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0

Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal

Rust

Retire the untrusted approval policy (#39630)

jif942af8447b1d
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/precomputed/app-server-exports-stable.json.zst b/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/precomputed/app-server-exports-stable.json.zst
index 7b93fdf70a..b5554016a2 100644
Binary files a/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/precomputed/app-server-exports-stable.json.zst and b/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/precomputed/app-server-exports-stable.json.zst differ
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/src/config_manager_service.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/src/config_manager_service.rs
index a222d3d598..63b6ed7775 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/src/config_manager_service.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/src/config_manager_service.rs
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ use codex_core::path_utils;
use codex_core::path_utils::SymlinkWritePaths;
use codex_core::path_utils::resolve_symlink_write_paths;
use codex_core::path_utils::write_atomically;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use serde_json::Value as JsonValue;
use std::borrow::Cow;
@@ -734,8 +735,13 @@ fn toml_value_to_value(value: &TomlValue) -> anyhow::Result<toml_edit::Value> {
}
}
-fn validate_config(value: &TomlValue) -> Result<(), toml::de::Error> {
- let _: ConfigToml = value.clone().try_into()?;
+fn validate_config(value: &TomlValue) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+ let config: ConfigToml = value.clone().try_into()?;
+ if config.approval_policy == Some(AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted) {
+ anyhow::bail!(
+ "approval_policy = \"untrusted\" is no longer supported; remove this setting"
+ );
+ }
Ok(())
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/src/lib.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/src/lib.rs
index 26a8859c18..b0f5062389 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/src/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/src/lib.rs
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use codex_code_mode::WebSocketCodeModeSessionProvider;
use codex_config::LoaderOverrides;
use codex_config::NoopThreadConfigLoader;
use codex_core::config::Config;
+use codex_core::config::UnsupportedUntrustedApprovalPolicyError;
use codex_core::resolve_installation_id;
use codex_login::AuthManager;
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
@@ -504,11 +505,19 @@ pub async fn run_main_with_transport_options(
config.http_client_factory(),
);
}
+ Err(err)
+ if err.get_ref().is_some_and(
+ <dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync + 'static>::is::<
+ UnsupportedUntrustedApprovalPolicyError,
+ >,
+ ) =>
+ {
+ return Err(err);
+ }
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = %err, "Failed to preload config for cloud config bundle");
- // TODO: Decide whether bootstrap config preload failures should block startup.
// If this fails, we cannot install cloud/thread config loaders, so non-strict
- // startup may continue without managed cloud config.
+ // startup continues without managed cloud config.
}
};
let mut config_warnings = Vec::new();
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/lib.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/lib.rs
index ad6d99ae5c..538274ee54 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/lib.rs
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ pub use mock_model_server::create_mock_responses_server_sequence_unchecked;
pub use models_cache::write_models_cache;
pub use models_cache::write_models_cache_with_models;
pub use responses::create_apply_patch_sse_response;
+pub use responses::create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response;
pub use responses::create_exec_command_sse_response;
pub use responses::create_final_assistant_message_sse_response;
pub use responses::create_request_permissions_sse_response;
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/responses.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/responses.rs
index 586d1446c0..a862259b06 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/responses.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/responses.rs
@@ -22,6 +22,27 @@ pub fn create_shell_command_sse_response(
]))
}
+pub fn create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
+ command: Vec<String>,
+ workdir: Option<&Path>,
+ timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
+ call_id: &str,
+) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
+ let command_str = shlex::try_join(command.iter().map(String::as_str))?;
+ let tool_call_arguments = serde_json::to_string(&json!({
+ "command": command_str,
+ "workdir": workdir.map(|w| w.to_string_lossy()),
+ "timeout_ms": timeout_ms,
+ "sandbox_permissions": "require_escalated",
+ "justification": "Test approval request."
+ }))?;
+ Ok(responses::sse(vec![
+ responses::ev_response_created("resp-1"),
+ responses::ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &tool_call_arguments),
+ responses::ev_completed("resp-1"),
+ ]))
+}
+
pub fn create_final_assistant_message_sse_response(message: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
Ok(responses::sse(vec![
responses::ev_response_created("resp-1"),
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_resource.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_resource.rs
index fcbe5ed9ef..2ccc6ddbee 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_resource.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_resource.rs
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ async fn start_resource_test_app_server_with_extra_config(
) -> Result<(TempDir, TestAppServer)> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
MockResponsesConfig::new(responses_server_uri)
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.with_root_config(&format!(
"chatgpt_base_url = \"{apps_server_url}\"\nmcp_oauth_credentials_store = \"file\""
))
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_server_elicitation.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_server_elicitation.rs
index 8dfefccc11..51821100fb 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_server_elicitation.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/mcp_server_elicitation.rs
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ fn write_config_toml(
format!(
r#"
model = "mock-model"
-approval_policy = "untrusted"
+approval_policy = "on-request"
sandbox_mode = "read-only"
model_provider = "mock_provider"
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_permissions.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_permissions.rs
index 787989b6d8..93cb18cae7 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_permissions.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_permissions.rs
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ async fn request_permissions_round_trip() -> Result<()> {
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.enable_feature(Feature::RequestPermissionsTool)
.write(codex_home.path())?;
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_user_input.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_user_input.rs
index 8daa098a33..bd52ef2fcb 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_user_input.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/request_user_input.rs
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ async fn request_user_input_round_trip_for_mode(
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.write(codex_home.path())?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/review.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/review.rs
index 48af99641a..070e441563 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/review.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/review.rs
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ async fn review_start_exec_approval_item_id_matches_command_execution_item() ->
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
.with_provider_name("Mock provider")
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.disable_feature(Feature::ShellSnapshot)
.write(codex_home.path())?;
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_queue.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_queue.rs
index 97adbf789b..67291b0255 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_queue.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_queue.rs
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ use anyhow::Context;
use anyhow::Result;
use app_test_support::MockResponsesConfig;
use app_test_support::TestAppServer;
+use app_test_support::create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_final_assistant_message_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_mock_responses_server_sequence;
use app_test_support::create_mock_responses_server_sequence_unchecked;
-use app_test_support::create_shell_command_sse_response;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientInfo;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientRequest;
use codex_app_server_protocol::CommandExecutionApprovalDecision;
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ async fn queue_app(responses: Vec<String>) -> Result<(TestAppServer, TempDir, Mo
async fn queue_app_with_server(server: MockServer) -> Result<(TestAppServer, TempDir, MockServer)> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
let config = MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.with_root_config(r#"approvals_reviewer = "user""#);
config.write(codex_home.path())?;
let app = TestAppServer::builder()
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ fn blocked_turn_response() -> Result<String> {
"import time; time.sleep(10)".to_string(),
];
- create_shell_command_sse_response(
+ create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
shell_command,
/*workdir*/ None,
/*timeout_ms*/ Some(10_000),
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_shell_command.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_shell_command.rs
index 5d9ef748a7..891201d644 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_shell_command.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_shell_command.rs
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
use anyhow::Result;
use app_test_support::MockResponsesConfig;
use app_test_support::TestAppServer;
+use app_test_support::create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_final_assistant_message_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_mock_responses_server_sequence;
-use app_test_support::create_shell_command_sse_response;
use app_test_support::format_with_current_shell_display;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientRequest;
use codex_app_server_protocol::CommandExecutionApprovalDecision;
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ async fn thread_shell_command_uses_existing_active_turn() -> Result<()> {
std::fs::create_dir(&workspace)?;
let responses = vec![
- create_shell_command_sse_response(
+ create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
vec![
"python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ async fn thread_shell_command_uses_existing_active_turn() -> Result<()> {
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.write(&codex_home)?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_status.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_status.rs
index bf2db5c0f7..9c51958f97 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_status.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_status.rs
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ async fn thread_status_changed_emits_runtime_updates() -> Result<()> {
let responses = vec![create_final_assistant_message_sse_response("done")?];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.enable_feature(Feature::CollaborationModes)
.write(codex_home.path())?;
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ async fn thread_status_changed_can_be_opted_out() -> Result<()> {
let responses = vec![create_final_assistant_message_sse_response("done")?];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.enable_feature(Feature::CollaborationModes)
.write(codex_home.path())?;
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_interrupt.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_interrupt.rs
index 6caf01d203..4e3225e7a4 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_interrupt.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_interrupt.rs
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ async fn turn_interrupt_resolves_pending_command_approval_request() -> Result<()
)?])
