Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal
Rust
Preserve unparsed shell wrappers in exec policy (#39588)
Dylan Hurd4b450d2f1b21
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rsindex 3b9dd6d520..9e327353fe 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ use crate::config::Config;use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;-use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix;use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;use shlex::try_join as shlex_try_join;@@ -171,14 +170,12 @@ pub(crate) struct UnmatchedCommandContext<'a> {pub(crate) permission_profile: &'a PermissionProfile,pub(crate) windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,pub(crate) sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,- pub(crate) used_complex_parsing: bool,pub(crate) command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin,}#[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]struct ExecPolicyCommands {commands: Vec<Vec<String>>,- used_complex_parsing: bool,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin,}@@ -326,7 +323,6 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {req: ExecApprovalRequest<'_>,ExecPolicyCommands {commands,- used_complex_parsing,command_origin,}: ExecPolicyCommands,) -> ExecApprovalRequirement {@@ -341,11 +337,8 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {allow_prefix_rules,} = req;let exec_policy = self.current_for_environment(environment_policy, allow_prefix_rules);- // Keep heredoc prefix parsing for the rules that apply to this model,- // but avoid reusable approvals for cyber models or when only the- // heredoc fallback parser matched.- let auto_amendment_allowed =- !used_complex_parsing && allow_prefix_rules == AllowPrefixRules::Honor;+ // Avoid reusable approvals when this model does not honor prefix rules.+ let auto_amendment_allowed = allow_prefix_rules == AllowPrefixRules::Honor;let exec_policy_fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {render_decision_for_unmatched_command(cmd,@@ -354,7 +347,6 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {permission_profile: &permission_profile,windows_sandbox_level,sandbox_permissions,- used_complex_parsing,command_origin,},)@@ -748,7 +740,6 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(permission_profile,windows_sandbox_level,sandbox_permissions,- used_complex_parsing,command_origin,} = context;let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();@@ -769,7 +760,6 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(&& profile_has_managed_filesystem_restrictions(permission_profile);if is_known_safe- && !used_complex_parsing&& (approval_policy == AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted|| windows_managed_fs_restrictions_without_sandbox_backend){@@ -860,7 +850,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy(command: &[String]) -> ExecPolicyCommands {{return ExecPolicyCommands {commands,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,};}@@ -873,23 +862,13 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy(command: &[String]) -> ExecPolicyCommands {{return ExecPolicyCommands {commands,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,};}}- if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(command) {- return ExecPolicyCommands {- commands: vec![single_command],- used_complex_parsing: true,- command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,- };- }-ExecPolicyCommands {commands: vec![command.to_vec()],- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,}}diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rsindex f585a04160..80d7ab8fc5 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy/executable_identity.rs@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ impl ExecPolicyManager {Some((_, script)) => ExecPolicyCommands {commands: parse_powershell_script_into_plain_commands(script).unwrap_or_else(|| vec![command.to_vec()]),- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,},None => commands_for_exec_policy(command),diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rsindex 690f92a536..916a3d6ff3 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs@@ -687,7 +687,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_falls_back_for_empty_shell_script() {commands_for_exec_policy(&command),ExecPolicyCommands {commands: vec![command],- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,});@@ -705,7 +704,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_falls_back_for_whitespace_shell_script() {commands_for_exec_policy(&command),ExecPolicyCommands {commands: vec![command],- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,});@@ -751,7 +749,7 @@ async fn ignore_user_config_keeps_user_policy_files() -> std::io::Result<()> {}#[tokio::test]-async fn evaluates_heredoc_script_against_prefix_rules() {+async fn heredoc_script_stays_in_sandbox_despite_inner_allow_rule() {let command = vec!