Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。
TypeScript agentai-agentai-assistantandroidclaude-codecodexelectroniosllmmacosreact-nativetypescriptwindows
fix(teammates): bind approvals to pending requests and routine revisions
Chrise0121b41eb97
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.tsindex 9a1a76087a..3484e605d7 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/__tests__/taskActionAuthorization.test.ts@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {createTaskActionAuthorizer,taskActionInputGuard,taskActionPrincipal,+ taskActionRoutineRevision,hasTaskActionAuthorization,TASK_ACTION_TOOLS,ORCA_TASK_ACTION_TOOLS,@@ -290,10 +291,34 @@ function desktopFixture(kind: 'private' | 'group' | 'automatic' = 'group') {reviewHostPermissionAction: vi.fn(async (): Promise<AutoReviewDecision> => ({ verdict: 'allow' })),};const getSession = vi.fn((): typeof runtime | undefined => runtime);+ const permissionRequest = { requestId: 'permission-1', kind: 'permission',+ toolName: 'bash', input: { command: 'echo reviewed' } };+ const capturePermissionRequest = vi.fn(async () => {+ const request = structuredClone(permissionRequest);+ return {+ details: { task: { id: 'own', title: 'Child task' }, request },+ assertCurrent() {+ if (JSON.stringify(permissionRequest) !== JSON.stringify(request))+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');+ },+ };+ });+ const routines = new Map<string, { enabled: boolean; revision: number }>();const authorize = createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer({input: () => ({ ...activeInput }), confirm, getSession,+ capturePermissionRequest,+ captureRoutine: async (_botId, id) => {+ const row = routines.get(id);+ if (!row) return undefined;+ const captured = { ...row };+ return { ...captured, assertCurrent() {+ if (routines.get(id)?.revision !== captured.revision)+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');+ } };+ },});- return { authorize, confirm, activeInput, caller, rows, runtime, getSession };+ return { authorize, confirm, activeInput, caller, rows, runtime, getSession,+ permissionRequest, capturePermissionRequest, routines };}const ownerWrites = [['cindy_helper', 'start_session_task'],@@ -894,6 +919,62 @@ describe('teammate turn principal', () => {expect(effect).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);});+ // Review #7782: approval must describe and bind the child's exact request, not+ // whichever request is current after the parent card is answered. Unit tier.+ it.each(['request-id', 'arguments'] as const)('expires a permission answer when child %s changes', async change => {+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');+ live(h);+ h.confirm.mockImplementation(async () => {+ if (change === 'request-id') h.permissionRequest.requestId = 'permission-2';+ else h.permissionRequest.input.command = 'echo replacement';+ return true;+ });+ const effect = vi.fn(async () => 'approved');+ const result = await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize,+ helper('message_session_task', { task_id: 'own', decision: 'approve' }), effect);+ expect(h.confirm).toHaveBeenCalledWith('companion', 'message_session_task',+ { task_id: 'own', decision: 'approve' }, expect.objectContaining({ risk: 'permission', details: {+ task: { id: 'own', title: 'Child task' },+ request: { requestId: 'permission-1', kind: 'permission', toolName: 'bash', input: { command: 'echo reviewed' } },+ } }));+ expect(JSON.stringify(result)).toContain('AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');+ expect(effect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ // Same save API on helper and scheduler: only an existing disabled->enabled+ // transition is a resume; ordinary creation/editing remains unchanged.+ it.each(['cindy_helper', 'cindy_scheduler'] as const)('asks for routine restoration through %s', async server => {+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');+ live(h);+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: false, revision: 3 });+ const request = { ...helper('routine_save', { botId: 'bot', id: 'saved', enabled: true }), server };+ expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, request,+ async () => taskActionRoutineRevision('bot', 'saved'))).toBe(3);+ expect(h.confirm).toHaveBeenCalledWith('companion', 'routine_save', request.args,+ { server, risk: 'resume' });+ h.confirm.mockClear();+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: true, revision: 4 });+ expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize, request, async () => 'edited')).toBe('edited');+ expect(await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize,+ { ...request, args: { botId: 'bot', enabled: true } }, async () => 'created')).toBe('created');+ expect(h.confirm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it('does not restore a routine changed during confirmation', async () => {+ const h = desktopFixture('automatic');+ live(h);+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: false, revision: 1 });+ h.confirm.mockImplementation(async () => {+ h.routines.set('saved', { enabled: false, revision: 2 });+ return true;+ });+ const effect = vi.fn(async () => 'enabled');+ const result = await withToolCallAuthority(h.authorize,+ helper('routine_save', { id: 'saved', enabled: true }), effect);+ expect(JSON.stringify(result)).toContain('AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');+ expect(effect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });+it.each(['deny', 'input-changed', 'permission-changed'] as const)('does not execute after confirmation %s', async change => {const h = desktopFixture('automatic');diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.tsindex 57d03f3242..a5dc68a022 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/register.ts@@ -3374,7 +3374,7 @@ export async function confirmTaskAction(title: t('taskActionConfirmation.title'),description: t(context?.risk ? `taskActionConfirmation.${context.risk}` : 'taskActionConfirmation.once'),toolName: `mcp__${context?.server ?? 'cindy_helper'}__${tool}`,- input: structuredClone(args) as Record<string, unknown>,+ input: structuredClone(context?.details ? { action: args, ...context.details } : args) as Record<string, unknown>,metadata: { hostOwnedConfirmation: 'task_action' },};try {@@ -3388,6 +3388,27 @@ export async function confirmTaskAction(}}+/** Snapshot the actual child request after the delegation service checks its owner. */+export async function captureTaskActionPermissionRequest(sessionId: string, taskId: string) {+ const task = await botDelegationServiceHolder?.getSessionTask(sessionId, taskId);+ if (!task?.ok || !task.task.session_id || !task.task.pendingInteraction) return null;+ const childId = task.task.session_id;+ const requestId = task.task.pendingInteraction.requestId;+ const pending = getPendingInteractionsForSession(childId).find(entry => entry.request.requestId === requestId);+ if (!pending || (pending.request.kind !== 'permission' && pending.request.kind !== 'plan_review')) return null;+ const request = structuredClone(pending.request);+ const signature = JSON.stringify(request);+ const child = getMakerIfReady()?.getSession(childId);+ return {+ details: { task: { id: taskId, title: task.task.title }, request },+ assertCurrent() {+ const current = getPendingInteractionsForSession(childId).find(entry => entry.request.requestId === requestId);+ if (getMakerIfReady()?.getSession(childId) !== child || !current || JSON.stringify(current.request) !== signature)+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');+ },+ };+}+/*** ghost_call 过户 workdir 外文件的确认桥(kind='ghost_grant_confirm')。* 单例挂在 cindy-brain 模块里(ghost.ts 经 getGhostGrantConfirmBridge 消费),diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.tsindex 4c649d8dd1..40061a6f73 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.ts@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ export interface TaskActionScope {key: string;ownerInput: boolean;principal?: TaskActionPrincipal;+ routine?: { botId: string; id: string; revision: number };/** Existing, explicitly confirmed delegation; never inferred from creator/follower. */delegated: boolean;/** Rechecked at mutation/delivery; includes account, target and delegation revocation. */@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ interface ActionContext {tool: string;fingerprint: string;principal?: TaskActionPrincipal;+ routine?: TaskActionScope['routine'];assertCurrent(): Promise<void>;assertCurrentSync?(): void;assertDeliveryCurrent(): Promise<void>;@@ -115,15 +117,29 @@ export type TaskActionRisk = 'remove' | 'permission' | 'resume';export interface TaskActionConfirmation {server: string;risk?: TaskActionRisk;+ details?: Record<string, unknown>;+}++export interface TaskActionTarget {+ details: Record<string, unknown>;+ assertCurrent(): void;+}++export interface TaskActionRoutineSnapshot {+ enabled: boolean;+ revision: number;+ assertCurrent(): void;}/** A small, explicit risk list. Everything else follows the task's normal permissions. */-export function taskActionRisk(call: Pick<Call, 'server' | 'tool' | 'args'>): TaskActionRisk | undefined {+export function taskActionRisk(call: Pick<Call, 'server' | 'tool' | 'args'>,+ facts?: { routineEnabled?: boolean }): TaskActionRisk | undefined {const args = call.args && typeof call.args === 'object' && !Array.isArray(call.args)? call.args as Record<string, unknown> : {};if (call.tool === 'routine_delete' || call.tool === 'schedule_delete')return 'remove';if (call.tool === 'message_session_task' && args.decision !