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feat(safety): add 3 universal PreToolUse safety hooks (secrets, rm-rf, mainpush) (#162)
Aurora Capitala2340b6ef7ca
diff --git a/claude-ops/.claude-plugin/plugin.json b/claude-ops/.claude-plugin/plugin.jsonindex f8a85dd2..9572567a 100644--- a/claude-ops/.claude-plugin/plugin.json+++ b/claude-ops/.claude-plugin/plugin.json@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@"fedex"],"userConfig": {+ "prevent_secret_commit": {+ "type": "boolean",+ "title": "Block git commits containing secrets",+ "description": "PreToolUse hook scans `git diff --cached` for high-confidence secret patterns (Stripe, AWS, GitHub tokens, JWTs, hardcoded passwords) and denies the commit if a match is found.",+ "default": true+ },+ "no_rm_rf_anchor": {+ "type": "boolean",+ "title": "Block rm -rf against root anchors",+ "description": "PreToolUse hook denies `rm -rf` targeting /, ~, $HOME, .., or . — protecting against catastrophic filesystem wipes. Specific subpaths (./node_modules, /tmp/foo) are allowed.",+ "default": true+ },+ "warn_mainpush": {+ "type": "boolean",+ "title": "Confirm direct push to main/master/production",+ "description": "PreToolUse hook forces user confirmation when pushing directly to a protected branch (main/master/production), either via explicit destination or while currently on the branch.",+ "default": true+ },"deploy_fix_enabled": {"type": "boolean","title": "Deploy auto-fix enabled",diff --git a/claude-ops/bin/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor b/claude-ops/bin/ops-no-rm-rf-anchornew file mode 100755index 00000000..7893093d--- /dev/null+++ b/claude-ops/bin/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+# PreToolUse hook (Bash, gated `rm *`):+# Blocks `rm -rf` against root anchors (/, ~, $HOME, .., .) which can wipe the+# user's machine or the calling repo. Allows specific subpaths.+#+# userConfig: no_rm_rf_anchor (boolean, default true). Disable by setting+# CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_NO_RM_RF_ANCHOR=false.+set -uo pipefail+# Disable filename globbing so unquoted `/*` / `../*` tokens don't expand+# when we tokenize the command string.+set -f++if [[ "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_NO_RM_RF_ANCHOR:-true}" == "false" ]]; then+ exit 0+fi++INPUT="${TOOL_INPUT:-${1:-}}"++# Try to parse JSON tool_input.command if INPUT is a JSON object; else use as-is.+CMD="$INPUT"+if [[ "$INPUT" == *'"command"'* ]]; then+ parsed=$(python3 -c '+import json, sys+try:+ d = json.loads(sys.argv[1])+ if isinstance(d, dict):+ print(d.get("command") or d.get("tool_input", {}).get("command", ""))+except Exception:+ pass+' "$INPUT" 2>/dev/null || true)+ [[ -n "$parsed" ]] && CMD="$parsed"+fi++# Only act on rm commands.+echo "$CMD" | grep -Eq '(^|[[:space:];&|`])rm([[:space:]]|$)' || exit 0++# Normalize: collapse whitespace.+NORM="$(echo "$CMD" | tr '\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ')"++# Match `rm` with -rf / -fr / -r -f (any combo of -r, -R, -f, --recursive, --force).+# Then check ALL arguments after the flags for dangerous anchors.+#+# Dangerous anchor regex matches the target token explicitly:+# / /* /.+# ~ ~/ ~/*+# $HOME $HOME/ $HOME/* "$HOME" "$HOME/..."+# .. ../* ../ .+# (also empty target)+#+# We split commands on ; && || | and check each segment.+DANGER=""++# shellcheck disable=SC2001+SEGMENTS=$(echo "$NORM" | awk '{ gsub(/&&/, "\n"); gsub(/\|\|/, "\n"); gsub(/\|/, "\n"); gsub(/;/, "\n"); print }')++while IFS= read -r seg; do+ seg="$(echo "$seg" | sed 's/^ *//;s/ *$//')"+ [[ -z "$seg" ]] && continue+ # Must start with rm (allow `sudo rm`, `time rm`, etc.)+ if ! echo "$seg" | grep -Eq '(^|[[:space:]])rm([[:space:]]|$)'; then+ continue+ fi+ # Must have recursive + force flags. Accept: -rf, -fr, -Rf, -fR, -r ... -f, --recursive ... --force, -rfv, etc.