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OpenAI's Codex Security CLI and TypeScript SDK for finding, validating, and fixing security vulnerabilities. npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openai/codex-security

docs(deep-scan): keep workbench-derived fields out of worker draft guidance (#1177)

Manas Choksidd17286f70e8
diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/templates/deep-scan/dedup.md b/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/templates/deep-scan/dedup.md
index e544fdca0..a062071c2 100644
--- a/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/templates/deep-scan/dedup.md
+++ b/plugins/codex-security/mcp-app/templates/deep-scan/dedup.md
@@ -22,6 +22,6 @@ For a valid merge, synthesize one stronger finding while preserving every materi
Account for every input finding using the host-supplied `provenance.sourceFindingIds`. Copy the refs for retained findings; union them for a valid merge, preserving previous refs. Never invent, omit, or reuse a ref across independent output findings. The host retains original source payloads and rejects unaccounted input. Identity collisions do not establish that findings are duplicates.
-Preserve the threat-model context and scope as needed. You cannot resolve or reject a source finding without inspecting code, which is outside this reducer's role.
+Preserve the threat-model context and scope as needed, omitting scope `includePaths` and `excludePaths`. You cannot resolve or reject a source finding without inspecting code, which is outside this reducer's role.
Call `record_codex_security_deep_reduction({ scanId, findings, threatModel?, scope? })` until it succeeds; correct a reported validation error and retry in the same conversation. After the first successful call, do not call it again. The host derives convergence and worker attribution from its existing state.
diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/references/core-scan.md b/plugins/codex-security/references/core-scan.md
index 5f20464fb..5860bedbe 100644
--- a/plugins/codex-security/references/core-scan.md
+++ b/plugins/codex-security/references/core-scan.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Perform one complete, evidence-backed security audit of the exact supplied repos
5. Launch focused investigator subagents with `fork_turns: "none"` as soon as useful packet groups exist. Choose their number and assignments from the amount, complexity, and independence of source-backed work, bounded by the supplied available subagent allowance; use fewer for related packets and more only when distinct surfaces justify them. Keep mapping other surfaces while they run. Send each only its focused-investigator prompt below, assigned packets, investigator perspective, repository path, authorized scope, any supplied scoped-source inventory, exact user context, supplied threat model, applicable packet-specific security guidance and its resolver command, the optional authoritative knowledge-base location, and verified search command. Do not include this reference or another worker's prompt. Supporting code may be outside a requested path, but an affected entry point, control, or operation must be in scope.
6. Before combining or revalidating any returned baseline or investigator result, persist it through the caller's bound `record_codex_security_scan_draft` tool when available, using `complete: false` and partial coverage. Give each candidate a stable `candidateId`; put candidates awaiting parent validation in `coverage.deferred` with a meaningful reason and their original finding payload under `candidate`. Preserve returned counterevidence and unresolved questions too. Checkpoint again after each validation decision, without waiting for other workers or the final report. Put source-validated findings in `findings` with the same `provenance.candidateId`; for a rejection, retain the candidate ID, original evidence, and source-backed counterevidence on a `rejected` coverage surface. An unfinished scan must retain its saved findings and pending candidates without presenting pending work as validated. Reconcile source coverage before combining findings. Union only the baseline and focused investigators' `fully_reviewed_files` with files the parent fully security-audited, then intersect that set with the supplied authorized inventory or an inventory of the selected current scope. Architecture mapping alone and supporting files outside that inventory do not count toward completed audit coverage. Finish the remaining in-scope files in coherent groups, reusing available investigators within the same allowance. Inspect implementation-owning generated or compressed code as data. Do not add overlapping worker counts or claim that a search hit completed a file. Keep this one transient set; do not create a separate progress ledger or receipt format. If a user limit or unavailable source prevents completion, identify the actual remaining paths and report partial coverage. Then combine baseline and investigator findings once. Group observations only when they share the same broken security control and effective remediation; preserve every affected route, operation, sink, and supporting source location. Never merge different security failures solely because they share a CWE.
