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fix(security): close DNS-rebinding via redirect target in _pin_dns

Daniela6012687ade4
diff --git a/scripts/url_safety.py b/scripts/url_safety.py
index 49bbc25..b212396 100644
--- a/scripts/url_safety.py
+++ b/scripts/url_safety.py
@@ -242,8 +242,19 @@ _dns_patch_lock = threading.Lock()
def _pin_dns(hostname: str, pinned_ip: str, port: int) -> Iterator[None]:
"""
Temporarily override ``socket.getaddrinfo`` so the named host resolves
- only to ``pinned_ip``. Other hostnames are forwarded to the real
- resolver. Restores the original function on exit, even on exception.
+ only to ``pinned_ip``, AND every other hostname looked up during the
+ pinned scope has its resolved IPs validated against
+ :func:`is_safe_ip`. Non-public resolutions raise ``socket.gaierror``,
+ which ``requests`` surfaces as ``ConnectionError`` — the caller's
+ existing error path.
+
+ The fall-through validation is the v2 fix for redirect-target DNS
+ rebinding: ``requests.Session.get(allow_redirects=True)`` may follow
+ 30x redirects to a *different* hostname; without this guard, the
+ redirect target was resolved by the unpatched resolver and could
+ land on a private IP.
+
+ Restores the original function on exit, even on exception.
"""
if not _dns_patch_lock.acquire(blocking=False):
raise URLSafetyError(
@@ -253,26 +264,18 @@ def _pin_dns(hostname: str, pinned_ip: str, port: int) -> Iterator[None]:
original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
target = hostname.lower()
- pinned_record = (
- socket.AF_INET,
- socket.SOCK_STREAM,
- socket.IPPROTO_TCP,
- "",
- (pinned_ip, port),
- )
def patched(host, requested_port, *args, **kwargs):
+ # Branch 1: the originally-pinned host returns the validated IP
+ # without any further resolver call.
if host and host.lower() == target:
family = kwargs.get("family", args[0] if args else 0)
if family in (0, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.AF_INET):
- # Reuse the pinned record regardless of which port the
- # caller asked for. urllib3 always asks for the same port
- # the URL specified, which is what we validated.
return [(
- pinned_record[0],
- pinned_record[1],
- pinned_record[2],
- pinned_record[3],
+ socket.AF_INET,
+ socket.SOCK_STREAM,
+ socket.IPPROTO_TCP,
+ "",
(pinned_ip, requested_port or port),
)]
raise socket.gaierror(
@@ -280,7 +283,24 @@ def _pin_dns(hostname: str, pinned_ip: str, port: int) -> Iterator[None]:
f"url_safety: address family {family} refused for pinned "
f"IPv4 host {host}",
)
- return original_getaddrinfo(host, requested_port, *args, **kwargs)
+
+ # Branch 2: every OTHER hostname (redirect target, embedded
+ # subresource, library bookkeeping) gets resolved by the real
+ # resolver, then each returned record is checked. A single
+ # non-public record fails the entire lookup.
+ result = original_getaddrinfo(host, requested_port, *args, **kwargs)
+ for info in result:
+ sockaddr = info[4]
+ if not sockaddr:
+ continue
+ ip_str = sockaddr[0]
+ if not is_safe_ip(ip_str):
+ raise socket.gaierror(
+ socket.EAI_FAIL,
+ f"url_safety: refused to resolve {host!r} to "
+ f"non-public IP {ip_str}",
+ )
+ return result
socket.getaddrinfo = patched # type: ignore[assignment]
try:
diff --git a/tests/test_url_safety.py b/tests/test_url_safety.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef6ef41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_url_safety.py
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+"""
+Tests for scripts/url_safety.py.
