OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security
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fix(example): bound Invoice Desk JSON request bodies (#2423)
Michael D'Angelo8e5860b2d241
diff --git a/examples/invoice-desk/SECURITY.md b/examples/invoice-desk/SECURITY.mdindex dfbc230a6..2ea2386df 100644--- a/examples/invoice-desk/SECURITY.md+++ b/examples/invoice-desk/SECURITY.md@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The documented startup runs a dependency-free Node.js process on`127.0.0.1:4310`, with `PORT` selecting another local port. Each applicationinstance creates fresh in-memory users, sessions, invoices, policies, previews,connector credentials, and deliveries. Restarting discards that state.-[Startup](app/server.mjs#L269), [store](app/store.mjs#L8).+[Startup](app/server.mjs#L284), [store](app/store.mjs#L8).```mermaidflowchart LR@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ browser interprets the resulting page.Connector credentials carry authority beyond the ordinary invoice view. Adiagnostic download or an invoice copy must not transfer that authority to itsrecipient. The Ledger bearer route has a separate authentication path from the-session-protected application. [Route boundaries](app/server.mjs#L92),+session-protected application. [Route boundaries](app/server.mjs#L100),[Ledger authentication](app/integrations.mjs#L53).### Controls already present@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Passwords use salted scrypt records and timing-safe comparison. Sessions userandom tokens, expire after eight hours, and are removed on logout or when anexpired session is checked. Cookies use `HttpOnly` and `SameSite=Strict`.[Password records](app/store.mjs#L3), [sessions](app/accounts.mjs#L12),-[cookie settings](app/server.mjs#L100).+[cookie settings](app/server.mjs#L113).The router applies a common session gate after its public and bearer-authenticatedroutes. Invoice lists and most invoice operations check workspace ownership;@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ JSON writes require a JSON object, amounts receive positive-integer validation,and responses use `Cache-Control: no-store` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.The rendering code has an HTML-escaping helper, and browser notices and previewsuse `textContent`. An escaping helper protects only values passed through it.-[Request parsing](app/server.mjs#L54), [rendering](app/views.mjs#L1),+[Request parsing](app/server.mjs#L56), [rendering](app/views.mjs#L1),[browser updates](app/public/client.js#L43).## 3. Threat scenarios and intended protections@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Neither this model nor the number of rows establishes a scanner's detection scor| Boundary and potential failure | Intended protection | Source to review || --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || Member to connector authority: a diagnostic export discloses a reusable credential. | Export only diagnostic fields that the recipient is allowed to see; keep connector secrets server-side. | [Support report](app/integrations.mjs#L16) |-| Workspace to workspace: an invoice read returns a record without checking its owner. | Apply workspace authorization to every object read as well as writes. | [Individual invoice route](app/server.mjs#L227), [ownership helper](app/invoices.mjs#L21) |+| Workspace to workspace: an invoice read returns a record without checking its owner. | Apply workspace authorization to every object read as well as writes. | [Individual invoice route](app/server.mjs#L240), [ownership helper](app/invoices.mjs#L21) || Workspace to shared cache: a valid preview request receives another workspace's cached content. | Cache identity must include the workspace and invoice identity, with versioning for invalidation. | [Preview cache](app/invoices.mjs#L71) || Reviewed version to sent version: editing leaves an old approval effective. | Sending requires approval of the current invoice version; edits invalidate or supersede earlier approval. | [Edit, approve, and send](app/invoices.mjs#L34) || Import input to review decision: unsupported or failed review permits an over-limit import. | Required review fails closed; unsupported schemas and reviewer errors cannot imply approval. | [Import review](app/imports.mjs#L35) |@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ Neither this model nor the number of rows establishes a scanner's detection scor| Member to administrator: a self-service profile edit changes authorization attributes. | Allow only intended profile fields to change and keep role assignment outside self-service profile updates. | [Profile update](app/accounts.mjs#L49), [role check](app/invoices.mjs#L10) || Stored note to another user's browser: note content becomes active HTML. | Encode note content for its rendering context; if formatting is supported, use an explicit safe formatting policy. | [Comments](app/invoices.mjs#L84), [invoice rendering](app/views.mjs#L71) |-Availability also needs review beyond those ten cases. The parser buffers a-complete request body, login performs synchronous password derivation, and the-store has no application-defined collection limits. Assess the caller's reach-and the resource consumed before assigning impact; this model sets no arbitrary-request or rate thresholds. [Body buffering](app/server.mjs#L54),+Availability also needs review beyond those ten cases. The parser accepts JSON+bodies up to 64 KiB and checks the byte count as each chunk arrives. Login+performs synchronous password derivation, and the store has no application-defined+collection limits. Assess the caller's reach and the resource consumed before+assigning impact. [Body buffering](app/server.mjs#L56),[password verification](app/accounts.mjs#L12), [collections](app/store.mjs#L99).