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OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security

fix(windows): keep credential state reusable across scans (#635)

faizan-oai5210198992c4
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/README.md b/sdk/typescript/README.md
index 776fdb2c6..7be01610d 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/README.md
+++ b/sdk/typescript/README.md
@@ -771,11 +771,19 @@ or excludes their original scope. With one ID, `scans compare` compares it
to the latest completed scan.
History lives in `$CODEX_SECURITY_STATE_DIR/workbench.sqlite3`, or
-`$CODEX_HOME/state/plugins/codex-security/workbench.sqlite3`. Keep this directory
-writable and outside the scanned repository. Scan configurations don't store
-credentials; session logs and live details can contain them. Press `d` during
-a scan for details, then `a` for all sources, `m` for the main scan, or
-`1` through `9` for a worker.
+`$CODEX_HOME/state/plugins/codex-security/workbench.sqlite3`. The CLI and
+workbench maintain the database and its journal files as the current user.
+Keep state private, writable, and outside the scanned repository.
+
+On Windows, an older sandboxed run can leave an invalid credential-home ancestor
+ACL. Preserve that state and its reports, and select a **new**, private
+`CODEX_SECURITY_STATE_DIR` outside both the old state and the repository.
+Sign in again if needed and keep using the new setting; it starts separate scan
+history. Existing ancestor ACLs are not rewritten.
+
+Scan configurations don't store credentials; session logs and live details can
+contain them. Press `d` during a scan for details, then `a` for all sources,
+`m` for the main scan, or `1` through `9` for a worker.
### Exports and CI
@@ -934,8 +942,8 @@ repositories you trust and are authorized to assess. Local tools and scans
under the same account aren't separate security principals.
The `codex_security_scan` profile allows reads across the local filesystem and
-writes to workspace roots and the scan state directory. Execution approvals
-are reviewed automatically and may grant extra permissions for one operation. Set
+writes to workspace roots. Execution approvals are reviewed automatically and
+may grant extra permissions for one operation. Set
`--codex 'approval_policy="never"'`, directly or in a selected profile, to deny
requests. Other overrides can't replace the reviewer or filesystem profile.
Saved scans keep their approval policy; older scans stay deny-all on rerun.
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts
index 4e23946d2..426452c9b 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ export class CodexSecurity {
checkOpen();
const session = await this.#prepareSession(
- { protectedRoot, stateDirectory },
+ { protectedRoot },
options,
signal,
temporaryRoot,
@@ -1877,10 +1877,7 @@ export class CodexSecurity {
}
async #prepareSession(
- {
- protectedRoot,
- stateDirectory,
- }: { protectedRoot: string; stateDirectory: string },
+ { protectedRoot }: { protectedRoot: string },
options: Pick<
ScanOptions,
| "auth"
@@ -1965,7 +1962,6 @@ export class CodexSecurity {
requireOutputOutsideRepository(protectedRoot, runtimeHome, "runtime");
const sessionConfig = scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
effectiveConfig,
- stateDirectory,
runtimeHome,
);
if (
@@ -2141,11 +2137,7 @@ export class CodexSecurity {
throwIfAborted(signal);
const config = await preserveCodexSecurityPluginRegistration(
runtime.codexHome,
- sharedCredentialCodexConfig(
- mergedConfig,
- codexSecurityStateDirectory(environment),
- runtime.codexHome,
- ),
+ sharedCredentialCodexConfig(mergedConfig, runtime.codexHome),
);
await writeCodexConfig(join(runtime.codexHome, "config.toml"), config);
runtime.plugin = await bootstrapPlugin(
@@ -2299,11 +2291,7 @@ export class CodexSecurity {
requestedConfig ?? (await mergedCodexConfig(this.config));
const codexConfig = await preserveCodexSecurityPluginRegistration(
codexHome,
- sharedCredentialCodexConfig(
- mergedConfig,
- codexSecurityStateDirectory(processEnvironment),
- codexHome,
- ),
+ sharedCredentialCodexConfig(mergedConfig, codexHome),
);
await writeCodexConfig(join(codexHome, "config.toml"), codexConfig);
const configPath = join(bootstrapWorkspace, "config-preflight.toml");
@@ -3321,7 +3309,6 @@ export function classifyConnectionFailure(
export function scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
config: JsonObject,
- stateDirectory: string,
protectedCredentialHome?: string,
): JsonObject {
const approvalPolicy = scanApprovalPolicy(config);
@@ -3354,7 +3341,6 @@ export function scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
filesystem: {
":root": "read",
":workspace_roots": "write",
- [stateDirectory]: "write",
...(protectedCredentialHome === undefined
? {}
: { [protectedCredentialHome]: "read" }),
@@ -3366,7 +3352,6 @@ export function scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
function sharedCredentialCodexConfig(
config: JsonObject,
- stateDirectory: string,
credentialHome: string,
): JsonObject {
const shared: JsonObject = {
@@ -3390,7 +3375,7 @@ function sharedCredentialCodexConfig(
};
}
}
- return scanRuntimeCodexConfig(shared, stateDirectory, credentialHome);
