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Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。

fix(teammates): bind approvals to pending requests and routine revisions

Chrise0121b41eb97
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts
index 9a1a76087a..3484e605d7 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {
createTaskActionAuthorizer,
taskActionInputGuard,
taskActionPrincipal,
+ taskActionRoutineRevision,
hasTaskActionAuthorization,
TASK_ACTION_TOOLS,
ORCA_TASK_ACTION_TOOLS,
@@ -290,10 +291,34 @@ function desktopFixture(kind: 'private' | 'group' | 'automatic' = 'group') {
reviewHostPermissionAction: vi.fn(async (): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => ({ verdict: 'allow' })),
};
const getSession = vi.fn((): typeof runtime | undefined => runtime);
+ const permissionRequest = { requestId: 'permission-1', kind: 'permission',
+ toolName: 'bash', input: { command: 'echo reviewed' } };
+ const capturePermissionRequest = vi.fn(async () => {
+ const request = structuredClone(permissionRequest);
+ return {
+ details: { task: { id: 'own', title: 'Child task' }, request },
+ assertCurrent() {
+ if (JSON.stringify(permissionRequest) !== JSON.stringify(request))
+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ },
+ };
+ });
+ const routines = new Map<string, { enabled: boolean; revision: number }>();
const authorize = createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer({
input: () => ({ ...activeInput }), confirm, getSession,
+ capturePermissionRequest,
+ captureRoutine: async (_botId, id) => {
+ const row = routines.get(id);
+ if (!row) return undefined;
+ const captured = { ...row };
+ return { ...captured, assertCurrent() {
+ if (routines.get(id)?.revision !== captured.revision)
+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ } };
+ },
});
- return { authorize, confirm, activeInput, caller, rows, runtime, getSession };
+ return { authorize, confirm, activeInput, caller, rows, runtime, getSession,
+ permissionRequest, capturePermissionRequest, routines };
}
const ownerWrites = [
['cindy_helper', 'start_session_task'],
@@ -894,6 +919,62 @@ describe('teammate turn principal', () => {
expect(effect).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
+ // Review #7782: approval must describe and bind the child's exact request, not
+ // whichever request is current after the parent card is answered. Unit tier.
+ it.each(['request-id', 'arguments'] as const)('expires a permission answer when child %s changes', async change => {
+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');
+ live(h);
+ h.confirm.mockImplementation(async () => {
+ if (change === 'request-id') h.permissionRequest.requestId = 'permission-2';
+ else h.permissionRequest.input.command = 'echo replacement';
+ return true;
+ });
+ const effect = vi.fn(async () => 'approved');
+ const result = await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize,
+ helper('message_session_task', { task_id: 'own', decision: 'approve' }), effect);
+ expect(h.confirm).toHaveBeenCalledWith('companion', 'message_session_task',
+ { task_id: 'own', decision: 'approve' }, expect.objectContaining({ risk: 'permission', details: {
+ task: { id: 'own', title: 'Child task' },
+ request: { requestId: 'permission-1', kind: 'permission', toolName: 'bash', input: { command: 'echo reviewed' } },
+ } }));
+ expect(JSON.stringify(result)).toContain('AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ expect(effect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ // Same save API on helper and scheduler: only an existing disabled->enabled
+ // transition is a resume; ordinary creation/editing remains unchanged.
