Skip to content

OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security

3.4 KB
Raw Blame
// Generated from the plugin references/default-severity-rubric.md. Run pnpm build.
export const defaultSeverityRubric =
  "# Severity guidance\n\nJudge the attacker's actual starting access, the security boundary crossed, and the additional unauthorized harm. Keep confidence separate from severity and identify the missing fact that could change the assessment. Missing proof alone does not establish that a broader attack is impossible; do not invent an attack path or downgrade merely because exploitation was not demonstrated.\n\n## Critical\n\nReserve Critical for consequential, strongly supported compromise meeting all three conditions:\n\n- **Access.** An unauthenticated internet attacker, ordinary external user, or publicly admitted untrusted workload can exploit the interface without employee-only access, an invitation, an approved business relationship, or compromise of a trusted supplier.\n- **Impact.** Crossing an important security boundary enables consequential access to protected data, privileged actions, meaningful code execution, workload escape, or comparable compromise of the affected system.\n- **Evidence.** Demonstrated exploitation or strong source-backed validation establishes the complete attack path.\n\nSecond-order attacks can qualify: an external attacker plants data that a trusted user or system later processes, causing consequential unauthorized access or privileged actions.\n\n## High\n\nAssign High when the evidence establishes all three conditions:\n\n- **Access.** A lower-trust actor can reach the affected operation. Internal users, partners, invited collaborators, and admitted untrusted workloads can qualify.\n- **Impact.** Crossing the boundary grants a substantial new capability. Examples include access to sensitive customer or business data or reusable credentials, account takeover, meaningful cross-tenant access or actions as another user, control of production workloads or deployments, privileged identities, encryption keys or important isolation boundaries, and significant repeatable disruption of a critical or shared service.\n- **Evidence.** Identify a realistic path from the actor's existing access to the new capability. A dangerous function, production label, internal access, or privileged credential alone leaves that path unproven.\n\n## Medium\n\nAssign Medium to a credible vulnerability with concretely bounded impact, such as nonsecret operational information, narrow unauthorized changes, contained disruption of a noncritical service, or isolated development or staging systems without a consequential pivot. A fully demonstrated vulnerability can still be Medium. Base a downgrade on verified constraints, not on an assumption that missing evidence rules out broader harm.\n\n## Low\n\nAssign Low to a supported security weakness with minor additional unauthorized harm and verified limits on its scope, sensitivity, or duration, such as a small information exposure with little security value or a narrowly contained nuisance. Do not use Low as a substitute for uncertainty about a potentially serious path.\n\n## Informational\n\nAssign Informational to a hardening opportunity or observation for which the supplied evidence establishes no additional unauthorized capability or security impact. Explain why it is informational rather than treating missing proof of exploitation as proof of safety. Administrative records that do not describe a security finding may be excluded; exclusion is distinct from severity.\n";