+ return scanRuntimeCodexConfig(shared, credentialHome);
}
export function scanPreflightCodexConfig(config: JsonObject): JsonObject {
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/runtime.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/runtime.ts
index 37858dee5..17cc88dc7 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/src/runtime.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/runtime.ts
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import {
mkdir,
mkdtemp,
open,
- opendir,
readFile,
readdir,
realpath,
@@ -82,6 +81,7 @@ const CREDENTIAL_LOCK_POLL_MILLISECONDS = 25;
const INCOMPLETE_CREDENTIAL_LOCK_MILLISECONDS = 30_000;
const MAX_PROCESS_ID = 2_147_483_647;
const MAX_WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_STDERR = 64 * 1024;
+const WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_COMPLETE_PREFIX = "CODEX_SECURITY_ACL_COMPLETE:";
const WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_DESCENDANTS_CHANGED_EXIT_CODE = 2;
export interface PluginInstall {
@@ -618,54 +618,6 @@ function windowsAceAllowsAncestorReplacement(
return false;
}
-export async function verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(
- path: string,
- inspectDescriptors: () => Promise<number>,
- options: { inspectEmpty?: boolean } = {},
-): Promise<void> {
- for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
- let descendants = 0;
- const pending = [path];
- try {
- while (pending.length !== 0) {
- const current = pending.pop()!;
- const directory = await opendir(current);
- for await (const entry of directory) {
- const child = join(current, entry.name);
- const metadata = await lstat(child);
- if (metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
- throw new Error(
- "Windows credential home contains a symbolic link or junction",
- );
- }
- if (!metadata.isDirectory() && !metadata.isFile()) {
- throw new Error("Windows credential home contains an unsafe entry");
- }
- descendants += 1;
- if (metadata.isDirectory()) pending.push(child);
- }
- }
- } catch (error) {
- const failure = error as NodeJS.ErrnoException;
- if (failure.code === "ENOENT" && failure.path !== path) {
- continue;
- }
- throw error;
- }
- if (descendants === 0 && options.inspectEmpty !== true) return;
-
- try {
- if ((await inspectDescriptors()) === descendants) return;
- } catch (error) {
- if (!(error instanceof WindowsCredentialDescendantsChangedError)) {
- throw error;
- }
- }
- }
-
- throw new Error("Windows credential descendants could not be verified");
-}
-
export async function streamWindowsCredentialAclDescriptors(
command: string,
args: readonly string[],
@@ -757,18 +709,33 @@ export async function inspectWindowsCredentialAclSnapshot(
if (ancestor === dirname(ancestor)) break;
}
- let home: WindowsCredentialAcl | undefined;
- let descendantsArePrivate = true;
- await verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(
- path,
- async () => {
- home = undefined;
- descendantsArePrivate = true;
- let inspected = 0;
- const descriptors = await streamWindowsCredentialAclDescriptors(
+ for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
+ let home: WindowsCredentialAcl | undefined;
+ let descendantsArePrivate = true;
+ let inspected = 0;
+ let completed = false;
+ try {
+ await streamWindowsCredentialAclDescriptors(
options.command,
options.args,
async (descriptor) => {
+ if (completed) {
+ throw new Error(
+ "Windows credential ACL inspection continued after completion",
+ );
+ }
+ if (descriptor.startsWith(WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_COMPLETE_PREFIX)) {
+ if (
+ descriptor !==
+ `${WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_COMPLETE_PREFIX}${inspected}`
+ ) {
+ throw new Error(
+ "Windows credential descendants could not be verified",
+ );
+ }
+ completed = true;
+ return;
+ }
const index = inspected;
inspected += 1;
await options.resolveDescriptorAliases?.(descriptor);
@@ -821,20 +788,22 @@ export async function inspectWindowsCredentialAclSnapshot(
},
{ environment: options.environment },
);
- if (descriptors <= ancestors) {
- throw new Error(
- "Windows credential-home ancestry could not be verified",
- );
- }
- return descriptors - ancestors - 1;
- },
- { inspectEmpty: true },
- );
-
- if (home === undefined) {
- throw new Error("Windows credential ACL could not be verified");
+ } catch (error) {
+ if (error instanceof WindowsCredentialDescendantsChangedError) continue;
+ throw error;
+ }
+ if (inspected <= ancestors) {
+ throw new Error("Windows credential-home ancestry could not be verified");
+ }
+ if (!completed) {
+ throw new Error("Windows credential descendants could not be verified");
+ }
+ if (home === undefined) {
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL could not be verified");
+ }
+ return { home, descendantsArePrivate };
}
- return { home, descendantsArePrivate };
+ throw new Error("Windows credential descendants could not be verified");
}
async function secureWindowsCredentialHome(path: string): Promise<void> {
@@ -880,15 +849,33 @@ async function secureWindowsCredentialHome(path: string): Promise<void> {
// Signed built-in cmdlets remain available under ConstrainedLanguage;
// arbitrary .NET constructors, static methods, and SID translation do not.
