Universal SEO skill for Claude Code. 26 sub-skills + 19 sub-agents covering technical SEO, E-E-A-T, schema, GEO/AEO, agent readiness (Lighthouse Agentic Browsing, WebMCP, llms.txt), backlinks, local SEO, e-commerce, international SEO, Google APIs, and PDF/Excel reporting. 9 optional extensions for live SEO data.
fix(security): close DNS-rebinding via redirect target in _pin_dns
Daniela6012687ade4
diff --git a/scripts/url_safety.py b/scripts/url_safety.pyindex 49bbc25..b212396 100644--- a/scripts/url_safety.py+++ b/scripts/url_safety.py@@ -242,8 +242,19 @@ _dns_patch_lock = threading.Lock()def _pin_dns(hostname: str, pinned_ip: str, port: int) -> Iterator[None]:"""Temporarily override ``socket.getaddrinfo`` so the named host resolves- only to ``pinned_ip``. Other hostnames are forwarded to the real- resolver. Restores the original function on exit, even on exception.+ only to ``pinned_ip``, AND every other hostname looked up during the+ pinned scope has its resolved IPs validated against+ :func:`is_safe_ip`. Non-public resolutions raise ``socket.gaierror``,+ which ``requests`` surfaces as ``ConnectionError`` — the caller's+ existing error path.++ The fall-through validation is the v2 fix for redirect-target DNS+ rebinding: ``requests.Session.get(allow_redirects=True)`` may follow+ 30x redirects to a *different* hostname; without this guard, the+ redirect target was resolved by the unpatched resolver and could+ land on a private IP.++ Restores the original function on exit, even on exception."""if not _dns_patch_lock.acquire(blocking=False):raise URLSafetyError(@@ -253,26 +264,18 @@ def _pin_dns(hostname: str, pinned_ip: str, port: int) -> Iterator[None]:original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfotarget = hostname.lower()- pinned_record = (- socket.AF_INET,- socket.SOCK_STREAM,- socket.IPPROTO_TCP,- "",- (pinned_ip, port),- )def patched(host, requested_port, *args, **kwargs):+ # Branch 1: the originally-pinned host returns the validated IP+ # without any further resolver call.if host and host.lower() == target:family = kwargs.get("family", args[0] if args else 0)if family in (0, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.AF_INET):- # Reuse the pinned record regardless of which port the- # caller asked for. urllib3 always asks for the same port- # the URL specified, which is what we validated.return [(- pinned_record[0],- pinned_record[1],- pinned_record[2],- pinned_record[3],+ socket.AF_INET,+ socket.SOCK_STREAM,+ socket.IPPROTO_TCP,+ "",(pinned_ip, requested_port or port),)]raise socket.gaierror(@@ -280,7 +283,24 @@ def _pin_dns(hostname: str, pinned_ip: str, port: int) -> Iterator[None]:f"url_safety: address family {family} refused for pinned "f"IPv4 host {host}",)- return original_getaddrinfo(host, requested_port, *args, **kwargs)++ # Branch 2: every OTHER hostname (redirect target, embedded+ # subresource, library bookkeeping) gets resolved by the real+ # resolver, then each returned record is checked. A single+ # non-public record fails the entire lookup.+ result = original_getaddrinfo(host, requested_port, *args, **kwargs)+ for info in result:+ sockaddr = info[4]+ if not sockaddr:+ continue+ ip_str = sockaddr[0]+ if not is_safe_ip(ip_str):+ raise socket.gaierror(+ socket.EAI_FAIL,+ f"url_safety: refused to resolve {host!r} to "+ f"non-public IP {ip_str}",+ )+ return resultsocket.getaddrinfo = patched # type: ignore[assignment]try:diff --git a/tests/test_url_safety.py b/tests/test_url_safety.pynew file mode 100644index 0000000..ef6ef41--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_url_safety.py@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@+"""+Tests for scripts/url_safety.py.++These tests exercise the SSRF policy, DNS-rebinding mitigation, and the+Playwright route-handler factory. They intentionally include a proof case+for the redirect-rebinding scenario that was discovered during the v2+self-audit (`safe_requests_session` did not validate redirect-target+hostname resolutions). The fix validates every host the patched resolver+is asked about, not only the originally-pinned host.