+ has_r=0; has_f=0+ if echo "$seg" | grep -Eq '(^|[[:space:]])-[a-zA-Z]*[rR][a-zA-Z]*([[:space:]]|$)' || echo "$seg" | grep -Eq -- '--recursive([[:space:]]|=|$)'; then+ has_r=1+ fi+ if echo "$seg" | grep -Eq '(^|[[:space:]])-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*([[:space:]]|$)' || echo "$seg" | grep -Eq -- '--force([[:space:]]|=|$)'; then+ has_f=1+ fi+ if (( has_r == 0 || has_f == 0 )); then+ continue+ fi++ # Extract tokens after `rm`, drop flag-tokens, examine targets.+ # Strip leading `sudo`/`time`/etc and then `rm`.+ rest=$(echo "$seg" | sed -E 's/^.*[[:space:]]?rm([[:space:]]+|$)//')+ # Tokenize on spaces (best-effort — won't perfectly handle quoted-with-spaces but covers the patterns specified).+ for tok in $rest; do+ # Skip flags.+ case "$tok" in+ -*) continue ;;+ esac+ # Strip surrounding quotes for comparison.+ bare="${tok%\"}"; bare="${bare#\"}"+ bare="${bare%\'}"; bare="${bare#\'}"++ case "$bare" in+ "" | "/" | "/*" | "/." | \+ "~" | "~/" | "~/*" | \+ '$HOME' | '$HOME/' | '$HOME/*' | \+ ".." | "../" | "../*" | \+ ".")+ DANGER="$bare"+ break+ ;;+ esac+ # Also catch quoted $HOME variants where the shell hasn't expanded them.+ if [[ "$tok" == '"$HOME"' || "$tok" == '"$HOME"/' || "$tok" == '"$HOME"/*' ]]; then+ DANGER="$tok"; break+ fi+ done++ [[ -n "$DANGER" ]] && break+done <<EOF+$SEGMENTS+EOF++if [[ -n "$DANGER" ]]; then+ reason="Blocked rm -rf against dangerous anchor: '$DANGER'. This can destroy the system, your home directory, or the calling repo. Use a specific subpath (e.g. ./node_modules, /tmp/foo). To override (NOT RECOMMENDED) set CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_NO_RM_RF_ANCHOR=false."+ python3 -c '+import json, sys+print(json.dumps({+ "hookSpecificOutput": {+ "hookEventName": "PreToolUse",+ "permissionDecision": "deny",+ "permissionDecisionReason": sys.argv[1]+ }+}))' "$reason"+ exit 0+fi++exit 0diff --git a/claude-ops/bin/ops-prevent-secret-commit b/claude-ops/bin/ops-prevent-secret-commitnew file mode 100755index 00000000..1cd4bfbd--- /dev/null+++ b/claude-ops/bin/ops-prevent-secret-commit@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+# PreToolUse hook (Bash, gated `git commit*`):+# Scans staged diff for high-confidence secret patterns. Emits permissionDecision=deny+# with hookSpecificOutput JSON when a match is found; exits 0 otherwise.+#+# userConfig: prevent_secret_commit (boolean, default true). Disable by setting+# CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_PREVENT_SECRET_COMMIT=false.+set -uo pipefail++# Opt-out: silently allow when disabled.+if [[ "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_PREVENT_SECRET_COMMIT:-true}" == "false" ]]; then+ exit 0+fi++INPUT="${TOOL_INPUT:-${1:-}}"++# Confirm this is a git commit (defense in depth — matcher should already gate).+if ! echo "$INPUT" | grep -Eq 'git[[:space:]]+commit'; then+ exit 0+fi++# Need git available + cwd inside a repo.+command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0+git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0++# Capture staged diff (cwd-relative). Limit size to keep <100ms.+FULL_DIFF="$(git diff --cached --no-color 2>/dev/null | head -c 524288 || true)"+[[ -z "$FULL_DIFF" ]] && exit 0++# Only scan ADDED lines (lines starting with '+', excluding diff header '+++').+# This ensures that a commit which REMOVES a leaked key is not blocked.+DIFF="$(echo "$FULL_DIFF" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -E -v '^\+\+\+' || true)"+[[ -z "$DIFF" ]] && exit 0++# Patterns: label|regex (POSIX ERE, BSD-grep compatible — no \d, no \b lookarounds).