== undefined) return 'permission';+ if (call.tool === 'routine_save' && args.enabled === true && facts?.routineEnabled === false) return 'resume';if ((call.tool === 'message_session_task' && args.mode === 'resume') || call.tool === 'schedule_resume')return 'resume';return undefined;@@ -188,6 +204,7 @@ export async function admitTaskAction(tool: call.tool,fingerprint,principal: scope.principal,+ routine: scope.routine,assertCurrent: scope.assertCurrent,assertCurrentSync: scope.assertCurrentSync,assertDeliveryCurrent: scope.assertDeliveryCurrent ?? scope.assertCurrent,@@ -214,6 +231,13 @@ export function taskActionPrincipal(callerSessionId: string): TaskActionPrincipareturn current?.sessionId === callerSessionId ? current.principal : undefined;}+/** Keep a saved routine's reviewed state through the service's atomic revision check. */+export function taskActionRoutineRevision(botId: string, id?: string): number | undefined {+ const current = actionContext.getStore();+ return current?.tool === 'routine_save' && current.routine?.botId === botId && current.routine.id === id+ ? current.routine.revision : undefined;+}+export async function assertTaskActionCurrent(): Promise<void> {await actionContext.getStore()?.assertCurrent();}diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.tsindex 9950003304..3f368b58e1 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/maker-ipc/taskActionHost.ts@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ import {DELEGATED_TASK_ACTIONS,taskActionRisk,type TaskActionConfirmation,+ type TaskActionTarget,+ type TaskActionRoutineSnapshot,taskActionFingerprint,type TaskActionPrincipal,type TaskActionScope,@@ -108,6 +110,8 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {};getSession(sessionId: string): TaskActionSession | undefined;confirm(sessionId: string, tool: string, args: unknown, context?: TaskActionConfirmation): Promise<boolean>;+ capturePermissionRequest(sessionId: string, taskId: string): Promise<TaskActionTarget | null>;+ captureRoutine(botId: string, id: string): Promise<TaskActionRoutineSnapshot | undefined>;}): ToolCallAuthorizer {return isolateTaskActionAuthorizer(async (call) => {// Per invocation: a concurrent automatic call must never inherit owner evidence.@@ -203,6 +207,21 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {? (call.args as Record<string, unknown>): {};const taskId = typeof args.task_id === 'string' ? args.task_id : undefined;+ const needsPermissionTarget = principal === 'autonomous' && runtimePermissionApplies &&+ call.tool === 'message_session_task' && args.decision !== undefined;+ const permissionTarget = needsPermissionTarget && taskId+ ? await deps.capturePermissionRequest(sessionId, taskId) : undefined;+ if (needsPermissionTarget && !permissionTarget) {+ rejectedDecision = { ok: false, errorCode: 'INTERACTION_STALE',+ message: 'The target permission request is unavailable. Read the task again before proposing a new decision.' };+ return null;+ }+ const routineBotId = call.server === 'cindy_scheduler' && typeof args.botId === 'string'+ ? args.botId : caller.botId;+ const routineId = typeof args.id === 'string' && args.id ? args.id : undefined;+ const routine = principal === 'autonomous' && runtimePermissionApplies &&+ call.tool === 'routine_save' && args.enabled === true && routineBotId && routineId+ ? await deps.captureRoutine(routineBotId, routineId) : undefined;const readDelegation = async (rechecking = false) => {if (!taskId ||@@ -311,6 +330,8 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {runtime?.assertInputCurrent();group?.assertCurrent();assertPermissionCurrent();+ permissionTarget?.assertCurrent();+ routine?.assertCurrent();const current = deps.input(sessionId);if (isAppSessionBoundaryPending() || db !== tryGetDbClient() ||@@ -321,6 +342,8 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {key: input.key,ownerInput,principal,+ ...(routine && routineBotId && routineId+ ? { routine: { botId: routineBotId, id: routineId, revision: routine.revision } } : {}),delegated: !!delegation || !!orcaTeam,assertDeliveryCurrent,assertCurrentSync,@@ -334,11 +357,11 @@ export function createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer(deps: {// Missing owner provenance no longer disables ordinary work. Only explicit// risks on autonomous turns need an exact, visible owner decision. The decision// does not change the principal or grant future calls; admission stays single-use.