OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security
TypeScript ai-securityapplication-securityclicode-scanningcodexcodex-securitycybersecuritydevsecopsnodejsnpmopenaisdksecuritytypescriptvulnerability-scanning
fix(deep-scan): reject directory trees emptied before dispatch (#2181)
Dipesh Babuc078ae5c5bbe
diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/tests/test_deep_scan_empty_target.ts b/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/tests/test_deep_scan_empty_target.tsindex b80583cd3..2f436cce7 100644--- a/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/tests/test_deep_scan_empty_target.ts+++ b/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/tests/test_deep_scan_empty_target.ts@@ -32,6 +32,45 @@ function inspect(run: DeepScanRunState) {after(() => temporaryDirectories.cleanup());+test("a directory tree emptied after registration dispatches no workers", async () => {+ const fixture = await fixtureRun();+ await mkdir(join(fixture.run.targetPath, "first", "nested"), {+ recursive: true,+ });+ await mkdir(join(fixture.run.targetPath, "second"));+ const source = join(fixture.run.targetPath, "first", "nested", "source.py");+ await writeFile(source, "");+ // A registration-time inventory count remains positive after its file is removed.+ Object.assign(fixture.run, { scopeFileCount: 1 });+ await rm(source);+ const executor = new FakeExecutor({ blockDiscoveryAfterCalls: 0 });+ const coordinator = createCoordinator(+ fixture,+ new FakeStore(fixture.run),+ executor,+ {+ checkFreshTarget: inspect,+ },+ );+ coordinator.start();+ try {+ const outcome = await Promise.race([+ coordinator.settled(),+ executor.discoveryStarted.promise.then(() =>+ assert.fail("Empty directory tree dispatched a worker"),+ ),+ ]);+ assert.equal(outcome.status, "failed", outcome.error);+ assert.match(outcome.error ?? "", /target is empty.*no security audit/iu);+ assert.equal(executor.discoveryCalls, 0);+ await writeFile(source, "");+ await inspect(fixture.run);+ } finally {+ coordinator.cancel("fixture cleanup");+ await coordinator.settled();+ }+});+test("only registered paths determine whether the target is empty", async () => {const { run } = await fixtureRun();run.includePaths = ["left", "right"];@@ -61,7 +100,7 @@ test("only registered paths determine whether the target is empty", async () =>);await assert.rejects(inspect(run), /target is empty.*no security audit/iu);- // Any entry counts, even if normal source inventory would ignore it.+ // A file counts even when normal source inventory would ignore it.await writeFile(join(right, ".gitignore"), "*");await inspect(run);run.includePaths.reverse();@@ -165,14 +204,23 @@ test(},);-for (const stop of ["cancellation", "deadline"]) {+for (const [stop, nested] of [+ ["cancellation", false],+ ["deadline", false],+ ["cancellation", true],+ ["deadline", true],+] as const) {test(- `a blocked directory read cannot delay ${stop}`,+ `a blocked ${nested ? "nested " : ""}directory read cannot delay ${stop}`,{ timeout: 15_000 },async (t) => {const fixture = await fixtureRun();const { run } = fixture;await mkdir(run.targetPath);+ const blockedPath = nested+ ? join(run.targetPath, "nested")+ : run.targetPath;+ if (nested) await mkdir(blockedPath);const scripts = join(fixture.pluginRoot, "scripts");await mkdir(scripts, { recursive: true });const markerDir = join(dirname(run.targetPath), "ready");@@ -187,7 +235,7 @@ import os, runpy, sys, timefrom pathlib import Pathreal_scan = os.scandirdef blocked(path):- if os.fsdecode(path) == ${JSON.stringify(run.targetPath)}:+ if os.fsdecode(path) == ${JSON.stringify(blockedPath)}:Path(${JSON.stringify(markerDir)}, str(os.getpid())).touch()time.sleep(30)return real_scan(path)diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/scripts/check_deep_scan_target.py b/plugins/codex-security/scripts/check_deep_scan_target.pyindex ba4b58457..a49ce6e6e 100644--- a/plugins/codex-security/scripts/check_deep_scan_target.py+++ b/plugins/codex-security/scripts/check_deep_scan_target.py@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-"""Check the physical contents of the targets registered for a fresh Deep Scan."""+"""Reject registered Deep Scan targets containing only empty directories."