+PATTERNS=(+ "Stripe live key|sk_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]{24,}"+ "Stripe test key|sk_test_[a-zA-Z0-9]{24,}"+ "AWS access key|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"+ "GitHub personal token|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"+ "GitHub OAuth token|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"+ "GitHub app server token|ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"+ "Slack bot token|xoxb-[A-Za-z0-9-]+"+ "Slack app token|xoxa-[A-Za-z0-9-]+"+ "Slack user token|xoxp-[A-Za-z0-9-]+"+ "JWT|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\\.?[A-Za-z0-9_.+/=-]*"+ "Anthropic API key|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-"+ "OpenAI API key|OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-"+ "Hardcoded password|password[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*['\"][^'\"]{8,}['\"]"+)++HITS=()+for entry in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do+ label="${entry%%|*}"+ regex="${entry#*|}"+ if echo "$DIFF" | grep -Eq "$regex"; then+ # Find which file contains the match (best-effort — last "+++ b/" before hit).+ file="$(echo "$FULL_DIFF" | grep -E "(^\\+\\+\\+ b/|$regex)" | grep -B1 -E "$regex" | grep -E '^\+\+\+ b/' | tail -1 | sed 's|^+++ b/||' || true)"+ if [[ -n "$file" ]]; then+ HITS+=("$label in $file")+ else+ HITS+=("$label in staged diff")+ fi+ fi+done++if (( ${#HITS[@]} > 0 )); then+ reason="Blocked git commit — likely secret(s) in staged diff: $(IFS='; '; echo "${HITS[*]}"). Unstage the secret, rotate it, and use an env var or secret manager. To override (NOT RECOMMENDED) set CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_PREVENT_SECRET_COMMIT=false."+ # Emit JSON on stdout. Use python3 for safe JSON escaping (always present on macOS/Linux).+ python3 -c '+import json, sys+reason = sys.argv[1]+print(json.dumps({+ "hookSpecificOutput": {+ "hookEventName": "PreToolUse",+ "permissionDecision": "deny",+ "permissionDecisionReason": reason+ }+}))' "$reason"+ exit 0+fi++exit 0diff --git a/claude-ops/bin/ops-warn-mainpush b/claude-ops/bin/ops-warn-mainpushnew file mode 100755index 00000000..399953d0--- /dev/null+++ b/claude-ops/bin/ops-warn-mainpush@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+# PreToolUse hook (Bash, gated `git push*`):+# Forces user confirmation (permissionDecision=ask) when pushing to main/master/production+# directly. Allows feature-branch pushes silently.+#+# userConfig: warn_mainpush (boolean, default true). Disable by setting+# CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_WARN_MAINPUSH=false.+set -uo pipefail++if [[ "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_WARN_MAINPUSH:-true}" == "false" ]]; then+ exit 0+fi++INPUT="${TOOL_INPUT:-${1:-}}"++# Parse JSON command if applicable.+CMD="$INPUT"+if [[ "$INPUT" == *'"command"'* ]]; then+ parsed=$(python3 -c '+import json, sys+try:+ d = json.loads(sys.argv[1])+ if isinstance(d, dict):+ print(d.get("command") or d.get("tool_input", {}).get("command", ""))+except Exception:+ pass+' "$INPUT" 2>/dev/null || true)+ [[ -n "$parsed" ]] && CMD="$parsed"+fi++# Only inspect git push commands.+echo "$CMD" | grep -Eq '(^|[[:space:];&|`])git[[:space:]]+push' || exit 0++DEST=""+REASON=""++# Case A: explicit `git push [flags...] <remote> <branch>` targeting main/master/production.+# Match by checking if any token after `push` equals one of the protected branch names.+if echo "$CMD" | grep -Eq 'git[[:space:]]+push([[:space:]]+(-[^[:space:]]+|[a-zA-Z0-9_./-]+))*[[:space:]]+(main|master|production)([[:space:]]|$)'; then+ DEST=$(echo "$CMD" | grep -Eo '(main|master|production)' | tail -1)+ REASON="Pushing directly to protected branch '$DEST'. Confirm before publishing — prefer a feature branch + PR."+fi++# Case B: explicit refspec like `HEAD:main` or `feature:main`.+if [[ -z "$DEST" ]] && echo "$CMD" | grep -Eq 'git[[:space:]]+push[[:space:]].