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Consider it done. The open-source AI agent that works out of the box · 想到,就能做到。开源、开箱即用的 AI Agent。

fix(provider-sharing): fail closed for Git objects and linked inputs

MagicLiziff14764f0b16
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts
index 5f46a84bf0..bfa8fe819d 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts
@@ -42,7 +42,32 @@ const LOGIN_FILE = /(?:^|[\\/])(?:auth|\.credentials)\.json$/i;
const NON_SECRET_FILE_NAME =
/(^|[\\/\s'"=:<>|;&(])(?:\.env\.(?:example|sample|template)|[^\\/\s'"=:<>|;&()]*\.pub)(?=$|[\s'"|;&()<>])/gi;
-type ShareCommandOptions = Pick<CredentialCommandOptions, 'cwd' | 'platform'>;
+type ShareCommandOptions = Pick<CredentialCommandOptions, 'cwd' | 'platform'> & {
+ resolveFilePath?: (operand: string, cwd: string) => string;
+};
+
+function credentialCommandOptions(opts: ShareCommandOptions): CredentialCommandOptions {
+ const { resolveFilePath, ...commandOptions } = opts;
+ if (!resolveFilePath) return { ...commandOptions, sourceFileSelectors: true };
+ let checkedPaths = 0;
+ return {
+ ...commandOptions,
+ sourceFileSelectors: true,
+ credentialTextTransform: shareCredentialText,
+ fileReadRequiresConsent: ({ operand, cwd, priorSegmentsMayMutate }) => {
+ checkedPaths += 1;
+ if (!cwd || priorSegmentsMayMutate || checkedPaths > 64 || PARENT_SEGMENT.test(operand)
+ || operand.includes(String.fromCharCode(92)) || /^~[^/]/.test(operand)
+ || /[$\x60*?{}\[\]]/.test(operand)) return true;
+ if (isShareCredentialPath(operand)) return true;
+ try {
+ return isShareCredentialPath(resolveFilePath(operand, cwd));
+ } catch {
+ return true;
+ }
+ },
+ };
+}
/**
* 换掉配置目录里说明类子路径的目录名,和按惯例不含密钥的文件名,让本机凭证规则不再因为它们命中;
@@ -98,7 +123,7 @@ function printsStoredCredentials(read: GitRead): boolean {
}
/**
- * 命令是否读取、打出或直接写着凭证(只看命令文本:脚本文件里读的、编码后再解开的认不出来)。会打出 git
+ * 命令是否读取、打出或直接写着凭证(可由执行器核实文件目标;脚本文件里读的、编码后再解开的认不出来)。会打出 git
* 配置的命令(git remote -v、git config --list 等)也算,配置里没有密钥时由执行器核实后放行。
*/
export function isShareCredentialCommand(
@@ -107,9 +132,8 @@ export function isShareCredentialCommand(
opts: ShareCommandOptions = {},
): boolean {
return commandSpellsOutSecret(command)
- || shellCommandReadsCredentials(shareCredentialText(command), workspaceRoots, {
- ...opts,
- sourceFileSelectors: true,
+ || shellCommandReadsCredentials(opts.resolveFilePath ? command : shareCredentialText(command), workspaceRoots, {
+ ...credentialCommandOptions(opts),
gitConfigRead: () => false,
});
}
@@ -130,9 +154,8 @@ export function shareCredentialGitReads(
reads.push(read);
return true;
};
- const needsConsent = shellCommandReadsCredentials(shareCredentialText(command), workspaceRoots, {
- ...opts,
- sourceFileSelectors: true,
+ const needsConsent = shellCommandReadsCredentials(opts.resolveFilePath ? command : shareCredentialText(command), workspaceRoots, {
+ ...credentialCommandOptions(opts),
gitContentRead: collect,
gitConfigRead: (read) => !printsStoredCredentials(read) && collect(read),
});
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts
index 5bb48da9bb..115a665e0b 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/executor.test.ts
@@ -627,6 +627,130 @@ describe('shared provider credentials', () => {
expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'read', path: path.join(project, 'cloud', 'credentials') }).ok).toBe(false);
});
+ it('resolves a public-file operand through a directory link before full-access authorization', async () => {
+ const secretDir = path.join(outside, '.aws');
+ fs.mkdirSync(secretDir);
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(secretDir, 'example.pub'), 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=linked-content');
+ fs.symlinkSync(secretDir, path.join(project, 'public'), process.platform === 'win32' ? 'junction' : 'dir');
+ const asked = vi.fn(async (): Promise<ExecutorConfirmation> => false);
+ const { executor, gate } = sharedExecutor('full', asked);
+ const action: ExecutorAction = { kind: 'exec', command: 'cat public/example.pub', cwd: project };
+ try {
+ expect(gate.authorize(action).ok).toBe(false);
+ expect(await executor.confirm(action)).toBe(false);
+ expect(asked).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(action);
+ expect(gate.authorize(action).ok).toBe(false);
+ } finally {
+ await executor.close();
+ }
+ });
+
+ it.runIf(posix)('checks an exempt operand again when its symlink target changes', async () => {
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, '.env'), 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=changed-target');
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, 'ordinary.txt'), 'public fixture');
+ const link = path.join(project, '.env.example');
+ fs.symlinkSync('ordinary.txt', link);
+ const asked = vi.fn(async (): Promise<ExecutorConfirmation> => false);
+ const { executor, gate } = sharedExecutor('full', asked);
+ const action: ExecutorAction = { kind: 'exec', command: 'cat .env.example', cwd: project };