.await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.with_root_config(r#"approvals_reviewer = "user""#)
.write(&codex_home)?;
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start.rs
index cd107bf668..52a05a5925 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start.rs
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use anyhow::Result;
use app_test_support::MockResponsesConfig;
use app_test_support::TestAppServer;
use app_test_support::create_apply_patch_sse_response;
+use app_test_support::create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_exec_command_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_final_assistant_message_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_mock_responses_server_repeating_assistant;
@@ -2253,7 +2254,7 @@ async fn turn_start_exec_approval_toggle_v2() -> Result<()> {
// Mock server: first turn requests a shell call (elicitation), then completes.
// Second turn same, but we'll set approval_policy=never to avoid elicitation.
let responses = vec![
- create_shell_command_sse_response(
+ create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
first_shell_command,
/*workdir*/ None,
Some(5000),
@@ -2273,9 +2274,9 @@ async fn turn_start_exec_approval_toggle_v2() -> Result<()> {
create_final_assistant_message_sse_response("done 2")?,
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
- // Default approval is untrusted to force elicitation on first turn.
+ // The first tool call explicitly requests escalation to force elicitation.
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.write(codex_home.as_path())?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
@@ -2467,7 +2468,7 @@ async fn run_turn_start_exec_approval_rejection_v2(
expected_approval_command.replace(bearer_token, "[REDACTED_SECRET]");
let responses = vec![
- create_shell_command_sse_response(
+ create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
shell_command,
/*workdir*/ None,
Some(5000),
@@ -2477,7 +2478,7 @@ async fn run_turn_start_exec_approval_rejection_v2(
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.write(codex_home.as_path())?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
@@ -2638,7 +2639,7 @@ async fn turn_start_explicit_local_environment_updates_legacy_cwd_between_turns(
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.write(&codex_home)?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
@@ -3077,7 +3078,8 @@ async fn turn_start_file_change_approval_v2() -> Result<()> {
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence_unchecked(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
+ .with_sandbox_mode("read-only")
// Snapshot startup is unrelated to the file-approval behavior under test.
.disable_feature(Feature::ShellSnapshot)
.write(&codex_home)?;
@@ -4048,7 +4050,8 @@ async fn turn_start_file_change_approval_accept_for_session_persists_v2() -> Res
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
+ .with_sandbox_mode("read-only")
.write(&codex_home)?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
@@ -4276,7 +4279,8 @@ async fn run_turn_start_file_change_approval_rejection_v2(
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
+ .with_sandbox_mode("read-only")
.write(&codex_home)?;
let mut mcp = TestAppServer::builder()
@@ -4568,7 +4572,7 @@ async fn command_execution_notifications_include_trusted_plugin_id() -> Result<(
];
let server = create_mock_responses_server_sequence(responses).await;
MockResponsesConfig::new(&server.uri())
- .with_approval_policy("untrusted")
+ .with_approval_policy("on-request")
.with_sandbox_mode("danger-full-access")
.enable_feature(Feature::Plugins)
.disable_feature(Feature::RemotePlugin)
@@ -4630,25 +4634,9 @@ async fn command_execution_notifications_include_trusted_plugin_id() -> Result<(
})
.await??;
if method == "item/started" {
- let server_req = timeout(
- DEFAULT_READ_TIMEOUT,
- mcp.read_stream_until_request_message(),
- )
- .await??;
- let ServerRequest::CommandExecutionRequestApproval { request_id, params } = server_req
- else {
- panic!("expected CommandExecutionRequestApproval request");
- };
- assert_eq!(params.item_id, "plugin-command");
- mcp.send_response(
- request_id,
- serde_json::to_value(CommandExecutionRequestApprovalResponse {
- decision: CommandExecutionApprovalDecision::Decline,
- })?,
- )
- .await?;
+ assert_eq!(status, CommandExecutionStatus::InProgress);
} else {
- assert_eq!(status, CommandExecutionStatus::Declined);
+ assert_eq!(status, CommandExecutionStatus::Completed);
}
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start_zsh_fork.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start_zsh_fork.rs
index 99c5951a23..f3f0aa2eb2 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start_zsh_fork.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start_zsh_fork.rs
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
use anyhow::Result;
use app_test_support::MockResponsesConfig;
use app_test_support::TestAppServer;
+use app_test_support::create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_final_assistant_message_sse_response;
use app_test_support::create_mock_responses_server_sequence;
use app_test_support::create_mock_responses_server_sequence_unchecked;
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ async fn turn_start_shell_zsh_fork_exec_approval_decline_v2() -> Result<()> {
eprintln!("using zsh path for zsh-fork test: {}", zsh_path.display());
let responses = vec![
- create_shell_command_sse_response(
+ create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
vec![
"python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ async fn turn_start_shell_zsh_fork_exec_approval_decline_v2() -> Result<()> {
create_config_toml(
&codex_home,
&server.uri(),
- "untrusted",
+ "on-request",
&BTreeMap::from([
(Feature::ShellZshFork, true),
(Feature::UnifiedExec, false),
@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ async fn turn_start_shell_zsh_fork_exec_approval_cancel_v2() -> Result<()> {
};
eprintln!("using zsh path for zsh-fork test: {}", zsh_path.display());
- let responses = vec![create_shell_command_sse_response(
+ let responses = vec![create_escalated_shell_command_sse_response(
vec![
"python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ async fn turn_start_shell_zsh_fork_exec_approval_cancel_v2() -> Result<()> {
create_config_toml(
&codex_home,
&server.uri(),
- "untrusted",
+ "on-request",
&BTreeMap::from([