["bash".to_string(),"-lc".to_string(),@@ -768,15 +766,19 @@ async fn evaluates_heredoc_script_against_prefix_rules() {prefix_rule: None,},ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {- bypass_sandbox: true,- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,+ bypass_sandbox: false,+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![+ "bash".to_string(),+ "-lc".to_string(),+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),+ ])),},).await;}#[tokio::test]-async fn omits_auto_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts() {+async fn proposes_full_command_amendment_for_heredoc_prompts() {assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {policy_src: None,@@ -792,14 +794,18 @@ async fn omits_auto_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts() {},ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {reason: None,- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![+ "bash".to_string(),+ "-lc".to_string(),+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),+ ])),},).await;}#[tokio::test]-async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_wont_match() {+async fn heredoc_prompt_replaces_unrelated_requested_prefix_with_full_command() {assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {policy_src: None,@@ -819,14 +825,18 @@ async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_wont_mat},ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {reason: None,- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![+ "bash".to_string(),+ "-lc".to_string(),+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),+ ])),},).await;}#[tokio::test]-async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_matches() {+async fn heredoc_prompt_replaces_inner_requested_prefix_with_full_command() {assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {policy_src: None,@@ -842,7 +852,11 @@ async fn drops_requested_amendment_for_heredoc_fallback_prompts_when_it_matches(},ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {reason: None,- proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,+ proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![+ "bash".to_string(),+ "-lc".to_string(),+ "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),+ ])),},).await;@@ -1164,7 +1178,6 @@ fn unmatched_granular_policy_still_prompts_for_restricted_sandbox_escalation() {permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},)@@ -1184,7 +1197,6 @@ fn unmatched_on_request_uses_permission_profile_file_system_policy_for_escalatiopermission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},)@@ -1204,7 +1216,6 @@ fn known_safe_on_request_still_prompts_for_restricted_sandbox_escalation() {permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::workspace_write(),windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},)diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rsindex bdf1b5f5e3..57820f1344 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_parses_powershell_shell_wrapper() {commands_for_exec_policy(&command),ExecPolicyCommands {commands: vec![vec!["echo".to_string(), "blocked".to_string()]],- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,});@@ -80,7 +79,6 @@ fn unmatched_safe_powershell_words_are_allowed() {permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell,},)@@ -104,7 +102,6 @@ fn read_only_windows_sandbox_runs_unmatched_commands_under_sandbox() {permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),windows_sandbox_level,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},)@@ -125,7 +122,6 @@ fn read_only_windows_policy_without_sandbox_backend_still_requires_approval() {permission_profile: &PermissionProfile::read_only(),windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},),@@ -166,7 +162,6 @@ fn writable_windows_policy_without_sandbox_backend_still_requires_approval() {permission_profile: &permission_profile,windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,- used_complex_parsing: false,command_origin: ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},)diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rsindex b549156c2d..df5f1b4980 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::merge_permission_profiles;use codex_sandboxing::record_filesystem_sandbox_violation;use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;-use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix;use codex_shell_escalation::EscalateServer;use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationDecision;use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationExecution;@@ -681,10 +680,7 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(sandbox_permissions,enable_shell_wrapper_parsing,} = context;- let CandidateCommands {- commands,- used_complex_parsing,- } = if enable_shell_wrapper_parsing {+ let commands = if enable_shell_wrapper_parsing {// In this codepath, the first argument in `commands` could be a bare// name like `find` instead of an absolute path like `/usr/bin/find`.// It could also be a shell built-in like `echo`.@@ -692,10 +688,7 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(} else {// In this codepath, `commands` has a single entry where the program// is always an absolute path.- CandidateCommands {- commands: vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)],- used_complex_parsing: false,- }+ vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)]};let fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {@@ -706,7 +699,6 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(permission_profile: &permission_profile,windows_sandbox_level,sandbox_permissions,- used_complex_parsing,command_origin: crate::exec_policy::ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,},)@@ -730,39 +722,24 @@ struct InterceptedExecPolicyContext {enable_shell_wrapper_parsing: bool,}-struct CandidateCommands {- commands: Vec<Vec<String>>,- used_complex_parsing: bool,-}-fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(program: &AbsolutePathBuf,argv: &[String],-) -> CandidateCommands {+) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {if let [_, flag, script] = argv {let shell_command = [program.to_string_lossy().to_string(),flag.clone(),script.clone(),];- if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command) {- return CandidateCommands {- commands,- used_complex_parsing: false,- };- }- if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&shell_command) {- return CandidateCommands {- commands: vec![single_command],- used_complex_parsing: true,- };+ if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command)+ && !commands.is_empty()+ {+ return commands;}}- CandidateCommands {- commands: vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)],- used_complex_parsing: false,- }+ vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)]}struct CoreShellCommandExecutor {diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rsindex 8783c21734..e0ff53b774 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs@@ -257,13 +257,24 @@ fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_parses_plain_shell_wrappers() {);assert_eq!