7. Independently validate each unique finding against local source once. Establish its attacker, entry point, trust boundary, attacker-controlled dataflow, transformations, broken control, sensitive operation, prerequisites, effective mitigations, strongest counterevidence, and concrete impact. For secrets exposed in source, apply the disclosure path below instead of requiring attacker-controlled application input or execution of the containing code. Record concise, source-backed `rootCause.summary`, `validation.summary`, `attackPath.dataflow.summary`, and `attackPath.reachability.summary` alongside their supporting facts; determine impact, likelihood, and severity from those established facts. State optional configuration, dependency-version, or deployment prerequisites; do not require proof of a real deployment or runtime reproduction. A public library or parser boundary is sufficient when callers control the input. Reject only with source-backed counterevidence, preserve valid baseline findings, record material unresolved proof gaps, and apply the severity rules below.
-8. Assemble complete semantic `scope`, `threatModel`, `findings`, and `coverage` using the plugin's `examples/completed-scan/` and `schemas/` as shape references, never as values to copy. Use the canonical field mapping and scenario reconciliation in `threat-model.md`, preserving supplied models unchanged and retaining source-backed architecture, capability, deployment, and uncertainty facts. Give each finding a stable lowercase vulnerability-family `ruleId`, its precise `taxonomy.category` and `taxonomy.cwe` values, genuine `provenance.source`, an instance when separately reported findings would otherwise collide, a `root_control` location when identifiable, all materially affected locations, calibrated severity and rationale, confidence and rationale, verified nonempty source evidence, attacker-to-sink reachability, and practical remediation. Write source evidence as `codeEvidence` entries with required `id`, `label`, `path`, `startLine`, `code`, and `explanation` fields; `endLine`, `language`, and `role` are optional. Use `code`, never `snippet`, and write new root-cause details as `rootCause`, never `root_cause`. Follow `finding-detail-fields.md` when constructing rich finding details. Use actual coverage surface labels and dispositions; report reviewed surfaces, explicit exclusions, deferred work, and unresolved questions honestly, and mark coverage `complete` only when the requested source scope was actually reviewed. Preserve every genuine finding, evidence item, user-supplied assumption, and unresolved proof gap in the caller's complete semantic result.
+8. Assemble complete semantic `scope`, `threatModel`, `findings`, and `coverage` following `final-report.md`; use `schemas/tools/scan-draft.schema.json` for draft tool arguments. Use the canonical field mapping and scenario reconciliation in `threat-model.md`, preserving supplied models unchanged and retaining source-backed architecture, capability, deployment, and uncertainty facts. Give each finding a stable lowercase vulnerability-family `ruleId`, its precise `taxonomy.category` and `taxonomy.cwe` values, genuine `provenance.source`, an instance when separately reported findings would otherwise collide, a `root_control` location when identifiable, all materially affected locations, calibrated severity and rationale, confidence and rationale, verified nonempty source evidence, attacker-to-sink reachability, and practical remediation. Write source evidence as `codeEvidence` entries with required `id`, `label`, `path`, `startLine`, `code`, and `explanation` fields; `endLine`, `language`, and `role` are optional. Use `code`, never `snippet`, and write new root-cause details as `rootCause`, never `root_cause`. Follow `finding-detail-fields.md` when constructing rich finding details. Use actual coverage surface labels and dispositions; report reviewed surfaces, explicit exclusions, deferred work, and unresolved questions honestly, and mark coverage `complete` only when the requested source scope was actually reviewed. Preserve every genuine finding, evidence item, user-supplied assumption, and unresolved proof gap in the caller's complete semantic result.
Keep discovery, validation, and attack-path reasoning within this one self-contained audit; do not invoke separate phase skills. Do not create ranking phases, per-file or per-candidate ledgers, separate phase worker pools, repeated phase reports, or receipt files.
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/custom-validation-prompt.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/custom-validation-prompt.ts
index 969725127..610bff8bc 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/src/custom-validation-prompt.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/custom-validation-prompt.ts
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { PLUGIN_NAME } from "./runtime.js";
// the ordinary validation sequence with a custom-validation request.
const SOURCES = {
"references/core-scan.md":
- "a89c6aa0649def73f815bac662c679cb07a00b71b995addb53ad1b6d8313022a",
+ "9c0eca53147383a89cd345eac7791ea75b954f7f083448ef25019d8f9ba30afe",
"skills/security-scan/SKILL.md":
"71e05d106aac8895aaa328c3ee868ae56ddc4763657c170ad6779e376f162eba",
"skills/security-diff-scan/SKILL.md":