(Feature::ShellZshFork, true),
(Feature::UnifiedExec, false),
@@ -491,7 +492,7 @@ async fn turn_start_shell_zsh_fork_subcommand_decline_marks_parent_declined_v2()
create_config_toml(
&codex_home,
&server.uri(),
- "untrusted",
+ "on-request",
&BTreeMap::from([
(Feature::ShellZshFork, true),
(Feature::UnifiedExec, false),
diff --git a/codex-rs/config/src/config_requirements.rs b/codex-rs/config/src/config_requirements.rs
index d7b7074489..0c9024841b 100644
--- a/codex-rs/config/src/config_requirements.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/config/src/config_requirements.rs
@@ -3214,22 +3214,16 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
#[test]
fn deserialize_allowed_approval_policies() -> Result<()> {
let toml_str = r#"
- allowed_approval_policies = ["untrusted", "on-request"]
+ allowed_approval_policies = ["on-request", "never"]
"#;
let config: ConfigRequirementsToml = from_str(toml_str)?;
let requirements: ConfigRequirements = with_unknown_source(config).try_into()?;
assert_eq!(
requirements.approval_policy.value(),
- AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
+ AskForApproval::OnRequest,
"currently, there is no way to specify the default value for approval policy in the toml, so it picks the first allowed value"
);
- assert!(
- requirements
- .approval_policy
- .can_set(&AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted)
- .is_ok()
- );
assert!(
requirements
.approval_policy
@@ -3237,11 +3231,13 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
.is_ok()
);
assert_eq!(
- requirements.approval_policy.can_set(&AskForApproval::Never),
+ requirements
+ .approval_policy
+ .can_set(&AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted),
Err(ConstraintError::InvalidValue {
field_name: "approval_policy",
- candidate: "Never".into(),
- allowed: "[UnlessTrusted, OnRequest]".into(),
+ candidate: "UnlessTrusted".into(),
+ allowed: "[OnRequest, Never]".into(),
requirement_source: RequirementSource::Unknown,
})
);
diff --git a/codex-rs/config/src/config_toml.rs b/codex-rs/config/src/config_toml.rs
index 08931f5474..ceff237fe8 100644
--- a/codex-rs/config/src/config_toml.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/config/src/config_toml.rs
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ pub struct ConfigToml {
pub model_auto_compact_token_limit_scope: Option<AutoCompactTokenLimitScope>,
/// Default approval policy for executing commands.
+ #[schemars(with = "Option<crate::schema::ConfigAskForApproval>")]
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
/// Configures who approval requests are routed to for review once they have
diff --git a/codex-rs/config/src/profile_toml.rs b/codex-rs/config/src/profile_toml.rs
index 7d13c02a41..076e19c364 100644
--- a/codex-rs/config/src/profile_toml.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/config/src/profile_toml.rs
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ pub struct ConfigProfile {
/// The key in the `model_providers` map identifying the
/// [`ModelProviderInfo`] to use.
pub model_provider: Option<String>,
+ #[schemars(with = "Option<crate::schema::ConfigAskForApproval>")]
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
pub approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
pub sandbox_mode: Option<SandboxMode>,
diff --git a/codex-rs/config/src/schema.rs b/codex-rs/config/src/schema.rs
index 3ef954b47b..bcebcbb759 100644
--- a/codex-rs/config/src/schema.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/config/src/schema.rs
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ use crate::config_toml::ConfigToml;
use crate::types::RawMcpServerConfig;
use codex_features::FEATURES;
use codex_features::legacy_feature_keys;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
+use schemars::JsonSchema;
use schemars::r#gen::SchemaGenerator;
use schemars::r#gen::SchemaSettings;
use schemars::schema::InstanceType;
@@ -14,6 +16,28 @@ use serde_json::Map;
use serde_json::Value;
use std::path::Path;
+/// Determines the conditions under which the user is consulted to approve
+/// running the command proposed by Codex.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+#[derive(JsonSchema)]
+#[schemars(rename = "AskForApproval")]
+#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
+pub(crate) enum ConfigAskForApproval {
+ /// The model decides when to ask the user for approval.
+ OnRequest,
+
+ /// Fine-grained controls for individual approval flows.
+ ///
+ /// When a field is `true`, commands in that category are allowed. When it
+ /// is `false`, those requests are automatically rejected instead of shown
+ /// to the user.
+ Granular(GranularApprovalConfig),
+
+ /// Never ask the user to approve commands. Failures are immediately returned
+ /// to the model, and never escalated to the user for approval.
+ Never,
+}
+
/// Schema for the `[features]` map with known + legacy keys only.
pub fn features_schema(schema_gen: &mut SchemaGenerator) -> Schema {
let mut object = SchemaObject {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/config.schema.json b/codex-rs/core/config.schema.json
index c806f53bcd..273f94e811 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/config.schema.json
+++ b/codex-rs/core/config.schema.json
@@ -255,13 +255,6 @@
"AskForApproval": {
"description": "Determines the conditions under which the user is consulted to approve running the command proposed by Codex.",
"oneOf": [
- {
- "description": "Under this policy, only \"known safe\" commands—as determined by `is_safe_command()`—that **only read files** are auto‑approved. Everything else will ask the user to approve.",
- "enum": [
- "untrusted"
- ],
- "type": "string"
- },
{
"description": "The model decides when to ask the user for approval.",
"enum": [
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs
index 48d2ea64b0..493b9ee48d 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs
@@ -9319,7 +9319,7 @@ async fn model_catalog_json_rejects_empty_catalog() -> std::io::Result<()> {
fn create_test_fixture() -> std::io::Result<PrecedenceTestFixture> {
let toml = r#"
model = "o3"
-approval_policy = "untrusted"
+approval_policy = "on-request"
[analytics]
enabled = true
@@ -10405,7 +10405,7 @@ async fn test_untrusted_project_gets_unless_trusted_approval_policy() -> anyhow:
)
.await?;
- // Verify that untrusted projects get UnlessTrusted approval policy
+ // Verify that untrusted projects get the internal always-prompt policy.
