Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal
Rust
Honor execution environment proxy requirements (#48198)
Sean Huang8f5387d10453
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_config_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_config_tests.rsindex bef4bb5872..b9517ec6fc 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_config_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_config_tests.rs@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ action = ['redact']policy,EnvironmentNetworkPolicy::from_config(&NetworkProxyConfig {+ enabled: true,unix_sockets: Some(Default::default()),..Default::default()},diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec.rsindex 5c316b5b68..53a61ddd10 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec.rs@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ impl NetworkProxySpec {)}- /// Returns the effective traffic policy without exposing controller-owned proxy settings.+ /// Returns proxy activation and traffic policy without controller-owned runtime settings.pub fn environment_policy(&self) -> EnvironmentNetworkPolicy {EnvironmentNetworkPolicy::from_config(&self.config, self.hard_deny_allowlist_misses)}diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec_tests.rsindex da9d6dea30..afdbd894a2 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/config/network_proxy_spec_tests.rs@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ fn environment_policy_replaces_soft_controller_allowlist_and_preserves_denials()owner.allow_upstream_proxy = false;owner.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets = Some(false);owner.allow_local_binding = Some(true);+ owner.enabled = true;assert_eq!(restricted.environment_policy(),EnvironmentNetworkPolicy::from_config(&owner, /*managed_allowed_domains_only*/ false)@@ -320,6 +321,7 @@ fn environment_policy_replaces_soft_controller_allowlist_and_preserves_denials()assert_eq!(external_rootless.environment_policy(),EnvironmentNetworkPolicy {+ requires_proxy: true,managed_allowed_domains_only: true,..owner_policy.clone()}@@ -864,6 +866,7 @@ async fn environment_local_binding_preserves_explicit_denials_and_inherits_omittassert_eq!(composed.environment_policy(),EnvironmentNetworkPolicy {+ requires_proxy: true,allow_local_binding: Some(expected),..owner.clone()},diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rsindex 87092d755f..3473cd50d6 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs@@ -232,8 +232,9 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {SandboxOverride::NoOverride};let network_approval_spec = tool.network_approval_spec(req, tool_ctx);- // Offline owner attachments stay offline unless approved command permissions grant- // networking. Existing enabled controller proxies remain independently authoritative.+ // An explicit owner proxy requirement permits filtered egress, like an enabled+ // controller proxy. Traffic-only owner policies stay offline unless command+ // permissions grant networking.// Preserve this baseline even when escalation skips the execution proxy, so retained// terminals still record that their launch bypassed network restrictions.let managed_network_active = if owner_network_policy {@@ -243,6 +244,10 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {.network.as_ref().is_some_and(NetworkProxySpec::enabled)+ || sandbox_config+ .network_policy+ .as_ref()+ .is_some_and(|policy| policy.requires_proxy)|| (network_approval_spec.is_some()|| tool.sandbox_permissions(req)diff --git a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/network_approval.rs b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/network_approval.rsindex c98a511f46..4546185ed4 100644--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/network_approval.rs+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/network_approval.rs@@ -2520,6 +2520,10 @@ async fn owner_network_policy_follows_the_selected_remote_command() -> Result<()("USER_DENIED", true, Some(false)),] {let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {+ config+ .features+ .disable(Feature::NetworkProxy)+ .expect("test config should allow feature update");for feature in [Feature::UnifiedExec, Feature::ExecPermissionApprovals] {config.features@@ -2551,6 +2555,7 @@ async fn owner_network_policy_follows_the_selected_remote_command() -> Result<()});let test = builder.build_with_remote_and_local_env(&server).await?;assert!(!test.config.managed_network_requirements_enabled());+ assert!(!test.config.features.enabled(Feature::NetworkProxy));assert_eq!