*:[[:space:]]*(main|master|production)([[:space:]]|$)'; then+ DEST=$(echo "$CMD" | grep -Eo '[^[:space:]]+:(main|master|production)' | tail -1)+ REASON="Pushing refspec $DEST — this updates a protected branch. Confirm before publishing."+fi++# Case C: bare `git push` (or `git push origin`/`git push -u origin`) — check current branch.+if [[ -z "$DEST" ]] && command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ if git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ BRANCH=$(git -C "$PWD" branch --show-current 2>/dev/null || true)+ case "$BRANCH" in+ main|master|production)+ # Bare push (no explicit refspec) defaults to current branch.+ if echo "$CMD" | grep -Eq 'git[[:space:]]+push([[:space:]]+(-u[[:space:]]+)?[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)?[[:space:]]*$' \+ || echo "$CMD" | grep -Eq 'git[[:space:]]+push[[:space:]]+(-u[[:space:]]+)?[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+[[:space:]]*$'; then+ DEST="current branch '$BRANCH'"+ REASON="You are on protected branch '$BRANCH' and about to push. Confirm before publishing — prefer a feature branch + PR."+ fi+ ;;+ esac+ fi+fi++if [[ -n "$DEST" ]]; then+ python3 -c '+import json, sys+print(json.dumps({+ "hookSpecificOutput": {+ "hookEventName": "PreToolUse",+ "permissionDecision": "ask",+ "permissionDecisionReason": sys.argv[1]+ }+}))' "$REASON"+ exit 0+fi++exit 0diff --git a/claude-ops/hooks/hooks.json b/claude-ops/hooks/hooks.jsonindex 44c3c138..175ef683 100644--- a/claude-ops/hooks/hooks.json+++ b/claude-ops/hooks/hooks.json@@ -25,6 +25,24 @@{"type": "command","command": "bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-pretool-wacli-health \"$TOOL_INPUT\" 2>/dev/null || true"+ },+ {+ "type": "command",+ "command": "bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-prevent-secret-commit",+ "timeout": 5,+ "if": "Bash(git commit*)"+ },+ {+ "type": "command",+ "command": "bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor",+ "timeout": 3,+ "if": "Bash(rm *)"+ },+ {+ "type": "command",+ "command": "bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-warn-mainpush",+ "timeout": 3,+ "if": "Bash(git push*)"}]},diff --git a/claude-ops/tests/run-all.sh b/claude-ops/tests/run-all.shindex fcba5986..16e4f21f 100755--- a/claude-ops/tests/run-all.sh+++ b/claude-ops/tests/run-all.sh@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ run_suite "$TESTS_DIR/test-no-secrets.sh"run_suite "$TESTS_DIR/test-agent-teams.sh"run_suite "$TESTS_DIR/test-ops-daemon-manager.sh"run_suite "$TESTS_DIR/test-ops-package.sh"+run_suite "$TESTS_DIR/test-safety-hooks.sh"echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"echo "SUMMARY"diff --git a/claude-ops/tests/test-safety-hooks.sh b/claude-ops/tests/test-safety-hooks.shnew file mode 100755index 00000000..aedb12d2--- /dev/null+++ b/claude-ops/tests/test-safety-hooks.sh@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+# test-safety-hooks.sh — Validates the 3 universal safety hooks:+# bin/ops-prevent-secret-commit (PreToolUse, gated git commit*)+# bin/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor (PreToolUse, gated rm *)+# bin/ops-warn-mainpush (PreToolUse, gated git push*)+set -uo pipefail++PLUGIN_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"+BIN="$PLUGIN_ROOT/bin"++pass=0+fail=0+ok() { echo " PASS: $1"; pass=$((pass+1)); }+err() { echo " FAIL: $1"; fail=$((fail+1)); }++# Helper: assert deny in JSON output.+assert_deny() {+ local out="$1" label="$2"+ if echo "$out" | grep -q '"permissionDecision"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"deny"'; then+ ok "$label"+ else+ err "$label (expected deny, got: $(echo "$out" | head -c 200))"+ fi+}+assert_ask() {+ local out="$1" label="$2"+ if echo "$out" | grep -q '"permissionDecision"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"ask"'; then+ ok "$label"+ else+ err "$label (expected ask, got: $(echo "$out" | head -c 200))"+ fi+}+assert_allow() {+ local out="$1" label="$2"+ # Allow = empty stdout (no JSON emitted, exit 0).