Business operating system for Claude Code — 57 skills, 21 agents, smart daemon. Unified inbox (WhatsApp/Email/Slack/Telegram), autonomous PR merge, full-AWS monitoring, revenue (Stripe+RevenueCat), e-commerce (Shopify), marketing (Klaviyo/Meta/GA4), voice (Bland/ElevenLabs), APM (Datadog/NewRelic/OTEL), YOLO mode.
claude-ops — default approval policy
Repository-wide rules for Cursor Approval Agents evaluating pull requests in this repo.
Purpose
claude-ops is a business operating system plugin for Claude Code. Changes can affect safety hooks, deploy automation, credential handling, and fleet orchestration. Default posture: approve only when risk is low and automated review is clean.
Auto-approve when ALL are true
- PR is small and scoped (generally ≤ 300 changed lines, excluding lockfiles and generated docs)
- Bugbot Review Context reports no findings requiring human review
- Security Review Context reports no findings requiring human review (when enabled)
- Risk score is at or below the agent's configured maximum threshold
- CI checks required for the changed paths are green
- No changes under high-risk paths (see below) unless a more specific subtree policy explicitly allows it
- PR does not modify approval policy files, routing files, or safety-hook bypass logic
Safe auto-approve examples
- Documentation-only edits under
claude-ops/docs/**,docs/**, orREADME.md - Test-only changes that do not alter production hook or deploy behavior
- Changelog, version bump, or badge updates with no runtime logic changes
- Typo or copy fixes in skills where behavior is unchanged
Never auto-approve
- Any change to
hooks/**,claude-ops/hooks/**, or safety-hook configuration - Credential, secret, rotation, or auth flows (
**/credentials/**,**/rotate/**, Doppler/1Password wiring) - MCP server implementations (
claude-ops/mcp-servers/**) that add network calls, file access, or new tool surfaces - Launchd/daemon lifecycle changes (
claude-ops/launchd/**,claude-ops/scripts/**that start/stop daemons) - GitHub Actions workflow changes (
.github/workflows/**) that weaken CI, skip tests, or broaden deploy permissions - Deletions or relaxations of guardrails (rm-rf blocks, secret-scan hooks, main-branch push warnings)
- Changes that remove tests, disable lint/typecheck, or bypass pre-commit hooks
- PRs labeled
security,breaking, ordo-not-auto-approve
Reviewer routing
When auto-approval is not allowed, request reviewers based on changed area:
| Changed area | Reviewers |
|---|---|
| Hooks / safety / deploy auto-fix | @Lifecycle-Innovations-Limited/platform or repo maintainers |
| MCP servers / external integrations | @Lifecycle-Innovations-Limited/platform |
| Plugin manifest / marketplace metadata | @Lifecycle-Innovations-Limited/platform |
| Docs-only | Any maintainer; no specialist required |
If reviewer assignment is unavailable, leave the PR unapproved and add a comment summarizing why human review is required.
Deploy expectations
For changes that ship through dev → staging → main:
- Do not auto-approve solely because CI passed on the PR branch
- Require evidence that deploy-fix and health-check paths remain intact when touching deploy-related code
- Treat production-impacting script changes as medium risk minimum
Conflict resolution
If this file conflicts with a closer APPROVAL_POLICY.md or a routed policy in .cursor/approval-policies/, follow the more specific policy. If specificity is unclear, follow the stricter rule and do not auto-approve.