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OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security

fix(runtime): enforce strict scan approval boundaries (#430)

mldangelo-oaid809b6db4222
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 3a8392271..38507a8ea 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ incomplete coverage.
### How scans run
Each scan uses the product's `codex_security_scan` filesystem profile and
-`approvalPolicy: "never"`. The scan does not request interactive approval. Its
-profile allows reads of the local filesystem and writes to workspace roots and
-the selected scan state directory.
-
-Setting `approval_policy`, `sandbox_mode`, or permissions through `--codex` or
-SDK `codexOverrides` does not replace the scan's approval policy or make its
-filesystem profile more restrictive. Separately enforced host and network
-restrictions still apply.
+`approvalPolicy: "never"`. The scan does not request interactive approval or
+grant filesystem escalations. Its profile allows reads of the local filesystem
+and writes to workspace roots and the selected scan state directory.
+
+Setting `approval_policy`, `approvals_reviewer`, `sandbox_mode`, or permissions
+through `--codex` or SDK `codexOverrides` does not replace the scan's approval
+policy or make its filesystem profile more restrictive. Separately enforced
+host and network restrictions still apply.
Scan and workbench subprocesses can inherit your environment. The workbench
removes `OPENAI_API_KEY` and `CODEX_API_KEY`, but it does not remove every
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/README.md b/sdk/typescript/README.md
index eb86c092c..b33eef9da 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/README.md
+++ b/sdk/typescript/README.md
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ configuration. Each scan starts with a private runtime and these Codex
defaults:
```toml
+approval_policy = "never"
cli_auth_credentials_store = "auto"
model = "gpt-5.6-sol"
model_reasoning_effort = "xhigh"
@@ -697,12 +698,13 @@ repository, Git installation, configured tools, and other scans under the
same account are not separate security principals.
Every scan uses the `codex_security_scan` filesystem profile and
-`approvalPolicy: "never"`. It can read the local filesystem and write to
-workspace roots and the selected scan state directory. Scans do not request
-interactive approval. Setting `approval_policy`, `sandbox_mode`, or permissions
+`approvalPolicy: "never"`. Its profile allows reads of the local filesystem and
+writes to workspace roots and the selected scan state directory. Scans do not
+request interactive approval or grant filesystem escalations. Setting
+`approval_policy`, `approvals_reviewer`, `sandbox_mode`, or permissions
through `--codex` or SDK `codexOverrides` does not replace these controls or
-make them more restrictive. Independently enforced host and network
-restrictions still apply.
+make the filesystem profile more restrictive. Independently enforced host and
+network restrictions still apply.
Scan and workbench subprocesses can inherit your environment, including
unrelated API tokens and cloud credentials. Start a scan with only the
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts
index e56fa145e..9f04dca44 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/api.ts
@@ -2787,11 +2787,24 @@ export function scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
): JsonObject {
const hardened = structuredClone(config);
delete hardened["sandbox_mode"];
+ delete hardened["approvals_reviewer"];
+ const profiles = hardened["profiles"];
+ if (isRecord(profiles)) {
+ for (const profile of Object.values(profiles)) {
+ if (!isRecord(profile)) continue;
+ delete profile["approval_policy"];
+ delete profile["approvals_reviewer"];
+ delete profile["default_permissions"];
+ delete profile["permissions"];
+ delete profile["sandbox_mode"];
+ }
+ }
const configuredPermissions = isRecord(hardened["permissions"])
? hardened["permissions"]
: {};
return {
...hardened,
+ approval_policy: "never",
allow_login_shell: false,
default_permissions: SCAN_PERMISSION_PROFILE,
permissions: {
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/config.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/config.ts
index 0e6d5a730..acc98ac2e 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/src/config.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/config.ts
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ export function isExternalModelProvider(
}
export const DEFAULT_CODEX_CONFIG: Readonly<JsonObject> = {
+ approval_policy: "never",
cli_auth_credentials_store: "auto",
model: "gpt-5.6-sol",
model_reasoning_effort: "xhigh",
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts
index 772a86481..4629d5321 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api-preflight-config.test.ts
@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
test("uses a root-read filesystem profile with writable workspace and workbench state", () => {
const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
const original = {
+ approval_policy: "on-request",
+ approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
sandbox_mode: "workspace-write",
allow_login_shell: true,
default_permissions: "unsafe",
@@ -324,6 +326,7 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
};
expect(scanRuntimeCodexConfig(original, stateDirectory)).toEqual({