+ if [[ -z "$out" ]]; then+ ok "$label"+ else+ err "$label (expected silent allow, got: $(echo "$out" | head -c 200))"+ fi+}++############################################+# 1. ops-prevent-secret-commit+############################################+echo ""+echo "── ops-prevent-secret-commit ──"++TMPREPO=$(mktemp -d)+cd "$TMPREPO"+git init -q+git config user.email "[email protected]"+git config user.name "test"+git commit --allow-empty -q -m init++# Patterns to test. Sample values are runtime-assembled to avoid tripping+# upstream secret scanners (GitHub, gitleaks, etc.) on this test file itself.+P_LIVE="sk_""live_""abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234"+P_TEST="sk_""test_""abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234"+P_AKIA="AKIA""IOSFODNN7""EXAMPLE"+P_GHP="ghp_""abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEF1234"+P_GHO="gho_""abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEF1234"+P_GHS="ghs_""abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEF1234"+P_XOXB="xoxb""-12345-67890-abcdefghij"+P_XOXA="xoxa""-12345-67890-abcdefghij"+P_XOXP="xoxp""-12345-67890-abcdefghij"+P_JWT="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.""eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NSJ9.""SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4f"+P_ANTHROPIC="ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=""sk-ant-""abc123"+P_OPENAI="OPENAI_API_KEY=""sk-""proj-abc123"+_PW_VAL="super""secret""123"+P_PASS="password = \"${_PW_VAL}\""++SECRETS=(+ "stripe-live:$P_LIVE"+ "stripe-test:$P_TEST"+ "aws-akia:$P_AKIA"+ "github-ghp:$P_GHP"+ "github-gho:$P_GHO"+ "github-ghs:$P_GHS"+ "slack-xoxb:$P_XOXB"+ "slack-xoxa:$P_XOXA"+ "slack-xoxp:$P_XOXP"+ "jwt:$P_JWT"+ "anthropic-key:$P_ANTHROPIC"+ "openai-key:$P_OPENAI"+ "password:$P_PASS"+)++for entry in "${SECRETS[@]}"; do+ label="${entry%%:*}"+ payload="${entry#*:}"+ echo "$payload" > "secret-$label.txt"+ git add "secret-$label.txt"+ out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git commit -m fix"}' bash "$BIN/ops-prevent-secret-commit" 2>&1)+ assert_deny "$out" "secret pattern blocked: $label"+ git reset -q HEAD "secret-$label.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1+ rm -f "secret-$label.txt"+done++# Clean diff → allow.+echo "just some clean code" > clean.txt+git add clean.txt+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git commit -m clean"}' bash "$BIN/ops-prevent-secret-commit" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "clean diff allowed"+git reset -q HEAD clean.txt >/dev/null 2>&1++# Opt-out.+echo "sk_""live_""aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" > optout.txt+git add optout.txt+out=$(CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_PREVENT_SECRET_COMMIT=false TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git commit -m x"}' bash "$BIN/ops-prevent-secret-commit" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "opt-out (env=false) bypasses hook"+git reset -q HEAD optout.txt >/dev/null 2>&1+++# Removal of secret → allow (only added lines are scanned).+TMPREPO2=$(mktemp -d)+cd "$TMPREPO2"+git init -q+git config user.email "[email protected]"+git config user.name "test"+echo "OPENAI_API_KEY=""sk-""proj-abc123" > leaked.txt+git add leaked.txt+git commit -q -m "oops leaked"+# Now remove the secret and replace with env-var reference.