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.approval_policy.value(),
AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
@@ -10805,8 +10805,7 @@ trust_level = "untrusted"
}
#[tokio::test]
-async fn explicit_approval_policy_falls_back_when_disallowed_by_requirements() -> std::io::Result<()>
-{
+async fn explicit_untrusted_approval_policy_is_rejected() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
std::fs::write(
codex_home.path().join(CONFIG_TOML_FILE),
@@ -10814,19 +10813,17 @@ async fn explicit_approval_policy_falls_back_when_disallowed_by_requirements() -
"#,
)?;
- let config = ConfigBuilder::without_managed_config_for_tests()
+ let error = ConfigBuilder::without_managed_config_for_tests()
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.fallback_cwd(Some(codex_home.path().to_path_buf()))
- .cloud_config_bundle(
- CloudConfigBundleFixture::loader_with_enterprise_requirement(
- r#"allowed_approval_policies = ["on-request"]"#,
- ),
- )
.build()
- .await?;
- assert_eq!(
- config.permissions.approval_policy.value(),
- AskForApproval::OnRequest
+ .await
+ .expect_err("untrusted approval policy should be rejected");
+ assert!(
+ error
+ .to_string()
+ .contains("approval_policy = \"untrusted\" is no longer supported"),
+ "unexpected error: {error}"
);
Ok(())
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
index 7cfa392daf..fecce3bf4a 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
@@ -186,6 +186,11 @@ pub(crate) use resolved_permission_profile::PermissionProfileState;
const DEFAULT_IGNORE_LARGE_UNTRACKED_DIRS: i64 = 200;
const DEFAULT_IGNORE_LARGE_UNTRACKED_FILES: i64 = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
+/// Signals that a public config selected the retired `untrusted` approval policy.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[error("approval_policy = \"untrusted\" is no longer supported; remove this setting")]
+pub struct UnsupportedUntrustedApprovalPolicyError;
+
/// Compatibility-only config retained so legacy `ghost_snapshot` settings
/// continue to load even though snapshots are no longer produced.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -3554,6 +3559,12 @@ impl Config {
}
configured_network_proxy_config.enabled = true;
}
+ if cfg.approval_policy == Some(AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted) {
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+ ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+ UnsupportedUntrustedApprovalPolicyError,
+ ));
+ }
let approval_policy_was_explicit =
approval_policy_override.is_some() || cfg.approval_policy.is_some();
let mut approval_policy = approval_policy_override
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
index 9e327353fe..f24b062469 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_shell_command::is_dangerous_command::DangerousCommandMatch;
use codex_shell_command::is_dangerous_command::dangerous_command_match;
-use codex_shell_command::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::fs;
use tokio::sync::Semaphore;
@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ pub(crate) static BANNED_PREFIX_SUGGESTIONS: &[&[&str]] = &[
///
/// The command tokens may be the original argv or a shell-specific lowering of
/// a wrapper such as `bash -lc ...` or `powershell.exe -Command ...`. We only
-/// need to distinguish the PowerShell case because its safelist and dangerous
+/// need to distinguish the PowerShell case because its dangerous-command
/// heuristics operate on PowerShell-flavored inner command words rather than
/// the generic command classifier.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
@@ -740,17 +739,9 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
permission_profile,
windows_sandbox_level,
sandbox_permissions,
- command_origin,
+ command_origin: _,
} = context;
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
- let is_known_safe = match command_origin {
- ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic => is_known_safe_command(command),
- #[cfg(windows)]
- ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::PowerShell => {
- codex_shell_command::is_safe_command::is_safe_powershell_words(command)
- }
- };
-
// When the Windows sandbox backend is disabled, managed filesystem
// restrictions are only a policy shape; there is no platform sandbox to
// enforce the boundary. Keep that legacy case conservative while still
@@ -759,13 +750,6 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
&& windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled
&& profile_has_managed_filesystem_restrictions(permission_profile);
- if is_known_safe
- && (approval_policy == AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted
- || windows_managed_fs_restrictions_without_sandbox_backend)
- {
- return Decision::Allow;
- }
-
// If the command is flagged as dangerous or we have no sandbox protection,
// we should never allow it to run without approval.
//
@@ -789,8 +773,8 @@ pub(crate) fn render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
Decision::Allow
}
AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => {
- // We already checked the unmatched-command safelist and it
- // returned false, so we must prompt.
+ // Projects marked untrusted require approval for every command
+ // that is not explicitly allowed by an exec policy rule.
Decision::Prompt
}
AskForApproval::OnRequest => {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs
index 57820f1344..b07932eda1 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_windows_tests.rs
@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_parses_powershell_shell_wrapper() {
}
#[test]
-fn unmatched_safe_powershell_words_are_allowed() {
+fn unmatched_powershell_read_requires_approval_without_sandbox() {
let command = vec!["Get-Content".to_string(), "Cargo.toml".to_string()];
assert_eq!(
- Decision::Allow,
+ Decision::Prompt,
render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
&command,
UnmatchedCommandContext {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs
index 0138cda4ca..4233e5f94d 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ use crate::tools::context::ToolInvocation;
use crate::tools::context::ToolPayload;
use crate::tools::handlers::ExecCommandHandler;
use crate::tools::handlers::RequestPermissionsHandler;
-use crate::tools::handlers::ShellCommandHandler;
use crate::tools::registry::ToolExecutor;
use crate::tools::router::ToolCallSource;
use crate::turn_diff_tracker::TurnDiffTracker;
@@ -11301,111 +11300,6 @@ async fn sample_rollout(
)
}
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn rejects_escalated_permissions_when_policy_not_on_request() {
- use crate::exec_policy::ExecApprovalRequest;
- use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
- use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;
- use crate::turn_diff_tracker::TurnDiffTracker;
- use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
- use codex_tools::ShellCommandBackendConfig;
-
- let (session, mut turn_context_raw) = make_session_and_context().await;
- // Ensure policy is NOT OnRequest so the early rejection path triggers
- Arc::make_mut(&mut turn_context_raw.config)
- .permissions
- .approval_policy
- .set(AskForApproval::Never)
- .expect("test setup should allow updating approval policy");
- let session = Arc::new(session);
- let mut turn_context = Arc::new(turn_context_raw);
- let step_context = StepContext::for_test(Arc::clone(&turn_context));
-
- let command_script = "echo hi";
- let timeout_ms = 1000;
- let sandbox_permissions = SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated;
-
- let turn_diff_tracker = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(TurnDiffTracker::new()));
-
- let tool_name = "shell_command";
- let call_id = "test-call".to_string();
-
- let handler = ShellCommandHandler::from(ShellCommandBackendConfig::Classic);
- #[allow(deprecated)]
- let workdir = Some(turn_context.cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string());
- let resp = handler
- .handle(ToolInvocation {
- session: Arc::clone(&session),
- turn: Arc::clone(&turn_context),
- step_context,
- cancellation_token: CancellationToken::new(),
- tracker: Arc::clone(&turn_diff_tracker),
- call_id,
- tool_name: codex_tools::ToolName::plain(tool_name),
- source: crate::tools::context::ToolCallSource::Direct,
- payload: ToolPayload::Function {
- arguments: serde_json::json!({
- "command": command_script,
- "workdir": workdir,
- "timeout_ms": timeout_ms,
- "sandbox_permissions": sandbox_permissions,
- "justification": Some("test"),
- })
- .to_string(),
- },
- })
- .await;
-
- let Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(output)) = resp else {
- panic!("expected error result");
- };
-
- let expected = format!(
- "approval policy is {policy:?}; reject command — you should not ask for escalated permissions if the approval policy is {policy:?}",
- policy = turn_context.approval_policy()
- );
-
- pretty_assertions::assert_eq!(output, expected);
- pretty_assertions::assert_eq!(
- session
- .granted_turn_permissions(codex_exec_server::LOCAL_ENVIRONMENT_ID)
- .await,
- None
- );
-
- // The rejection should not poison the non-escalated path for the same
- // command. Force DangerFullAccess so this check stays focused on approval
- // policy rather than platform-specific sandbox behavior.