## 4. Assumptions, impact, and verification@@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ The direct executable binds to loopback, but the exported `createApp()` returnsan unbound server. Remote exposure, reverse proxies, TLS, persistent storage, andmultiple processes would change this model; none is a supported deployment forthis sample. The current cookie and in-memory design are not a production-deployment contract. [Server construction](app/server.mjs#L86),-[listener](app/server.mjs#L269).+deployment contract. [Server construction](app/server.mjs#L94),+[listener](app/server.mjs#L284).Revisit this model when routes, ownership rules, approval transitions, credentialrecipients, rendering, or storage change. Run the harness to preserve the QAdiff --git a/examples/invoice-desk/app/README.md b/examples/invoice-desk/app/README.mdindex 5fb8e3c93..58b8e43f2 100644--- a/examples/invoice-desk/app/README.md+++ b/examples/invoice-desk/app/README.md@@ -53,5 +53,6 @@ invoice data. Destination owners can inspect received requests.- `views.mjs` and `public/`: interface templates, styles, and form handling.`GET /health` reports process readiness. JSON writes require-`Content-Type: application/json`. Stopping the process releases all application+`Content-Type: application/json`. The API accepts documents up to 64 KiB and+returns HTTP 413 for larger bodies. Stopping the process releases all applicationstate; no application files or databases are written to disk.diff --git a/examples/invoice-desk/app/server.mjs b/examples/invoice-desk/app/server.mjsindex 967431755..a0f54e7c4 100644--- a/examples/invoice-desk/app/server.mjs+++ b/examples/invoice-desk/app/server.mjs@@ -51,14 +51,22 @@ const assets = new Map([],]);+const MAX_JSON_BYTES = 64 * 1024;+async function readBody(request) {if (!request.headers["content-type"]?.startsWith("application/json"))throw new HttpError(415, "Send a JSON document.");const chunks = [];- for await (const chunk of request) chunks.push(chunk);+ let size = 0;+ for await (const chunk of request.iterator({ destroyOnReturn: false })) {+ size += chunk.length;+ if (size > MAX_JSON_BYTES)+ throw new HttpError(413, "JSON documents must be 64 KiB or smaller.");+ chunks.push(chunk);+ }let value;try {- value = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"));+ value = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks, size).toString("utf8"));} catch {throw new HttpError(400, "Invalid JSON document.");}@@ -255,6 +263,8 @@ export function createApp() {}throw new HttpError(404, "Page not found.");} catch (error) {+ if (error instanceof HttpError && error.status === 413)+ response.shouldKeepAlive = false;respond(response, error instanceof HttpError ? error.status : 500, {error:error instanceof HttpErrordiff --git a/examples/invoice-desk/qa/app.test.mjs b/examples/invoice-desk/qa/app.test.mjsindex 492d3f2f6..c1f024fc7 100644--- a/examples/invoice-desk/qa/app.test.mjs+++ b/examples/invoice-desk/qa/app.test.mjs@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@import assert from "node:assert/strict";import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";+import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";import { test } from "node:test";import { cp, mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promises";import { tmpdir } from "node:os";@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ async function app(t) {const cookie = response.headers.get("set-cookie").split(";")[0];return (path, options = {}) => request(path, { ...options, cookie });};- return { request, login };+ return { request, login, origin };}function scenario(id, run) {@@ -418,6 +419,36 @@ test("health, static assets, and every ordinary page are served", async (t) => {}});+test(+ "JSON requests accept 64 KiB and reject larger bodies",+ { timeout: 5000 },+ async (t) => {+ const { request, origin } = await app(t);+ const [email, password] = accounts.alex;+ const body = { email, password, note: "é" };+ const size = Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(body));+ body.note += " ".repeat(64 * 1024 - size);+ const post = () => request("/api/login", { method: "POST", body });+ assert.equal((await post()).status, 200);+ const atLimit = JSON.stringify(body);+ body.note += " ";+ assert.equal((await post()).status, 413);++ // A chunked upload can receive the response before sending its final chunk.+ const upload = httpRequest(`${origin}/api/login`, {+ method: "POST",+ headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },+ });+ t.after(() => upload.destroy());+ upload.write(atLimit);+ upload.write(" ");+ const [rejected] = await once(upload, "response");+ assert.equal(rejected.statusCode, 413);+ assert.equal(rejected.headers.connection, "close");+ rejected.resume();+ },+);+test("anonymous callers and incorrect passwords do not authenticate", async (t) => {const { request } = await app(t);assert.equal((await request("/api/invoices")).status, 401);