OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security
TypeScript ai-securityapplication-securityclicode-scanningcodexcodex-securitycybersecuritydevsecopsnodejsnpmopenaisdksecuritytypescriptvulnerability-scanning
chore(codex-security): sync public projection
ianw-oai132940443c1e
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/references/static-finding-assessment.md b/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/references/static-finding-assessment.mdindex dbe2a23a9..7f1d11f83 100644--- a/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/references/static-finding-assessment.md+++ b/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/references/static-finding-assessment.md@@ -47,10 +47,7 @@ Before treating a static path as security-relevant, classify:- policy basis: repository policy, product docs, deploy/config evidence,package metadata, code comments, threat model, or unknown-A reachable dataflow is not enough on its own. Static evidence is strongest when the vulnerable condition is reachable and the source crosses a product security boundary the project appears to support.--If a path is only example-only, fixture-only, docs-only, generated-only,-vendored-only, local-only, trusted configuration, or intentionally code-executing extension behavior, record that as counterevidence unless other repository evidence shows the surface is shipped, deployed, documented for untrusted users, or bypasses a supported hardening/auth boundary.+Check whether untrusted input can reach the bug.## Static Confidencediff --git a/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.md b/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.mdindex a40bf9a95..3d5adbfcb 100644--- a/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.md+++ b/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.md@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Use the shared scan artifact path conventions in `../../references/scan-artifact1. Load the per-scan threat model path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md` as the repo-specific threat-model source of truth. Start from this along with the potential findings. Both inputs are required for this workflow.- For repository-wide and scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes` even if they were not assigned polished candidate numbers during discovery.-2. Determine whether the affected code is in scope for the repository threat model and whether it belongs to a real product surface or real production workflow.+2. Determine whether the affected code is in scope for the repository threat model and whether it belongs to a product surface or production workflow.3. Build a factual attack path using repository evidence only:- service mapping- exposure and entry points@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Use the shared scan artifact path conventions in `../../references/scan-artifactUse this checklist before finalizing the attack-path facts or policy decision:- Determine whether the finding is actually a real security vulnerability rather than a correctness bug or false positive.-- Determine whether the affected code belongs to a real product surface or meaningful production workflow.+- Determine whether the affected code belongs to a product surface or production workflow.- Map the relevant service, component, or workflow context from repository evidence.- Establish exposure and entry points from repository evidence such as listeners, ingress, load balancers, service ports, manifests, routing, or network policy.- Establish identities, privileges, and trust boundaries that matter for the path.@@ -103,5 +103,5 @@ Render attack-path facts using `references/attack-path-facts.md`.- Save a final visible report for each candidate finding using that finding's attack-path analysis report path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.-- Considerations for attack path ---- A finding should count as a real security issue if a realistic attacker could use it from a reasonable attack surface relevant to the product, especially if it is something that is part of the thread model.-- The attack surface should generally be one that is plausibly exposed to end users / external actors (or another actor explicitly in scope in the threat model), not an arbitrary internal-only or contrived path.+- A bug matters if evidence shows an attacker could exploit it.+- The attack surface should generally be one that is plausibly exposed to end users / external actors (or another actor explicitly in scope in the threat model).diff --git a/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/references/severity-policy.md b/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/references/severity-policy.mdindex f5a96d492..d3f31f03b 100644--- a/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/references/severity-policy.md+++ b/sdk/typescript/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/references/severity-policy.md@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Examples that usually should not remain `high`/`critical` without very strong pr- Generic correctness/reliability bugs- Strange edge cases with unclear attacker value- Low-impact information leaks-- Internal-only defects without realistic attacker reachability+- Internal-only defects without attacker reachability- The report shows a bug class in isolation, but not a realistic exploit path.- The issue requires the attacker to already have privileged, admin, root, console, shell, or code-execution access.- "Could maybe matter if chained with many assumptions" arguments@@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ Final policy-adjustment guidance:- `localhost` usually supports low likelihood unless a lower-privileged attacker can realistically reach that listener- `none` does not increase likelihood based on exposure- Then decide reportability using the existing facts:- - if the component is not part of a real product surface or meaningful production workflow, set `ignore`- if repository evidence does not establish a realistic lower-privileged in-scope attacker path, set `ignore`- if the path is internal-only, developer-only, operator-only, localhost-only, privileged-local, or otherwise not meaningfully reportable in context, set `ignore`