2434,7 @@ export class ClaudeCodeAgent extends BaseAgent {workspaceRoots,writableRoots,opts.remoteHostId ? 'linux' : process.platform,+ mcpApprovalPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt,);// 热切换收口:reviewAutoAction 是 async,期间 setPermissionMode 可能收紧(Auto→Ask)// 或放宽(→Full)。必须按**最新**档位决策,否则进入审查前的旧 auto 档 allow 会绕过用户@@ -2718,6 +2719,7 @@ export class ClaudeCodeAgent extends BaseAgent {workspaceRoots: string[],writableRoots: string[],platform: NodeJS.Platform,+ hostAutoApprove = false,): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => {const directoryGeneration = autoReviewDirectoryGeneration;const request = {@@ -2739,11 +2741,12 @@ export class ClaudeCodeAgent extends BaseAgent {if (request.userIntent !== currentAutoReviewIntent || request.authorizationContext !== (currentAutoReviewAuthority ?? undefined)) {return Promise.resolve({ verdict: 'block', reason: 'User instructions changed; retry against the current request.' });}- key = JSON.stringify(prepared);+ key = JSON.stringify([prepared, hostAutoApprove]);const cached = autoReviewDecisionCache.get(key);pending = cached ?? resolveAutoReviewDecision(prepared,this.deps.reviewAutoPermissionAction,+ hostAutoApprove,);if (!cached) autoReviewDecisionCache.set(key, pending);return pending;@@ -3699,10 +3702,7 @@ export class ClaudeCodeAgent extends BaseAgent {);let remoteForcePrompt = mutablePermissionMode !== 'auto' && remoteTurnPolicyForcePrompt;let remoteUnavailableHandoff = false;- if (- mutablePermissionMode === 'auto'- && (remoteMcpPolicy !== 'auto-approve' || remoteTurnPolicyForcePrompt)- ) {+ if (mutablePermissionMode === 'auto') {const normalizedAction = normalizeBuiltinToolForAutoReview(remoteToolName, params.input ?? {});const action = normalizedAction.kind === 'other'? toolAutoReviewAction(remoteToolName, params.input ?? {}, remoteHostApprovalPresentation?.description)@@ -3721,6 +3721,7 @@ export class ClaudeCodeAgent extends BaseAgent {(d): d is string => typeof d === 'string' && d.length > 0,),'linux',+ remoteMcpPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !remoteTurnPolicyForcePrompt,);const modeAfterReview = mutablePermissionMode as PermissionMode;if (isPlanToolBlocked(remoteToolName)) {diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.test.tsindex 8fdd988fc4..98e066cf73 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.test.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.test.ts@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import {AUTO_REVIEW_UNAVAILABLE_METADATA_KEY,AUTO_REVIEW_UNAVAILABLE_PROMPT_TEXT,type AutoReviewDelegate,+ type AutoReviewRequest,} from '../shared/auto-review-decision.js';type AgentEvent = Omit<CoreAgentEvent, 'data'> & { data: any };@@ -16979,6 +16980,58 @@ describe('CodexAgent MCP thread context hooks', () => {await fullHandle.close();});+ describe.each(['mcp', 'dynamic'] as const)('delegated trusted MCP %s', (kind) => {+ it.each(['ordinary', 'allow', 'block', 'ask', 'revoked', 'unavailable', 'late-revoke', 'late-scope'] as const)('keeps live authorization before the Host shortcut: %s', async (scenario) => {+ let active = scenario !== 'revoked';+ let revision = 'scope-1';+ const reviewer = Object.assign(vi.fn(async (_request: AutoReviewRequest) => {+ if (scenario === 'late-revoke') active = false;+ if (scenario === 'late-scope') revision = 'scope-2';+ return { verdict: scenario === 'block' ? 'block' as const : scenario === 'ask' ? 