(test.session_configured.network_proxy.is_some(),configured_controller@@ -2593,6 +2598,8 @@ async fn owner_network_policy_follows_the_selected_remote_command() -> Result<()("DENIED", "owner-only.invalid", "HTTP/1.1 403"),("REVIEWED", "owner-only.invalid", "HTTP/1.1 502"),("OFFLINE", "owner-only.invalid", "ROOTLESS_OWNER_OFFLINE"),+ ("REQUIRED_ALLOWED", NETWORK_TEST_HOST, "HTTP/1.1 502"),+ ("REQUIRED_DENIED", "owner-only.invalid", "HTTP/1.1 403"),("GRANTED_DENIED", "owner-only.invalid", "HTTP/1.1 403"),("LOCAL_GRANTED",@@ -2623,12 +2630,14 @@ async fn owner_network_policy_follows_the_selected_remote_command() -> Result<()suffix,"ESCALATED" | "ESCALATION_DENIED" | "ESCALATED_DENY_READ");- let restricted = matches!(suffix, "OFFLINE" | "GRANTED_DENIED");+ let requires_proxy = matches!(suffix, "REQUIRED_ALLOWED" | "REQUIRED_DENIED");+ let restricted = requires_proxy || matches!(suffix, "OFFLINE" | "GRANTED_DENIED");if scenario != "ROOTLESS" && restricted {continue;}let marker = format!("{scenario}_OWNER_{suffix}");let mut proxy_config = NetworkProxyConfig {+ enabled: requires_proxy,allow_local_binding: match suffix {"LOCAL_DENIED" => Some(false),"LOCAL_OMITTED" => None,@@ -2689,11 +2698,28 @@ async fn owner_network_policy_follows_the_selected_remote_command() -> Result<()});remote.config = EnvironmentConfigState::Ready(owner_config);- // Restricted owners run offline until an approved grant enables their filtered proxy.+ // Traffic policy alone leaves restricted owners offline. Required proxies and+ // approved network grants activate the filtered route without a controller proxy.let command = if suffix == "OFFLINE" {format!("python3 -c \"import socket; sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); sock.connect(('198.51.100.1', 9))\" 2>/dev/null || printf {marker}")+ } else if requires_proxy {+ let direct_probe = r#"python3 - <<'PYTHON'+import errno, socket+sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)+try:+ sock.connect(('198.51.100.1', 9))+except OSError as error:+ assert error.errno in (errno.ENETUNREACH, errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM), error+ print('OWNER_DIRECT_NETWORK_BLOCKED')+else:+ raise AssertionError('direct network unexpectedly allowed')+PYTHON"#;+ format!(+ "{direct_probe}\n{}",+ remote_network_proxy_request_command(&marker)+ )} else if suffix == "ESCALATED_DENY_READ" {let read_probe = r#"python3 - <<'PYTHON'try:@@ -2721,6 +2747,7 @@ PYTHON"#;remote_network_proxy_request_command(&marker)};let mut args = network_exec_args(&command);+ args.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("shell");args["environment_id"] = json!(REMOTE_ENVIRONMENT_ID);if escalated {args["sandbox_permissions"] = json!("require_escalated");@@ -2818,6 +2845,9 @@ PYTHON"#;output.contains(expected),"unexpected network output for {marker}: {output}");+ if requires_proxy {+ assert!(output.contains("OWNER_DIRECT_NETWORK_BLOCKED"), "{output}");+ }if suffix == "ESCALATION_DENIED" {assert!(!output.contains(":unproxied"));} else if suffix == "ESCALATED_DENY_READ" {diff --git a/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/environment_policy.rs b/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/environment_policy.rsindex c1bfd97b27..d877f79d02 100644--- a/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/environment_policy.rs+++ b/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/environment_policy.rs@@ -5,13 +5,17 @@ use crate::NetworkUnixSocketPermissions;use serde::Deserialize;use serde::Serialize;-/// Traffic restrictions supplied by the owner of one execution environment.+/// Managed proxy requirements supplied by the owner of one execution environment.///-/// Proxy enablement, listeners, network mode, MITM, and credentials remain outside-/// attachment-owned traffic policy.+/// The owner can require proxy routing without granting direct network access.+/// Listeners, network mode, MITM, and credentials remain controller-owned.#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]pub struct EnvironmentNetworkPolicy {+ /// Requires managed proxy routing even when direct network access is restricted.+ /// False or omission leaves activation to the controller and command permissions.+ #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]+ pub requires_proxy: bool,pub domains: Option<NetworkDomainPermissions>,pub unix_sockets: Option<NetworkUnixSocketPermissions>,pub allow_upstream_proxy: bool,@@ -22,9 +26,10 @@ pub struct EnvironmentNetworkPolicy {}impl EnvironmentNetworkPolicy {- /// Captures portable traffic restrictions without exposing controller runtime settings.+ /// Captures proxy activation and traffic restrictions without controller runtime settings.pub fn from_config(config: &NetworkProxyConfig, managed_allowed_domains_only: bool) -> Self {Self {+ requires_proxy: config.enabled,domains: config.domains.clone(),unix_sockets: config.unix_sockets.clone(),allow_upstream_proxy: config.allow_upstream_proxy,