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Rust

omx(team): auto-checkpoint worker-3 [4]

bellman17da2964d7f9
diff --git a/rust/crates/tools/src/lib.rs b/rust/crates/tools/src/lib.rs
index 5abf4173..71000650 100644
--- a/rust/crates/tools/src/lib.rs
+++ b/rust/crates/tools/src/lib.rs
@@ -9530,6 +9530,124 @@ printf 'pwsh:%s' "$1"
registry
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn path_scope_classifies_direct_paths_inside_and_outside_workspace() {
+ let _guard = env_guard();
+ let root = temp_path("perm-path-direct");
+ fs::create_dir_all(root.join("src")).expect("create workspace");
+ fs::write(root.join("src/lib.rs"), "// ok\n").expect("write in workspace");
+ let outside = temp_path("perm-path-direct-outside.txt");
+ fs::write(&outside, "secret\n").expect("write outside file");
+ let previous = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
+ std::env::set_current_dir(&root).expect("enter workspace");
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ super::classify_bash_permission("cat src/lib.rs"),
+ PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite
+ );
+ assert_eq!(
+ super::classify_bash_permission(&format!("cat {}", outside.display())),
+ PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess
+ );
+
+ std::env::set_current_dir(previous).expect("restore cwd");
+ let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(root);
+ let _ = fs::remove_file(outside);
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(unix)]
+ #[test]
+ fn path_scope_denies_symlink_that_resolves_outside_workspace() {
+ let _guard = env_guard();
+ let root = temp_path("perm-path-symlink");
+ fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("create workspace");
+ let outside = temp_path("perm-path-symlink-secret.txt");
+ fs::write(&outside, "secret\n").expect("write outside file");
+ std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&outside, root.join("secret-link")).expect("create symlink");
+ let previous = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
+ std::env::set_current_dir(&root).expect("enter workspace");
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ super::classify_bash_permission("cat secret-link"),
+ PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess,
+ "workspace-relative symlinks resolving outside the workspace must not be downgraded to workspace-write"
+ );
+
+ std::env::set_current_dir(previous).expect("restore cwd");
+ let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(root);
+ let _ = fs::remove_file(outside);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn path_scope_denies_shell_expansion_and_glob_traversal() {
+ let _guard = env_guard();
+ let root = temp_path("perm-path-expansion");
+ fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("create workspace");
+ let previous = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
+ std::env::set_current_dir(&root).expect("enter workspace");
+
+ for command in [
+ "cat ../*",
+ "cat $PWD/../secret.txt",
+ "cat ${PWD}/../secret.txt",
+ "cat $(pwd)/../secret.txt",
+ ] {
+ assert_eq!(
+ super::classify_bash_permission(command),
+ PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess,
+ "{command} should not be treated as workspace-scoped"
+ );
+ }
+
+ std::env::set_current_dir(previous).expect("restore cwd");
+ let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(root);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn path_scope_allows_nested_worktree_paths_but_denies_parent_escape() {
+ let _guard = env_guard();
+ let root = temp_path("perm-path-worktree");
+ let worktree = root.join("main").join("linked-worktree");
+ fs::create_dir_all(worktree.join("src")).expect("create worktree");
+ fs::write(worktree.join("src/lib.rs"), "// ok\n").expect("write worktree file");
+ let previous = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
+ std::env::set_current_dir(&worktree).expect("enter worktree");
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ super::classify_bash_permission("cat src/lib.rs"),
+ PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite
+ );
+ assert_eq!(
+ super::classify_bash_permission("cat ../../outside.txt"),
+ PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess
+ );
+
+ std::env::set_current_dir(previous).expect("restore cwd");
+ let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(root);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn path_scope_denies_windows_style_absolute_paths() {
+ for command in [
+ r"cat C:\\Users\\attacker\\secret.txt",
+ r"cat C:/Users/attacker/secret.txt",
+ r"Get-Content -Path C:\\Users\\attacker\\secret.txt",
+ r"Get-Content -Path C:/Users/attacker/secret.txt",
+ ] {
+ let mode = if command.starts_with("Get-Content") {
+ super::classify_powershell_permission(command)
+ } else {
+ super::classify_bash_permission(command)
+ };
+ assert_eq!(
+ mode,
+ PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess,
+ "{command} should not be treated as workspace-scoped"
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn given_read_only_enforcer_when_bash_then_denied() {
let registry = read_only_registry();