OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security
TypeScript ai-securityapplication-securityclicode-scanningcodexcodex-securitycybersecuritydevsecopsnodejsnpmopenaisdksecuritytypescriptvulnerability-scanning
fix(cli): show file scope until scan review progress begins (#464)
mldangelo-oai2528ca6d9be9
diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md b/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.mdindex df5d5fa82..a3fa9c3a1 100644--- a/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md+++ b/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ For every reportable finding in `findings.json`, preserve the validated reasonin- Lead the title and `summary` with the user action and product impact.- Use `attackPath.summary` to briefly explain how to reproduce the issue.- Explain how the code causes that product behavior in `rootCause.summary`. Use plain language and avoid repetition.-- Wrap RPC names, functions, types, fields, parameters, configuration keys, literal identifiers, and short expressions in single backticks. For example: `environment/add`, `environmentId`, `execServerUrl`, and `EnvironmentManager::upsert_environment()`.+- Wrap RPC names, functions, types, fields, parameters, configuration keys, literal identifiers, and short expressions in single backticks. For example: `item/rename`, `itemId`, `title`, and `ItemStore.rename()`.- Keep code out of prose. Put source snippets in `codeEvidence[].code`, then reference them from the section that explains why the snippet matters. The workspace consolidates those referenced snippets under **Root cause** so the violated invariant and its source proof stay together.- Root cause must be a source-backed walkthrough, not a verdict paragraph. Start with the code where user-controlled data is declared, decoded, or read; follow each meaningful call, transformation, or state transition; then show the missing control, dangerous operation, and later consumer when it affects impact.- Give each code-evidence item a stable `id`, a concise `label`, an exact source location, the smallest useful snippet, a `role`, and an `explanation`. Supported roles include `user_input`, `entrypoint`, `propagation`, `root_control`, `sink`, `outcome`, and `expected_control`.@@ -34,130 +34,138 @@ The workspace **Evidence** section is an artifact navigator, not another source-## Structured Example-The following shape shows how to encode the `environment/add` reserved-environment overwrite finding:+This fictional item-service fixture illustrates the field shape. Its paths, identifiers, snippets and scenario were invented for this example; they are not taken from a scan target or finding. Use the shape with your own validated source evidence.```json{- "summary": "The runtime `environment/add` method forwards caller-controlled `environmentId` and `execServerUrl` to `EnvironmentManager::upsert_environment()`. Startup rejects the reserved `local` identifier, but the runtime mutation path accepts it and replaces the map entry used by default environment lookup.",+ "summary": "In this fictional item service, an authenticated caller can change another tenant's item title by supplying its item identifier. The write route never checks tenant ownership.","codeEvidence": [{- "id": "rpc-input",- "label": "Caller-controlled environment fields",- "path": "codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/environment.rs",- "startLine": 6,- "endLine": 12,- "language": "rust",+ "id": "request-fields",+ "label": "Caller-controlled item fields",+ "path": "example_service/items.py",+ "startLine": 1,+ "endLine": 2,+ "language": "python","role": "user_input",- "code": "#[serde(rename_all = \"camelCase\")]\npub struct EnvironmentAddParams {\n pub environment_id: String,\n pub exec_server_url: String,\n}",- "explanation": "`environmentId` and `execServerUrl` are accepted as caller-controlled strings."+ "code": "def rename_fields(body):\n return body[\"itemId\"], body[\"title\"]",+ "explanation": "The fictional request body selects both the item and its replacement title."