'ask' as const : 'allow' as const };+ }), { prepareRequest: vi.fn(async (request: AutoReviewRequest): Promise<AutoReviewRequest> => {+ if (scenario === 'unavailable') throw new Error('Host storage unavailable');+ if (scenario === 'ordinary') return request;+ return active ? { ...request, delegatedTask: { source: 'approved-plugin', pluginId: 'eval', role: 'worker',+ task: 'Run the approved evaluation only', workingDir: '/repo', authorizationRevision: revision } }+ : { ...request, authorizationError: 'Plugin authorization revoked' };+ }) });+ const callTool = vi.fn(async () => ({ contentItems: [], success: true }));+ const agent = new CodexAgent(createDeps({}, {+ reviewAutoPermissionAction: reviewer,+ getMcpToolApprovalPolicy: () => 'auto-approve',+ codexHostDynamicToolProvider: {+ listTools: () => [{ type: 'function' as const, name: 'cindy_scheduler__call_tool', description: 'Scheduler', inputSchema: { type: 'object' }, deferLoading: false }],+ callTool,+ },+ }));+ const host = installFakeHost(agent, (method) => method === Method.TurnStart ? { turn: { id: 'delegated-turn' } } : undefined);+ const handle = await agent.startSession({ sessionId: `delegated-mcp-${kind}-${scenario}`, model: 'gpt-5.5', providerId: 'openai', workingDir: '/repo', permissionMode: 'auto' });+ try {+ const resolver = vi.fn(async (): Promise<InteractionDecision> => ({ kind: 'permission', behavior: 'deny' }));+ handle.setInteractionResolver(resolver);+ await handle.send({ type: 'user', content: 'Run this evaluation; do not create schedules.' });+ const h = host.getThreadHandlers();+ if (!h?.mcpServerElicitation || !h.dynamicToolCall) throw new Error('missing MCP handlers');+ h.turnStarted?.({ threadId: 'start-thread-id', turn: { id: 'delegated-turn' } });+ const input = { name: 'schedule_create', args: { prompt: 'outside task scope' } };+ const result = kind === 'mcp'+ ? await h.mcpServerElicitation({ threadId: 'start-thread-id', turnId: 'delegated-turn', serverName: 'cindy_scheduler', mode: 'form', message: 'Allow tool call', requestedSchema: {},+ _meta: { codex_approval_kind: 'mcp_tool_call', tool_name: 'call_tool', tool_params: input } })+ : await h.dynamicToolCall({ threadId: 'start-thread-id', turnId: 'delegated-turn', callId: 'delegated-call', namespace: null, tool: 'cindy_scheduler__call_tool', arguments: input }, { requestId: 'delegated-dynamic' });+ const allowed = scenario === 'ordinary' || scenario === 'allow';+ expect(result).toMatchObject(kind === 'mcp' ? { action: allowed ? 'accept' : 'decline' } : { success: allowed });+ expect(callTool).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(kind === 'dynamic' && allowed ? 1 : 0);+ expect(reviewer.prepareRequest).toHaveBeenCalled();+ expect(reviewer).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ordinary', 'revoked', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 0 : 1);+ expect(resolver).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ask', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 1 : 0);+ if (reviewer.mock.calls.length) {+ expect(reviewer.mock.calls[0]![0].delegatedTask?.pluginId).toBe('eval');+ expect(JSON.stringify(reviewer.mock.calls[0]![0].action)).toContain('schedule_create');+ }+ } finally { await handle.close(); }+ });+ });+it.each(['command', 'file', 'mcp', 'permissions', 'dynamic'] as const)('revalidates cancelled Auto waits across %s approval callbacks', async (kind) => {for (const lifecycle of ['abort', 'graceful-stop', 'close', 'completed', 'failed', 'superseded', 'child-completed', 'child-root-stopped', 'child-root-completed', 'same-turn-started'] as const) {for (const verdict of ['allow', 'ask'] as const) {diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.tsindex 5612a98ee9..85924b8182 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/codex/index.ts@@ -5631,7 +5631,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();// 关掉抹平 → fail-closed(不把远端 /private/tmp 误当 /tmp 区内)。本地用真实 process.platform。// 定义在此(startSession 作用域,opts=session)以避开 awaitApprovalDecision 内层 opts 的遮蔽。const sessionReviewPlatform: NodeJS.Platform = opts.remoteHostId ? 'linux' : process.platform;- const reviewAutoAction = (action: ReviewableAction): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => {+ const reviewAutoAction = (action: ReviewableAction, hostAutoApprove = false): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => {const directoryGeneration = autoReviewDirectoryGeneration;const request = {sessionId: opts.sessionId,@@ -5659,11 +5659,12 @@ assertRouteCurrent();if (request.userIntent !