+ try {
+ expect(gate.authorize(action).ok).toBe(true);
+ expect(text(await executor.callTool('Bash', { command: action.command }))).toContain('public fixture');
+ expect(asked).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ fs.rmSync(link);
+ fs.symlinkSync('.env', link);
+ expect(gate.authorize(action).ok).toBe(false);
+ const denied = await executor.callTool('Bash', { command: action.command });
+ expect(denied.isError).toBe(true);
+ expect(text(denied)).not.toContain('PRIVATE_FIXTURE=changed-target');
+ expect(asked).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(action);
+ } finally {
+ await executor.close();
+ }
+ });
+
+ it.runIf(posix)('does not reuse a Git exemption or ordinary approval after a template link changes', async () => {
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, '.env'), 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=changed-during-probe');
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, 'ordinary.txt'), 'public fixture');
+ const link = path.join(project, '.env.example');
+ fs.symlinkSync('ordinary.txt', link);
+ const asked = vi.fn(async () => false);
+ const history = {
+ provesSafe: vi.fn(async () => {
+ fs.rmSync(link);
+ fs.symlinkSync('.env', link);
+ return true;
+ }),
+ } as unknown as GitCredentialHistory;
+ const { gate, executor } = sharedExecutor('full', asked, history);
+ const ordinary: ExecutorAction = { kind: 'exec', command: 'cat .env.example', cwd: project };
+ const compound: ExecutorAction = { kind: 'exec', command: 'git diff && cat .env.example', cwd: project };
+ gate.recordApproval(ordinary);
+ gate.recordCredentialExemption(compound);
+ try {
+ expect(await executor.confirm(compound)).toBe(false);
+ expect(asked).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(compound);
+ expect(gate.authorize(compound).ok).toBe(false);
+ expect(gate.authorize(ordinary).ok).toBe(false);
+ } finally {
+ await executor.close();
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('resolves ordinary templates in the actual shell directory and keeps local tasks unchanged', () => {
+ const templates = path.join(project, 'templates');
+ fs.mkdirSync(templates);
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(templates, '.env.example'), 'PUBLIC_FIXTURE=example');
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, 'README.md'), 'documentation');
+ const { gate, workspace } = sharedExecutor('full');
+ for (const command of [
+ 'cat templates/.env.example',
+ 'cat < templates/.env.example',
+ 'cd templates && cat .env.example',
+ 'grep -f templates/.env.example README.md',
+ ]) {
+ expect(gate.authorize({ kind: 'exec', command, cwd: project }).ok, command).toBe(true);
+ }
+ for (const command of [
+ 'cat missing/.env.example',
+ 'cat templates/.env.*',
+ 'cat templates/../templates/.env.example',
+ 'cd "$DIR" && cat .env.example',
+ 'ln -sf .env templates/.env.example && cat templates/.env.example',
+ 'HOME=/other cat templates/.env.example',
+ 'unknown-reader --input templates/.env.example',
+ ]) {
+ const action: ExecutorAction = { kind: 'exec', command, cwd: project };
+ expect(gate.authorize(action).ok, command).toBe(false);
+ expect(gate.credentialGitReads(action), command).toBeNull();
+ expect(new ExecutorGate(workspace, 'full').authorize(action).ok, command).toBe(true);
+ }
+ });
+
+ it.runIf(posix)('keeps consent for broken template links and linked auxiliary reader inputs', () => {
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, '.env'), 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=auxiliary-input');
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, 'README.md'), 'documentation');
+ fs.symlinkSync('.env', path.join(project, '.env.example'));
+ fs.symlinkSync('missing', path.join(project, '.env.sample'));
+ const escaped = 'literal' + String.fromCharCode(92) + '.env.example';
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(project, escaped), 'public fixture');
+ const { gate } = sharedExecutor('full');
+ for (const command of [
+ 'cat .env.sample',
+ 'grep -f .env.example README.md',
+ 'sed -f .env.example README.md',
+ 'git grep -f .env.example -- README.md',
+ 'git blame --contents .env.example README.md',
+ 'git diff && cat < .env.example',
+ 'sh -c "cat .env.example"',
+ 'cat ' + escaped,
+ ]) {
+ const action: ExecutorAction = { kind: 'exec', command, cwd: project };
+ expect(gate.authorize(action).ok, command).toBe(false);
+ expect(gate.credentialGitReads(action), command).toBeNull();
+ }
+ });
+
it('asks on this computer and goes ahead only with what the user allowed', async () => {
const asked: ExecutorAction[] = [];
let answer = true;
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts
index 66ec7220c4..621f76e609 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/__tests__/gitCredentials.git-integration.test.ts
@@ -244,6 +244,66 @@ describe('GitCredentialHistory', () => {
