OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security
TypeScript ai-securityapplication-securityclicode-scanningcodexcodex-securitycybersecuritydevsecopsnodejsnpmopenaisdksecuritytypescriptvulnerability-scanning
docs(security): clarify local trust and reportable boundaries (#352)
mldangelo-oai52ad6bb81c16
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex b2ca5bf7f..3a8392271 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -48,14 +48,24 @@ operations can use repository configuration, hooks, filters, attributes,credential helpers, worktrees, and executables on your `PATH`. These are notseparate security boundaries.-The product also does not isolate users, tasks, repositories, or scan jobs-that share the same operating-system account, credentials, or local state.-Do not treat shared local state as a multi-user or multi-tenant system.+### Local trust and attacker prerequisites++The product does not isolate users, tasks, repositories, or scan jobs that+share the same operating-system account, credentials, or local state. Do not+treat shared local state as a multi-user or multi-tenant system.++Private Codex state, workbench databases, output directories, and resume+receipts are not separate security boundaries from your operating-system+account. A report that depends on changing them must show how an+attacker-controlled input reaches them through a supported workflow and+crosses a security boundary.Trusting a repository does not authorize unrelated actions. Repository-contents, model output, patches, service responses, and imported artifacts-are data. They are not permission to scan another target, expose a credential,-contact another destination, modify an unrelated file, or apply a patch.+contents, filenames, symlinks, model output, patches, service responses, and+imported artifacts are data. They do not authorize another target, a broader+scope, a different credential, an unrelated read or write, an unapproved+patch or network destination, a bypassed restriction, or a passing result for+incomplete coverage.### How scans run@@ -79,7 +89,9 @@ environment credentials it needs.A security issue must cross a boundary the product actually provides:-- Scan only the selected target and write only to authorized output paths.+- Scan only the selected target and requested scope; write only to authorized+ output paths.+- Honor explicitly selected credentials and documented cost controls.- Keep credentials, private source, and scan results out of model requests,logs, reports, and network destinations the operator did not authorize.- Apply the scan's actual filesystem and execution profile and respect host or@@ -100,6 +112,8 @@ Report reproducible issues in an official release, such as:independently enforced host, execution, filesystem, or network restriction.- A scan, patch, file write, or network request outside the action youauthorized.+- Ignoring the target, path scope, credential, or documented cost limit you+ explicitly selected.- Path traversal, a symlink, an archive, or a file-replacement race that writesoutside the approved output or sends an unrelated local file to a model.- An incomplete, forged, or incorrectly scoped scan accepted as complete or as@@ -116,17 +130,28 @@ Report reproducible issues in an official release, such as:The following are not security vulnerabilities by themselves:- Reading selected repository files, resolving worktrees, running Git, or- using configured hooks, filters, credential helpers, and executables.-- An attack that first requires control of your trusted repository, local Git- installation, operating-system account, environment, or Codex state.-- A claim that depends on you intentionally selecting a malicious plugin,- interpreter, executable, credential, scan artifact, or override.-- Access, cancellation, modified results, or scan-history visibility between- processes that already share your operating-system account and local state.-- Prompt injection, unexpected model output, a missed finding, or a false- positive that does not cross an actual security boundary.-- A documented exclusion, ignore rule, soft cost limit, estimate, or Git- behavior accurately reflected in the scan and its results.+ using configured hooks, filters, credential helpers, and executables within+ the authority you granted.+- An attack that assumes prior control of your operating-system account,+ trusted local Git settings, private Codex state, or private scan outputs+ without showing how a supported input gains that control.+- A claim that depends on you deliberately granting a plugin, interpreter, or+ executable the authority your account already has.+- Access, cancellation, or changes to private scan state, workbench databases,+ results, resume receipts, or scan history by a process that already shares+ your account and local state.+- Prompt injection, unexpected model output, missed findings, false positives,+ or unsigned review receipts that do not cross a boundary or cause a supported+ security gate to accept incomplete or misrepresented coverage.+- A documented exclusion, ignore rule, estimate, or Git behavior accurately+ reflected in the scan and its results.+- Disclosed estimation uncertainty or unavoidable in-flight cost overruns+ when an explicitly requested limit is still enforced as documented.+- Terminal formatting or control characters without a demonstrated security+ impact in a supported terminal.+- A hypothetical compromise of a trusted release runner, registry, or+ dependency supplier without a path from untrusted input to a protected+ release or a bypass of its integrity controls.- A dependency advisory, theoretical attack, or old package version without areproducible impact on a supported release.- Slow processing of a file, document, or repository you deliberately selected.