- const risk = principal === 'autonomous' ? taskActionRisk(call) : undefined;+ const risk = principal === 'autonomous' ? taskActionRisk(call, { routineEnabled: routine?.enabled }) : undefined;if (risk && runtimePermissionApplies) {await scope.assertCurrent();const confirmed = await deps.confirm(sessionId, call.tool, structuredClone(call.args),- { server: call.server, risk });+ { server: call.server, risk, ...(permissionTarget ? { details: permissionTarget.details } : {}) });if (!confirmed) {rejectedDecision = { ok: false, errorCode: 'USER_CANCELLED',message: 'The action was not approved. Do not execute or retry it without a new request.' };diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.tsindex 2a60193a4b..c7c0f26097 100644--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/mcp-integrations/mcp-providers.ts@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import { createMoveSession } from './moveSession.js';import { listProjects, renameProject, removeProject } from './projectManagement.js';import { activeOwnerScopeKey, getActiveAppSession, isAppSessionBoundaryPending } from '../appSessionState.js';import type { createBotCapabilityService } from '../maker-ipc/botCapabilityService.js';-import { routineTools } from '../routines/service.js';+import { getRoutineEngine, routineTools } from '../routines/service.js';+import { taskActionRoutineRevision } from '../maker-ipc/taskActionAuthorization.js';import { join as pathJoin } from 'node:path';import { and, eq, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ import {getTaskActionInputState,getTaskActionSession,confirmTaskAction,+ captureTaskActionPermissionRequest,} from '../maker-ipc/register.js';import { createBotProfile } from '../localDb/ipc/bots.js';import { submitGithubIssueForSession } from '../github-issue/index.js';@@ -312,6 +314,19 @@ export function createDesktopMcpProviders(deps: DesktopMcpProvidersDeps): LiziMcisScopeCurrent: (db) => !isAppSessionBoundaryPending() && db === tryGetDbClient(),authorizeAction: createDesktopTaskActionAuthorizer({input: getTaskActionInputState, getSession: getTaskActionSession, confirm: confirmTaskAction,+ capturePermissionRequest: captureTaskActionPermissionRequest,+ captureRoutine: async (botId, id) => {+ const engine = await getRoutineEngine();+ const routine = (await routineTools.list(botId)).find(row => row.id === id);+ if (!routine) return undefined;+ return {+ enabled: routine.enabled, revision: routine.revision,+ assertCurrent() {+ if (engine.list(botId).find(row => row.id === id)?.revision !== routine.revision)+ throw new Error('TASK_ACTION_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED');+ },+ };+ },}),});// Companion history uses the same account scope as ordinary task history.@@ -1027,7 +1042,11 @@ export function createDesktopMcpProviders(deps: DesktopMcpProvidersDeps): LiziMc},},botRoutines: {- service: routineTools,+ service: {+ ...routineTools,+ save: (botId, input, id) => routineTools.save(botId, input, id,+ taskActionRoutineRevision(botId, id)),+ },resolveBotId: async (callerSessionId) => {const scope = activeOwnerScopeKey();if (!getActiveAppSession().dataOwnerId || isAppSessionBoundaryPending()) {diff --git a/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md b/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.mdindex bab2c332b1..b7ca051cd0 100644--- a/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md+++ b/docs/product-rules/teammate-authority.md@@ -21,17 +21,21 @@| --- | --- || 删除自动化 | `routine_delete`、`schedule_delete` || 代用户回答权限请求 | `message_session_task` 携带 `decision` |-| 恢复暂停执行 | `message_session_task(mode=resume)`、`schedule_resume` |+| 恢复暂停执行 | `message_session_task(mode=resume)`、`schedule_resume`,以及 `routine_save` 将已有停用规则保存为启用(含内置规则) |其余操作不命中风险表就继续现有权限流程。新增普通工具不需要另开“自主解锁”例外。主人输入、已核实的主人转达和受托指令沿正常权限审核,不再加第二张行动确认卡。风险表不是平台权限、账号访问或消息来源认证的替代品。+保存新规则、编辑已启用规则和继续保存为停用不追加恢复确认;以宿主读取的现有状态判断,+不把全部保存操作升级成风险。恢复许可同时绑定规则版本,确认期间修改规则会使旧许可失效。## 等待、决定与恢复- 风险确认进入普通 `Session.runHostInteraction` 和 `requestHostInteraction`,发布等待授权状态,桌面、同账号手机/远控与已绑定 IM 共用同一请求。卡片说明目标、动作和本次影响,只允许这一次。- 执行调用等待决定;允许后在原调用继续,无需 Agent 重发。同一次放行只能消费一次。+- 代答许可展示子任务当前请求的工具、参数(或计划)与请求 ID,绑定该实际请求;+ 原请求已处理或被新请求替换时,旧卡不能批准新请求。- 拒绝、取消、停止或任务关闭不执行;晚到回答不恢复旧操作。断线重连读取既有待处理请求,不重新派发操作。- 同意到执行及延迟投递仍校验账号、实例、输入、权限与 Plan 代次;变更使旧放行失效。- 来源判定与操作决定分别保留。获准自主操作不会给后续转达生成主人原话凭证。