== currentAutoReviewIntent || request.authorizationContext !== (currentAutoReviewAuthority ?? undefined)) {return Promise.resolve({ verdict: 'block', reason: 'User instructions changed; retry against the current request.' });}- key = JSON.stringify(prepared);+ key = JSON.stringify([prepared, hostAutoApprove]);const cached = autoReviewDecisionCache.get(key);pending = cached ?? resolveAutoReviewDecision(prepared,this.deps.reviewAutoPermissionAction,+ hostAutoApprove,);if (!cached) autoReviewDecisionCache.set(key, pending);return pending;@@ -7792,6 +7793,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();opts?: {forcePrompt?: boolean;autoReviewAction?: ReviewableAction;+ hostAutoApprove?: boolean;itemId?: string;},): Promise<{ decision: ApprovalDecision; reason?: string }> {@@ -7867,6 +7869,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();!opts?.autoReviewAction || (forcePrompt && opts.autoReviewAction.kind !== 'other')? toolAutoReviewAction(req.toolName, req.input, req.description): opts.autoReviewAction,+ opts?.hostAutoApprove === true && !forcePrompt,);} finally {if (pendingApprovals.get(requestId) === reviewEntry) pendingApprovals.delete(requestId);@@ -9286,7 +9289,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();`mcp:${params.serverName}`,policyPermissionInput,);- if (approvalPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt) {+ if (mutablePermissionMode !== 'auto' && approvalPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt) {log.debug('mcp elicitation auto-approved by host policy', {serverName: params.serverName,mode: params.mode,@@ -9325,6 +9328,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();{forcePrompt:turnPolicyForcePrompt || approvalPolicy === 'prompt-each-time',+ hostAutoApprove: approvalPolicy === 'auto-approve',// Display text is not execution evidence. An absent argument payload// must hit the shared missing-evidence denial, never reach AI as a// seemingly complete action made only of server/title/message fields.@@ -9908,7 +9912,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();};const approvalPolicy = classifyMcpToolApprovalPolicy(approvalContext);const hostApprovalPresentation = mcpToolApprovalPresentation(approvalContext);- if (approvalPolicy !== 'auto-approve') {+ if (approvalPolicy !== 'auto-approve' || mutablePermissionMode === 'auto') {const requestId = `dynamic-tool:${serverName}:${params.turnId}:${params.callId}`;const decision = await awaitApprovalDecision(params.threadId,@@ -9928,6 +9932,7 @@ assertRouteCurrent();},{forcePrompt: approvalPolicy === 'prompt-each-time',+ hostAutoApprove: approvalPolicy === 'auto-approve',...(toolUseId ? { itemId: toolUseId } : {}),},);diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-auto-review-dispatch.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-auto-review-dispatch.test.tsindex 5333c96355..af116b4d27 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-auto-review-dispatch.test.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-auto-review-dispatch.test.ts@@ -4667,6 +4667,38 @@ describe('pi auto-review dispatch & spawn config (mocked pi process)', () => {});});+ it.each(['ordinary', 'allow', 'block', 'ask', 'revoked', 'unavailable', 'late-revoke', 'late-scope'] as const)('delegated trusted MCP main keeps live authorization: %s', async (scenario) => {+ let active = scenario !== 'revoked';+ let revision = 'scope-1';+ const review = Object.assign(vi.fn(async (_request: AutoReviewRequest) => {+ if (scenario === 'late-revoke') active = false;+ if (scenario === 'late-scope') revision = 'scope-2';+ return { verdict: scenario === 'block' ? 'block' as const : scenario === 'ask' ? 