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0

Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal

Rust

Preserve unparsed shell wrappers in exec policy (#39588)

Dylan Hurd4b450d2f1b21
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
index 3b9dd6d520..9e327353fe 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ use crate::config::Config;
use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;
use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
-use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use shlex::try_join as shlex_try_join;
@@ -171,14 +170,12 @@ pub(crate) struct UnmatchedCommandContext<'a> {
pub(crate) permission_profile: &'a PermissionProfile,
pub(crate) windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
pub(crate) sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
- pub(crate) used_complex_parsing: bool,
pub(crate) command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin,
}
#[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
struct ExecPolicyCommands {
commands: Vec<Vec<String>>,
- used_complex_parsing: bool,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin,
}
@@ -326,7 +323,6 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {
req: ExecApprovalRequest<'_>,
ExecPolicyCommands {
commands,
- used_complex_parsing,
command_origin,
}: ExecPolicyCommands,
) -> ExecApprovalRequirement {
@@ -341,11 +337,8 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {
allow_prefix_rules,
} = req;
let exec_policy = self.current_for_environment(environment_policy, allow_prefix_rules);
- // Keep heredoc prefix parsing for the rules that apply to this model,
- // but avoid reusable approvals for cyber models or when only the
- // heredoc fallback parser matched.
- let auto_amendment_allowed =
- !used_complex_parsing && allow_prefix_rules == AllowPrefixRules::Honor;
+ // Avoid reusable approvals when this model does not honor prefix rules.
+ let auto_amendment_allowed = allow_prefix_rules == AllowPrefixRules::Honor;
let exec_policy_fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {
render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
cmd,
@@ -354,7 +347,6 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {
permission_profile: &permission_profile,
windows_sandbox_level,
sandbox_permissions,
- used_complex_parsing,
command_origin,
},
)
@@ -748,7 +740,6 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
permission_profile,
windows_sandbox_level,
sandbox_permissions,
- used_complex_parsing,
command_origin,
} = context;
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
@@ -769,7 +760,6 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
&& profile_has_managed_filesystem_restrictions(permission_profile);
if is_known_safe
- && !used_complex_parsing
&& (approval_policy == AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted
|| windows_managed_fs_restrictions_without_sandbox_backend)
{
@@ -860,7 +850,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy(command: &[String]) -> ExecPolicyCommands {
{
return ExecPolicyCommands {
commands,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
};
}
@@ -873,23 +862,13 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy(command: &[String]) -> ExecPolicyCommands {
{
return ExecPolicyCommands {
commands,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,
};
}
}
- if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(command) {
- return ExecPolicyCommands {
- commands: vec![single_command],
- used_complex_parsing: true,
- command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
- };
- }
-
ExecPolicyCommands {
commands: vec![command.to_vec()],
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
}
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs
index f585a04160..80d7ab8fc5 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {
Some((_, script)) => ExecPolicyCommands {
commands: parse_powershell_script_into_plain_commands(script)
.unwrap_or_else(|| vec![command.to_vec()]),
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,
},
None => commands_for_exec_policy(command),
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
index 690f92a536..916a3d6ff3 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
@@ -687,7 +687,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_falls_back_for_empty_shell_script() {
commands_for_exec_policy(&command),
ExecPolicyCommands {
commands: vec![command],
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
}
);
@@ -705,7 +704,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_falls_back_for_whitespace_shell_script() {
commands_for_exec_policy(&command),
ExecPolicyCommands {
commands: vec![command],
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
}
);
@@ -751,7 +749,7 @@ async fn ignore_user_config_keeps_user_policy_files() -> std::io::Result<()> {
}
#[tokio::test]
-async fn evaluates_heredoc_script_against_prefix_rules() {
+async fn heredoc_script_stays_in_sandbox_despite_inner_allow_rule() {
let command = vec![
"bash".to_string(),
"-lc".to_string(),
@@ -768,15 +766,19 @@ async fn evaluates_heredoc_script_against_prefix_rules() {
prefix_rule: None,
},
ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
- bypass_sandbox: true,
- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
+ bypass_sandbox: false,
+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![
+ "bash".to_string(),
+ "-lc".to_string(),
+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
+ ])),
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
-async fn omits_auto_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts() {
+async fn proposes_full_command_amendment_for_heredoc_prompts() {
assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(
ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {
policy_src: None,
@@ -792,14 +794,18 @@ async fn omits_auto_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts() {
},
ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
reason: None,
- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![
+ "bash".to_string(),
+ "-lc".to_string(),
+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
+ ])),
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
-async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_wont_match() {