expect(await provesSafe(fullDiffHistory, 'git log -p --full-diff -- README.md')).toBe(false);
});
+ it('keeps confirmation for a dangling credential blob outside every scanned commit', async () => {
+ const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, 'git show HEAD')).toBe(true);
+ write('.env', 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=unreachable-content\n');
+ const blob = git('hash-object', '-w', '.env').trim();
+ fs.rmSync(path.join(repo, '.env'));
+ expect(git('ls-files', '--', '.env')).toBe('');
+ expect(git('rev-list', '--all', '--reflog', '--objects')).not.toContain(blob);
+ expect(git('show', blob)).toContain('PRIVATE_FIXTURE=unreachable-content');
+ for (const command of ['git show ' + blob, 'git show ' + blob + ' -- README.md']) {
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, command), command).toBe(false);
+ await requiresCredentialConfirmation(history, command);
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('does not use replaced objects to prove the original history has no credentials', async () => {
+ const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, 'git show HEAD')).toBe(true);
+ const safe = git('rev-parse', 'HEAD').trim();
+ write('.env', 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=original-history\n');
+ git('add', '.env');
+ git('commit', '-q', '--no-gpg-sign', '-m', 'original credentials');
+ const original = git('rev-parse', 'HEAD').trim();
+ git('replace', original, safe);
+ git('reset', '--mixed', '-q', 'HEAD');
+ expect(git('ls-files', '--', '.env')).toBe('');
+ expect(git('show', 'HEAD')).not.toContain('PRIVATE_FIXTURE=original-history');
+ expect(git('--no-replace-objects', 'show', 'HEAD')).toContain('PRIVATE_FIXTURE=original-history');
+ for (const command of ['git --no-replace-objects show HEAD', 'git show HEAD']) {
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, command), command).toBe(false);
+ await requiresCredentialConfirmation(history, command);
+ }
+ git('replace', '-d', original);
+ vi.stubEnv('GIT_REPLACE_REF_BASE', 'refs/custom-replace/');
+ git('replace', original, safe);
+ expect(await provesSafe(history, 'git --no-replace-objects show HEAD')).toBe(false);
+ await requiresCredentialConfirmation(history, 'git --no-replace-objects show HEAD');
+ });
+
+ it.runIf(process.platform !== 'win32')('does not exempt a tracked template symlink to an ignored credential file', async () => {
+ write('.gitignore', '.env\n');
+ write('.env', 'PRIVATE_FIXTURE=symlink-target\n');
+ fs.rmSync(path.join(repo, '.env.example'));
+ fs.symlinkSync('.env', path.join(repo, '.env.example'));
+ git('add', '.gitignore', '.env.example');
+ git('commit', '-q', '--no-gpg-sign', '-m', 'template link');
+ expect(git('ls-files', '--', '.env')).toBe('');
+ expect(git('ls-files', '--stage', '--', '.env.example')).toMatch(/^120000 /);
+ const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
+ for (const command of [
+ 'cat .env.example',
+ 'cat < .env.example',
+ 'git diff && cat .env.example',
+ 'git grep -f .env.example -- README.md',
+ 'git blame --contents .env.example README.md',
+ ]) {
+ await requiresCredentialConfirmation(history, command);
+ }
+ });
+
it('does not exempt a git read after an earlier shell segment may change state', async () => {
const history = new GitCredentialHistory();
expect(await provesSafe(history, 'git add -A && git diff --cached')).toBe(false);
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts
index b682fcc302..0630200713 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/executor.ts
@@ -187,7 +187,9 @@ export class RemoteExecutor {
const history = this.opts.gitCredentials;
if (!history || action.kind !== 'exec') return null;
const reads = this.gate.credentialGitReads(action);
- return reads ? history.provesSafe(action.command, reads, signal).catch(() => false) : null;
+ return reads ? history.provesSafe(action.command, reads, signal)
+ .then((safe) => safe && this.gate.credentialGitReads(action) !== null)
+ .catch(() => false) : null;
}
/** 检查上限;凭证类操作没有批准时先在本机问一次。 */
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts
index 94d953a336..ea34a2a1eb 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gate.ts
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
* 批准记录只在短时间内有效;命令与抓取的批准用一次即失效,路径批准在有效期内覆盖同一路径的读写
* (编辑会先读后写)。
*/
+import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import { classifyShellCommand, reviewAction, type GitRead } from '@cindy/maker-core';
@@ -164,7 +165,11 @@ export class ExecutorGate {
if (!this.options.confirmCredentials) return false;
if (action.kind === 'fetch') return false;
if (action.kind === 'exec') {
- return isShareCredentialCommand(action.command, this.workspace.allRoots(), { cwd: action.cwd, platform: process.platform });
+ return isShareCredentialCommand(action.command, this.workspace.allRoots(), {
+ cwd: action.cwd,
+ platform: process.platform,
+ resolveFilePath: (operand, cwd) => fs.realpathSync.native(this.workspace.resolve(operand, cwd)),