+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import os+import socket+import sys+import threading+from unittest.mock import patch++import pytest++_SCRIPTS = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))), "scripts")+if _SCRIPTS not in sys.path:+ sys.path.insert(0, _SCRIPTS)++import url_safety # noqa: E402+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# is_safe_ip+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++ "ip,expected",+ [+ ("1.1.1.1", True),+ ("8.8.8.8", True),+ ("104.20.23.154", True),+ ("2606:4700:4700::1111", True),+ ("192.168.1.1", False),+ ("10.0.0.1", False),+ ("172.16.0.1", False),+ ("127.0.0.1", False),+ ("169.254.169.254", False), # AWS/GCP/Azure metadata+ ("0.0.0.0", False),+ ("::1", False),+ ("fe80::1", False), # IPv6 link-local+ ("fd00::1", False), # IPv6 unique-local+ ("224.0.0.1", False), # multicast+ ("not-an-ip", False),+ ("", False),+ ],+)+def test_is_safe_ip(ip: str, expected: bool) -> None:+ assert url_safety.is_safe_ip(ip) is expected+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# validate_url (parse-only, no DNS)+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++ "url",+ [+ "https://example.com",+ "http://example.com/path?q=1",+ "https://example.com:8443/api",+ "http://1.1.1.1",+ "https://subdomain.example.com",+ ],+)+def test_validate_url_accepts_public(url: str) -> None:+ assert url_safety.validate_url(url) is True+++ "url",+ [+ "ftp://example.com",+ "file:///etc/passwd",+ "javascript:alert(1)",+ "https://localhost",+ "https://127.0.0.1",+ "https://10.0.0.1",+ "https://192.168.1.1",+ "https://169.254.169.254",+ "https://metadata.google.internal",+ "https://metadata.azure.com",+ "not a url",+ "https://",+ ],+)+def test_validate_url_rejects(url: str) -> None:+ assert url_safety.validate_url(url) is False+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# validate_url_strict (resolves DNS; private resolutions raise)+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++def test_validate_url_strict_accepts_ip_literal_public() -> None:+ url, ip = url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://1.1.1.1/")+ assert ip == "1.1.1.1"+ assert url == "https://1.1.1.1/"+++ "url",+ [+ "https://127.0.0.1/",+ "https://10.0.0.1/",+ "https://192.168.1.1/",+ "https://169.254.169.254/",+ "https://0.0.0.0/",+ ],+)+def test_validate_url_strict_rejects_private_ip_literal(url: str) -> None:+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError):+ url_safety.validate_url_strict(url)+++def test_validate_url_strict_refuses_when_dns_resolves_to_private() -> None:+ """A hostname whose A record points at a private IP must be refused."""+ fake_addrinfo = [+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("10.0.0.7", 443))+ ]+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError, match="non-public IP"):+ url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://attacker.example/")+++def test_validate_url_strict_refuses_mixed_public_and_private() -> None:+ """If any A record is private, refuse the whole hostname (mitigates+ multi-record race conditions)."""+ fake_addrinfo = [+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("1.2.3.4", 443)),+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("10.0.0.7", 443)),+ ]+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError, match="non-public IP"):+ url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://attacker.example/")+++def test_validate_url_strict_dns_failure_raises_safety_error() -> None:+ """DNS failures surface as URLSafetyError, not gaierror, so callers+ have a uniform exception type."""+ with patch.object(+ url_safety.socket,+ "getaddrinfo",+ side_effect=socket.gaierror("nodename nor servname provided"),+ ):+ with pytest.raises(url_safety.URLSafetyError, match="DNS resolution failed"):+ url_safety.validate_url_strict("https://does-not-exist.example/")+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# _pin_dns: redirect-target validation (regression test for v2 self-audit)+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++def test_pin_dns_validates_non_pinned_host_resolutions() -> None:+ """+ The v2 self-audit found that ``_pin_dns`` only intercepted lookups for+ the originally-pinned host. Redirect targets (which are different+ hostnames) fell through to the unprotected resolver, allowing+ DNS-rebinding via 30x redirects: an attacker-controlled public host+ could redirect to e.g. http://169.254.169.254/ and the request would+ be followed.++ This test asserts that *any* host whose resolution lands on a private+ IP raises ``socket.gaierror`` from inside the pinned context, which+ ``requests`` surfaces as a ``ConnectionError`` (caught and reported+ by ``fetch_page.fetch_page``).+ """+ original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo++ def fake_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs):+ # Original pinned host: this branch is never reached during the+ # test because we never look it up after _pin_dns intercepts.+ if host == "pinned.example":+ return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("8.8.8.8", port or 443))]+ # Redirect target: resolves to AWS metadata endpoint.