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OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security

docs(security): clarify local trust and reportable boundaries (#352)

mldangelo-oai52ad6bb81c16
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index b2ca5bf7f..3a8392271 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -48,14 +48,24 @@ operations can use repository configuration, hooks, filters, attributes,
credential helpers, worktrees, and executables on your `PATH`. These are not
separate security boundaries.
-The product also does not isolate users, tasks, repositories, or scan jobs
-that share the same operating-system account, credentials, or local state.
-Do not treat shared local state as a multi-user or multi-tenant system.
+### Local trust and attacker prerequisites
+
+The product does not isolate users, tasks, repositories, or scan jobs that
+share the same operating-system account, credentials, or local state. Do not
+treat shared local state as a multi-user or multi-tenant system.
+
+Private Codex state, workbench databases, output directories, and resume
+receipts are not separate security boundaries from your operating-system
+account. A report that depends on changing them must show how an
+attacker-controlled input reaches them through a supported workflow and
+crosses a security boundary.
Trusting a repository does not authorize unrelated actions. Repository
-contents, model output, patches, service responses, and imported artifacts
-are data. They are not permission to scan another target, expose a credential,
-contact another destination, modify an unrelated file, or apply a patch.
+contents, filenames, symlinks, model output, patches, service responses, and
+imported artifacts are data. They do not authorize another target, a broader
+scope, a different credential, an unrelated read or write, an unapproved
+patch or network destination, a bypassed restriction, or a passing result for
+incomplete coverage.
### How scans run
@@ -79,7 +89,9 @@ environment credentials it needs.
A security issue must cross a boundary the product actually provides:
-- Scan only the selected target and write only to authorized output paths.
+- Scan only the selected target and requested scope; write only to authorized
+ output paths.
+- Honor explicitly selected credentials and documented cost controls.
- Keep credentials, private source, and scan results out of model requests,
logs, reports, and network destinations the operator did not authorize.
- Apply the scan's actual filesystem and execution profile and respect host or
@@ -100,6 +112,8 @@ Report reproducible issues in an official release, such as:
independently enforced host, execution, filesystem, or network restriction.
- A scan, patch, file write, or network request outside the action you
authorized.
+- Ignoring the target, path scope, credential, or documented cost limit you
+ explicitly selected.
- Path traversal, a symlink, an archive, or a file-replacement race that writes
outside the approved output or sends an unrelated local file to a model.
- An incomplete, forged, or incorrectly scoped scan accepted as complete or as
@@ -116,17 +130,28 @@ Report reproducible issues in an official release, such as:
The following are not security vulnerabilities by themselves:
- Reading selected repository files, resolving worktrees, running Git, or
- using configured hooks, filters, credential helpers, and executables.
-- An attack that first requires control of your trusted repository, local Git
- installation, operating-system account, environment, or Codex state.
-- A claim that depends on you intentionally selecting a malicious plugin,
- interpreter, executable, credential, scan artifact, or override.
-- Access, cancellation, modified results, or scan-history visibility between
- processes that already share your operating-system account and local state.
-- Prompt injection, unexpected model output, a missed finding, or a false
- positive that does not cross an actual security boundary.
-- A documented exclusion, ignore rule, soft cost limit, estimate, or Git
- behavior accurately reflected in the scan and its results.
+ using configured hooks, filters, credential helpers, and executables within
+ the authority you granted.
+- An attack that assumes prior control of your operating-system account,
+ trusted local Git settings, private Codex state, or private scan outputs
+ without showing how a supported input gains that control.
+- A claim that depends on you deliberately granting a plugin, interpreter, or
+ executable the authority your account already has.
+- Access, cancellation, or changes to private scan state, workbench databases,
+ results, resume receipts, or scan history by a process that already shares
+ your account and local state.
+- Prompt injection, unexpected model output, missed findings, false positives,
+ or unsigned review receipts that do not cross a boundary or cause a supported
+ security gate to accept incomplete or misrepresented coverage.
+- A documented exclusion, ignore rule, estimate, or Git behavior accurately
+ reflected in the scan and its results.
+- Disclosed estimation uncertainty or unavoidable in-flight cost overruns
+ when an explicitly requested limit is still enforced as documented.
+- Terminal formatting or control characters without a demonstrated security
+ impact in a supported terminal.
+- A hypothetical compromise of a trusted release runner, registry, or
+ dependency supplier without a path from untrusted input to a protected
+ release or a bypass of its integrity controls.
- A dependency advisory, theoretical attack, or old package version without a
reproducible impact on a supported release.
- Slow processing of a file, document, or repository you deliberately selected.