+ it.each(['cindy_helper', 'cindy_scheduler'] as const)('asks for routine restoration through %s', async server => {
+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');
+ live(h);
+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: false, revision: 3 });
+ const request = { ...helper('routine_save', { botId: 'bot', id: 'saved', enabled: true }), server };
+ expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, request,
+ async () => taskActionRoutineRevision('bot', 'saved'))).toBe(3);
+ expect(h.confirm).toHaveBeenCalledWith('companion', 'routine_save', request.args,
+ { server, risk: 'resume' });
+ h.confirm.mockClear();
+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: true, revision: 4 });
+ expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, request, async () => 'edited')).toBe('edited');
+ expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize,
+ { ...request, args: { botId: 'bot', enabled: true } }, async () => 'created')).toBe('created');
+ expect(h.confirm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ it('does not restore a routine changed during confirmation', async () => {
+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');
+ live(h);
+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: false, revision: 1 });
+ h.confirm.mockImplementation(async () => {
+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: false, revision: 2 });
+ return true;
+ });
+ const effect = vi.fn(async () => 'enabled');
+ const result = await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize,
+ helper('routine_save', { id: 'saved', enabled: true }), effect);
+ expect(JSON.stringify(result)).toContain('AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ expect(effect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
it.each(['deny', 'input-changed', 'permission-changed'] as const)(
'does not execute after confirmation %s', async change => {
const h = desktopFixture('automatic');
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts
index 57d03f3242..a5dc68a022 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts
@@ -3374,7 +3374,7 @@ export async function confirmTaskAction(
title: t('taskActionConfirmation.title'),
description: t(context?.risk ? `taskActionConfirmation.${context.risk}` : 'taskActionConfirmation.once'),
toolName: `mcp__${context?.server ?? 'cindy_helper'}__${tool}`,
- input: structuredClone(args) as Record<string, unknown>,
+ input: structuredClone(context?.details ? { action: args, ...context.details } : args) as Record<string, unknown>,
metadata: { hostOwnedConfirmation: 'task_action' },
};
try {
@@ -3388,6 +3388,27 @@ export async function confirmTaskAction(
}
}
+/** Snapshot the actual child request after the delegation service checks its owner. */
+export async function captureTaskActionPermissionRequest(sessionId: string, taskId: string) {
+ const task = await botDelegationServiceHolder?.getSessionTask(sessionId, taskId);
+ if (!task?.ok || !task.task.session_id || !task.task.pendingInteraction) return null;
+ const childId = task.task.session_id;
+ const requestId = task.task.pendingInteraction.requestId;
+ const pending = getPendingInteractionsForSession(childId).find(entry => entry.request.requestId === requestId);
+ if (!pending || (pending.request.kind !== 'permission' && pending.request.kind !== 'plan_review')) return null;
+ const request = structuredClone(pending.request);
+ const signature = JSON.stringify(request);
+ const child = getMakerIfReady()?.getSession(childId);
+ return {
+ details: { task: { id: taskId, title: task.task.title }, request },
+ assertCurrent() {
+ const current = getPendingInteractionsForSession(childId).find(entry => entry.request.requestId === requestId);
+ if (getMakerIfReady()?.getSession(childId) !== child || !current || JSON.stringify(current.request) !== signature)
+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ },
+ };
+}
+
/**
* ghost_call 过户 workdir 外文件的确认桥(kind='ghost_grant_confirm')。
* 单例挂在 cindy-brain 模块里(ghost.ts 经 getGhostGrantConfirmBridge 消费),
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts
index 4c649d8dd1..40061a6f73 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ export interface TaskActionScope {
key: string;
ownerInput: boolean;
principal?: TaskActionPrincipal;
+ routine?: { botId: string; id: string; revision: number };
/** Existing, explicitly confirmed delegation; never inferred from creator/follower. */
delegated: boolean;
/** Rechecked at mutation/delivery; includes account, target and delegation revocation. */
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ interface ActionContext {
tool: string;
fingerprint: string;
principal?: TaskActionPrincipal;
+ routine?: TaskActionScope['routine'];
assertCurrent(): Promise<void>;
assertCurrentSync?(): void;
assertDeliveryCurrent(): Promise<void>;
@@ -115,15 +117,29 @@ export type TaskActionRisk = 'remove' | 'permission' | 'resume';
export interface TaskActionConfirmation {
server: string;
risk?: TaskActionRisk;
+ details?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+export interface TaskActionTarget {
+ details: Record<string, unknown>;
+ assertCurrent(): void;