+ });
}
return isShareCredentialPath(path.resolve(action.path)) || isShareCredentialPath(realPathOrAncestor(action.path));
}
@@ -175,18 +180,22 @@ export class ExecutorGate {
*/
credentialGitReads(action: ExecutorAction): GitRead[] | null {
if (!this.options.confirmCredentials || action.kind !== 'exec') return null;
- return shareCredentialGitReads(action.command, this.workspace.allRoots(), { cwd: action.cwd, platform: process.platform });
+ return shareCredentialGitReads(action.command, this.workspace.allRoots(), {
+ cwd: action.cwd,
+ platform: process.platform,
+ resolveFilePath: (operand, cwd) => fs.realpathSync.native(this.workspace.resolve(operand, cwd)),
+ });
}
authorize(action: ExecutorAction): ExecutorGateDecision {
let credential = this.needsCredentialConsent(action);
- if (credential && this.consumeCredentialExemption(action)) credential = false;
+ if (credential && this.consumeCredentialExemption(action) && this.credentialGitReads(action) !== null) credential = false;
if (this.mode === 'full' && !credential) return { ok: true, elevated: true };
// 抓取网页:本机用户批准过这个地址就放开内网。公网样式的域名也可能解析到内网(公司内网域名),
// 只看地址文本判定为不必问,但抓取时会按 DNS 结果被拦下。
if (action.kind === 'fetch' && this.consume(action)) return { ok: true, elevated: true };
if (!credential && !this.requiresApproval(action)) return { ok: true };
- if (this.consume(action)) return { ok: true, elevated: true };
+ if (this.consume(action, credential)) return { ok: true, elevated: true };
return { ok: false, reason: this.deniedReason(action) };
}
@@ -223,10 +232,11 @@ export class ExecutorGate {
return action.scope === 'tree' && !this.workspace.contains(action.path);
}
- private consume(action: ExecutorAction): boolean {
+ private consume(action: ExecutorAction, credential = false): boolean {
this.prune();
const { kind, key } = approvalOf(action);
- const index = this.approvals.findIndex((approval) => approval.kind === kind && approval.key === key);
+ const index = this.approvals.findIndex((approval) => approval.kind === kind && approval.key === key
+ && (!credential || approval.credential));
if (index < 0) return false;
if (kind !== 'path') this.approvals.splice(index, 1);
return true;
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts
index 0cd57349c6..2328974d9f 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/executor/gitCredentials.ts
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* - 还不行时(git diff、git show、git log),按原命令只列出会显示的文件,其中没有凭证类文件也算读不到。
* 认不出 git 在哪个仓库里跑、仓库带子模块、比较仓库外的文件、超过等待时限,都按读得到处理,照旧弹卡。
* 会打出 git 配置的命令(git remote -v、git config --list 等)按本机生效的配置核对其中没有密钥。
- * 与命令文本判定一样只防误发:直接写出底层对象名(git show <blob>)、在前面的命令里改 GIT_DIR 之类的认不出。
+ * 与命令文本判定一样只防误发:不能解析为提交的对象、replacement refs 与前段可能改状态时不授予豁免。
*/
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import fsp from 'node:fs/promises';
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ function git(
opts: { stdin?: string; onRecord?: (record: string) => boolean | void; timeoutMs?: number } = {},
): Promise<string> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
- const child = spawn('git', [...args], {
+ const child = spawn('git', ['--no-replace-objects', ...args], {
cwd,
env: { ...process.env, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0', GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS: '0', LC_ALL: 'C' },
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
@@ -304,10 +304,33 @@ function pathspecsAvoid(read: GitRead, cwd: string, top: string, credentials: Re
});
}
-function revisionOperands(read: GitRead): string[] {
+function revisionOperands(read: GitRead): string[] | null {
if (!SHOWN_FILES[read.sub] && !PATHSPEC_SUBCOMMANDS.has(read.sub)) return [];
const separator = read.args.indexOf('--');
const args = read.args.slice(0, separator < 0 ? read.args.length : separator);
+ if (read.sub === 'grep') {
+ let patternProvided = false;
+ const revisions: string[] = [];
+ for (let index = 0; index < args.length; index += 1) {
+ const arg = args[index];
+ if (arg === '-e' || arg === '--regexp') {
+ if (args[index + 1] === undefined) return null;
+ index += 1;
+ patternProvided = true;
+ } else if (/^(?:-e.+|--regexp=)/.test(arg)) {
+ patternProvided = true;
+ } else if (arg === '--cached' || arg === '--line-number' || /^-[nivwhHlLcoqEGFP]+$/.test(arg)) {
+ continue;
+ } else if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
+ return null;
+ } else if (!patternProvided) {
+ patternProvided = true;
+ } else {
+ revisions.push(arg);
+ }
+ }
+ return patternProvided ? revisions : null;
+ }
return args.flatMap((arg) => {
if (arg.startsWith('-')) return [];
return arg.split(/\.\.\.?/).filter(Boolean);
@@ -320,12 +343,14 @@ async function revisionsAreCovered(
tips: ReadonlySet<string>,
deadline: number,
): Promise<boolean> {
- for (const revision of revisionOperands(read)) {
+ const revisions = revisionOperands(read);
+ if (!revisions) return false;
+ for (const revision of revisions) {
