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fix(test,daemon): make the userns probe revert-sensitive and stop a false invariant shipping

Martin Vogelf9038b84eb3b
diff --git a/src/daemon/ipc.c b/src/daemon/ipc.c
index 1243405c7..cec3b60b4 100644
--- a/src/daemon/ipc.c
+++ b/src/daemon/ipc.c
@@ -1572,7 +1572,17 @@ static void posix_overflow_init_once(void) {
#endif /* __linux__ */
/* The overflow uid tolerated for ancestors in this process, or
- * POSIX_NO_OVERFLOW_UID when none. Derived once from immutable /proc state. */
+ * POSIX_NO_OVERFLOW_UID when none.
+ *
+ * Derived once per process. NOT from immutable state, whatever an earlier
+ * revision of this comment claimed: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) rewrites
+ * /proc/self/uid_map, and pthread_once state survives fork() already marked
+ * done. A child that forks WITHOUT exec and then changes namespace therefore
+ * keeps the parent answer. That is safe here only because every caller runs in
+ * a freshly exec'd process -- the daemon double-fork execs
+ * (daemon/bootstrap.c), workers go through cbm_subprocess_spawn's fork+exec,
+ * and src/ contains no setns/unshare at all. If you ever add a fork-without-exec
+ * path that reaches this check, this cache is WRONG and must go. */
static uid_t posix_ancestor_overflow_uid(void) {
#ifdef CBM_ENABLE_TEST_SEAMS
if (g_posix_overflow_override_active) {
diff --git a/tests/test_daemon_ipc.c b/tests/test_daemon_ipc.c
index 9a10f838c..2da597add 100644
--- a/tests/test_daemon_ipc.c
+++ b/tests/test_daemon_ipc.c
@@ -5203,7 +5203,19 @@ TEST(daemon_ipc_posix_single_uid_userns_real_smoke_issue1830) {
if (WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 3) {
FAIL("userns smoke could not re-exec /proc/self/exe for the probe");
}
- ASSERT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status));
+ /* {0,1,2,3} is the whole protocol. Any other code -- a sanitizer exit (LSan
+ * defaults to 23), an abort, a signal -- is a broken harness, not a refusal,
+ * and must say so with the code it actually saw. */
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ FAIL("userns probe did not exit normally (signalled) -- not a security verdict");
+ }
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0 && WEXITSTATUS(status) != 1) {
+ char unexpected[128];
+ (void)snprintf(unexpected, sizeof(unexpected),
+ "userns probe exited %d -- not a security verdict",
+ WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ FAIL(unexpected);
+ }
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
PASS();
#else
diff --git a/tests/test_main.c b/tests/test_main.c
index 463a41c0a..e25de3026 100644
--- a/tests/test_main.c
+++ b/tests/test_main.c
@@ -954,9 +954,13 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
* seven call sites do. Re-exec into this probe so the decision is made by a
* process that STARTED inside the namespace, which is the production shape
* the test means to cover. */
-#if defined(__linux__)
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CBM_ENABLE_TEST_SEAMS)
if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "--userns-secure-probe") == 0) {
- return cbm_daemon_ipc_private_directory_secure(argv[2]) ? 0 : 1;
+ /* _exit, not return: this process exists to answer ONE boolean. A
+ * return runs the atexit chain, and the runner is built with
+ * -fsanitize=address, so a future leak anywhere in the prologue would
+ * exit 23 and read as a security verdict on a test that has none. */
+ _exit(cbm_daemon_ipc_private_directory_secure(argv[2]) ? 0 : 1);
}
#endif
int mcp_idxfailclosed_rc = tf_maybe_run_mcp_idxfailclosed_probe(argc, argv);