- let turn_context_mut = Arc::get_mut(&mut turn_context).expect("unique thread settings Arc");
- Arc::make_mut(&mut turn_context_mut.config)
- .permissions
- .set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::Disabled)
- .expect("test setup should allow updating permission profile");
-
- let command = session.user_shell().derive_exec_args(
- command_script,
- turn_context.config.permissions.allow_login_shell,
- );
- let exec_approval_requirement = session
- .services
- .exec_policy
- .create_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(ExecApprovalRequest {
- command: &command,
- approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy(),
- permission_profile: turn_context.permission_profile(),
- environment_policy: None,
- windows_sandbox_level: turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
- sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
- prefix_rule: None,
- allow_prefix_rules: turn_context.allow_prefix_rules(),
- })
- .await;
- assert!(matches!(
- exec_approval_requirement,
- ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip { .. }
- ));
-}
-
#[cfg(unix)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_tool_cancellation_waits_for_runtime_cleanup() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/shell_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/shell_tests.rs
index 7b7b238b23..4cf246a8b9 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/shell_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/shell_tests.rs
@@ -32,56 +32,10 @@ use crate::turn_diff_tracker::TurnDiffTracker;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EnvironmentConfig;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EnvironmentConfigState;
use codex_protocol::protocol::TurnEnvironmentSelection;
-use codex_shell_command::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
-use codex_shell_command::powershell::try_find_powershell_executable_blocking;
-use codex_shell_command::powershell::try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
use serde_json::json;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
-/// The logic for is_known_safe_command() has heuristics for known shells,
-/// so we must ensure the commands generated by [ShellCommandHandler] can be
-/// recognized as safe if the `command` is safe.
-#[test]
-fn commands_generated_by_shell_command_handler_can_be_matched_by_is_known_safe_command() {
- let bash_shell = Shell {
- shell_type: ShellType::Bash,
- shell_path: PathBuf::from("/bin/bash"),
- };
- assert_safe(&bash_shell, "ls -la");
-
- let zsh_shell = Shell {
- shell_type: ShellType::Zsh,
- shell_path: PathBuf::from("/bin/zsh"),
- };
- assert_safe(&zsh_shell, "ls -la");
-
- if let Some(path) = try_find_powershell_executable_blocking() {
- let powershell = Shell {
- shell_type: ShellType::PowerShell,
- shell_path: path.to_path_buf(),
- };
- assert_safe(&powershell, "ls -Name");
- }
-
- if let Some(path) = try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking() {
- let pwsh = Shell {
- shell_type: ShellType::PowerShell,
- shell_path: path.to_path_buf(),
- };
- assert_safe(&pwsh, "ls -Name");
- }
-}
-
-fn assert_safe(shell: &Shell, command: &str) {
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&shell.derive_exec_args(
- command, /* use_login_shell */ /*use_login_shell*/ true
- )));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&shell.derive_exec_args(
- command, /* use_login_shell */ /*use_login_shell*/ false
- )));
-}
-
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_command_handler_to_exec_params_uses_selected_environment() {
let (session, mut turn_context) = make_session_and_context().await;
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
index df5f1b4980..206020d53c 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ struct CoreShellActionProvider {
#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
enum DecisionSource {
PrefixRule,
- /// Often, this is `is_safe_command()`.
+ /// Derived from the unmatched-command sandbox fallback.
UnmatchedCommandFallback,
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
index 868fed1f5c..ec2b62375c 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
@@ -569,24 +569,24 @@ impl Expectation {
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
- "expected successful trusted command exit: {}",
+ "expected successful command exit: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(stdout_contains),
- "trusted command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
+ "command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode { stdout_contains } => {
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
- "expected no exit code for trusted command: {}",
+ "expected no exit code for command: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(stdout_contains),
- "trusted command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
+ "command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "trusted_command_unless_trusted_runs_without_prompt",
+ name: "simple_command_unless_trusted_requires_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -989,13 +989,16 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
- outcome: Outcome::Auto,
- expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
- stdout_contains: "trusted-unless",
+ outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
+ decision: ReviewDecision::denied("blocked in untrusted project"),
+ expected_reason: None,
+ },
+ expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
+ output_contains: "blocked in untrusted project",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "trusted_command_unless_trusted_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
+ name: "simple_command_unless_trusted_requires_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -1004,9 +1007,12 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
- outcome: Outcome::Auto,
- expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
- stdout_contains: "trusted-unless",
+ outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
+ decision: ReviewDecision::denied("blocked in untrusted project"),
+ expected_reason: None,
+ },
+ expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
+ output_contains: "blocked in untrusted project",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
@@ -1046,7 +1052,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "known_safe_escalation_on_request_requires_approval",
+ name: "simple_command_escalation_on_request_requires_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -1068,7 +1074,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "known_safe_escalation_granular_sandbox_disabled_rejects",
+ name: "simple_command_escalation_granular_sandbox_disabled_rejects",
approval_policy: Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: true,
@@ -1287,7 +1293,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "trusted_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt",
+ name: "simple_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -1302,7 +1308,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "trusted_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
+ name: "simple_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -1606,7 +1612,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "trusted_command_never_runs_without_prompt",
+ name: "simple_command_never_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -1732,7 +1738,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "unified exec on request no approval for safe command",
+ name: "unified exec on request no approval for simple command",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
@@ -1788,7 +1794,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "safe command with heredoc and redirect still requires approval",
+ name: "heredoc with redirect still requires approval",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
@@ -1975,7 +1981,7 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
- name: "quoted_shell_metacharacters_unless_trusted_run_without_prompt",
+ name: "quoted_shell_metacharacters_unless_trusted_require_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
@@ -1984,9 +1990,12 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
- outcome: Outcome::Auto,
- expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
- stdout_contains: "-g*.py -{delete,print}",
+ outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
+ decision: ReviewDecision::denied("blocked in untrusted project"),
+ expected_reason: None,
+ },
+ expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
+ output_contains: "blocked in untrusted project",
},
},
]
diff --git a/codex-rs/mcp-server/src/codex_tool_config.rs b/codex-rs/mcp-server/src/codex_tool_config.rs
index 531c8f8038..b9c8aa8505 100644
--- a/codex-rs/mcp-server/src/codex_tool_config.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/mcp-server/src/codex_tool_config.rs
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ pub struct CodexToolCallParam {
pub cwd: Option<String>,
/// Approval policy for shell commands generated by the model:
- /// `untrusted`, `on-request`, `never`.