},{- "id": "rpc-forward",- "label": "RPC forwards both fields without validation",- "path": "codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/environment_processor.rs",- "startLine": 15,- "endLine": 22,- "language": "rust",+ "id": "route-forward",+ "label": "Write route omits tenant ownership",+ "path": "example_service/items.py",+ "startLine": 7,+ "endLine": 9,+ "language": "python","role": "entrypoint",- "code": "self.environment_manager\n .upsert_environment(params.environment_id, params.exec_server_url)\n .map_err(|err| invalid_request(err.to_string()))?;",- "explanation": "The handler passes both values directly to `upsert_environment()` and performs no reserved-ID check."+ "code": "def rename_item(request, store):\n item_id, title = rename_fields(request.body)\n store.rename(item_id, title)",+ "explanation": "The route passes the item identifier and title to the store without binding the authenticated tenant to that item."},{- "id": "startup-reserved-check",- "label": "Startup protects the reserved local identifier",- "path": "codex-rs/exec-server/src/environment.rs",- "startLine": 167,- "endLine": 176,- "language": "rust",- "role": "expected_control",- "code": "if id == LOCAL_ENVIRONMENT_ID {\n return Err(ExecServerError::Protocol(format!(\n \"environment id `{LOCAL_ENVIRONMENT_ID}` is reserved for EnvironmentManager\"\n )));\n}",- "explanation": "Initial environment construction enforces the invariant that `local` belongs to `EnvironmentManager`."- },- {- "id": "runtime-upsert",- "label": "Runtime upsert omits the reserved-ID check",- "path": "codex-rs/exec-server/src/environment.rs",- "startLine": 253,- "endLine": 281,- "language": "rust",+ "id": "store-write",+ "label": "Store writes the selected item",+ "path": "example_service/items.py",+ "startLine": 13,+ "endLine": 14,+ "language": "python","role": "root_control",- "code": "if environment_id.is_empty() {\n return Err(ExecServerError::Protocol(\n \"environment id cannot be empty\".to_string(),\n ));\n}\n// ... build remote environment ...\nself.environments\n .write()\n .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)\n .insert(environment_id, Arc::new(environment));",- "explanation": "`upsert_environment()` rejects only an empty ID before inserting into the shared map. Passing `local` replaces the protected entry."+ "code": "def rename(self, item_id, title):\n self.items[item_id].title = title",+ "explanation": "The store updates the selected object without an ownership check. A caller can select another tenant's fictional item."},{- "id": "default-lookup",- "label": "Default selection reads the overwritten map entry",- "path": "codex-rs/exec-server/src/environment.rs",- "startLine": 205,- "endLine": 210,- "language": "rust",+ "id": "item-title",+ "label": "Later reads observe the replacement",+ "path": "example_service/items.py",+ "startLine": 17,+ "endLine": 18,+ "language": "python","role": "outcome",- "code": "pub fn default_environment(&self) -> Option<Arc<Environment>> {\n self.default_environment\n .as_deref()\n .and_then(|environment_id| self.get_environment(environment_id))\n}",- "explanation": "Default lookup resolves the stored `local` ID through the mutable environment map, so the replacement affects later operations."+ "code": "def item_title(self, item_id):\n return self.items[item_id].title",+ "explanation": "Later reads return the title written through the unchecked update."+ },+ {+ "id": "read-owner-check",+ "label": "Read route checks tenant ownership",+ "path": "example_service/items.py",+ "startLine": 21,+ "endLine": 25,+ "language": "python",+ "role": "expected_control",+ "code": "def read_item(request, store, item_id):\n item = store.items[item_id]\n if item.tenant_id != request.tenant_id:\n raise PermissionError(\"Item belongs to another tenant\")\n return item",+ "explanation": "The fictional read route compares the stored owner with the authenticated tenant. The write route needs the same invariant."}],"rootCause": {- "summary": "The violated invariant is that `local` must always identify the manager-owned local runtime. Startup enforces that invariant, but `EnvironmentManager::upsert_environment()` does not reuse the reserved-ID check and inserts a remote `Environment` under the caller-supplied key.",+ "summary": "The read route enforces tenant ownership, but the rename route forwards caller-selected fields to a store operation that writes the item without that check.","evidenceRefs": [- "rpc-input",- "rpc-forward",- "runtime-upsert",- "default-lookup",- "startup-reserved-check"+ "request-fields",+ "route-forward",+ "store-write",+ "item-title",+ "read-owner-check"]},"validation": {- "method": "static source trace",- "summary": "The source trace confirms that an `environment/add` caller controls both inputs, the RPC forwards them unchanged, and runtime insertion accepts `local`.",- "evidenceRefs": ["rpc-input", "rpc-forward", "runtime-upsert"],+ "method": "static trace of the fictional fixture",+ "summary": "The illustrated request controls the item identifier. Neither the route nor the store checks its owner before replacing the title.",+ "evidenceRefs": [+ "request-fields",+ "route-forward",+ "store-write"+ ],"assertions": [- "The runtime path lacks the reserved-ID check present during startup.",- "Inserting `local` replaces the existing `HashMap` entry."