'ask' as const : 'allow' as const };+ }), { prepareRequest: vi.fn(async (request: AutoReviewRequest): Promise<AutoReviewRequest> => {+ if (scenario === 'unavailable') throw new Error('Host storage unavailable');+ if (scenario === 'ordinary') return request;+ return active ? { ...request, delegatedTask: { source: 'approved-plugin', pluginId: 'eval', role: 'worker',+ task: 'Run the approved evaluation only', workingDir: cwd, authorizationRevision: revision } }+ : { ...request, authorizationError: 'Plugin authorization revoked' };+ }) });+ const handle = await start('auto', review, false, { serverNames: ['cindy_scheduler'], policy: () => 'auto-approve' });+ try {+ const resolver = vi.fn(async () => ({ kind: 'permission', behavior: 'deny' }) as const);+ handle.setInteractionResolver(resolver);+ await handle.send({ type: 'user', content: 'Run this evaluation; do not create schedules.' });+ firePermissionRequest('delegated-mcp', 'mcp__cindy_scheduler__call_tool', { name: 'schedule_create', args: { prompt: 'outside task scope' } });+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(captured.sent).toContainEqual(expect.objectContaining({ type: 'extension_ui_response', id: 'delegated-mcp' })));+ expect(captured.sent).toContainEqual(expect.objectContaining({ id: 'delegated-mcp', confirmed: scenario === 'ordinary' || scenario === 'allow' }));+ expect(review.prepareRequest).toHaveBeenCalled();+ expect(review).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ordinary', 'revoked', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 0 : 1);+ expect(resolver).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ask', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 1 : 0);+ if (review.mock.calls.length) {+ expect(review.mock.calls[0]![0].delegatedTask?.pluginId).toBe('eval');+ expect(JSON.stringify(review.mock.calls[0]![0].action)).toContain('schedule_create');+ }+ } finally { await handle.close(); }+ });+it('reviews actual operations for MCP servers the host policy does not trust', async () => {const review = vi.fn(async () => ({ verdict: 'allow' as const }));const handle = await start('auto', review, false, {diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-startsession-cleanup.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-startsession-cleanup.test.tsindex 75382094cb..275a2d5f10 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-startsession-cleanup.test.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/__tests__/pi-startsession-cleanup.test.ts@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';import path from 'node:path';import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';+import type { AutoReviewRequest } from '../../shared/auto-review-decision.js';// hoisted 控制旋钮:vi.mock 工厂被提升到 import 之上,不能闭包引用普通 let。const knobs = vi.hoisted(() => ({@@ -1103,6 +1104,90 @@ describe('PiAgent.startSession failure cleanup (mocked pi process)', () => {expect(proxyDisposed).toBe(2);});+ it.each(['ordinary', 'allow', 'block', 'ask', 'revoked', 'unavailable', 'late-revoke', 'late-scope'] as const)('delegated trusted MCP child keeps live authorization: %s', async (scenario) => {+ let active = scenario !== 'revoked';+ let revision = 'scope-1';+ const review = Object.assign(vi.fn(async (_request: AutoReviewRequest) => {+ if (scenario === 'late-revoke') active = false;+ if (scenario === 'late-scope') revision = 'scope-2';+ return { verdict: scenario === 'block' ? 'block' as const : scenario === 'ask' ? 'ask' as const : 'allow' as const };+ }), { prepareRequest: vi.fn(async (request: AutoReviewRequest): Promise<AutoReviewRequest> => {+ if (scenario === 'unavailable') throw new Error('Host storage unavailable');+ if (scenario === 'ordinary') return request;+ return active ? { ...request, delegatedTask: { source: 'approved-plugin', pluginId: 'eval', role: 'worker',+ task: 'Run the approved evaluation only', workingDir: cwd, authorizationRevision: revision } }+ : { ...request, authorizationError: 'Plugin authorization revoked' };+ }) });+ const run = pendingSubagentRun({ toolName: 'mcp__cindy_scheduler__call_tool', input: { name: 'schedule_create', args: { prompt: 'outside task