+ /// `on-request`, `never`.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub approval_policy: Option<CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy>,
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ pub struct CodexToolCallParam {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, PartialEq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy {
- Untrusted,
OnRequest,
Never,
}
@@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ pub enum CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy {
impl From<CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy> for AskForApproval {
fn from(value: CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy) -> Self {
match value {
- CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy::Untrusted => AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy::OnRequest => AskForApproval::OnRequest,
CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy::Never => AskForApproval::Never,
}
@@ -299,9 +297,8 @@ mod tests {
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"approval-policy": {
- "description": "Approval policy for shell commands generated by the model: `untrusted`, `on-request`, `never`.",
+ "description": "Approval policy for shell commands generated by the model: `on-request`, `never`.",
"enum": [
- "untrusted",
"on-request",
"never"
],
diff --git a/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/responses.rs b/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/responses.rs
index 48a575a4c6..2b4d78ce18 100644
--- a/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/responses.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/responses.rs
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ pub fn create_shell_command_sse_response(
"command": command_str,
"workdir": workdir.map(|w| w.to_string_lossy()),
"timeout_ms": timeout_ms,
+ "sandbox_permissions": "require_escalated",
+ "justification": "Test approval request.",
}))?;
let response_id = format!("resp-{call_id}");
Ok(responses::sse(vec![
diff --git a/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/suite/codex_tool.rs b/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/suite/codex_tool.rs
index 0b430f3eb5..dcc6bf8b0c 100644
--- a/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/suite/codex_tool.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/suite/codex_tool.rs
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ fn create_expected_elicitation_request_params(
}
/// Test that patch approval triggers an elicitation request to the MCP and that
-/// sending the approval applies the patch, as expected.
+/// sending a denial leaves the patch unapplied, as expected.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() {
if env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR).is_ok() {
@@ -244,11 +244,14 @@ async fn patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
}
let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
- let test_file = cwd.path().join("destination_file.txt");
- std::fs::write(&test_file, "original content\n")?;
+ let test_file = Path::new("/").join(
+ cwd.path()
+ .file_name()
+ .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("temporary directory must have a file name"))?,
+ );
let patch_content = format!(
- "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: {}\n-original content\n+modified content\n*** End Patch",
+ "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: {}\n+new content\n*** End Patch",
test_file.as_path().to_string_lossy()
);
@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ async fn patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
dir: _dir,
} = create_mcp_process(vec![
create_apply_patch_sse_response(&patch_content, "call1234")?,
- create_final_assistant_message_sse_response("Patch has been applied successfully!")?,
+ create_final_assistant_message_sse_response("Patch was not applied.")?,
])
.await?;
@@ -267,11 +270,12 @@ async fn patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
.send_codex_tool_call(CodexToolCallParam {
cwd: Some(cwd.path().to_string_lossy().to_string()),
prompt: "please modify the test file".to_string(),
- // This test exercises patch approval elicitation, not local sandbox setup.
- config: Some(HashMap::from([(
- "sandbox_mode".to_string(),
- json!("danger-full-access"),
- )])),
+ // Use the user reviewer so this test exercises MCP elicitation even when auto-review
+ // is enabled by the surrounding environment.
+ config: Some(HashMap::from([
+ ("approvals_reviewer".to_string(), json!("user")),
+ ("features.guardian_approval".to_string(), json!(false)),
+ ])),
..Default::default()
})
.await?;
@@ -296,9 +300,8 @@ async fn patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let mut expected_changes = HashMap::new();
expected_changes.insert(
test_file.as_path().to_path_buf(),
- FileChange::Update {
- unified_diff: "@@ -1 +1 @@\n-original content\n+modified content\n".to_string(),
- move_path: None,
+ FileChange::Add {
+ content: "new content\n".to_string(),
},
);
@@ -314,12 +317,12 @@ async fn patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
)?)
);
- // Accept the patch approval request by responding to the elicitation
+ // Deny the patch approval request so this test does not require the Linux sandbox helper.
mcp_process
.send_response(
elicitation_request_id,
serde_json::to_value(PatchApprovalResponse {
- decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
+ decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by test"),
})?,
)
.await?;
@@ -337,21 +340,20 @@ async fn patch_approval_triggers_elicitation() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
result: json!({
"content": [
{
- "text": "Patch has been applied successfully!",
+ "text": "Patch was not applied.",
"type": "text"
}
],
"structuredContent": {
"threadId": params.thread_id,
- "content": "Patch has been applied successfully!"
+ "content": "Patch was not applied."
}
}),
},
codex_response
);
- let file_contents = std::fs::read_to_string(test_file.as_path())?;
- assert_eq!(file_contents, "modified content\n");
+ assert!(!test_file.exists());
Ok(())
}
@@ -644,8 +646,8 @@ async fn create_mcp_process(responses: Vec<String>) -> anyhow::Result<McpHandle>
}
/// Create a Codex config that uses the mock server as the model provider.
-/// It also uses `approval_policy = "untrusted"` so that we exercise the
-/// elicitation code path for shell commands.
+/// The shell command explicitly requests escalation so that we exercise the
+/// elicitation code path.
fn create_config_toml(codex_home: &Path, server_uri: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let config_toml = codex_home.join("config.toml");
std::fs::write(
@@ -653,7 +655,7 @@ fn create_config_toml(codex_home: &Path, server_uri: &str) -> std::io::Result<()
format!(
r#"
model = "mock-model"
-approval_policy = "untrusted"
+approval_policy = "on-request"
sandbox_policy = "workspace-write"
model_provider = "mock_provider"
diff --git a/codex-rs/memories/read/src/usage.rs b/codex-rs/memories/read/src/usage.rs
index 8691531483..cb9503efca 100644
--- a/codex-rs/memories/read/src/usage.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/memories/read/src/usage.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
use codex_protocol::parse_command::ParsedCommand;
-use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_script_into_commands;
-use codex_shell_command::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
use codex_shell_command::parse_command::parse_shell_script;
pub use crate::metrics::MEMORIES_USAGE_METRIC;
@@ -27,17 +25,15 @@ impl MemoriesUsageKind {
}
pub fn memories_usage_kinds_from_command(command: &str) -> Vec<MemoriesUsageKind> {
- let Some(commands) = parse_shell_script_into_commands(command) else {
- return Vec::new();
- };
- if !commands
+ let commands = parse_shell_script(command);
+ if commands
.iter()
- .all(|command| is_known_safe_command(command))
+ .any(|command| matches!(command, ParsedCommand::Unknown { .. }))
{
return Vec::new();
}
- parse_shell_script(command)
+ commands
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|command| match command {
ParsedCommand::Read { path, .. } => get_memory_kind(path.display().to_string()),
diff --git a/codex-rs/prompts/templates/permissions/approval_policy/unless_trusted.md b/codex-rs/prompts/templates/permissions/approval_policy/unless_trusted.md
index 039f702656..e997ef2839 100644
--- a/codex-rs/prompts/templates/permissions/approval_policy/unless_trusted.md
+++ b/codex-rs/prompts/templates/permissions/approval_policy/unless_trusted.md
@@ -1 +1 @@
- Approvals are your mechanism to get user consent to run shell commands without the sandbox. `approval_policy` is `unless-trusted`: The harness will escalate most commands for user approval, apart from a limited allowlist of safe "read" commands.