(- candidate_commands.commands,+ candidate_commands,vec![vec!["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],vec!["pwd".to_string()],]);- assert!(!candidate_commands.used_complex_parsing);+}++#[test]+fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_preserves_unparsed_shell_wrappers() {+ let program = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(host_absolute_path(&["bin", "bash"])).unwrap();+ for script in ["", " \n\t", "cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF"] {+ let argv = ["not-bash".into(), "-lc".into(), script.into()];+ assert_eq!(+ commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(&program, &argv),+ vec![join_program_and_argv(&program, &argv)]+ );+ }}#[test]diff --git a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rsindex a6b5bf7618..868fed1f5c 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs@@ -608,6 +608,12 @@ impl Expectation {}}+#[derive(Clone)]+enum ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment {+ Prefix(&'static [&'static str]),+ FullCommand,+}+#[derive(Clone)]enum Outcome {Auto,@@ -618,7 +624,7 @@ enum Outcome {ExecApprovalWithAmendment {decision: ReviewDecision,expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,- expected_execpolicy_amendment: Option<&'static [&'static str]>,+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Option<ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment>,},PatchApproval {decision: ReviewDecision,@@ -1052,7 +1058,10 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),expected_reason: None,- expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(&["echo", "known-safe-escalation"]),+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::Prefix(&[+ "echo",+ "known-safe-escalation",+ ])),},expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {output_contains: "rejected by user",@@ -1079,6 +1088,26 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {output_contains: "you should not ask for escalated permissions",},},+ ScenarioSpec {+ name: "cat_heredoc_inner_allow_rule_requires_escalation_approval",+ approval_policy: OnRequest,+ sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),+ action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPolicy {+ command: "cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF",+ policy_src: r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["cat"], decision="allow")"#,+ },+ sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,+ features: vec![],+ model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),+ outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {+ decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),+ expected_reason: None,+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::FullCommand),+ },+ expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {+ output_contains: "rejected by user",+ },+ },ScenarioSpec {name: "cat_heredoc_file_redirect_prefix_rule_requires_escalation_approval",approval_policy: OnRequest,@@ -1122,7 +1151,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {},},ScenarioSpec {- name: "python_heredoc_requested_prefix_rule_omits_amendment",+ name: "python_heredoc_requested_prefix_rule_proposes_full_command",approval_policy: OnRequest,sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule {@@ -1137,7 +1166,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),expected_reason: None,- expected_execpolicy_amendment: None,+ expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::FullCommand),},expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {output_contains: "rejected by user",@@ -2130,9 +2159,15 @@ async fn run_scenario(scenario: &ScenarioSpec) -> Result<()> {scenario.name);}- let expected_execpolicy_amendment = expected_execpolicy_amendment.map(|command| {- ExecPolicyAmendment::new(command.iter().map(|part| (*part).to_string()).collect())- });+ let expected_execpolicy_amendment =+ expected_execpolicy_amendment.as_ref().map(|expected| {+ ExecPolicyAmendment::new(match expected {+ ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::Prefix(command) => {+ command.iter().map(|part| (*part).to_string()).collect()+ }+ ExpectedExecPolicyAmendment::FullCommand => approval.command.clone(),+ })+ });assert_eq!(approval.proposed_execpolicy_amendment, expected_execpolicy_amendment,"unexpected execpolicy amendment for {}",diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rsindex 386f20831d..5157a61f73 100644--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs@@ -159,26 +159,6 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_shell_lc_literal_commands(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Some(commands)}-/// Returns the parsed argv for a single shell command in a here-doc style-/// script (`<<`), as long as the script contains exactly one command node.