+}
+
+export interface TaskActionRoutineSnapshot {
+ enabled: boolean;
+ revision: number;
+ assertCurrent(): void;
}
/** A small, explicit risk list. Everything else follows the task's normal permissions. */
-export function taskActionRisk(call: Pick<Call, 'server' | 'tool' | 'args'>): TaskActionRisk | undefined {
+export function taskActionRisk(call: Pick<Call, 'server' | 'tool' | 'args'>,
+ facts?: { routineEnabled?: boolean }): TaskActionRisk | undefined {
const args = call.args && typeof call.args === 'object' && !Array.isArray(call.args)
? call.args as Record<string, unknown> : {};
if (call.tool === 'routine_delete' || call.tool === 'schedule_delete')
return 'remove';
if (call.tool === 'message_session_task' && args.decision !== undefined) return 'permission';
+ if (call.tool === 'routine_save' && args.enabled === true && facts?.routineEnabled === false) return 'resume';
if ((call.tool === 'message_session_task' && args.mode === 'resume') || call.tool === 'schedule_resume')
return 'resume';
return undefined;
@@ -188,6 +204,7 @@ export async function admitTaskAction(
tool: call.tool,
fingerprint,
principal: scope.principal,
+ routine: scope.routine,
assertCurrent: scope.assertCurrent,
assertCurrentSync: scope.assertCurrentSync,
assertDeliveryCurrent: scope.assertDeliveryCurrent ?? scope.assertCurrent,
@@ -214,6 +231,13 @@ export function taskActionPrincipal(callerSessionId: string): TaskActionPrincipa
return current?.sessionId === callerSessionId ? current.principal : undefined;
}
+/** Keep a saved routine's reviewed state through the service's atomic revision check. */
+export function taskActionRoutineRevision(botId: string, id?: string): number | undefined {
+ const current = actionContext.getStore();
+ return current?.tool === 'routine_save' && current.routine?.botId === botId && current.routine.id === id
+ ? current.routine.revision : undefined;
+}
+
export async function assertTaskActionCurrent(): Promise<void> {
await actionContext.getStore()?.assertCurrent();
}
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts
index 9950003304..3f368b58e1 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ import {
DELEGATED_TASK_ACTIONS,
taskActionRisk,
type TaskActionConfirmation,
+ type TaskActionTarget,
+ type TaskActionRoutineSnapshot,
taskActionFingerprint,
type TaskActionPrincipal,
type TaskActionScope,
@@ -108,6 +110,8 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
};
getSession(sessionId: string): TaskActionSession | undefined;
confirm(sessionId: string, tool: string, args: unknown, context?: TaskActionConfirmation): Promise<boolean>;
+ capturePermissionRequest(sessionId: string, taskId: string): Promise<TaskActionTarget | null>;
+ captureRoutine(botId: string, id: string): Promise<TaskActionRoutineSnapshot | undefined>;
}): ToolCallAuthorizer {
return isolateTaskActionAuthorizer(async (call) => {
// Per invocation: a concurrent automatic call must never inherit owner evidence.
@@ -203,6 +207,21 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
? (call.args as Record<string, unknown>)
: {};
const taskId = typeof args.task_id === 'string' ? args.task_id : undefined;
+ const needsPermissionTarget = principal === 'autonomous' && runtimePermissionApplies &&
+ call.tool === 'message_session_task' && args.decision !== undefined;
+ const permissionTarget = needsPermissionTarget && taskId
+ ? await deps.capturePermissionRequest(sessionId, taskId) : undefined;
+ if (needsPermissionTarget && !permissionTarget) {
+ rejectedDecision = { ok: false, errorCode: 'INTERACTION_STALE',
+ message: 'The target permission request is unavailable. Read the task again before proposing a new decision.' };
+ return null;
+ }
+ const routineBotId = call.server === 'cindy_scheduler' && typeof args.botId === 'string'
+ ? args.botId : caller.botId;
+ const routineId = typeof args.id === 'string' && args.id ? args.id : undefined;
+ const routine = principal === 'autonomous' && runtimePermissionApplies &&
+ call.tool === 'routine_save' && args.enabled === true && routineBotId && routineId
+ ? await deps.captureRoutine(routineBotId, routineId) : undefined;
const readDelegation = async (rechecking = false) => {
if (
!taskId ||
@@ -311,6 +330,8 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
runtime?.assertInputCurrent();
group?.assertCurrent();
assertPermissionCurrent();
+ permissionTarget?.assertCurrent();
+ routine?.assertCurrent();
const current = deps.input(sessionId);
if (
isAppSessionBoundaryPending() || db !== tryGetDbClient() ||
@@ -321,6 +342,8 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
key: input.key,
ownerInput,
principal,
+ ...(routine && routineBotId && routineId
+ ? { routine: { botId: routineBotId, id: routineId, revision: routine.revision } } : {}),
delegated: !!delegation || !!orcaTeam,
assertDeliveryCurrent,
assertCurrentSync,
@@ -334,11 +357,11 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {
// Missing owner provenance no longer disables ordinary work. Only explicit
// risks on autonomous turns need an exact, visible owner decision. The decision
// does not change the principal or grant future calls; admission stays single-use.