+ "The write route does not compare the authenticated tenant with the item owner.",+ "The store updates the caller-selected item."],"limitations": [- "The finding was validated by source review; no live JSON-RPC reproduction was run."+ "This example is invented to demonstrate the field shape; it is not a scan result."]},"attackPath": {- "summary": "A lower-trust app-server client opts into the experimental API, calls `environment/add` with `environmentId: \"local\"`, and points `execServerUrl` at an attacker-controlled executor. Later default environment selection resolves the replaced map entry.",+ "summary": "A fictional authenticated caller submits item/rename with another tenant's item identifier and a replacement title.","dataflow": {- "summary": "`environment/add` parameters -> `environment_add()` -> `upsert_environment()` -> shared environment map -> `default_environment()`",- "source": "caller-controlled `environmentId` and `execServerUrl`",- "sink": "the shared environment map",- "outcome": "default `local` selection resolves to the attacker-controlled remote executor",+ "summary": "request body -> rename_fields() -> rename_item() -> ItemStore.rename() -> item_title()",+ "source": "caller-selected item identifier and title",+ "sink": "the selected item's title",+ "outcome": "the other tenant's item title changes","evidenceRefs": [- "rpc-input",- "rpc-forward",- "runtime-upsert",- "default-lookup"+ "request-fields",+ "route-forward",+ "store-write",+ "item-title"]},"reachability": {- "summary": "The attacker must be able to act as an app-server client and enable `experimentalApi`; default stdio and private Unix-socket transports reduce exposure.",- "attacker": "lower-trust app-server client",- "entrypoint": "experimental `environment/add` RPC",- "outcome": "future operations selected for `local` are routed to the remote executor"+ "summary": "The fictional caller needs access to the authenticated rename route and an item identifier belonging to another tenant.",+ "attacker": "authenticated caller in the invented service",+ "entrypoint": "item/rename",+ "outcome": "unauthorized modification of a fictional item"},- "evidenceRefs": ["rpc-forward", "runtime-upsert", "default-lookup"],+ "evidenceRefs": [+ "route-forward",+ "store-write",+ "item-title"+ ],"impact": {"level": "medium",- "why": "Later commands and filesystem requests selected for `local` can be routed to the attacker-controlled remote executor."+ "why": "The fictional failure permits cross-tenant modification of an item title."},"likelihood": {"level": "medium",- "why": "Exploitation requires access to the app-server client boundary and the experimental method."+ "why": "The invented route accepts an item identifier from the caller."},"limitations": [- "This overwrite does not directly execute code on the victim host."+ "No real service, repository, scan target or finding is represented."]},- "remediation": "Reuse the startup reserved-ID check inside `EnvironmentManager::upsert_environment()` so the runtime mutation path rejects the reserved `local` identifier.",+ "remediation": "Check the selected item's tenant against the authenticated tenant before writing it; reuse the same ownership check on read and write routes.","remediationTests": [- "Assert that `environment/add` with `environmentId: \"local\"` returns a protocol error.",- "Assert that `default_environment()` still resolves the manager-owned local runtime after a rejected upsert."+ "Reject a rename when the selected fictional item belongs to another tenant.",+ "Allow an owner to rename its own fictional item."],"preventiveControls": [- "Centralize reserved-identifier validation so every environment mutation path shares one guard."