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fix(ops-merge): keep read-only upstreams out of the merge queue (#799)

Aurora Capital07d89c29c1e7
diff --git a/claude-ops/bin/ops-merge-scan b/claude-ops/bin/ops-merge-scan
index 3109e805..b70fc334 100755
--- a/claude-ops/bin/ops-merge-scan
+++ b/claude-ops/bin/ops-merge-scan
@@ -12,8 +12,21 @@ OPS_PLUGIN_ROOT_FALLBACK="$PLUGIN_DIR" . "${PLUGIN_DIR}/lib/registry-path.sh"
. "${PLUGIN_DIR}/lib/registry-resolve.sh"
PREFS="${OPS_DATA_DIR}/preferences.json"
-# Optional: scope to a single repo
-FILTER_REPO="${1:-}"
+# Optional: scope to a single repo. Accepts a bare slug or --repo <slug>, because
+# the skill documents the flag form while this script only ever read $1 — passing
+# --repo used to set FILTER_REPO to the literal string "--repo" and scan a repo
+# named that, which found nothing and looked like "no open PRs".
+FILTER_REPO=""
+case "${1:-}" in
+ --repo) FILTER_REPO="${2:-}" ;;
+ --repo=*) FILTER_REPO="${1#--repo=}" ;;
+ -*) echo "{\"error\":\"unknown flag ${1}\",\"prs\":[]}" && exit 1 ;;
+ *) FILTER_REPO="${1:-}" ;;
+esac
+
+if [ -n "$FILTER_REPO" ] && ! printf '%s' "$FILTER_REPO" | grep -qE '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$'; then
+ echo "{\"error\":\"not an owner/name slug: ${FILTER_REPO}\",\"prs\":[]}" && exit 1
+fi
if [ ! -f "$REGISTRY" ]; then
echo '{"error":"registry.json not found","prs":[]}' && exit 1
@@ -31,6 +44,53 @@ else
REPOS=$(ops_registry_repos "$REGISTRY")
fi
+# Drop repos we cannot push to.
+#
+# The registry lists every project cloned locally, which includes upstreams we
+# only ever read: a fork's parent, a dependency we patched once, a public repo
+# we filed one issue against. Those surface open PRs from unrelated contributors,
+# and a merge queue that lists them invites merging someone else's work into a
+# project that is not ours. On 2026-08-15 a scan returned 57 such PRs across four
+# upstream repos alongside 8 real ones.
+#
+# `.permissions.push` is true only for a member or collaborator, which is exactly
+# the line we want.
+#
+# The gate is fail-closed: only an explicit `true` keeps a repo. A lookup that
+# errors, returns null, or reports false is dropped. Fail-open was tempting so a
+# network blip could not hide your own PRs, but this list feeds a queue whose next
+# step is `gh pr merge`, and "we could not tell" must never resolve to "merge it".
+# A blip costs you a rerun; the other way costs someone else's repo.
+#
+# --repo is NOT exempt. It used to be, which meant `--repo someone/else` walked
+# straight past the check.
+#
+# OPS_MERGE_INCLUDE_EXTERNAL takes a single slug, not a boolean, so authorising one
+# upstream for one run cannot silently re-open the whole registry.
+ALLOW_EXTERNAL="${OPS_MERGE_INCLUDE_EXTERNAL:-}"
+[ "$ALLOW_EXTERNAL" = "1" ] && ALLOW_EXTERNAL="" # legacy boolean is not an allowlist
+
+KEPT=""
+SKIPPED=""
+for repo in $REPOS; do
+ if [ -n "$ALLOW_EXTERNAL" ] && [ "$repo" = "$ALLOW_EXTERNAL" ]; then
+ KEPT="$KEPT $repo"
+ echo "ops-merge: including $repo by explicit OPS_MERGE_INCLUDE_EXTERNAL" >&2
+ continue
+ fi
+ PERM=$(gh api "repos/$repo" --jq '.permissions.push' 2>/dev/null || echo "error")
+ case "$PERM" in
+ true) KEPT="$KEPT $repo" ;;
+ *) SKIPPED="$SKIPPED $repo($PERM)" ;;
+ esac
+done
+REPOS="$KEPT"
+[ -n "$SKIPPED" ] && echo "ops-merge: skipped, no confirmed push access:$SKIPPED" >&2
+
+if [ -z "$(printf '%s' "$REPOS" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
+ echo '{"prs":[],"note":"no repos with confirmed push access"}' && exit 0
+fi
+
# Approved PR author logins (owner + bots). Configured in preferences.json
# under .merge_authors (array of GitHub logins, e.g. "you", "dependabot[bot]").
# Empty / missing → keep all authors (legacy behavior).
diff --git a/claude-ops/skills/ops-merge/SKILL.md b/claude-ops/skills/ops-merge/SKILL.md
index 0218949a..6b240396 100644
--- a/claude-ops/skills/ops-merge/SKILL.md
+++ b/claude-ops/skills/ops-merge/SKILL.md
@@ -487,6 +487,18 @@ During this command's execution, invoke the following superpower skills at the s
- **NEVER trust a fixer's claim of merge success.** Always verify via `gh pr view --json state,mergedAt,mergeCommit` before marking complete. See Phase 5 verification protocol.
- **NEVER let a fixer call `gh pr merge`.** Merge is orchestrator-only. Fixers push, orchestrator verifies the push, orchestrator merges, orchestrator verifies the merge.
+- **NEVER merge, or open a PR against, a repo the owner is not a member of.** The registry lists every locally cloned project, so a fork's upstream (`facebookresearch/*`, someone else's OSS) appears in the queue carrying open PRs from unrelated contributors. Those are read-only. Contributing upstream is a deliberate act the owner asks for, one PR at a time, never a pipeline sweep.
+
+ **Check push access immediately before every `gh pr create`, `gh pr merge`, and `git push` — in every phase (0 salvage, 2 merge, 5 verified-merge, 6 main sync):**
+
+ ```bash
+ PERM=$(gh api "repos/$REPO" --jq '.permissions.push' 2>/dev/null || echo error)
+ [ "$PERM" = "true" ] || { echo "refusing: no confirmed push access to $REPO ($PERM)"; exit 1; }
+ ```
+
+ **Fail closed.** Only a literal `true` proceeds. `false`, `null`, a network error, a renamed repo, or an empty response all refuse. The scan filtering the queue is not sufficient on its own: the queue can be stale, hand-edited, or passed in by an operator, and the step after it is a merge. Re-check at the point of action, not once at the start.
+
+ `OPS_MERGE_INCLUDE_EXTERNAL=<owner/name>` authorises exactly one repo for one run, and only when the owner asked. It is a slug, never a boolean — a global on/off would re-open the whole registry to a pipeline whose next call is `gh pr merge`.
- **NEVER force-push to main/master**
- **NEVER merge with red CI** — fix root cause first
- **NEVER bypass review on PRs touching auth, payments, PII, or secrets** — these require `security-reviewer` subagent audit before merge