const remaining = deadline - Date.now();
if (remaining <= 0) return false;
const commit = await git(['rev-parse', '--verify', '--quiet', revision + '^{commit}'], cwd, { timeoutMs: remaining })
.then((output) => output.trim(), () => '');
- if (!commit) continue;
+ if (!commit) return false;
if (tips.has(commit)) continue;
let covered = false;
for (const tip of tips) {
@@ -471,6 +496,13 @@ export class GitCredentialHistory {
if (!topLine || !commonLine) return false;
const top = path.resolve(topLine);
const commonDir = path.resolve(cwd, commonLine);
+ if (process.env.GIT_REPLACE_REF_BASE !== undefined) return false;
+ const replacementTimeout = deadline - Date.now();
+ if (replacementTimeout <= 0) return false;
+ const replacements = await git(['for-each-ref', '--format=%(refname)', 'refs/replace'], top, {
+ timeoutMs: replacementTimeout,
+ });
+ if (replacements.trim()) return false;
// 指向仓库外的文件时 git diff 不经仓库、直接比较文件。
if (read.sub === 'diff' && read.args.some((arg) => !arg.startsWith('-') && isOutside(top, path.resolve(cwd, arg)))) {
return false;
diff --git a/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md b/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md
index e4a561d0bd..b0178f3c46 100644
--- a/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md
+++ b/docs/product-rules/provider-sharing.md
@@ -285,7 +285,10 @@ Desktop「设置 → 模型供应商」的左栏(2026-10-08 用户裁决):
- 减少误弹(2026-10-12 用户裁决)。**以下几条只用于这张分享任务的确认卡**,本机任务、同账号远程供应商与
自动审查的判定都不变:
- `.env.example` / `.env.sample` / `.env.template` 与公钥 `*.pub` 按惯例不含密钥,不算凭证类文件
- (读取、启动时同步都照普通文件);放在凭证目录里(如 `~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub`)时仍算;
+ (读取、启动时同步都照普通文件);放在凭证目录里(如 `~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub`)时仍算。命令中读取
+ 文件时,执行前按该命令段的实际目录核对原始路径与链接的真实目标;模板、公钥与配置目录里的说明
+ 路径不能借链接指向凭证。目标不存在、链接断开、目录或展开认不出、前段可能改动链接或环境时,
+ 都保留确认,不用改写后的文件名或上次核实的链接目标放行;
- 按扩展名缩小范围的搜索不算读取凭证:rg 的 `-g '*.ts'`、grep 的 `--include='*.md'` 这类只选中源码
与文档文件的写法,字面上能选中 `.env.ts`、`id_rsa.ts`,但这类名字是代码模块。直接写出像凭证的
文件名、`*.json` / `*.txt` / `*.sh` 这类可能存放凭证的格式、扩展名不确定的写法(`*.ts*`)仍要确认;
@@ -294,7 +297,10 @@ Desktop「设置 → 模型供应商」的左栏(2026-10-08 用户裁决):
stash 与 reflog 的历史和暂存区里从没有凭证类文件;或命令用 `--` 限定的路径碰不到这些文件;或
(`git diff` / `git show` / `git log`)按原命令只列出会显示的文件,其中没有凭证类文件。认不出 git
在哪个仓库里跑、仓库带子模块、比较仓库外的文件、核实超过 8 秒,都照旧弹卡;仓库的扫描结果留在
- 内存里给后面的命令用。直接写出底层对象名(如 `git show <文件对象>`)之类的写法同样认不出;
+ 内存里给后面的命令用。指定的对象必须能解析为提交且已在扫描范围内,否则改按实际显示的文件
+ 核对;无法证明为提交的底层对象(如 `git show <blob-id>`)保留确认,不能按干净历史放行。所有
+ 历史与内容探针禁用 replacement refs;仓库有 `refs/replace` 或宿主设置了 `GIT_REPLACE_REF_BASE`
+ 时不授予内容豁免,避免探针与实际命令使用不同对象;
- 打出 git 配置的命令(`git remote -v` / `get-url` / `show`、读 `git config`、`git var -l`)按受邀者
电脑上生效的 git 配置核实:要打出的那些项里没有密钥(地址里嵌的令牌或密码、`http.extraHeader`、
密码与令牌类配置项)就不弹卡,有才确认;
@@ -337,7 +343,7 @@ Desktop「设置 → 模型供应商」的左栏(2026-10-08 用户裁决):
明确提示,同区域分享不受影响。
10. 受邀者任务启动时不带凭证类文件;任务中读写凭证类文件或执行读取凭证的命令,即使在完全访问下也
要受邀者在本机确认后才执行(§9 第 7 条)。`rg -g '*.ts'` 这类只按源码扩展名缩小范围的搜索、读
- `.env.example` 与 `*.pub`、在没有凭证类文件的仓库里(或只涉及普通文件时)跑 `git diff` / `git log -p`、
+ 实际目标已核实为非凭证的 `.env.example` 与 `*.pub`、在没有凭证类文件的仓库里(或只涉及普通文件时)跑 `git diff` / `git log -p`、
配置里没有密钥时跑 `git remote -v` 都不弹确认卡;命令里直接写着密钥、`git credential fill` 要确认;
本机任务与同账号远程供应商的确认不受影响。
11. Light 与 Dark 两种模式都已实现。
diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts
index 00725b4f0b..e66316172b 100644
--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts
+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.test.ts
@@ -4722,6 +4722,46 @@ describe('shellCommandReadsCredentials — 只认凭证那一部分红线', () =
// 两个附加选项只供供应商分享的受邀者任务用(apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts)。
describe('shellCommandReadsCredentials — 分享任务的附加选项', () => {
+ it('passes original reader operands, redirects and auxiliary files to the sharing path check', () => {
+ for (const command of ['cat .env.example', 'cat < .env.example', 'grep -f .env.example README.md']) {
+ const checked: string[] = [];
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ cwd: '/repo',
+ platform: 'linux',
+ credentialTextTransform: (text) => text.replaceAll('.env.example', 'example'),
+ fileReadRequiresConsent: (read) => {
+ checked.push(read.operand);
+ return read.operand === '.env.example';
+ },
+ }), command).toBe(true);
+ expect(checked, command).toContain('.env.example');
+ }
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials('cat .env.example', roots, {
+ credentialTextTransform: (text) => text.replaceAll('.env.example', 'example'),
+ fileReadRequiresConsent: () => false,
+ })).toBe(false);
+ expect(shellCommandReadsCredentials('cat .env.example', roots)).toBe(true);
+ });
+
+ it('binds sharing file checks to the segment directory and invalidates preceding mutations', () => {
+ for (const [command, expected] of [
+ ['cd /repo/examples && cat example.pub', { cwd: '/repo/examples', priorSegmentsMayMutate: false }],
+ ['ln -sf .env example.pub && cat example.pub', { cwd: '/repo', priorSegmentsMayMutate: true }],