+ "Keep the tenant ownership invariant in a shared item-access operation."]}```diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/scan-dashboard.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/scan-dashboard.tsindex 3942c0104..8bce9fcef 100644--- a/sdk/typescript/src/scan-dashboard.ts+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/scan-dashboard.ts@@ -564,7 +564,9 @@ export class ScanDashboard {const files =this.#files === null? "waiting for inventory"- : `${formatCount(this.#files.filesCompleted)} / ${formatCount(this.#files.filesTotal)} reviewed`;+ : this.#files.filesCompleted > 0+ ? `${formatCount(this.#files.filesCompleted)} / ${formatCount(this.#files.filesTotal)} reviewed`+ : `${formatCount(this.#files.filesTotal)} in scope`;const history = this.#activityLines(width);const maximumOffset = Math.max(0, history.length - activityRows);this.#scrollOffset = Math.min(this.#scrollOffset, maximumOffset);diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication-integration.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication-integration.test.tsindex 0e4b60652..9686700ac 100644--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication-integration.test.ts+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication-integration.test.ts@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ describe("database-backed Linear publication integration", () => {const prompt = fs.readFileSync(0, "utf8"); const payload = JSON.parse(prompt.split("BEGIN UNTRUSTED PUBLICATION DATA\\n")[1].split("\\nEND UNTRUSTED PUBLICATION DATA")[0]); const finding = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(payload.publicationFile, "utf8")).batches[0][0];fs.appendFileSync(payload.handoffFile, JSON.stringify({ scanId: payload.scanId, findingId: finding.findingId, occurrenceId: finding.occurrenceId, error: "Synthetic connected publication may have completed.", possibleMutation: true, arguments: finding.arguments }) + "\\n"); fs.writeFileSync(process.env.CODEX_PUBLICATION_PARENT_PID, String(process.pid));spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", ${JSON.stringify(descendant)}], { env: { ...(process.platform === "win32" ? { SystemRoot: process.env.SystemRoot } : {}), CODEX_PUBLICATION_DESCENDANT_PID: process.env.CODEX_PUBLICATION_DESCENDANT_PID }, stdio: "ignore" });-const waiter = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)); for (let attempts = 0; !fs.existsSync(process.env.CODEX_PUBLICATION_DESCENDANT_PID); attempts += 1) { if (attempts === 500) process.exit(3); Atomics.wait(waiter, 0, 0, 10); }+const waiter = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)); for (let attempts = 0; (!fs.existsSync(process.env.CODEX_PUBLICATION_DESCENDANT_PID) || fs.statSync(process.env.CODEX_PUBLICATION_DESCENDANT_PID).size === 0); attempts += 1) { if (attempts === 500) process.exit(3); Atomics.wait(waiter, 0, 0, 10); }process.on("SIGINT", () => {}); process.on("SIGTERM", () => {}); fs.writeSync(1, '{"type":"synthetic.publisher_ready"}\\n');for (;;) Atomics.wait(waiter, 0, 0, 1000);`,{ mode: 0o600 },diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/scan-dashboard.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/scan-dashboard.test.tsindex d8c756630..f2bb7ac88 100644--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/scan-dashboard.test.ts+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/scan-dashboard.test.ts@@ -594,6 +594,8 @@ describe("live scan dashboard", () => {filesCompleted: 0,filesTotal: 1_258,});+ expect(lastFrame(stderr)).toContain("1,258 in scope");+ expect(lastFrame(stderr)).not.toContain("reviewed");dashboard.record({id: "read-1",kind: "command",@@ -608,6 +610,13 @@ describe("live scan dashboard", () => {output_tokens: 236,}).cost!,);+ dashboard.setFiles({+ phase: "discovery",+ filesCompleted: 3,+ filesTotal: 1_258,+ });+ expect(lastFrame(stderr)).toContain("3 / 1,258 reviewed");+ expect(lastFrame(stderr)).not.toContain("in scope");dashboard.stop();const text = stripVTControlCharacters(stderr.text());@@ -623,7 +632,6 @@ describe("live scan dashboard", () => {expect(text).toContain(" routes/login.ts");expect(text).not.toContain("[09:41:19] routes/login.ts");expect(text).toContain("routes/login.ts");- expect(text).toContain("0 / 1,258 reviewed");expect(text).not.toContain("opened");expect(text).not.toContain("3 / 6 active");expect(text.replace(/\s+/gu, " ")).toContain(