+ `approval_policy` is `unless-trusted`: The harness will require user approval before running commands unless an explicit exec policy rule allows them.
diff --git a/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs b/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
index 2cf3e39cd9..b2230b0aea 100644
--- a/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
@@ -914,9 +914,8 @@ impl Op {
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
#[strum(serialize_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum AskForApproval {
- /// Under this policy, only "known safe" commands—as determined by
- /// `is_safe_command()`—that **only read files** are auto‑approved.
- /// Everything else will ask the user to approve.
+ /// Internal policy for projects marked untrusted. Commands require
+ /// approval unless an explicit exec policy rule allows them.
#[serde(rename = "untrusted")]
#[strum(serialize = "untrusted")]
UnlessTrusted,
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs
index 5157a61f73..ddd5807bfc 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/bash.rs
@@ -315,7 +315,6 @@ fn parse_raw_string(node: Node, src: &str) -> Option<String> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
- use crate::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
fn parse_seq(src: &str) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
@@ -444,7 +443,6 @@ mod tests {
for flag in ["-c", "-lc"] {
let command = [shell, flag, script].map(str::to_owned);
assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&command), None, "{command:?}");
- assert!(!is_known_safe_command(&command), "{command:?}");
}
}
}
@@ -485,7 +483,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(parse_seq(script), None, "{script:?}");
for shell in ["bash", "zsh"] {
let command = [shell, "-lc", script].map(str::to_owned);
- assert!(!is_known_safe_command(&command), "{command:?}");
+ assert_eq!(parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&command), None, "{command:?}");
}
}
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_safe_command.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_safe_command.rs
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f24a6d21d..0000000000
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_safe_command.rs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,536 +0,0 @@
-use crate::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
-use crate::command_safety::is_dangerous_command::executable_name_lookup_key;
-#[cfg(windows)]
-use crate::command_safety::windows_safe_commands::is_safe_command_windows;
-#[cfg(windows)]
-use crate::command_safety::windows_safe_commands::is_safe_powershell_words as is_safe_powershell_words_windows;
-
-pub fn is_known_safe_command(command: &[String]) -> bool {
- let command: Vec<String> = command
- .iter()
- .map(|s| {
- if s == "zsh" {
- "bash".to_string()
- } else {
- s.clone()
- }
- })
- .collect();
-
- #[cfg(windows)]
- {
- if is_safe_command_windows(&command) {
- return true;
- }
- }
-
- if is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&command) {
- return true;
- }
-
- // Support `bash -lc "..."` where the script consists solely of one or
- // more "plain" commands (only bare words / quoted strings) combined with
- // a conservative allow‑list of shell operators that themselves do not
- // introduce side effects ( "&&", "||", ";", and "|" ). If every
- // individual command in the script is itself a known‑safe command, then
- // the composite expression is considered safe.
- if let Some(all_commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&command)
- && !all_commands.is_empty()
- && all_commands
- .iter()
- .all(|cmd| is_safe_to_call_with_exec(cmd))
- {
- return true;
- }
- false
-}
-
-/// Returns whether already-tokenized PowerShell words are read-only enough to
-/// be auto-approved by the Windows safelist.
-pub fn is_safe_powershell_words(command: &[String]) -> bool {
- #[cfg(windows)]
- {
- is_safe_powershell_words_windows(command)
- }
-
- #[cfg(not(windows))]
- {
- let _ = command;
- false
- }
-}
-
-fn is_safe_to_call_with_exec(command: &[String]) -> bool {
- let Some(cmd0) = command.first().map(String::as_str) else {
- return false;
- };
-
- match executable_name_lookup_key(cmd0).as_deref() {
- Some(cmd) if cfg!(target_os = "linux") && matches!(cmd, "numfmt" | "tac") => true,
-
- #[rustfmt::skip]
- Some(
- "cat" |
- "cd" |
- "cut" |
- "echo" |
- "expr" |
- "false" |
- "grep" |
- "head" |
- "id" |
- "ls" |
- "nl" |
- "paste" |
- "pwd" |
- "rev" |
- "seq" |
- "stat" |
- "tail" |
- "tr" |
- "true" |
- "uname" |
- "uniq" |
- "wc" |
- "which" |
- "whoami") => {
- true
- },
-
- Some("base64") => {
- const UNSAFE_BASE64_OPTIONS: &[&str] = &["-o", "--output"];
-
- !command.iter().skip(1).any(|arg| {
- UNSAFE_BASE64_OPTIONS.contains(&arg.as_str())
- || arg.starts_with("--output=")
- || (arg.starts_with("-o") && arg != "-o")
- })
- }
-
- Some("find") => {
- // Certain options to `find` can delete files, write to files, or
- // execute arbitrary commands, so we cannot auto-approve the
- // invocation of `find` in such cases.
- #[rustfmt::skip]
- const UNSAFE_FIND_OPTIONS: &[&str] = &[
- // Options that can execute arbitrary commands.
- "-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir",
- // Option that deletes matching files.
- "-delete",
- // Options that write pathnames to a file.
- "-fls", "-fprint", "-fprint0", "-fprintf",
- ];
-
- !command
- .iter()
- .any(|arg| UNSAFE_FIND_OPTIONS.contains(&arg.as_str()))
- }
-
- // Ripgrep
- Some("rg") => {
- const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS: &[&str] = &[
- // Takes an arbitrary command that is executed for each match.
- "--pre",
- // Takes a command that can be used to obtain the local hostname.
- "--hostname-bin",
- ];
- const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS: &[&str] = &[
- // Calls out to other decompression tools, so do not auto-approve
- // out of an abundance of caution.
- "--search-zip",
- "-z",
- ];
-
- !command.iter().any(|arg| {
- UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS.contains(&arg.as_str())
- || UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS
- .iter()
- .any(|&opt| arg == opt || arg.starts_with(&format!("{opt}=")))
- })
- }
-
- // Repository configuration can make even read-only Git commands execute helpers.
