Free, open source blog writer for Claude Code. Researches current sources, writes answer-first posts for Google and AI answers, has an independent reviewer score each one out of 100 and ships only after five delivery gates. 32 skills, 30 /blog commands, 5 agents. Active development at AI-Marketing-Hub/claude-blog; public releases ship here.
Python agent-skillsaiai-citationsai-contentai-marketingai-marketing-hubblogblog-writingclaude-codeclaude-code-skillclaude-pluginclaude-skillcontent-creationcontent-optimizationcontent-strategyeeatgeomultilingualopen-sourceseo
"""Wave 3 regression tests: installer profile paths behind OS-level symlinks."""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
from types import SimpleNamespace
import pytest
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("wave3_installer_ownership", ROOT / "scripts" / "installer_ownership.py")
OWNERSHIP = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
sys.modules[SPEC.name] = OWNERSHIP
SPEC.loader.exec_module(OWNERSHIP)
def _link_to_tmp(tmp_path):
real = tmp_path / "real" / "var" / "home"
real.mkdir(parents=True)
alias = tmp_path / "alias"
alias.symlink_to(real, target_is_directory=True)
return real, alias
def test_user_created_symlink_ancestor_is_refused_with_a_clear_message(tmp_path):
real, alias = _link_to_tmp(tmp_path)
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
OWNERSHIP.ProfileFS(alias / "user" / ".claude")
message = str(exc.value)
assert f"refusing symlinked path component {alias}" in message
assert "Not a directory" not in message
assert not (real / "user").exists()
def test_root_owned_alias_under_the_filesystem_root_is_followed(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
real, alias = _link_to_tmp(tmp_path)
# Stand in for /home: treat this one link as the trusted root-owned alias.
original = OWNERSHIP.is_trusted_system_symlink
monkeypatch.setattr(
OWNERSHIP, "is_trusted_system_symlink",
lambda path, link_stat: path == alias or original(path, link_stat),
)
fs = OWNERSHIP.ProfileFS(alias / "user" / ".claude")
assert (real / "user" / ".claude").is_dir()
assert fs.root == alias / "user" / ".claude"
def test_trusted_rule_requires_root_ownership_directly_under_the_root():
root_link = SimpleNamespace(st_uid=0)
user_link = SimpleNamespace(st_uid=os.getuid() or 1000)
assert OWNERSHIP.is_trusted_system_symlink(Path("/home"), root_link)
assert not OWNERSHIP.is_trusted_system_symlink(Path("/home"), user_link)
assert not OWNERSHIP.is_trusted_system_symlink(Path("/home/user/link"), root_link)
assert not OWNERSHIP.is_trusted_system_symlink(Path("/a/b"), root_link)
def test_symlinked_claude_directory_is_refused_even_if_root_owned(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
real = tmp_path / "elsewhere"
real.mkdir()
home = tmp_path / "home"
home.mkdir()
(home / ".claude").symlink_to(real, target_is_directory=True)
monkeypatch.setattr(OWNERSHIP, "is_trusted_system_symlink", lambda path, link_stat: True)
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
OWNERSHIP.ProfileFS(home / ".claude")
assert f"refusing symlinked path component {home / '.claude'}" in str(exc.value)
def test_symlinked_skills_directory_is_refused_with_a_clear_message(tmp_path):
profile = tmp_path / "profile"
profile.mkdir()
outside = tmp_path / "outside"
outside.mkdir()
(profile / "skills").symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)
fs = OWNERSHIP.ProfileFS(profile)
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
fs.parent_fd(PurePosixPath("skills/blog/SKILL.md"), create=True)
message = str(exc.value)
assert f"refusing symlinked path component {profile / 'skills'}" in message
assert "Not a directory" not in message
assert list(outside.iterdir()) == []
def _real_home_alias():
home = Path("/home")
try:
link = os.lstat(home)
except OSError:
return None
if not home.is_symlink() or link.st_uid != 0:
return None
target = Path(os.path.realpath(home))
try:
return home / ROOT.resolve().relative_to(target)
except ValueError:
return None
@pytest.mark.skipif(_real_home_alias() is None, reason="/home is not a root-owned alias of a path containing this checkout")
def test_profile_behind_the_real_home_alias_is_accepted():
alias_root = _real_home_alias()
scratch = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=".w3-profile-", dir=ROOT.parent))
try:
profile = Path("/home") / scratch.resolve().relative_to(Path(os.path.realpath("/home"))) / "user" / ".claude"
assert str(profile).startswith("/home/")
fs = OWNERSHIP.ProfileFS(profile)
assert (scratch / "user" / ".claude").is_dir()
assert fs.root == profile
finally:
shutil.rmtree(scratch, ignore_errors=True)
assert alias_root is not None
@pytest.mark.skipif(_real_home_alias() is None, reason="/home is not a root-owned alias of a path containing this checkout")
def test_install_and_uninstall_scripts_work_with_home_behind_the_alias(tmp_path):
scratch = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=".w3-home-", dir=ROOT.parent))
try:
home = Path("/home") / scratch.resolve().relative_to(Path(os.path.realpath("/home")))
env = dict(os.environ, HOME=str(home), CLAUDE_BLOG_SKIP_PIP="1")
installed = subprocess.run(["bash", str(ROOT / "install.sh")], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, cwd=ROOT)
assert installed.returncode == 0, installed.stderr
assert "unsafe parent" not in installed.stderr and "Not a directory" not in installed.stderr
assert (scratch / ".claude" / "skills" / "blog" / "SKILL.md").is_file()
removed = subprocess.run(["bash", str(ROOT / "uninstall.sh")], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, cwd=ROOT)
assert removed.returncode == 0, removed.stderr
assert not (scratch / ".claude" / "skills" / "blog" / "SKILL.md").exists()
finally:
shutil.rmtree(scratch, ignore_errors=True)
def test_shell_wrappers_rewrite_the_cryptic_message(tmp_path):
"""An older installed engine's wording is routed through the clear message."""
fake = tmp_path / "engine.py"
fake.write_text(
"import sys\nsys.stderr.write('ERROR: installation path has an unsafe parent at skills: Not a directory\\n')\nsys.exit(1)\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
for script in ("install.sh", "uninstall.sh"):
source = (ROOT / script).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
start = source.index("run_ownership_engine() {")
end = source.index("\n}\n", start) + 3
harness = tmp_path / f"harness-{script}"
harness.write_text(source[start:end] + f'\nrun_ownership_engine "{fake}"\n', encoding="utf-8")
result = subprocess.run(["bash", str(harness)], capture_output=True, text=True)
assert result.returncode == 1
assert "refusing symlinked path component skills" in result.stderr
assert "unsafe parent" not in result.stderr