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -45,16 +45,38 @@ def check_selected_targets(root: Path, selections: list[str], file_paths: list[sfor selection in selections:check_path(selection)+ def has_content(selection: str) -> bool:+ pending = [selection]+ failure = None+ while pending:+ current = pending.pop()+ try:+ target, regular = check_path(current)+ if regular:+ return True+ with os.scandir(target) as entries:+ for entry in entries:+ if not entry.is_dir(follow_symlinks=False):+ return True+ # Preserve link entries as content without traversing their targets.+ if (+ getattr(entry.stat(follow_symlinks=False), "st_reparse_tag", 0)+ & 0x20000000+ ):+ return True+ pending.append(str(Path(entry.path).relative_to(root)))+ except OSError as exc:+ if failure is None:+ failure = exc+ if failure is not None:+ raise failure+ return False+failure = Nonefor selection in selections:try:- # A previously validated directory may have changed during another probe.- target, regular = check_path(selection)- if regular:+ if has_content(selection):return- with os.scandir(target) as entries:- if next(entries, None) is not None:- returnexcept OSError as exc:if selection in files:raisediff --git a/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_deep_scan_target.py b/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_deep_scan_target.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..6048ea77c--- /dev/null+++ b/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_deep_scan_target.py@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@+"""Exercise filesystem failures encountered below a selected Deep Scan directory."""++from __future__ import annotations++import errno+import os+import runpy+from pathlib import Path++import pytest+++def check_targets():+ script = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "check_deep_scan_target.py"+ return runpy.run_path(str(script))["check_selected_targets"]++[email protected]_platform+def test_nested_read_failure_is_preserved_unless_another_selection_has_content(+ tmp_path, monkeypatch, check_targets+):+ root = tmp_path / "target"+ denied = root / "empty" / "nested"+ denied.mkdir(parents=True)+ failure = PermissionError(errno.EACCES, "Synthetic denied directory", str(denied))+ original = os.scandir++ def scandir(path):+ if Path(path) == denied:+ raise failure+ return original(path)++ monkeypatch.setattr(os, "scandir", scandir)+ with pytest.raises(PermissionError) as caught:+ check_targets(root, ["empty"], [])+ assert caught.value is failure+ (root / "sibling.py").write_text("")+ check_targets(root, ["empty", "sibling.py"], ["sibling.py"])++[email protected](os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX directory symlink fixture")+def test_nested_directory_links_are_not_followed(tmp_path, monkeypatch, check_targets):+ root = tmp_path / "target"+ root.mkdir()+ outside = tmp_path / "outside"+ outside.mkdir()+ (root / "link").symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)+ original = os.scandir++ def scandir(path):+ assert Path(path) != outside+ return original(path)++ monkeypatch.setattr(os, "scandir", scandir)+ check_targets(root, ["."], [])diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_workbench_deep_scan.py b/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_workbench_deep_scan.pyindex c0cf7123e..76c959597 100644--- a/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_workbench_deep_scan.py+++ b/plugins/codex-security/tests/test_workbench_deep_scan.py@@ -99,17 +99,21 @@ def start_empty_target_scan(tmp_path: Path, *, config: str | None = None) -> Dee@pytest.mark.cross_platform-def test_target_admission_reads_one_entry_without_looking_up_its_type(+def test_target_admission_stops_at_the_first_non_directory_entry(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:script = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "check_deep_scan_target.py"check_selected_targets = runpy.run_path(str(script))["check_selected_targets"]events = []+ class FileEntry:+ def is_dir(self, *, follow_symlinks):+ assert not follow_symlinks+ return False+def entries():events.append("read")- # A filesystem can report DT_UNKNOWN. Any entry-type lookup here fails.- yield object()+ yield FileEntry()pytest.fail("admission read a second directory entry")@contextmanager