+
+These tests exercise the SSRF policy, DNS-rebinding mitigation, and the
+Playwright route-handler factory. They intentionally include a proof case
+for the redirect-rebinding scenario that was discovered during the v2
+self-audit (`safe_requests_session` did not validate redirect-target
+hostname resolutions). The fix validates every host the patched resolver
+is asked about, not only the originally-pinned host.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+import threading
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+_SCRIPTS = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))), "scripts")
+if _SCRIPTS not in sys.path:
+ sys.path.insert(0, _SCRIPTS)
+
+import url_safety # noqa: E402
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# is_safe_ip
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ "ip,expected",
+ [
+ ("1.1.1.1", True),
+ ("8.8.8.8", True),
+ ("104.20.23.154", True),
+ ("2606:4700:4700::1111", True),
+ ("192.168.1.1", False),
+ ("10.0.0.1", False),
+ ("172.16.0.1", False),
+ ("127.0.0.1", False),
+ ("169.254.169.254", False), # AWS/GCP/Azure metadata
+ ("0.0.0.0", False),
+ ("::1", False),
+ ("fe80::1", False), # IPv6 link-local
+ ("fd00::1", False), # IPv6 unique-local
+ ("224.0.0.1", False), # multicast
+ ("not-an-ip", False),
+ ("", False),
+ ],
+)
+def test_is_safe_ip(ip: str, expected: bool) -> None:
+ assert url_safety.is_safe_ip(ip) is expected
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_url (parse-only, no DNS)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ "url",
+ [
+ "https://example.com",
+ "http://example.com/path?q=1",
+ "https://example.com:8443/api",
+ "http://1.1.1.1",
+ "https://subdomain.example.com",
+ ],
+)
+def test_validate_url_accepts_public(url: str) -> None:
+ assert url_safety.validate_url(url) is True
+
+
+ "url",
+ [
+ "ftp://example.com",
+ "file:///etc/passwd",
+ "javascript:alert(1)",
+ "https://localhost",
+ "https://127.0.0.1",
+ "https://10.0.0.1",
+ "https://192.168.1.1",
+ "https://169.254.169.254",
+ "https://metadata.google.internal",
+ "https://metadata.azure.com",
+ "not a url",
+ "https://",
+ ],
+)
+def test_validate_url_rejects(url: str) -> None:
+ assert url_safety.validate_url(url) is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_url_strict (resolves DNS; private resolutions raise)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_validate_url_strict_accepts_ip_literal_public() -> None:
+ url, ip = url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://1.1.1.1/")
+ assert ip == "1.1.1.1"
+ assert url == "https://1.1.1.1/"
+
+
+ "url",
+ [
+ "https://127.0.0.1/",
+ "https://10.0.0.1/",
+ "https://192.168.1.1/",
+ "https://169.254.169.254/",
+ "https://0.0.0.0/",
+ ],
+)
+def test_validate_url_strict_rejects_private_ip_literal(url: str) -> None:
+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError):
+ url_safety.validate_url_strict(url)
+
+
+def test_validate_url_strict_refuses_when_dns_resolves_to_private() -> None:
+ """A hostname whose A record points at a private IP must be refused."""
+ fake_addrinfo = [
+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("10.0.0.7", 443))
+ ]
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):
+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError, match="non-public IP"):
+ url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://attacker.example/")
+
+
+def test_validate_url_strict_refuses_mixed_public_and_private() -> None:
+ """If any A record is private, refuse the whole hostname (mitigates
+ multi-record race conditions)."""
+ fake_addrinfo = [
+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("1.2.3.4", 443)),
+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("10.0.0.7", 443)),
+ ]
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):
+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError, match="non-public IP"):
+ url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://attacker.example/")
+
+
+def test_validate_url_strict_dns_failure_raises_safety_error() -> None:
+ """DNS failures surface as URLSafetyError, not gaierror, so callers
+ have a uniform exception type."""
+ with patch.object(
+ url_safety.socket,
+ "getaddrinfo",
+ side_effect=socket.gaierror("nodename nor servname provided"),
+ ):
+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError, match="DNS resolution failed"):
+ url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://does-not-exist.example/")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _pin_dns: redirect-target validation (regression test for v2 self-audit)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_pin_dns_validates_non_pinned_host_resolutions() -> None:
+ """
+ The v2 self-audit found that ``_pin_dns`` only intercepted lookups for
+ the originally-pinned host. Redirect targets (which are different
+ hostnames) fell through to the unprotected resolver, allowing
+ DNS-rebinding via 30x redirects: an attacker-controlled public host
+ could redirect to e.g. http://169.254.169.254/ and the request would
+ be followed.
+
+ This test asserts that *any* host whose resolution lands on a private
+ IP raises ``socket.gaierror`` from inside the pinned context, which
+ ``requests`` surfaces as a ``ConnectionError`` (caught and reported
+ by ``fetch_page.fetch_page``).