+ ['HOME=/other cat example.pub', { cwd: '/repo', priorSegmentsMayMutate: true }],
+ ['cd "$DIR" && cat example.pub', { cwd: undefined }],
+ ] as const) {
+ const checked: unknown[] = [];
+ shellCommandReadsCredentials(command, roots, {
+ cwd: '/repo',
+ platform: 'linux',
+ fileReadRequiresConsent: (read) => {
+ checked.push(read);
+ return true;
+ },
+ });
+ expect(checked, command).toEqual([expect.objectContaining({ operand: 'example.pub', ...expected })]);
+ }
+ });
const sourceSearches = [
"rg -n 'API_KEY' --glob '*.ts'",
"rg -g '*.{ts,tsx}' token src",
diff --git a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts
index 8b44232247..897c7451a8 100644
--- a/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts
+++ b/packages/maker-core/src/agents/shared/auto-review.ts
@@ -3252,6 +3252,12 @@ export type GitRead = {
* (apps/desktop/src/main/remote-agent/credentials.ts)。本机任务的自动审查不传,判定不变。
*/
export type CredentialCommandOptions = ShellReviewOptions & {
+ credentialTextTransform?: (text: string) => string;
+ fileReadRequiresConsent?: (read: {
+ operand: string;
+ cwd?: string;
+ priorSegmentsMayMutate: boolean;
+ }) => boolean;
/** rg -g、grep --include 这类搜索范围只选中源码与文档扩展名时不算读取凭证。 */
sourceFileSelectors?: boolean;
/**
@@ -5437,12 +5443,14 @@ function readerOptionValueIsSensitive(
value: string | undefined,
isSensitiveOperand: (value: string) => boolean,
selectorCouldMatch: (value: string) => boolean = selectorCouldMatchCredential,
+ fileReadRequiresConsent?: (value: string) => boolean,
): boolean {
if (kind === 'selector') return selectorCouldMatch(value ?? '');
if (!value || (kind !== 'data-file' && kind !== 'aux-file' && kind !== 'aux-file-list')) return false;
const operands = kind === 'aux-file-list' ? value.split(/[:;]/) : [value];
- return operands.some((operand) =>
- isSensitiveOperand(operand) || selectorCouldMatchCredential(operand));
+ return operands.some((operand) => fileReadRequiresConsent
+ ? fileReadRequiresConsent(operand)
+ : isSensitiveOperand(operand) || selectorCouldMatchCredential(operand));
}
function readerArgumentsReadDotenv(
@@ -5451,6 +5459,8 @@ function readerArgumentsReadDotenv(
isSensitiveOperand: (value: string) => boolean = isDotenvCredentialPath,
platform: NodeJS.Platform = process.platform,
selectorCouldMatch: (value: string) => boolean = selectorCouldMatchCredential,
+ fileReadRequiresConsent?: (value: string) => boolean,
+ checkPositionalFiles = true,
): boolean {
let dataArgumentProvided = !FIRST_DATA_ARGUMENT_BINS.has(bin);
let optionsEnded = false;
@@ -5473,12 +5483,14 @@ function readerArgumentsReadDotenv(
const secondValue = attached === undefined ? args[index + 2] : args[index + 1];
if (nameValue === undefined || secondValue === undefined) return true;
if (kind === 'named-file'
- && readerOptionValueIsSensitive('data-file', secondValue, isSensitiveOperand)) return true;
+ && readerOptionValueIsSensitive('data-file', secondValue, isSensitiveOperand,
+ selectorCouldMatch, fileReadRequiresConsent)) return true;
index += attached === undefined ? 2 : 1;
continue;
}
const value = attached ?? args[index + 1];
- const isSensitive = readerOptionValueIsSensitive(kind, value, isSensitiveOperand, selectorCouldMatch);
+ const isSensitive = readerOptionValueIsSensitive(kind, value, isSensitiveOperand,
+ selectorCouldMatch, fileReadRequiresConsent);
if (kind !== 'data' && isSensitive) return true;
if (attached === undefined) index += 1;
if (kind === 'data' || kind === 'data-file') dataArgumentProvided = true;
@@ -5493,7 +5505,8 @@ function readerArgumentsReadDotenv(
if (!kind) continue;
const attached = token.slice(optionIndex + 1) || undefined;
const value = attached ?? args[index + 1];
- const isSensitive = readerOptionValueIsSensitive(kind, value, isSensitiveOperand, selectorCouldMatch);
+ const isSensitive = readerOptionValueIsSensitive(kind, value, isSensitiveOperand,
+ selectorCouldMatch, fileReadRequiresConsent);
if (kind !== 'data' && isSensitive) return true;
if (attached === undefined) index += 1;
if (kind === 'data' || kind === 'data-file') dataArgumentProvided = true;
@@ -5508,7 +5521,9 @@ function readerArgumentsReadDotenv(
dataArgumentProvided = true;
continue;
}
- if (shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv(token, isSensitiveOperand)) return true;
+ if (fileReadRequiresConsent && checkPositionalFiles
+ ? fileReadRequiresConsent(token)
+ : shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv(token, isSensitiveOperand)) return true;
}
return false;
}
@@ -5842,7 +5857,10 @@ function isGitExcludePathspec(value: string): boolean {
return value.startsWith(':!') || value.startsWith(':^');
}
-function gitBlameContentsReadDotenv(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
+function gitBlameContentsReadDotenv(
+ args: readonly string[],
+ fileReadRequiresConsent: (value: string) => boolean = shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv,
+): boolean {
for (let index = 0; index < args.length; index += 1) {