+ if host == "redirected.example":+ return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("169.254.169.254", port or 443))]+ return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)++ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", side_effect=fake_getaddrinfo):+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):+ # Lookup for the redirect target must fail-closed, even though+ # _pin_dns was set up for "pinned.example".+ with pytest.raises(socket.gaierror, match="non-public IP"):+ socket.getaddrinfo("redirected.example", 443)+++def test_pin_dns_passes_through_public_redirect_targets() -> None:+ """Public redirect targets keep working normally."""+ original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo++ def fake_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs):+ if host == "elsewhere.example":+ return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("1.1.1.1", port or 443))]+ return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)++ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", side_effect=fake_getaddrinfo):+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):+ result = socket.getaddrinfo("elsewhere.example", 443)+ assert result[0][4][0] == "1.1.1.1"+++def test_pin_dns_restores_getaddrinfo_on_normal_exit() -> None:+ before = socket.getaddrinfo+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):+ assert socket.getaddrinfo is not before+ assert socket.getaddrinfo is before+++def test_pin_dns_restores_getaddrinfo_on_exception() -> None:+ before = socket.getaddrinfo+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):+ with url_safety._pin_dns("pinned.example", "8.8.8.8", 443):+ raise RuntimeError("boom")+ assert socket.getaddrinfo is before+++def test_pin_dns_lock_refuses_concurrent_entry() -> None:+ """The non-blocking lock raises rather than corrupts state."""+ entered = threading.Event()+ proceed = threading.Event()+ second_exc: list[Exception] = []++ def first_thread():+ with url_safety._pin_dns("a.example", "1.1.1.1", 443):+ entered.set()+ proceed.wait()++ def second_thread():+ entered.wait()+ try:+ with url_safety._pin_dns("b.example", "2.2.2.2", 443):+ pass+ except url_safety.URLSafetyError as exc:+ second_exc.append(exc)++ t1 = threading.Thread(target=first_thread)+ t2 = threading.Thread(target=second_thread)+ t1.start()+ t2.start()+ t2.join(timeout=5)+ proceed.set()+ t1.join(timeout=5)+ assert len(second_exc) == 1, "concurrent _pin_dns must raise URLSafetyError"+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# Playwright route handler factory+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++class _FakeRoute:+ def __init__(self) -> None:+ self.action: str | None = None++ def abort(self) -> None:+ self.action = "abort"++ def continue_(self) -> None:+ self.action = "continue"+++class _FakeRequest:+ def __init__(self, url: str, resource_type: str = "document") -> None:+ self.url = url+ self.resource_type = resource_type+++def test_route_handler_continues_public_host() -> None:+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()+ fake_addrinfo = [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("1.1.1.1", 443))]+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):+ route = _FakeRoute()+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("https://safe.example/style.css"))+ assert route.action == "continue"+++def test_route_handler_aborts_private_resolution() -> None:+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()+ fake_addrinfo = [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("169.254.169.254", 80))]+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):+ route = _FakeRoute()+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("http://attacker.example/exfil"))+ assert route.action == "abort"+++def test_route_handler_allows_data_urls() -> None:+ """data:, blob:, chrome-extension: schemes are not DNS-bound."""+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()+ route = _FakeRoute()+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("..."))+ assert route.action == "continue"+++def test_route_handler_blocks_specified_resource_types() -> None:+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler(+ blocked_resource_types={"image", "font"}+ )+ route = _FakeRoute()+ # Even a public-IP image gets aborted when type is blocked.+ fake_addrinfo = [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("1.1.1.1", 443))]+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", return_value=fake_addrinfo):+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("https://cdn.example/logo.png", "image"))+ assert route.action == "abort"+++def test_route_handler_aborts_on_dns_failure() -> None:+ handler = url_safety.make_safe_playwright_route_handler()+ with patch.object(url_safety.socket, "getaddrinfo", side_effect=socket.gaierror("nx")):+ route = _FakeRoute()+ handler(route, _FakeRequest("https://nx.example/"))+ assert route.action == "abort"