scope' } } }, {}, 'input');+ const discovery = deferSubagentDiscovery(run);+ const control = vi.spyOn(piSubagentRuns, 'controlPiSubagentRuns').mockResolvedValue(1);+ const deps = buildDeps({ reviewAutoPermissionAction: review, getMcpToolApprovalPolicy: () => 'auto-approve' });+ const prepareSpawn = deps.preparePiExtraSpawnConfig!;+ deps.preparePiExtraSpawnConfig = async (...args) => {+ const prepared = await prepareSpawn(...args);+ if (!prepared?.mcpBridge) throw new Error('missing MCP bridge fixture');+ return { ...prepared, mcpBridge: { ...prepared.mcpBridge, servers: [{ name: 'cindy_scheduler', url: 'http://127.0.0.1:4567/mcp' }] } };+ };+ const handle = await new PiAgent(deps).startSession({ ...opts(), permissionMode: 'auto' });+ try {+ const resolver = vi.fn(async () => ({ kind: 'permission', behavior: 'deny' }) as const);+ handle.setInteractionResolver(resolver);+ await handle.send({ type: 'user', content: 'Run this evaluation; do not create schedules.' });+ discovery.publish();+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(control).toHaveBeenCalled(), { timeout: 3_000 });+ expect(control).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(String), run.taskId, 'approval', expect.objectContaining({ value:+ scenario === 'ordinary' || scenario === 'allow' ? 'allow' : ['ask', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 'user-deny' : expect.stringMatching(/^auto-review-deny(?::|$)/) }));+ expect(review.prepareRequest).toHaveBeenCalled();+ expect(review).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ordinary', 'revoked', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 0 : 1);+ expect(resolver).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ask', 'unavailable'].includes(scenario) ? 1 : 0);+ if (review.mock.calls.length) {+ expect(review.mock.calls[0]![0].delegatedTask?.pluginId).toBe('eval');+ expect(JSON.stringify(review.mock.calls[0]![0].action)).toContain('schedule_create');+ }+ } finally { discovery.clear(); await handle.close(); }+ });++ it.each((['zero', 'throw'] as const).flatMap((failure) =>+ (['allow-revoked', 'allow-current', 'ask', 'unavailable', 'control-plane'] as const).map((scenario) => ({ failure, scenario })),+ ))('delegated trusted MCP child rechecks automatic delivery, preserves human confirmation: $failure/$scenario', async ({ failure, scenario }) => {+ let active = true;+ const review = Object.assign(vi.fn(async (_request: AutoReviewRequest) => ({ verdict: scenario === 'ask' ? 'ask' as const : 'allow' as const })), {+ prepareRequest: vi.fn(async (request: AutoReviewRequest): Promise<AutoReviewRequest> => {+ if (scenario === 'unavailable') throw new Error('Host storage unavailable');+ return active ? { ...request, delegatedTask: { source: 'approved-plugin', pluginId: 'eval', role: 'worker',+ task: 'Run the approved evaluation only', workingDir: cwd, authorizationRevision: 'scope-1' } }+ : { ...request, authorizationError: 'Plugin authorization revoked' };+ }),+ });+ const run = pendingSubagentRun({ toolName: 'mcp__cindy_scheduler__call_tool', input: { name: 'schedule_create', args: {} }, controlPlaneWrite: scenario === 'control-plane' }, {}, 'input');+ const discovery = deferSubagentDiscovery(run);+ const control = vi.spyOn(piSubagentRuns, 'controlPiSubagentRuns').mockImplementationOnce(async () => {+ if (scenario === 'allow-revoked') active = false;+ if (failure === 'throw') throw new Error('mailbox write failed');+ return 0;+ }).mockResolvedValue(1);+ const deps = buildDeps({ reviewAutoPermissionAction: review, getMcpToolApprovalPolicy: () => 'auto-approve' });+ const prepareSpawn = deps.preparePiExtraSpawnConfig!;+ deps.preparePiExtraSpawnConfig = async (...args) => {+ const prepared = await prepareSpawn(...args);+ if (!prepared?.mcpBridge) throw new Error('missing MCP bridge fixture');+ return { ...prepared, mcpBridge: { ...prepared.mcpBridge, servers: [{ name: 'cindy_scheduler', url: 'http://127.0.0.1:4567/mcp' }] } };+ };+ const handle = await new PiAgent(deps).startSession({ ...opts(), permissionMode: 'auto' });+ try {+ const resolver = vi.fn(async () => ({ kind: 'permission', behavior: 'allow' }) as const);+ handle.setInteractionResolver(resolver);+ await handle.send({ type: 'user', content: 'Run the approved evaluation.' });+ discovery.publish();+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(control).