- const risk = principal === 'autonomous' ? taskActionRisk(call) : undefined;
+ const risk = principal === 'autonomous' ? taskActionRisk(call, { routineEnabled: routine?.enabled }) : undefined;
if (risk && runtimePermissionApplies) {
await scope.assertCurrent();
const confirmed = await deps.confirm(sessionId, call.tool, structuredClone(call.args),
- { server: call.server, risk });
+ { server: call.server, risk, ...(permissionTarget ? { details: permissionTarget.details } : {}) });
if (!confirmed) {
rejectedDecision = { ok: false, errorCode: 'USER_CANCELLED',
message: 'The action was not approved. Do not execute or retry it without a new request.' };
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts
index 2a60193a4b..c7c0f26097 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import { createMoveSession } from './moveSession.js';
import { listProjects, renameProject, removeProject } from './projectManagement.js';
import { activeOwnerScopeKey, getActiveAppSession, isAppSessionBoundaryPending } from '../appSessionState.js';
import type { createBotCapabilityService } from '../maker-ipc/botCapabilityService.js';
-import { routineTools } from '../routines/service.js';
+import { getRoutineEngine, routineTools } from '../routines/service.js';
+import { taskActionRoutineRevision } from '../maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.js';
import { join as pathJoin } from 'node:path';
import { and, eq, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ import {
getTaskActionInputState,
getTaskActionSession,
confirmTaskAction,
+ captureTaskActionPermissionRequest,
} from '../maker-ipc/register.js';
import { createBotProfile } from '../localDb/ipc/bots.js';
import { submitGithubIssueForSession } from '../github-issue/index.js';
@@ -312,6 +314,19 @@ export function createDesktopMcpProviders(deps: DesktopMcpProvidersDeps): LiziMc
isScopeCurrent: (db) => !isAppSessionBoundaryPending() && db === tryGetDbClient(),
authorizeAction: createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer({
input: getTaskActionInputState, getSession: getTaskActionSession, confirm: confirmTaskAction,
+ capturePermissionRequest: captureTaskActionPermissionRequest,
+ captureRoutine: async (botId, id) => {
+ const engine = await getRoutineEngine();
+ const routine = (await routineTools.list(botId)).find(row => row.id === id);
+ if (!routine) return undefined;
+ return {
+ enabled: routine.enabled, revision: routine.revision,
+ assertCurrent() {
+ if (engine.list(botId).find(row => row.id === id)?.revision !== routine.revision)
+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');
+ },
+ };
+ },
}),
});
// Companion history uses the same account scope as ordinary task history.
@@ -1027,7 +1042,11 @@ export function createDesktopMcpProviders(deps: DesktopMcpProvidersDeps): LiziMc
},
},
botRoutines: {
- service: routineTools,
+ service: {
+ ...routineTools,
+ save: (botId, input, id) => routineTools.save(botId, input, id,
+ taskActionRoutineRevision(botId, id)),
+ },
resolveBotId: async (callerSessionId) => {
const scope = activeOwnerScopeKey();
if (!getActiveAppSession().dataOwnerId || isAppSessionBoundaryPending()) {
diff --git a/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md b/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md
index bab2c332b1..b7ca051cd0 100644
--- a/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md
+++ b/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md
@@ -21,17 +21,21 @@
| --- | --- |
| 删除自动化 | `routine_delete`、`schedule_delete` |
| 代用户回答权限请求 | `message_session_task` 携带 `decision` |
-| 恢复暂停执行 | `message_session_task(mode=resume)`、`schedule_resume` |
+| 恢复暂停执行 | `message_session_task(mode=resume)`、`schedule_resume`,以及 `routine_save` 将已有停用规则保存为启用(含内置规则) |
其余操作不命中风险表就继续现有权限流程。新增普通工具不需要另开“自主解锁”例外。
主人输入、已核实的主人转达和受托指令沿正常权限审核,不再加第二张行动确认卡。
风险表不是平台权限、账号访问或消息来源认证的替代品。
+保存新规则、编辑已启用规则和继续保存为停用不追加恢复确认;以宿主读取的现有状态判断,
+不把全部保存操作升级成风险。恢复许可同时绑定规则版本,确认期间修改规则会使旧许可失效。
## 等待、决定与恢复
- 风险确认进入普通 `Session.runHostInteraction` 和 `requestHostInteraction`,发布等待授权状态,
桌面、同账号手机/远控与已绑定 IM 共用同一请求。卡片说明目标、动作和本次影响,只允许这一次。
- 执行调用等待决定;允许后在原调用继续,无需 Agent 重发。同一次放行只能消费一次。
+- 代答许可展示子任务当前请求的工具、参数(或计划)与请求 ID,绑定该实际请求;
+ 原请求已处理或被新请求替换时,旧卡不能批准新请求。
- 拒绝、取消、停止或任务关闭不执行;晚到回答不恢复旧操作。断线重连读取既有待处理请求,不重新派发操作。
- 同意到执行及延迟投递仍校验账号、实例、输入、权限与 Plan 代次;变更使旧放行失效。
- 来源判定与操作决定分别保留。获准自主操作不会给后续转达生成主人原话凭证。