+ // Enumerate and count ACLs in the same process: parallel startup can create
+ // or remove private cache and lock files while this traversal is running.
const script = [
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
+ "$script:descriptorCount = 0",
+ "function Write-CredentialAcl($path) { $descriptor = Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl -LiteralPath $path | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl; if (-not $descriptor) { throw 'Windows credential ACL could not be verified' }; $script:descriptorCount += 1; $descriptor }",
+ "function Read-CredentialDescendants($path) {",
+ " try { $entries = @(Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\\Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $path -Force) } catch {",
+ // A child can disappear while an existing directory is being enumerated.
+ // Retry that incomplete listing before accepting a vanished descendant.
+ ` if ($_.FullyQualifiedErrorId -eq 'System.IO.FileNotFoundException,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand') { exit ${WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_DESCENDANTS_CHANGED_EXIT_CODE} }`,
+ " if ($path -ne $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH -and $_.CategoryInfo.Category -eq 'ObjectNotFound') { return }",
+ " throw",
+ " }",
+ " foreach ($entry in $entries) {",
+ " if (($entry.Attributes -band 1024) -and ($entry.LinkType -in @('SymbolicLink', 'Junction'))) { throw 'Windows credential home contains a symbolic link or junction' }",
+ " if ($entry.PSObject.TypeNames -notcontains 'System.IO.DirectoryInfo' -and $entry.PSObject.TypeNames -notcontains 'System.IO.FileInfo') { throw 'Windows credential home contains an unsafe entry' }",
+ " try { Write-CredentialAcl $entry.FullName } catch { if ($_.FullyQualifiedErrorId -like 'GetAcl_PathNotFound,*') { continue }; throw }",
+ " if ($entry.PSIsContainer) { Read-CredentialDescendants $entry.FullName }",
+ " }",
+ "}",
"$path = $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH",
- "while ($true) { $parent = Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\\Split-Path -Path $path -Parent; if (-not $parent -or $parent -eq $path) { break }; Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl -LiteralPath $parent | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl; $path = $parent }",
- "Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl -LiteralPath $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl",
- // Temporary descendants can disappear during enumeration or ACL reads.
- // Retry interrupted enumeration as well as incomplete descriptor counts.
- `try { Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\\Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH -Recurse -Force | Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\\ForEach-Object { try { Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl -LiteralPath $_.FullName | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl } catch { if ($_.FullyQualifiedErrorId -notlike 'GetAcl_PathNotFound,*') { throw } } } } catch { if ($_.FullyQualifiedErrorId -eq 'System.IO.FileNotFoundException,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand') { exit ${WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_DESCENDANTS_CHANGED_EXIT_CODE} }; throw }`,
- ].join("; ");
+ "while ($true) { $parent = Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\\Split-Path -Path $path -Parent; if (-not $parent -or $parent -eq $path) { break }; Write-CredentialAcl $parent; $path = $parent }",
+ "Write-CredentialAcl $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH",
+ "Read-CredentialDescendants $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH",
+ `"${WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_COMPLETE_PREFIX}$script:descriptorCount"`,
+ ].join("\n");
const resolvePrincipalScript = [
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
"$descriptor = 'O:' + $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_PRINCIPAL + 'G:SYD:(A;;GA;;;SY)'",
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-credentials.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-credentials.test.ts
index e8935a636..148b69656 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-credentials.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-credentials.test.ts
@@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ describe("CodexSecurity orchestration", () => {
filesystem: {
":root": "read",
":workspace_roots": "write",
- [join(ambientHome, "state", "plugins", "codex-security")]:
- "write",
[join(
ambientHome,
"state",
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts
index 07c741a38..13d6c1af1 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts
@@ -357,8 +357,7 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
);
});
- test("uses a root-read filesystem profile with writable workspace and workbench state", () => {
- const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
+ test("uses a root-read filesystem profile with only writable workspaces", () => {
const original = {
approval_policy: "on-request",
approvals_reviewer: "user",
@@ -374,7 +373,7 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
},
};
- expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(original, stateDirectory)).toEqual({
+ expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(original)).toEqual({
approval_policy: "on-request",
approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