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2), { timeout: 3_000 });+ expect(control.mock.calls[0]?.[3]).toMatchObject({ value: 'allow' });+ expect(control.mock.calls[1]?.[3]).toMatchObject({ value: scenario === 'allow-revoked'+ ? expect.stringContaining('auto-review-deny:Plugin authorization revoked') : 'allow' });+ expect(review).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['unavailable', 'control-plane'].includes(scenario) ? 0 : 1);+ expect(resolver).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(['ask', 'unavailable', 'control-plane'].includes(scenario) ? 1 : 0);+ } finally { discovery.clear(); await handle.close(); }+ });+it('refuses to deliver an answer decided before the boundary but ready after it', async () => {// Auto-review reaches the mailbox without ever touching a user surface, so// the offer is not parked when the session closes — it simply finishes itsdiff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/index.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/index.tsindex a5bd761010..e8f39f4c72 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/index.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/pi/index.ts@@ -3931,7 +3931,7 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {};const autoReviewUnavailableNotice = createAutoReviewUnavailableNotice(emitAutoReviewRuntimeNotice);const autoReviewConfirmUndeliveredNotice = createAutoReviewConfirmUndeliveredNotice(emitAutoReviewRuntimeNotice);- const reviewAutoAction = (action: ReviewableAction): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => {+ const reviewAutoAction = (action: ReviewableAction, hostAutoApprove = false): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => {// Directory grants become active only after their permission snapshot is// durable. While persistence is pending, neither the requested roots nor// the old runtime roots are a complete authorization view, so fail closed@@ -3965,10 +3965,10 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {if (request.userIntent !== currentAutoReviewIntent || request.authorizationContext !== (currentAutoReviewAuthority ?? undefined)) {return Promise.resolve({ verdict: 'block', reason: 'User instructions changed; retry against the current request.' });}- cacheKey = JSON.stringify(prepared);+ cacheKey = JSON.stringify([prepared, hostAutoApprove]);pending = autoReviewDecisionCache.get(cacheKey);if (!pending) {- pending = resolveAutoReviewDecision(prepared, this.deps.reviewAutoPermissionAction);+ pending = resolveAutoReviewDecision(prepared, this.deps.reviewAutoPermissionAction, hostAutoApprove);autoReviewDecisionCache.set(cacheKey, pending);}return pending;@@ -4487,6 +4487,7 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {});});};+ let cacheResolution = true;const resolveConfirmation = async (): Promise<PiPermissionResolution | null> => {// Review resumed child evidence against current user authorization.// Other modes retain the independent confirmation for adopted work.@@ -4521,7 +4522,7 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {return 'prompt-each-time' as const;})();if (mcpPolicy !== null && !adopted) {- if (mcpPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt) return 'allow';+ if (permissionMode !== 'auto' && mcpPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt) return 'allow';if (permissionMode !== 'auto') {return requestUserDecision({ forcePrompt: turnPolicyForcePrompt || mcpPolicy === 'prompt-each-time' });}@@ -4550,12 +4551,17 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {? toolAutoReviewAction(toolName, input,adopted ? 