const token = args[index];
if (token === '--') break;
@@ -5854,7 +5872,7 @@ function gitBlameContentsReadDotenv(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
if (!isContentsOption) continue;
const attached = equalsIndex >= 0 ? token.slice(equalsIndex + 1) : undefined;
const value = attached ?? args[index + 1];
- if (value && shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv(value)) return true;
+ if (value && fileReadRequiresConsent(value)) return true;
if (attached === undefined) index += 1;
}
return false;
@@ -6211,6 +6229,7 @@ function priorShellSegmentsMayMutate(
workspaceRoots: string[],
opts: ShellReviewOptions,
segmentCwds: readonly (string | undefined)[],
+ allowResolvedDirectoryChanges = false,
): boolean {
for (let index = 0; index < segmentIndex; index += 1) {
const segmentCwd = segmentCwds[index];
@@ -6223,6 +6242,10 @@ function priorShellSegmentsMayMutate(
// for a later credential exemption even though its output is otherwise read-only.
const tokens = stripShellControlTokens(tokenize(segments[index].text));
const unwrapped = unwrapCommand(tokens, segmentOpts.cwd ?? workspaceRoots[0], segmentOpts.cwdUnknown === true);
+ if (allowResolvedDirectoryChanges && !process.env.CDPATH
+ && tokens[0] === 'cd' && tokens.length === 2 && !tokens[1].startsWith('-')
+ && segments[index].separatorAfter === 'and' && segmentCwds[index + 1] !== undefined
+ && !segmentHasSideEffectRedirectOrSubstitution(segments[index].text)) continue;
const invocation = unwrapped.tokens[0] && executableName(unwrapped.tokens[0]) === 'git'
? parseGitInvocation(unwrapped.tokens, workspaceRoots, segmentOpts)
: undefined;
@@ -6252,16 +6275,16 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
depth = 0,
): boolean {
if (depth >= MAX_EXEC_REVIEW_DEPTH) return true;
- const selectorCouldMatch = opts.sourceFileSelectors ? shareSelectorCouldMatchCredential : selectorCouldMatchCredential;
+ const credentialText = opts.credentialTextTransform ?? ((text: string) => text);
+ const selectorMatcher = opts.sourceFileSelectors ? shareSelectorCouldMatchCredential : selectorCouldMatchCredential;
+ const selectorCouldMatch = (value: string) => selectorMatcher(credentialText(value));
const segments = splitExecutableSegments(command);
- // 只有调用方要核实 git 调用时才需要各段的目录。
- const segmentCwds = opts.gitContentRead || opts.gitConfigRead ? segmentWorkingDirs(segments, workspaceRoots, opts) : [];
+ // 调用方核实 Git 或文件读取时需要各段的实际目录。
+ const segmentCwds = opts.gitContentRead || opts.gitConfigRead || opts.fileReadRequiresConsent
+ ? segmentWorkingDirs(segments, workspaceRoots, opts) : [];
for (const [segmentIndex, { text: segment }] of segments.entries()) {
const inputRedirections = parseShellInputRedirections(segment);
if (inputRedirections.hasUnresolvedTarget) return true;
- const readsCredentialInput = inputRedirections.targets.some(
- (target) => shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv(target),
- );
const inspectionCommand = inputRedirections.targets.length > 0
? parseShellInputRedirections(segment, true).command
: inputRedirections.command;
@@ -6275,11 +6298,26 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
const bin = executableName(tokens[0] ?? '');
const sharesGitCredentialChecks = opts.gitContentRead !== undefined || opts.gitConfigRead !== undefined;
const configOverride = bin === 'git' && gitUsesConfigOverride(tokens);
- const priorMutation = sharesGitCredentialChecks
+ const priorMutation = sharesGitCredentialChecks || opts.fileReadRequiresConsent
? priorShellSegmentsMayMutate(segments, segmentIndex, workspaceRoots, opts, segmentCwds)
|| segmentHasSideEffectRedirectOrSubstitution(segment)
|| configOverride
: false;
+ const priorFileMutation = opts.fileReadRequiresConsent
+ ? priorShellSegmentsMayMutate(segments, segmentIndex, workspaceRoots, opts, segmentCwds, true)
+ || segmentHasSideEffectRedirectOrSubstitution(segment)
+ || rawTokens[0] !== tokens[0]
+ : false;
+ const fileReadRequiresConsent = opts.fileReadRequiresConsent
+ ? (operand: string) => opts.fileReadRequiresConsent!({
+ operand,
+ cwd: depth === 0 ? segmentCwds[segmentIndex] : undefined,
+ priorSegmentsMayMutate: priorFileMutation,
+ }) : undefined;
+ const readsCredentialInput = inputRedirections.targets.some((target) => fileReadRequiresConsent
+ ? fileReadRequiresConsent(target)
+ : shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv(credentialText(target)));
+ if (fileReadRequiresConsent && readsCredentialInput) return true;
// xargs and parallel construct the real argv from stdin. The command that eventually reads
// a repository or credential file is therefore outside this static scan; shared-provider
@@ -6331,7 +6369,7 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
// Inline programs are not shell argv, so a Python/Node reader such as
// `open(".env")` never reaches the reader-specific path parser. Keep
// credential path patterns visible in these payloads before recursing.