allow_login_shell: false,
@@ -385,7 +384,6 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
filesystem: {
":root": "read",
":workspace_roots": "write",
- [stateDirectory]: "write",
},
},
},
@@ -399,33 +397,28 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
});
});
- test("keeps persistent credentials read-only within writable scan state", () => {
+ test("keeps persistent credentials and their ancestry read-only", () => {
const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
const credentialHome = join(stateDirectory, "codex-home");
- const config = scanRuntimeCodexConfig({}, stateDirectory, credentialHome);
-
- expect(config).toMatchObject({
- permissions: {
- codex_security_scan: {
- filesystem: {
- ":root": "read",
- ":workspace_roots": "write",
- [stateDirectory]: "write",
- [credentialHome]: "read",
- },
+ const config = scanRuntimeCodexConfig({}, credentialHome);
+
+ expect(config["permissions"]).toEqual({
+ codex_security_scan: {
+ filesystem: {
+ ":root": "read",
+ ":workspace_roots": "write",
+ [credentialHome]: "read",
},
},
});
});
test("preserves an explicitly requested strict approval policy", () => {
- const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
-
expect(
- scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
- { approval_policy: "never", approvals_reviewer: "user" },
- stateDirectory,
- ),
+ scanRuntimeCodexConfig({
+ approval_policy: "never",
+ approvals_reviewer: "user",
+ }),
).toMatchObject({
approval_policy: "never",
approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
@@ -434,7 +427,6 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
});
test("preserves a strict approval policy from the selected profile", () => {
- const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
const config = {
approval_policy: "on-request",
profile: "strict",
@@ -444,7 +436,7 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
},
};
- expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(config, stateDirectory)).toMatchObject({
+ expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(config)).toMatchObject({
approval_policy: "never",
approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
profiles: { strict: { model: "profile-model" }, other: {} },
@@ -453,7 +445,6 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
});
test("removes execution and permission overrides from every configured profile", () => {
- const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
const original = {
profile: "selected",
profiles: {
@@ -476,7 +467,7 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
},
};
- const hardened = scanRuntimeCodexConfig(original, stateDirectory);
+ const hardened = scanRuntimeCodexConfig(original);
expect(hardened).toMatchObject({
approval_policy: "on-request",
approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
@@ -505,7 +496,6 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
request_trace: "preserve-configured-metadata",
},
},
- stateDirectory,
credentialHome,
);
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts
index 6cc2c4765..e0c3f9d08 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
-import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
+import {
+ mkdir,
+ mkdtemp,
+ readFile,
+ rm,
+ stat,
+ writeFile,
+} from "node:fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
import { parse } from "smol-toml";
import { scanRuntimeCodexConfig } from "../src/api.js";
@@ -12,6 +19,11 @@ import {
mergedCodexConfig,
writeCodexConfig,
} from "../src/index.js";
+import {
+ prepareCodexSecurityCredentialHome,
+ requireSecureCredentialHome,
+} from "../src/runtime.js";
+import { PLUGIN_ROOT } from "./plugin-root.js";
const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
@@ -29,13 +41,18 @@ async function temporaryDirectory(): Promise<string> {
return path;
}
-function runPinnedCodex(codexHome: string, arguments_: readonly string[]) {
+function runPinnedCodex(
+ codexHome: string,
+ arguments_: readonly string[],
+ overrides: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {},
+) {
const node = Bun.which("node");
if (node === null) {
throw new Error("The pinned Codex CLI requires Node.js.");
}
const environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {
...process.env,
+ ...overrides,
CODEX_HOME: codexHome,
};
delete environment["OPENAI_API_KEY"];
@@ -84,21 +101,27 @@ function macOsSandboxUnavailable(): boolean {
async function scanSandboxFixture() {
const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const codexHome = join(root, "codex-home");
- const workspace = join(root, "workspace");
const stateDirectory = join(root, "state");
+ const codexHome = await prepareCodexSecurityCredentialHome({
+ CODEX_SECURITY_STATE_DIR: stateDirectory,
+ });
+ const workspace = join(stateDirectory, "scans", "workspace");
+ const temporary = join(root, "temp");
await Promise.all(
- [codexHome, workspace, stateDirectory].map((path) => mkdir(path)),
+ [workspace, temporary].map((path) => mkdir(path, { recursive: true })),
);
await writeCodexConfig(
join(codexHome, "config.toml"),
- scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
- await mergedCodexConfig({}),
- stateDirectory,
- codexHome,
- ),
+ scanRuntimeCodexConfig(await mergedCodexConfig({}), codexHome),
);
- return { root, codexHome, workspace };
+ return {
+ root,
+ codexHome,
+ stateDirectory,
+ workspace,
+ // Native sandbox temp grants must not cover the credential-home ancestry.