+ """
+ original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
+
+ def fake_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs):
+ # Original pinned host: this branch is never reached during the
+ # test because we never look it up after _pin_dns intercepts.
+ if host == "pinned.example":
+ return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("8.8.8.8", port or 443))]
+ # Redirect target: resolves to AWS metadata endpoint.
+ if host == "redirected.example":
+ return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("169.254.169.254", port or 443))]
+ return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)
+
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", side_effect=fake_getaddrinfo):
+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):
+ # Lookup for the redirect target must fail-closed, even though
+ # _pin_dns was set up for "pinned.example".
+ with pytest.raises(socket.gaierror, match="non-public IP"):
+ socket.getaddrinfo("redirected.example", 443)
+
+
+def test_pin_dns_passes_through_public_redirect_targets() -> None:
+ """Public redirect targets keep working normally."""
+ original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
+
+ def fake_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs):
+ if host == "elsewhere.example":
+ return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("1.1.1.1", port or 443))]
+ return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)
+
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", side_effect=fake_getaddrinfo):
+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):
+ result = socket.getaddrinfo("elsewhere.example", 443)
+ assert result[0][4][0] == "1.1.1.1"
+
+
+def test_pin_dns_restores_getaddrinfo_on_normal_exit() -> None:
+ before = socket.getaddrinfo
+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):
+ assert socket.getaddrinfo is not before
+ assert socket.getaddrinfo is before
+
+
+def test_pin_dns_restores_getaddrinfo_on_exception() -> None:
+ before = socket.getaddrinfo
+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):
+ raise RuntimeError("boom")
+ assert socket.getaddrinfo is before
+
+
+def test_pin_dns_lock_refuses_concurrent_entry() -> None:
+ """The non-blocking lock raises rather than corrupts state."""
+ entered = threading.Event()
+ proceed = threading.Event()
+ second_exc: list[Exception] = []
+
+ def first_thread():
+ with url_safety._pin_dns("a.example", "1.1.1.1", 443):
+ entered.set()
+ proceed.wait()
+
+ def second_thread():
+ entered.wait()
+ try:
+ with url_safety._pin_dns("b.example", "2.2.2.2", 443):
+ pass
+ except url_safety.URLSafetyError as exc:
+ second_exc.append(exc)
+
+ t1 = threading.Thread(target=first_thread)
+ t2 = threading.Thread(target=second_thread)
+ t1.start()
+ t2.start()
+ t2.join(timeout=5)
+ proceed.set()
+ t1.join(timeout=5)
+ assert len(second_exc) == 1, "concurrent _pin_dns must raise URLSafetyError"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Playwright route handler factory
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _FakeRoute:
+ def __init__(self) -> None:
+ self.action: str | None = None
+
+ def abort(self) -> None:
+ self.action = "abort"
+
+ def continue_(self) -> None:
+ self.action = "continue"
+
+
+class _FakeRequest:
+ def __init__(self, url: str, resource_type: str = "document") -> None:
+ self.url = url
+ self.resource_type = resource_type
+
+
+def test_route_handler_continues_public_host() -> None:
+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()
+ fake_addrinfo = [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("1.1.1.1", 443))]
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):
+ route = _FakeRoute()
+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("https://safe.example/style.css"))
+ assert route.action == "continue"
+
+
+def test_route_handler_aborts_private_resolution() -> None:
+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()
+ fake_addrinfo = [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("169.254.169.254", 80))]
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):
+ route = _FakeRoute()
+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("http://attacker.example/exfil"))
+ assert route.action == "abort"
+
+
+def test_route_handler_allows_data_urls() -> None:
+ """data:, blob:, chrome-extension: schemes are not DNS-bound."""
+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()
+ route = _FakeRoute()
+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("..."))
+ assert route.action == "continue"
+
+
+def test_route_handler_blocks_specified_resource_types() -> None:
+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler(
+ blocked_resource_types={"image", "font"}
+ )
+ route = _FakeRoute()
+ # Even a public-IP image gets aborted when type is blocked.
+ fake_addrinfo = [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("1.1.1.1", 443))]
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):
+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("https://cdn.example/logo.png", "image"))
+ assert route.action == "abort"
+
+
+def test_route_handler_aborts_on_dns_failure() -> None:
+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()
+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", side_effect=socket.gaierror("nx")):
+ route = _FakeRoute()
+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("https://nx.example/"))
+ assert route.action == "abort"