+async fn heredoc_prompt_replaces_unrelated_requested_prefix_with_full_command() {
assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(
ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {
policy_src: None,
@@ -819,14 +825,18 @@ async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_wont_mat
},
ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
reason: None,
- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![
+ "bash".to_string(),
+ "-lc".to_string(),
+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
+ ])),
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
-async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_matches() {
+async fn heredoc_prompt_replaces_inner_requested_prefix_with_full_command() {
assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(
ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {
policy_src: None,
@@ -842,7 +852,11 @@ async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_matches(
},
ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
reason: None,
- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![
+ "bash".to_string(),
+ "-lc".to_string(),
+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
+ ])),
},
)
.await;
@@ -1164,7 +1178,6 @@ fn unmatched_granular_policy_still_prompts_for_restricted_sandbox_escalation() {
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
)
@@ -1184,7 +1197,6 @@ fn unmatched_on_request_uses_permission_profile_file_system_policy_for_escalatio
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
)
@@ -1204,7 +1216,6 @@ fn known_safe_on_request_still_prompts_for_restricted_sandbox_escalation() {
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::workspace_write(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
)
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs
index bdf1b5f5e3..57820f1344 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_parses_powershell_shell_wrapper() {
commands_for_exec_policy(&command),
ExecPolicyCommands {
commands: vec![vec!["echo".to_string(), "blocked".to_string()]],
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,
}
);
@@ -80,7 +79,6 @@ fn unmatched_safe_powershell_words_are_allowed() {
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,
},
)
@@ -104,7 +102,6 @@ fn read_only_windows_sandbox_runs_unmatched_commands_under_sandbox() {
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),
windows_sandbox_level,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
)
@@ -125,7 +122,6 @@ fn read_only_windows_policy_without_sandbox_backend_still_requires_approval() {
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
),
@@ -166,7 +162,6 @@ fn writable_windows_policy_without_sandbox_backend_still_requires_approval() {
permission_profile: &permission_profile,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
)
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
index b549156c2d..df5f1b4980 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::merge_permission_profiles;
use codex_sandboxing::record_filesystem_sandbox_violation;
use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
-use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix;
use codex_shell_escalation::EscalateServer;
use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationDecision;
use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationExecution;
@@ -681,10 +680,7 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
sandbox_permissions,
enable_shell_wrapper_parsing,
} = context;
- let CandidateCommands {
- commands,
- used_complex_parsing,
- } = if enable_shell_wrapper_parsing {
+ let commands = if enable_shell_wrapper_parsing {
// In this codepath, the first argument in `commands` could be a bare
// name like `find` instead of an absolute path like `/usr/bin/find`.
// It could also be a shell built-in like `echo`.
@@ -692,10 +688,7 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
} else {
// In this codepath, `commands` has a single entry where the program
// is always an absolute path.
- CandidateCommands {
- commands: vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)],
- used_complex_parsing: false,
- }
+ vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)]
};
let fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {
@@ -706,7 +699,6 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
permission_profile: &permission_profile,
windows_sandbox_level,
sandbox_permissions,
- used_complex_parsing,
command_origin: crate::exec_policy::ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
},
)
@@ -730,39 +722,24 @@ struct InterceptedExecPolicyContext {
enable_shell_wrapper_parsing: bool,
}
-struct CandidateCommands {
- commands: Vec<Vec<String>>,
- used_complex_parsing: bool,
-}
-
fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(
program: &AbsolutePathBuf,
argv: &[String],
-) -> CandidateCommands {
+) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
if let [_, flag, script] = argv {
let shell_command = [
program.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
flag.clone(),
script.clone(),
];
- if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command) {
- return CandidateCommands {
- commands,
- used_complex_parsing: false,
- };
- }
- if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&shell_command) {
- return CandidateCommands {
- commands: vec![single_command],
- used_complex_parsing: true,
- };
+ if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command)
+ && !commands.is_empty()
+ {
+ return commands;
}
}
- CandidateCommands {
- commands: vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)],
- used_complex_parsing: false,
- }
+ vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)]
}
struct CoreShellCommandExecutor {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs
index 8783c21734..e0ff53b774 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs
@@ -257,13 +257,24 @@ fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_parses_plain_shell_wrappers() {
);
assert_eq!(
- candidate_commands.commands,
+ candidate_commands,
vec![
vec!["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],
vec!["pwd".to_string()],
]
);
- assert!(!candidate_commands.used_complex_parsing);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_preserves_unparsed_shell_wrappers() {
