Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal
Rust
Prevent `apply_patch` from widening write permissions (#39614)
sayan-oai530c1aed58b8
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch.rsindex 36ae51ba7b..c57302c4ce 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch.rs@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths() -> Option<AdditionalPermissionProfile> {let write_paths = file_paths.iter()+ // Skip already-writable targets before deriving parent permissions.+ // Otherwise, a writable directory could grant access to its parent.+ .filter(|path| {+ !file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd.as_path())+ }).map(|path| {path.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| path.clone())diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rsindex c964846bc1..b78e62e2da 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rs@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@use super::*;use codex_apply_patch::MaybeApplyPatchVerified;use codex_exec_server::LOCAL_FS;+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;use codex_protocol::protocol::FileChange;use core_test_support::PathBufExt;@@ -312,3 +314,35 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths_keep_dirs_outside_workspace_root() {Some(vec![expected_outside]));}++#[test]+fn write_permissions_for_paths_do_not_widen_workspace_root_target() {+ let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("tmp");+ let cwd = tmp.path().join("workspace").abs();+ std::fs::create_dir_all(&cwd).expect("create workspace");+ let sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(+ &[],+ /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,+ /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,+ );++ let permissions =+ write_permissions_for_paths(std::slice::from_ref(&cwd), &sandbox_policy, &cwd);++ assert_eq!(permissions, None);+}++#[test]+fn write_permissions_for_paths_do_not_regrant_an_already_writable_parent() {+ let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("tmp");+ let cwd = tmp.path().abs();+ let file_path = cwd.join("protected.txt");+ let sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![+ FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(cwd.clone().into(), FileSystemAccessMode::Write),+ FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(file_path.clone().into(), FileSystemAccessMode::Read),+ ]);++ let permissions = write_permissions_for_paths(&[file_path], &sandbox_policy, &cwd);++ assert_eq!(permissions, None);+}diff --git a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/apply_patch_cli.rs b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/apply_patch_cli.rsindex 3a88ab6d7a..013d1de2d4 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/apply_patch_cli.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/apply_patch_cli.rs@@ -986,6 +986,71 @@ async fn apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspaceOk(())}+#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]+async fn apply_patch_cli_does_not_widen_permissions_for_workspace_directory_target() -> Result<()> {+ skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));+ skip_if_remote!(+ Ok(()),+ "link escape setup needs local filesystem link creation"+ );++ let test_root = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;+ let work_dir = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(test_root.path().join("work"))?;+ std::fs::create_dir_all(work_dir.as_path())?;+ let outside_file = test_root.path().join("victim.txt");+ let original_contents = "original outside content\n";+ std::fs::write(&outside_file, original_contents)?;++ let harness_work_dir = work_dir.clone();+ let harness = apply_patch_harness_with(move |builder| {+ builder.with_config(move |config| {+ config.approvals_reviewer = codex_protocol::config_types::ApprovalsReviewer::User;+ config.workspace_roots = vec![harness_work_dir.clone()];+ config+ .permissions+ .set_workspace_roots(config.workspace_roots.clone());+ config.cwd = harness_work_dir;+ })+ })+ .await?;+ let link_path = harness.path("link.txt");+ create_file_symlink(&outside_file, &link_path)?;++ // The second hunk names the already-writable workspace directory. It must+ // not grant access to that directory's parent before the first hunk runs.+ let patch = r#"*** Begin Patch+*** Update File: link.txt+@@+-original outside content++pwned+*** Add File: ../work++decoy+*** End Patch"#;+ let call_id = "apply-workspace-directory-decoy";+ mount_apply_patch(&harness, call_id, patch, "fail").await;++ harness+ .submit_with_permission_profile(+ "attempt to widen apply_patch permissions with a directory target",+ restrictive_workspace_write_profile(),+ )+ .await?;++ let out = harness.apply_patch_output(call_id).await;+ assert_eq!(+ std::fs::read_to_string(&outside_file)?,+ original_contents,+ "directory target must not make the outside victim writable; tool output: {out}",+ );+ assert!(+ std::fs::symlink_metadata(&link_path)?+ .file_type()+ .is_symlink()+ );+ Ok(())+}+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]async fn apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace() -> Result<()> {skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));