+ environment: { TEMP: temporary, TMP: temporary, TMPDIR: temporary },
+ };
}
describe("Codex configuration", () => {
@@ -354,10 +377,9 @@ describe("Codex configuration", () => {
});
test("retains the Windows sandbox in the hardened scan profile", async () => {
- const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-windows-state");
const merged = await mergedCodexConfig({});
- expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(merged, stateDirectory)).toMatchObject({
+ expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(merged)).toMatchObject({
windows: { sandbox: "unelevated" },
default_permissions: "codex_security_scan",
permissions: {
@@ -365,7 +387,6 @@ describe("Codex configuration", () => {
filesystem: {
":root": "read",
":workspace_roots": "write",
- [stateDirectory]: "write",
},
},
},
@@ -373,43 +394,50 @@ describe("Codex configuration", () => {
});
test("writes scan permissions accepted by the pinned Codex CLI", async () => {
- const { codexHome, workspace } = await scanSandboxFixture();
- const result = runPinnedCodex(codexHome, [
- "--cd",
- workspace,
- "features",
- "list",
- ]);
+ const { codexHome, workspace, environment } = await scanSandboxFixture();
+ const result = runPinnedCodex(
+ codexHome,
+ ["--cd", workspace, "features", "list"],
+ environment,
+ );
expect(result.exitCode, new TextDecoder().decode(result.stderr)).toBe(0);
expect(result.stdout.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
test.skipIf(macOsSandboxUnavailable())(
- "denies writes outside the scan workspace and state directory",
+ "allows scan helpers to write workspace files without writable credential ancestry",
async () => {
- const { root, codexHome, workspace } = await scanSandboxFixture();
+ const { root, codexHome, stateDirectory, workspace, environment } =
+ await scanSandboxFixture();
const node = Bun.which("node");
expect(node).not.toBeNull();
const attemptWrite = (path: string) =>
- runPinnedCodex(codexHome, [
- "sandbox",
- "--config",
- "permissions.codex_security_scan.network.enabled=true",
- "--permission-profile",
- "codex_security_scan",
- "--cd",
- workspace,
- node!,
- "-e",
- "require('node:fs').writeFileSync(process.argv[1], 'probe')",
- path,
- ]);
+ runPinnedCodex(
+ codexHome,
+ [
+ "sandbox",
+ "--config",
+ "permissions.codex_security_scan.network.enabled=true",
+ "--permission-profile",
+ "codex_security_scan",
+ "--cd",
+ workspace,
+ node!,
+ "-e",
+ "require('node:fs').writeFileSync(process.argv[1], 'probe')",
+ path,
+ ],
+ environment,
+ );
const allowed = join(workspace, "inside.txt");
const permitted = attemptWrite(allowed);
const outside = join(root, "outside.txt");
expect(attemptWrite(outside).exitCode).not.toBe(0);
await expect(stat(outside)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });
+ const stateFile = join(stateDirectory, "outside.txt");
+ expect(attemptWrite(stateFile).exitCode).not.toBe(0);
+ await expect(stat(stateFile)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });
if (permitted.exitCode !== 0) {
const details = new TextDecoder().decode(permitted.stderr);
if (
@@ -428,6 +456,47 @@ describe("Codex configuration", () => {
);
}
expect(await readFile(allowed, "utf8")).toBe("probe");
+
+ const repository = join(root, "repository");
+ await mkdir(repository);
+ await writeFile(join(repository, "fixture.txt"), "synthetic source\n");
+ const inventory = join(workspace, "in-scope-files.txt");
+ const python =
+ Bun.which("python3") ?? Bun.which("python") ?? Bun.which("py");
+ expect(python).not.toBeNull();
+ const helper = runPinnedCodex(
+ codexHome,
+ [
+ "sandbox",
+ "--config",
+ "permissions.codex_security_scan.network.enabled=true",
+ "--permission-profile",
+ "codex_security_scan",
+ "--cd",
+ workspace,
+ python!,
+ join(PLUGIN_ROOT, "scripts", "generate_in_scope_files.py"),
+ "--repo",
+ repository,
+ "--scope",
+ ".",
+ "--out",
+ inventory,
+ ],
+ environment,
+ );
+ expect(helper.exitCode, new TextDecoder().decode(helper.stderr)).toBe(0);
+ const inventoryPaths = (await readFile(inventory, "utf8"))
+ .trim()
+ .split(/\r?\n/u)
+ .map((path) => resolve(repository, path));
+ expect(inventoryPaths).toEqual([join(repository, "fixture.txt")]);
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome);
+ expect(
+ await prepareCodexSecurityCredentialHome({
+ CODEX_SECURITY_STATE_DIR: stateDirectory,
+ }),
+ ).toBe(codexHome);
},
);
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/runtime.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/runtime.test.ts
index 396057bdd..66fc9bff7 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/runtime.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/runtime.test.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
import { execFile, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import * as childProcess from "node:child_process";
+import { EventEmitter, once } from "node:events";
import { existsSync, renameSync, symlinkSync } from "node:fs";
import {
chmod,
@@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ import {
relative,
sep,
} from "node:path";
+import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";
+import { setImmediate as nextTurn } from "node:timers/promises";
import { promisify } from "node:util";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { brotliDecompressSync } from "node:zlib";
@@ -75,7 +79,6 @@ import {
runWorkbench,
setCodexSecurityCredentialLogout,
streamWindowsCredentialAclDescriptors,
- verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants,