-pub fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<String>> {- let (_, script) = extract_bash_command(command)?;- let tree = try_parse_shell(script)?;- let root = tree.root_node();- if root.has_error() {- return None;- }- if !has_named_descendant_kind(root, "heredoc_redirect") {- return None;- }- if has_named_descendant_kind(root, "file_redirect") {- return None;- }-- let command_node = find_single_command_node(root)?;- parse_heredoc_command_words(command_node, script)-}-fn parse_plain_command_from_node(cmd: tree_sitter::Node, src: &str) -> Option<Vec<String>> {if cmd.kind() != "command" {return None;@@ -277,43 +257,6 @@ fn parse_literal_shell_word(node: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> Option<String> {}}-fn parse_heredoc_command_words(cmd: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> Option<Vec<String>> {- if cmd.kind() != "command" {- return None;- }-- let mut words = Vec::new();- let mut cursor = cmd.walk();- for child in cmd.named_children(&mut cursor) {- match child.kind() {- "command_name" => {- let word_node = child.named_child(0)?;- if !matches!(word_node.kind(), "word" | "number")- || !is_literal_word_or_number(word_node, src)- {- return None;- }- words.push(word_node.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned());- }- "word" | "number" => {- if !is_literal_word_or_number(child, src) {- return None;- }- words.push(child.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned());- }- // Allow heredoc constructs that attach stdin to a single command- // without changing argv matching semantics for the executable- // prefix. Other file redirects may write outside the sandbox and- // must not be collapsed to the executable prefix for execpolicy.- "comment" => {}- kind if is_allowed_heredoc_attachment_kind(kind) => {}- _ => return None,- }- }-- if words.is_empty() { None } else { Some(words) }-}-fn is_literal_word_or_number(node: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> bool {if !matches!(node.kind(), "word" | "number") {return false;@@ -330,50 +273,6 @@ fn is_literal_word_or_number(node: Node<'_>, src: &str) -> bool {})}-fn is_allowed_heredoc_attachment_kind(kind: &str) -> bool {- matches!(- kind,- "heredoc_body"- | "simple_heredoc_body"- | "heredoc_redirect"- | "herestring_redirect"- | "redirected_statement"- )-}--fn find_single_command_node(root: Node<'_>) -> Option<Node<'_>> {- let mut stack = vec![root];- let mut single_command = None;- while let Some(node) = stack.pop() {- if node.kind() == "command" {- if single_command.is_some() {- return None;- }- single_command = Some(node);- }-- let mut cursor = node.walk();- for child in node.named_children(&mut cursor) {- stack.push(child);- }- }- single_command-}--fn has_named_descendant_kind(node: Node<'_>, kind: &str) -> bool {- let mut stack = vec![node];- while let Some(current) = stack.pop() {- if current.kind() == kind {- return true;- }- let mut cursor = current.walk();- for child in current.named_children(&mut cursor) {- stack.push(child);- }- }- false-}-fn parse_double_quoted_string(node: Node, src: &str) -> Option<String> {if node.kind() != "string" {return None;@@ -591,30 +490,6 @@ mod tests {}}- #[test]- fn heredoc_prefix_does_not_restore_dynamic_words() {- for script in [- "find . -{delete,print}",- "find . -del*",- r"find . -de\lete",- "cat ~",- "cat ~HOME",- "cat =sh",- "c*",- ] {- let command = [- "bash".to_owned(),- "-lc".to_owned(),- format!("{script} <<'EOF'\nEOF"),- ];- assert_eq!(- parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command),- None,- "{script:?}"- );- }- }-#[test]fn rejects_variable_assignment_prefix() {assert!(parse_seq("FOO=bar ls").is_none());@@ -689,103 +564,4 @@ mod tests {assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$(pwd)\" pattern").is_none());assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$(echo '*.py')\" pattern").is_none());}-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_supports_heredoc() {- let command = vec![- "zsh".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),- ];- let parsed = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command);- assert_eq!(parsed, Some(vec!["python3".to_string()]));-- let command_unquoted = vec![- "zsh".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "python3 << PY\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),- ];- let parsed_unquoted = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command_unquoted);- assert_eq!(parsed_unquoted, Some(vec!["python3".to_string()]));- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_multi_command_scripts() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "python3 <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY\necho done".to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_non_heredoc_redirects() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "echo hello > /tmp/out.txt".to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_heredoc_with_extra_file_redirect() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "python3 <<'PY' > /tmp/out.txt\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_heredoc_with_variable_assignment() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "PATH=/tmp/evil:$PATH cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF".to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_herestring_with_chaining() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- r#"echo hello > /tmp/out.txt && cat /tmp/out.txt"#.to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_herestring_with_substitution() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- r#"python3 <<< "$(rm -rf /)""#.to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_arithmetic_shift_non_heredoc_script() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "echo $((1<<2))".to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }-- #[test]- fn parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix_rejects_heredoc_command_with_word_expansion() {- let command = vec![- "bash".to_string(),- "-lc".to_string(),- "python3 $((1<<2)) <<'PY'\nprint('hello')\nPY".to_string(),- ];- assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command), None);- }}