+echo 'OPENAI_API_KEY=$OPENAI_API_KEY' > leaked.txt+git add leaked.txt+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git commit -m remediate"}' bash "$BIN/ops-prevent-secret-commit" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "removing a secret is allowed (only added lines scanned)"+cd / && rm -rf "$TMPREPO2"+cd / && rm -rf "$TMPREPO"++############################################+# 2. ops-no-rm-rf-anchor+############################################+echo ""+echo "── ops-no-rm-rf-anchor ──"++DANGEROUS=(+ "rm -rf /"+ "rm -rf /*"+ "rm -rf ~"+ "rm -rf ~/*"+ "rm -rf \$HOME"+ "rm -rf \"\$HOME\""+ "rm -rf .."+ "rm -rf ../*"+ "rm -rf ."+ "rm -fr /"+ "rm -Rf ~"+ "rm --recursive --force /"+)+for cmd in "${DANGEROUS[@]}"; do+ payload=$(printf '{"command":"%s"}' "$(echo "$cmd" | sed 's/"/\\"/g')")+ out=$(TOOL_INPUT="$payload" bash "$BIN/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor" 2>&1)+ assert_deny "$out" "dangerous blocked: $cmd"+done++SAFE=(+ "rm -rf ./node_modules"+ "rm -rf /tmp/foo"+ "rm -rf /tmp/build-output"+ "rm -rf dist"+ "rm -rf ./dist/*"+ "rm file.txt"+ "rm -f stale.lock"+ "rm -r somedir"+)+for cmd in "${SAFE[@]}"; do+ payload=$(printf '{"command":"%s"}' "$cmd")+ out=$(TOOL_INPUT="$payload" bash "$BIN/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor" 2>&1)+ assert_allow "$out" "safe allowed: $cmd"+done++# Opt-out.+out=$(CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_NO_RM_RF_ANCHOR=false TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"rm -rf /"}' bash "$BIN/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "opt-out (env=false) bypasses hook"+++# Multi-target: safe first, dangerous second → still blocked.+MULTI_DANGEROUS=(+ "rm -rf /tmp/build /"+ "rm -rf dist ~"+ "rm -rf ./node_modules .."+)+for cmd in "${MULTI_DANGEROUS[@]}"; do+ payload=$(printf '{"command":"%s"}' "$(echo "$cmd" | sed 's/"/\\"/g')")+ out=$(TOOL_INPUT="$payload" bash "$BIN/ops-no-rm-rf-anchor" 2>&1)+ assert_deny "$out" "multi-target blocked: $cmd"+done+############################################+# 3. ops-warn-mainpush+############################################+echo ""+echo "── ops-warn-mainpush ──"++TMPREPO=$(mktemp -d)+cd "$TMPREPO"+git init -q -b main+git config user.email "[email protected]"+git config user.name "test"+git commit --allow-empty -q -m init++# On main → bare push asks.+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_ask "$out" "bare push from main → ask"+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push origin"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_ask "$out" "git push origin from main → ask"+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push -u origin main"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_ask "$out" "explicit push origin main → ask"+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push origin master"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_ask "$out" "explicit push origin master → ask"+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push origin production"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_ask "$out" "explicit push origin production → ask"+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push origin HEAD:main"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_ask "$out" "refspec HEAD:main → ask"++# Switch to feature branch → bare push allowed.+git checkout -q -b feature/safe-thing+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "bare push from feature branch → allow"+out=$(TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push -u origin feature/safe-thing"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "explicit feature push → allow"++# Opt-out.+git checkout -q main+out=$(CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_WARN_MAINPUSH=false TOOL_INPUT='{"command":"git push origin main"}' bash "$BIN/ops-warn-mainpush" 2>&1)+assert_allow "$out" "opt-out (env=false) bypasses hook"++cd / && rm -rf "$TMPREPO"++############################################+echo ""+echo "── Summary ──"+echo " Passed: $pass"+echo " Failed: $fail"+[[ $fail -eq 0 ]]