+ approval_policy: "never",
allow_login_shell: false,
default_permissions: "codex_security_scan",
permissions: {
@@ -338,6 +341,8 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
},
});
expect(original).toMatchObject({
+ approval_policy: "on-request",
+ approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
sandbox_mode: "workspace-write",
allow_login_shell: true,
default_permissions: "unsafe",
@@ -363,6 +368,49 @@ describe("CodexSecurity preflight configuration", () => {
});
});
+ test("removes execution and permission overrides from every configured profile", () => {
+ const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
+ const original = {
+ profile: "selected",
+ profiles: {
+ selected: {
+ model: "profile-model",
+ approval_policy: "on-request",
+ approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
+ default_permissions: "unsafe",
+ permissions: { unsafe: { filesystem: { ":root": "write" } } },
+ sandbox_mode: "danger-full-access",
+ },
+ other: {
+ model_reasoning_effort: "high",
+ approval_policy: "untrusted",
+ approvals_reviewer: "guardian_subagent",
+ default_permissions: "other-unsafe",
+ permissions: { "other-unsafe": { filesystem: { ":root": "write" } } },
+ sandbox_mode: "workspace-write",
+ },
+ },
+ };
+
+ const hardened = scanRuntimeCodexConfig(original, stateDirectory);
+ expect(hardened).toMatchObject({
+ approval_policy: "never",
+ default_permissions: "codex_security_scan",
+ profile: "selected",
+ });
+ expect(hardened["profiles"]).toEqual({
+ selected: { model: "profile-model" },
+ other: { model_reasoning_effort: "high" },
+ });
+ expect(original.profiles.selected).toMatchObject({
+ approval_policy: "on-request",
+ approvals_reviewer: "auto_review",
+ default_permissions: "unsafe",
+ permissions: { unsafe: { filesystem: { ":root": "write" } } },
+ sandbox_mode: "danger-full-access",
+ });
+ });
+
test("preserves configured Responses metadata without persisting scan attribution", () => {
const stateDirectory = join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-persistent-state");
const credentialHome = join(stateDirectory, "codex-home");
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api.test.ts
index fd8cc731c..17514bf89 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/api.test.ts
@@ -1908,6 +1908,9 @@ describe("CodexSecurity orchestration", () => {
default_permissions: "codex_security_scan",
allow_login_shell: false,
});
+ expect((codexOptions as CodexOptions | null)?.config).not.toHaveProperty(
+ "approvals_reviewer",
+ );
expect(threadOptions as Record<string, unknown> | null).toEqual({
workingDirectory: scanDir,
skipGitRepoCheck: true,
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts
index 6897c4d4d..f3fc3fb2d 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/config.test.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
@@ -63,6 +63,15 @@ function runPinnedCodex(codexHome: string, arguments_: readonly string[]) {
}
describe("Codex configuration", () => {
+ test("never grants scan execution approvals by default", async () => {
+ expect(await mergedCodexConfig({})).toMatchObject({
+ approval_policy: "never",
+ });
+ expect(await mergedCodexConfig({})).not.toHaveProperty(
+ "approvals_reviewer",
+ );
+ });
+
test("lets Codex honor native and managed credential storage", async () => {
expect(DEFAULT_CODEX_CONFIG["cli_auth_credentials_store"]).toBe("auto");
expect((await mergedCodexConfig({}))["cli_auth_credentials_store"]).toBe(
@@ -326,6 +335,64 @@ describe("Codex configuration", () => {
});
});
+ test("denies writes outside the scan workspace and state directory", async () => {
+ const root = await temporaryDirectory();
+ const codexHome = join(root, "codex-home");
+ const workspace = join(root, "workspace");
+ const stateDirectory = join(root, "state");
+ await Promise.all(
+ [codexHome, workspace, stateDirectory].map((path) => mkdir(path)),
+ );
+ await writeCodexConfig(
+ join(codexHome, "config.toml"),
+ scanRuntimeCodexConfig(
+ await mergedCodexConfig({}),
+ stateDirectory,
+ codexHome,
+ ),
+ );
+ const node = Bun.which("node");
+ expect(node).not.toBeNull();
+ const attemptWrite = (path: string) =>
+ runPinnedCodex(codexHome, [
+ "sandbox",
+ "--config",
+ "permissions.codex_security_scan.network.enabled=true",
+ "--permission-profile",
+ "codex_security_scan",
+ "--cd",
+ workspace,
+ node!,
+ "-e",
+ "require('node:fs').writeFileSync(process.argv[1], 'probe')",
+ path,
+ ]);
+
+ const allowed = join(workspace, "inside.txt");
+ const permitted = attemptWrite(allowed);
+ const outside = join(root, "outside.txt");
+ expect(attemptWrite(outside).exitCode).not.toBe(0);
+ await expect(stat(outside)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });
+ if (permitted.exitCode !== 0) {
+ const details = new TextDecoder().decode(permitted.stderr);
+ if (
+ process.platform === "linux" &&
+ /bwrap: (?:setting up uid map: Permission denied|loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted)/u.test(
+ details,
+ )
+ ) {
+ expect(runPinnedCodex(codexHome, ["features", "list"]).exitCode).toBe(
+ 0,
+ );
+ return;
+ }
+ throw new Error(
+ `The pinned Codex CLI rejected an allowed scan write: ${details}`,
+ );
+ }
+ expect(await readFile(allowed, "utf8")).toBe("probe");
+ });
+
test("writes Windows sandbox settings accepted by the pinned Codex CLI", async () => {
const root = await temporaryDirectory();
const path = join(root, "config.toml");