+ let program = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(host_absolute_path(&["bin", "bash"])).unwrap();
+ for script in ["", " \n\t", "cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF"] {
+ let argv = ["not-bash".into(), "-lc".into(), script.into()];
+ assert_eq!(
+ commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(&program, &argv),
+ vec![join_program_and_argv(&program, &argv)]
+ );
+ }
}
#[test]
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
index a6b5bf7618..868fed1f5c 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
@@ -608,6 +608,12 @@ impl Expectation {
}
}
+#[derive(Clone)]
+enum ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment {
+ Prefix(&'static [&'static str]),
+ FullCommand,
+}
+
#[derive(Clone)]
enum Outcome {
Auto,
@@ -618,7 +624,7 @@ enum Outcome {
ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision: ReviewDecision,
expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,
- expected_execpolicy_amendment: Option<&'static [&'static str]>,
+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Option<ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment>,
},
PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision,
@@ -1052,7 +1058,10 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),
expected_reason: None,
- expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(&["echo", "known-safe-escalation"]),
+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::Prefix(&[
+ "echo",
+ "known-safe-escalation",
+ ])),
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
@@ -1079,6 +1088,26 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
output_contains: "you should not ask for escalated permissions",
},
},
+ ScenarioSpec {
+ name: "cat_heredoc_inner_allow_rule_requires_escalation_approval",
+ approval_policy: OnRequest,
+ sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
+ action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPolicy {
+ command: "cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF",
+ policy_src: r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["cat"], decision="allow")"#,
+ },
+ sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
+ features: vec![],
+ model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
+ outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
+ decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),
+ expected_reason: None,
+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::FullCommand),
+ },
+ expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
+ output_contains: "rejected by user",
+ },
+ },
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_heredoc_file_redirect_prefix_rule_requires_escalation_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
@@ -1122,7 +1151,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "python_heredoc_requested_prefix_rule_omits_amendment",
+ name: "python_heredoc_requested_prefix_rule_proposes_full_command",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule {
@@ -1137,7 +1166,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),
expected_reason: None,
- expected_execpolicy_amendment: None,
+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::FullCommand),
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
@@ -2130,9 +2159,15 @@ async fn run_scenario(scenario: &ScenarioSpec) -> Result<()> {
scenario.name
);
}
- let expected_execpolicy_amendment = expected_execpolicy_amendment.map(|command| {
- ExecPolicyAmendment::new(command.iter().map(|part| (*part).to_string()).collect())
- });
+ let expected_execpolicy_amendment =
+ expected_execpolicy_amendment.as_ref().map(|expected| {
+ ExecPolicyAmendment::new(match expected {
+ ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::Prefix(command) => {
+ command.iter().map(|part| (*part).to_string()).collect()
+ }
+ ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::FullCommand => approval.command.clone(),
+ })
+ });
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_execpolicy_amendment, expected_execpolicy_amendment,
"unexpected execpolicy amendment for {}",
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs
index 386f20831d..5157a61f73 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs
@@ -159,26 +159,6 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_shell_lc_literal_commands(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<
Some(commands)
}
-/// Returns the parsed argv for a single shell command in a here-doc style
-/// script (`<<`), as long as the script contains exactly one command node.
-pub fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
- let (_, script) = extract_bash_command(command)?;
- let tree = try_parse_shell(script)?;
- let root = tree.root_node();
- if root.has_error() {
- return None;
- }
- if !has_named_descendant_kind(root, "heredoc_redirect") {
- return None;
- }
- if has_named_descendant_kind(root, "file_redirect") {
- return None;
- }
-
- let command_node = find_single_command_node(root)?;
- parse_heredoc_command_words(command_node, script)
-}
-
fn parse_plain_command_from_node(cmd: tree_sitter::Node, src: &str) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
if cmd.kind() != "command" {
return None;
@@ -277,43 +257,6 @@ fn parse_literal_shell_word(node: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> Option<String> {
}
}
-fn parse_heredoc_command_words(cmd: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
- if cmd.kind() != "command" {
- return None;
- }
-
- let mut words = Vec::new();
- let mut cursor = cmd.walk();
- for child in cmd.named_children(&mut cursor) {
- match child.kind() {
- "command_name" => {
- let word_node = child.named_child(0)?;
- if !matches!(word_node.kind(), "word" | "number")
- || !is_literal_word_or_number(word_node, src)
- {
- return None;
- }
- words.push(word_node.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned());
- }
- "word" | "number" => {
- if !is_literal_word_or_number(child, src) {
- return None;
- }
- words.push(child.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned());
- }
- // Allow heredoc constructs that attach stdin to a single command
- // without changing argv matching semantics for the executable
- // prefix. Other file redirects may write outside the sandbox and
- // must not be collapsed to the executable prefix for execpolicy.