} from "../src/runtime.js";
import { loadBundledRuntime, PLUGIN_ROOT } from "./plugin-root.js";
import { runTestInSubprocess } from "./support/test-subprocess.js";
@@ -99,6 +102,10 @@ async function temporaryDirectory(
return path;
}
+function windowsCredentialAclOutput(descriptors: readonly string[]): string {
+ return `${descriptors.join("\n")}\nCODEX_SECURITY_ACL_COMPLETE:${descriptors.length}\n`;
+}
+
async function plantCredentialHomeLock(
home: string,
pid: number,
@@ -2704,178 +2711,49 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
).rejects.toThrow("private Windows credential home");
});
- test("retries Windows credential descendant verification after concurrent changes", async () => {
- const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const home = join(root, "home");
- const temporary = join(home, ".auth-temporary");
- await mkdir(home);
- await writeFile(join(home, "auth.json"), "credential\n");
- await writeFile(temporary, "temporary credential\n");
- let attempts = 0;
-
- await verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(home, async () => {
- attempts += 1;
- if (attempts === 1) await rm(temporary);
- return 1;
- });
-
- expect(attempts).toBe(2);
- });
-
- test("retries Windows credential verification when a descendant disappears", async () => {
- if (
- runTestInSubprocess(
- import.meta.path,
- "retries Windows credential verification when a descendant disappears",
- )
- ) {
- return;
- }
- const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const home = join(root, "home");
- const temporary = join(home, ".auth-temporary");
- await mkdir(home);
- await writeFile(join(home, "auth.json"), "credential\n");
- await writeFile(temporary, "temporary credential\n");
- const originalLstat = fsPromises.lstat;
- let removed = false;
- let inspections = 0;
- mock.module("node:fs/promises", () => ({
- ...fsPromises,
- lstat: async (path: Parameters<typeof lstat>[0]) => {
- if (path === temporary && !removed) {
- removed = true;
- await rm(temporary);
- }
- return originalLstat(path);
- },
- }));
+ test.each(["created", "removed"] as const)(
+ "inspects Windows credentials once while private descendants are %s",
+ async (change) => {
+ const root = await temporaryDirectory();
+ const home = join(root, "home");
+ const inspectionCount = join(root, "inspection-count");
+ const temporary = join(home, ".auth-temporary");
+ await mkdir(home);
+ await writeFile(join(home, "auth.json"), "credential\n");
+ if (change === "removed") await writeFile(temporary, "temporary\n");
+ const sid = "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001";
+ const directory = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;OICI;FA;;;${sid})`;
+ const file = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;;FA;;;${sid})`;
+ const ancestors: string[] = [];
+ for (let ancestor = dirname(home); ; ancestor = dirname(ancestor)) {
+ ancestors.push(directory);
+ if (ancestor === dirname(ancestor)) break;
+ }
+ const script = [
+ 'const fs = require("node:fs")',
+ `fs.appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(inspectionCount)}, "inspection\\n")`,
+ change === "created"
+ ? `fs.writeFileSync(${JSON.stringify(temporary)}, "temporary")`
+ : `fs.rmSync(${JSON.stringify(temporary)})`,
+ `const descriptors = [...${JSON.stringify([...ancestors, directory])}, ...fs.readdirSync(${JSON.stringify(home)}).map(() => ${JSON.stringify(file)})]`,
+ 'process.stdout.write(descriptors.join("\\n") + "\\nCODEX_SECURITY_ACL_COMPLETE:" + descriptors.length + "\\n")',
+ ].join("; ");
- try {
- await verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(home, async () => {
- inspections += 1;
- return 1;
+ const snapshot = await inspectWindowsCredentialAclSnapshot(home, sid, {
+ command: process.execPath,
+ args: ["--eval", script],
});
- } finally {
- mock.module("node:fs/promises", () => ({
- ...fsPromises,
- lstat: originalLstat,
- }));
- }
-
- expect(removed).toBe(true);
- expect(inspections).toBe(1);
- });
- test("rejects Windows credential descendants that repeatedly disappear", async () => {
- if (
- runTestInSubprocess(
- import.meta.path,
- "rejects Windows credential descendants that repeatedly disappear",
- )
- ) {
- return;
- }
- const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const home = join(root, "home");
- const credential = join(home, "auth.json");
- await mkdir(home);
- await writeFile(credential, "credential\n");
- const originalLstat = fsPromises.lstat;
- let attempts = 0;
- mock.module("node:fs/promises", () => ({
- ...fsPromises,
- lstat: async (path: Parameters<typeof lstat>[0]) => {
- if (path === credential) {
- attempts += 1;
- throw Object.assign(new Error("credential disappeared"), {
- code: "ENOENT",
- path,
- });
- }
- return originalLstat(path);
- },
- }));
-
- try {
- await expect(
- verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(home, async () => 1),
- ).rejects.toThrow("Windows credential descendants could not be verified");
- } finally {
- mock.module("node:fs/promises", () => ({
- ...fsPromises,
- lstat: originalLstat,
- }));
- }
-
- expect(attempts).toBe(3);
- });
-
- test("does not retry a missing Windows credential home", async () => {
- const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const home = join(root, "missing-home");
- let inspections = 0;
-
- await expect(
- verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(home, async () => {
- inspections += 1;
- return 0;
- }),
- ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT", path: home });
-
- expect(inspections).toBe(0);
- });
-
- test("rejects Windows credential descendants that never stabilize", async () => {
- const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const home = join(root, "home");
- await mkdir(home);
- await writeFile(join(home, "auth.json"), "credential\n");
- let attempts = 0;
-
- await expect(
- verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(home, async () => {
- attempts += 1;
- return 0;
- }),
- ).rejects.toThrow("Windows credential descendants could not be verified");
- expect(attempts).toBe(3);
- });
-
- test("inspects Windows credential ancestry, home, and descendants in one subprocess", async () => {
- const root = await temporaryDirectory();
- const home = join(root, "home");
- const inspectionCount = join(root, "inspection-count");
- await mkdir(home);
- await writeFile(join(home, "auth.json"), "credential\n");
- const sid = "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001";
- const directory = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;OICI;FA;;;${sid})`;
- const file = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;;FA;;;${sid})`;
- const ancestors: string[] = [];
- for (let ancestor = dirname(home); ; ancestor = dirname(ancestor)) {
- ancestors.push(directory);
- if (ancestor === dirname(ancestor)) break;
- }
- const descriptors = [...ancestors, directory, file];
- const script = [
- `require("node:fs").appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(inspectionCount)}, "inspection\\n")`,
- `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(`${descriptors.join("\n")}\n`)})`,
- ].join("; ");
-
- const snapshot = await inspectWindowsCredentialAclSnapshot(home, sid, {
- command: process.execPath,
- args: ["--eval", script],
- });
-
- expect(snapshot.home).toMatchObject({
- owner: sid,
- protected: true,
- grantsCurrentUserAccess: true,
- untrustedPrincipals: [],
- });
- expect(snapshot.descendantsArePrivate).toBe(true);
- expect(await readFile(inspectionCount, "utf8")).toBe("inspection\n");
- });
+ expect(snapshot.home).toMatchObject({
+ owner: sid,
+ protected: true,
+ grantsCurrentUserAccess: true,
+ untrustedPrincipals: [],
+ });
+ expect(snapshot.descendantsArePrivate).toBe(true);
+ expect(await readFile(inspectionCount, "utf8")).toBe("inspection\n");
+ },
+ );
test("inspects Windows credential ancestry and the home even without descendants", async () => {
const root = await temporaryDirectory();
@@ -2895,7 +2773,7 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
command: process.execPath,
args: [
"--eval",
- `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(`${descriptors.join("\n")}\n`)})`,
+ `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(windowsCredentialAclOutput(descriptors))})`,
],
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({
@@ -2924,8 +2802,10 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
const script = [
'const fs = require("node:fs")',
`fs.appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(inspectionCount)}, "inspection\\n")`,
- `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(`${descriptors.join("\n")}\n`)})`,
- `if (fs.existsSync(${JSON.stringify(temporary)})) { fs.unlinkSync(${JSON.stringify(temporary)}); process.exitCode = 2 }`,
+ `const interrupted = fs.existsSync(${JSON.stringify(temporary)})`,
+ `if (interrupted) fs.unlinkSync(${JSON.stringify(temporary)})`,
+ `process.stdout.write(interrupted ? ${JSON.stringify(`${descriptors.join("\n")}\n`)} : ${JSON.stringify(windowsCredentialAclOutput(descriptors))})`,
+ "process.exitCode = interrupted ? 2 : 0",
].join("; ");
await expect(
@@ -2969,6 +2849,137 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
},
);
+ test.each(["safe", "unsafe"] as const)(
+ "drains Windows credential callbacks before retrying %s snapshots",
+ async (kind) => {
+ if (
+ runTestInSubprocess(
+ import.meta.path,
+ `drains Windows credential callbacks before retrying ${kind} snapshots`,
+ )
+ ) {
+ return;
+ }
+ const home = join(await temporaryDirectory(), "home");
+ const sid = "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001";
+ const directory = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;OICI;FA;;;${sid})`;
+ const descriptors: string[] = [];
+ for (let ancestor = dirname(home); ; ancestor = dirname(ancestor)) {
+ descriptors.push(directory);
+ if (ancestor === dirname(ancestor)) break;
+ }
+ descriptors.push(directory);
+ const firstDescriptors = [...descriptors];
+ if (kind === "unsafe") {
+ firstDescriptors[0] = `${directory}(A;OICI;FA;;;WD)`;
+ }
+
+ const makeChild = () =>
+ Object.assign(new EventEmitter(), {
+ stdout: new PassThrough(),
+ stderr: new PassThrough(),
+ exitCode: null as number | null,
+ signalCode: null,
+ kill: () => true,
+ });
+ const first = makeChild();
+ let enterCallback!: () => void;
+ const callbackEntered = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+ enterCallback = resolve;
+ });
+ let releaseCallback!: () => void;
+ const callbackReleased = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+ releaseCallback = resolve;
+ });
+ let paused = false;
+ let callbackFinished = false;
+ let attempts = 0;
+ const originalSpawn = childProcess.spawn;
+ mock.module("node:child_process", () => ({
+ ...childProcess,
+ spawn: () => {
+ attempts += 1;
+ if (attempts === 1) return first;
+ expect(attempts).toBe(2);
+ expect(callbackFinished).toBe(true);
+ const child = makeChild();
+ queueMicrotask(() => {