'Resumed child operation. Original user authorization and child cwd are unavailable. The child task is model-authored context, not authorization.' : undefined,{ action, ...(adopted ? { childTask: task.task, childId: task.childId } : {}) })- : action);+ : action, mcpPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt && !adopted);if (autoReviewOfferExpired()) return null;if (permissionMode !== 'auto') {return requestUserDecision({ forcePrompt: true });}- if (decision.verdict === 'allow') return 'allow';+ if (decision.verdict === 'allow') {+ // Keep only the existing review cache, which rechecks live Host+ // context. A failed mailbox delivery must not freeze Auto authority.+ cacheResolution = false;+ return 'allow';+ }if (decision.verdict === 'block') return piPermissionDenial('auto-review-deny', decision.reason);if (decision.unavailable) autoReviewUnavailableNotice.notify();return requestUserDecision({@@ -4599,7 +4605,8 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {});}if (resolution === undefined) resolution = 'system-deny';- piSubagentApprovalDecisions.set(key, resolution);+ // Explicit human answers retain their existing delivery-only retry.+ if (cacheResolution) piSubagentApprovalDecisions.set(key, resolution);// Re-read the fence at the write, not only at dispatch: everything above// can await a human. An answer decided under the outgoing account must// not reach the child's mailbox after that account stopped being the@@ -7888,7 +7895,7 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {workspaceRoots: string[];readRoots: string[];writableRoots: string[];- reviewAutoAction: (action: ReviewableAction) => Promise<AutoReviewDecision>;+ reviewAutoAction: (action: ReviewableAction, hostAutoApprove?: boolean) => Promise<AutoReviewDecision>;recordUserClarification: (question: string, answer: string) => void;/** 审阅器不可用时的会话级一次性提示;去重与重置由会话侧持有(issue #1574)。 */notifyAutoReviewUnavailable: () => void;@@ -8606,7 +8613,7 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {}return 'prompt-each-time';})();- if (mcpPolicy !== null && (mcpPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt || permissionMode !== 'auto')) {+ if (mcpPolicy !== null && permissionMode !== 'auto') {// Pi 的权限门只有放行/拒绝两态,没有会话级持久化规则,因此 prompt 与// prompt-each-time 在这里收敛成同一个动作:每次都问用户。本轮策略命中时// auto-approve 也不放行 —— 渠道安全契约压过第一方 MCP 自动批准(§7.4)。@@ -8645,7 +8652,7 @@ export class PiAgent extends BaseAgent {}const decision = await reviewAutoAction(turnPolicyForcePrompt? toolAutoReviewAction(toolName, input, hostApprovalPresentation?.description, action)- : action);+ : action, mcpPolicy === 'auto-approve' && !turnPolicyForcePrompt);// 权限热切换:reviewAutoAction 是 async 的,期间用户可能改档。按**最新**档位收口,// 不能用进入审查前捕获的旧 auto 档直接放行(Pi 明确支持热切换,codex review P1):// - 已收紧到 ask(或其它非 auto/bypass)→ 破坏性调用即便 verdict=allow 也必须走diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review-decision.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review-decision.tsindex 81f9c4aa38..6dcb46d2a1 100644--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review-decision.ts+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review-decision.ts@@ -472,7 +472,11 @@ function oversizedReviewEvidence(action: ReviewableAction): string | null {export async function resolveAutoReviewDecision(request: AutoReviewRequest,delegate: AutoReviewDelegate | undefined,+ hostAutoApprove = false,): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> {+ // Host trust skips model review only after live context preparation has+ // established that this is not a delegated task with a narrower scope.+ if (hostAutoApprove && !request.delegatedTask) return { verdict: 'allow' };// Bound untrusted input before the static classifier's command/path parsers,// not merely before the model request. Neither may inspect an oversized action.const oversizedEvidenceReason = oversizedReviewEvidence(request.action);