- "comment" => {}
- kind if is_allowed_heredoc_attachment_kind(kind) => {}
- _ => return None,
- }
- }
-
- if words.is_empty() { None } else { Some(words) }
-}
-
fn is_literal_word_or_number(node: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> bool {
if !matches!(node.kind(), "word" | "number") {
return false;
@@ -330,50 +273,6 @@ fn is_literal_word_or_number(node: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> bool {
})
}
-fn is_allowed_heredoc_attachment_kind(kind: &str) -> bool {
- matches!(
- kind,
- "heredoc_body"
- | "simple_heredoc_body"
- | "heredoc_redirect"
- | "herestring_redirect"
- | "redirected_statement"
- )
-}
-
-fn find_single_command_node(root: Node<'_>) -> Option<Node<'_>> {
- let mut stack = vec![root];
- let mut single_command = None;
- while let Some(node) = stack.pop() {
- if node.kind() == "command" {
- if single_command.is_some() {
- return None;
- }
- single_command = Some(node);
- }
-
- let mut cursor = node.walk();
- for child in node.named_children(&mut cursor) {
- stack.push(child);
- }
- }
- single_command
-}
-
-fn has_named_descendant_kind(node: Node<'_>, kind: &str) -> bool {
- let mut stack = vec![node];
- while let Some(current) = stack.pop() {
- if current.kind() == kind {
- return true;
- }
- let mut cursor = current.walk();
- for child in current.named_children(&mut cursor) {
- stack.push(child);
- }
- }
- false
-}
-
fn parse_double_quoted_string(node: Node, src: &str) -> Option<String> {
if node.kind() != "string" {
return None;
@@ -591,30 +490,6 @@ mod tests {
}
}
- #[test]
- fn heredoc_prefix_does_not_restore_dynamic_words() {
- for script in [
- "find . -{delete,print}",
- "find . -del*",
- r"find . -de\lete",
- "cat ~",
- "cat ~HOME",
- "cat =sh",
- "c*",
- ] {
- let command = [
- "bash".to_owned(),
- "-lc".to_owned(),
- format!("{script} <<'EOF'\nEOF"),
- ];
- assert_eq!(
- parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command),
- None,
- "{script:?}"
- );
- }
- }
-
#[test]
fn rejects_variable_assignment_prefix() {
assert!(parse_seq("FOO=bar ls").is_none());
@@ -689,103 +564,4 @@ mod tests {
assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$(pwd)\" pattern").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$(echo '*.py')\" pattern").is_none());
}
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_supports_heredoc() {
- let command = vec![
- "zsh".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
- ];
- let parsed = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command);
- assert_eq!(parsed, Some(vec!["python3".to_string()]));
-
- let command_unquoted = vec![
- "zsh".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "python3 << PY\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
- ];
- let parsed_unquoted = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command_unquoted);
- assert_eq!(parsed_unquoted, Some(vec!["python3".to_string()]));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_multi_command_scripts() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY\necho done".to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_non_heredoc_redirects() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "echo hello > /tmp/out.txt".to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_heredoc_with_extra_file_redirect() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "python3 <<'PY' > /tmp/out.txt\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_heredoc_with_variable_assignment() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "PATH=/tmp/evil:$PATH cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF".to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_herestring_with_chaining() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- r#"echo hello > /tmp/out.txt && cat /tmp/out.txt"#.to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_herestring_with_substitution() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- r#"python3 <<< "$(rm -rf /)""#.to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_arithmetic_shift_non_heredoc_script() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "echo $((1<<2))".to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_heredoc_command_with_word_expansion() {
- let command = vec![
- "bash".to_string(),
- "-lc".to_string(),
- "python3 $((1<<2)) <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),
- ];
- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);
- }
}