+ child.stdout.end(windowsCredentialAclOutput(descriptors));
+ child.stderr.end();
+ child.exitCode = 0;
+ child.emit("close", 0, null);
+ });
+ return child;
+ },
+ }));
+ let settled = false;
+ const outcome = inspectWindowsCredentialAclSnapshot(home, sid, {
+ command: "synthetic-credential-inspector",
+ args: [],
+ resolveDescriptorAliases: async () => {
+ if (paused) return;
+ paused = true;
+ enterCallback();
+ await callbackReleased;
+ callbackFinished = true;
+ },
+ }).then(
+ (value) => {
+ settled = true;
+ return { value, error: undefined };
+ },
+ (error: unknown) => {
+ settled = true;
+ return { value: undefined, error };
+ },
+ );
+ try {
+ first.stdout.write(`${firstDescriptors.join("\n")}\n`);
+ await Promise.race([
+ callbackEntered,
+ outcome.then(() => {
+ throw new Error(
+ "Credential inspection settled before its callback",
+ );
+ }),
+ ]);
+ const ended = once(first.stdout, "end");
+ first.stdout.end();
+ first.stderr.end();
+ await ended;
+ first.exitCode = 2;
+ first.emit("close", 2, null);
+ await nextTurn();
+ expect(settled).toBe(false);
+ expect(attempts).toBe(1);
+ releaseCallback();
+ const result = await outcome;
+ if (kind === "unsafe") {
+ expect(result.error).toMatchObject({
+ message:
+ "Windows credential-home ancestor allows another identity to replace the directory",
+ });
+ expect(attempts).toBe(1);
+ } else {
+ expect(result.error).toBeUndefined();
+ expect(result.value).toMatchObject({
+ home: { owner: sid, protected: true },
+ descendantsArePrivate: true,
+ });
+ expect(attempts).toBe(2);
+ }
+ } finally {
+ releaseCallback();
+ first.stdout.destroy();
+ first.stderr.destroy();
+ mock.module("node:child_process", () => ({
+ ...childProcess,
+ spawn: originalSpawn,
+ }));
+ }
+ },
+ );
+
test("rejects unsafe Windows credential ancestry during combined ACL inspection", async () => {
const root = await temporaryDirectory();
const home = join(root, "home");
@@ -3007,6 +3018,54 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
).rejects.toThrow("Windows credential-home ancestry could not be verified");
});
+ test("rejects incomplete or failed Windows credential descendant streams", async () => {
+ const root = await temporaryDirectory();
+ const home = join(root, "home");
+ await mkdir(home);
+ const sid = "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001";
+ const directory = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;OICI;FA;;;${sid})`;
+ const file = `O:${sid}G:SYD:P(A;;FA;;;${sid})`;
+ const descriptors: string[] = [];
+ for (let ancestor = dirname(home); ; ancestor = dirname(ancestor)) {
+ descriptors.push(directory);
+ if (ancestor === dirname(ancestor)) break;
+ }
+ descriptors.push(directory, file);
+ const complete = windowsCredentialAclOutput(descriptors);
+ for (const { output, exitCode, error } of [
+ {
+ output: `${descriptors.join("\n")}\n`,
+ exitCode: 0,
+ error: "Windows credential descendants could not be verified",
+ },
+ {
+ output: `${descriptors.slice(0, -1).join("\n")}\nCODEX_SECURITY_ACL_COMPLETE:${descriptors.length}\n`,
+ exitCode: 0,
+ error: "Windows credential descendants could not be verified",
+ },
+ {
+ output: `${complete}${file}\n`,
+ exitCode: 0,
+ error: "Windows credential ACL inspection continued after completion",
+ },
+ {
+ output: complete,
+ exitCode: 1,
+ error: "Windows credential ACL inspection failed",
+ },
+ ]) {
+ await expect(
+ inspectWindowsCredentialAclSnapshot(home, sid, {
+ command: process.execPath,
+ args: [
+ "--eval",
+ `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(output)}); process.exitCode = ${exitCode}`,
+ ],
+ }),
+ ).rejects.toThrow(error);
+ }
+ });
+
test("detects unsafe descendants during combined Windows credential ACL inspections", async () => {
const root = await temporaryDirectory();
const home = join(root, "home");
@@ -3027,7 +3086,7 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
command: process.execPath,
args: [
"--eval",
- `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(`${descriptors.join("\n")}\n`)})`,
+ `process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(windowsCredentialAclOutput(descriptors))})`,
],
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({ descendantsArePrivate: false });
@@ -3574,6 +3633,32 @@ describe("runtime directories and plugin Python boundary", () => {
).rejects.toThrow("private Windows credential home");
});
+ test.skipIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+ "rejects Windows credential-home junctions even if their targets disappear",
+ async () => {
+ const root = await temporaryDirectory();
+ const home = await prepareCodexSecurityCredentialHome({
+ CODEX_SECURITY_STATE_DIR: join(root, "state"),
+ });
+ const outside = join(root, "outside");
+ await mkdir(outside);
+ const credential = join(outside, "auth.json");
+ await writeFile(credential, "synthetic outside credential\n");
+ await symlink(outside, join(home, "linked-cache"), "junction");
+
+ await expect(requireSecureCredentialHome(home)).rejects.toThrow(
+ "Windows credential home contains a symbolic link or junction",
+ );
+ expect(await readFile(credential, "utf8")).toBe(
+ "synthetic outside credential\n",
+ );
+ await rename(outside, join(root, "moved-outside"));
+ await expect(requireSecureCredentialHome(home)).rejects.toThrow(
+ "Windows credential home contains a symbolic link or junction",
+ );
+ },
+ );
+
test.skipIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
"creates credential homes with a verified managed-compatible Windows ACL",
async () => {