- if (inlinePayloadMentionsCredentialPath(payload)) return true;
+ if (inlinePayloadMentionsCredentialPath(opts.fileReadRequiresConsent ? payload : credentialText(payload))) return true;
if (shellCommandReadsCredentials(payload, workspaceRoots, opts, depth + 1)) return true;
}
@@ -6347,14 +6385,18 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
if (bin === 'git') {
const invocation = parseGitInvocation(tokens, workspaceRoots, opts);
if (!invocation?.sub || !SAFE_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS.has(invocation.sub)) continue;
+ const credentialArgs = invocation.args.map(credentialText);
if (readsCredentialInput) return true;
if (invocation.sub === 'grep') {
if (gitGrepExpandsSearchScope(invocation.args)) return true;
- if (readerArgumentsReadDotenv('grep', invocation.args, isGitDotenvOperand)) return true;
- } else if ((invocation.sub === 'blame' && gitBlameContentsReadDotenv(invocation.args))
+ if (readerArgumentsReadDotenv('grep', fileReadRequiresConsent ? invocation.args : credentialArgs,
+ (operand) => isGitDotenvOperand(credentialText(operand)), opts.platform ?? process.platform,
+ selectorCouldMatch, fileReadRequiresConsent, false)) return true;
+ } else if ((invocation.sub === 'blame' && gitBlameContentsReadDotenv(invocation.args,
+ fileReadRequiresConsent ?? ((operand) => shellOperandCouldMatchDotenv(credentialText(operand)))))
|| ((invocation.sub === 'log' || invocation.sub === 'whatchanged' || invocation.sub === 'show')
- && gitLineRangeReadsDotenv(invocation.args))
- || gitArgumentsReadDotenv(invocation.args)) {
+ && gitLineRangeReadsDotenv(credentialArgs))
+ || gitArgumentsReadDotenv(credentialArgs)) {
return true;
}
if (gitContentReadWithoutPath(invocation.sub, invocation.args)
@@ -6369,14 +6411,18 @@ function shellCommandReadsDotenv(
continue;
}
- if (!DOTENV_FILE_READER_BINS.has(bin)) continue;
+ if (!DOTENV_FILE_READER_BINS.has(bin)) {
+ if (fileReadRequiresConsent && credentialText(segment) !== segment) return true;
+ continue;
+ }
if (readsCredentialInput) return true;
const args = tokens.slice(1);
if (grepRecursesIntoPotentialDotenv(bin, args, selectorCouldMatch)) return true;
if (bin === 'ag' && agSearchesPotentialCredential(args)) return true;
if (bin === 'rg' && rgSearchesPotentialDotenv(args, selectorCouldMatch)) return true;
if (readerArgumentsReadDotenv(
- bin, args, isDotenvCredentialPath, opts.platform ?? process.platform, selectorCouldMatch)) return true;
+ bin, args, isDotenvCredentialPath, opts.platform ?? process.platform,
+ selectorCouldMatch, fileReadRequiresConsent)) return true;
}
return false;
}
@@ -6441,7 +6487,7 @@ export function shellCommandReadsCredentials(
// 超长命令解析器不展开扫描,按需要确认处理(与 classifyShellCommand 同样不放过)。
if (command.length > MAX_AUTO_REVIEW_ACTION_TEXT_CHARS) return true;
if (shellCommandReadsDotenv(command, workspaceRoots, opts, depth)) return true;
- const variants = deterministicScanVariants(command);
+ const variants = deterministicScanVariants(opts.credentialTextTransform?.(command) ?? command);
return matchesAnyVariant(CREDENTIAL_ALWAYS_ASK_PATTERNS, variants) || fetchesCloudMetadata(variants.quotesOnly);
}