- Some("git") => false,
-
- // Special-case `sed -n {N|M,N}p`
- Some("sed")
- if {
- command.len() <= 4
- && command.get(1).map(String::as_str) == Some("-n")
- && is_valid_sed_n_arg(command.get(2).map(String::as_str))
- } =>
- {
- true
- }
-
- // ── anything else ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
- _ => false,
- }
-}
-
-// (bash parsing helpers implemented in crate::bash)
-
-/* ----------------------------------------------------------
-Example
----------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/// Returns true if `arg` matches /^(\d+,)?\d+p$/
-fn is_valid_sed_n_arg(arg: Option<&str>) -> bool {
- // unwrap or bail
- let s = match arg {
- Some(s) => s,
- None => return false,
- };
-
- // must end with 'p', strip it
- let core = match s.strip_suffix('p') {
- Some(rest) => rest,
- None => return false,
- };
-
- // split on ',' and ensure 1 or 2 numeric parts
- let parts: Vec<&str> = core.split(',').collect();
- match parts.as_slice() {
- // single number, e.g. "10"
- [num] => !num.is_empty() && num.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()),
-
- // two numbers, e.g. "1,5"
- [a, b] => {
- !a.is_empty()
- && !b.is_empty()
- && a.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
- && b.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
- }
-
- // anything else (more than one comma) is invalid
- _ => false,
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use super::*;
- use std::string::ToString;
-
- fn vec_str(args: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
- args.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect()
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn known_safe_examples() {
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["ls"])));
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["base64"])));
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
- "sed", "-n", "1,5p", "file.txt"
- ])));
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
- "nl",
- "-nrz",
- "Cargo.toml"
- ])));
-
- // Safe `find` command (no unsafe options).
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
- "find", ".", "-name", "file.txt"
- ])));
-
- if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["numfmt", "1000"])));
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["tac", "Cargo.toml"])));
- } else {
- assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["numfmt", "1000"])));
- assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["tac", "Cargo.toml"])));
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn git_commands_are_not_known_safe() {
- for args in [
- vec_str(&["git", "status", "--short"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "log", "-p", "-1"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "diff"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "show", "HEAD"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "branch"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "branch", "--show-current"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "--version"]),
- vec_str(&["/usr/bin/git", "status"]),
- vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "git status"]),
- vec_str(&["zsh", "-lc", "cd nested && git status"]),
- vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "git diff | head -20"]),
- ] {
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&args),
- "Git must not be trusted from its arguments alone: {args:?}",
- );
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn cargo_check_is_not_safe() {
- assert!(!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["cargo", "check"])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn zsh_lc_safe_command_sequence() {
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["zsh", "-lc", "ls"])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn unknown_or_partial() {
- assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["foo"])));
- assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["git", "fetch"])));
- assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
- "sed", "-n", "xp", "file.txt"
- ])));
-
- // Unsafe `find` commands.
- for args in [
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-name", "file.txt", "-exec", "rm", "{}", ";"]),
- vec_str(&[
- "find", ".", "-name", "*.py", "-execdir", "python3", "{}", ";",
- ]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-name", "file.txt", "-ok", "rm", "{}", ";"]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-name", "*.py", "-okdir", "python3", "{}", ";"]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-delete", "-name", "file.txt"]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fls", "/etc/passwd"]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fprint", "/etc/passwd"]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fprint0", "/etc/passwd"]),
- vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fprintf", "/root/suid.txt", "%#m %u %p\n"]),
- ] {
- assert!(
- !is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
- "expected {args:?} to be unsafe"
- );
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn base64_output_options_are_unsafe() {
- for args in [
- vec_str(&["base64", "-o", "out.bin"]),
- vec_str(&["base64", "--output", "out.bin"]),
- vec_str(&["base64", "--output=out.bin"]),
- vec_str(&["base64", "-ob64.txt"]),
- ] {
- assert!(
- !is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
- "expected {args:?} to be considered unsafe due to output option"
- );
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn ripgrep_rules() {
- // Safe ripgrep invocations – none of the unsafe flags are present.
- assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
- "rg",
- "Cargo.toml",
- "-n"
- ])));
-
- // Unsafe flags that do not take an argument (present verbatim).
- for args in [
- vec_str(&["rg", "--search-zip", "files"]),
- vec_str(&["rg", "-z", "files"]),
- ] {
- assert!(
- !is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
- "expected {args:?} to be considered unsafe due to zip-search flag",
- );
- }
-
- // Unsafe flags that expect a value, provided in both split and = forms.
- for args in [
- vec_str(&["rg", "--pre", "pwned", "files"]),
- vec_str(&["rg", "--pre=pwned", "files"]),
- vec_str(&["rg", "--hostname-bin", "pwned", "files"]),
- vec_str(&["rg", "--hostname-bin=pwned", "files"]),
- ] {
- assert!(
- !is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
- "expected {args:?} to be considered unsafe due to external-command flag",
- );
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn windows_powershell_full_path_is_safe() {
- if !cfg!(windows) {
- // Windows only because on Linux path splitting doesn't handle `/` separators properly
- return;
- }
-
- let Some(powershell) = crate::powershell::try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking()
- .or_else(crate::powershell::try_find_powershell_executable_blocking)
- else {
- return;
- };
- let powershell = powershell.as_path().to_str().unwrap();
-
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- powershell,
- "-Command",
- "Get-Location",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn windows_git_full_path_is_not_safe() {
- if !cfg!(windows) {
- return;
- }
-
- assert!(!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- r"C:\Program Files\Git\cmd\git.exe",
- "status",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn bash_lc_safe_examples() {
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls"])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls -1"])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "grep -R \"Cargo.toml\" -n"
- ])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "sed -n 1,5p file.txt"
- ])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "sed -n '1,5p' file.txt"
- ])));
-
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "find . -name file.txt"
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn bash_lc_safe_examples_with_operators() {
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "grep -R \"Cargo.toml\" -n || true"
- ])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "ls && pwd"
- ])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "echo 'hi' ; ls"
- ])));
- assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
- "bash",
- "-lc",
- "ls | wc -l"
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn bash_lc_unsafe_examples() {
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "git", "status"])),
- "Four arg version is not known to be safe."
- );
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "'git status'"])),
- "The extra quoting around 'git status' makes it a program named 'git status' and is therefore unsafe."
- );
-
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "find . -name file.txt -delete"])),
- "Unsafe find option should not be auto-approved."
- );
-
- // Disallowed because of unsafe command in sequence.
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls && rm -rf /"])),
- "Sequence containing unsafe command must be rejected"
- );
-
- // Disallowed because of parentheses / subshell.
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "(ls)"])),
- "Parentheses (subshell) are not provably safe with the current parser"
- );
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls || (pwd && echo hi)"])),
- "Nested parentheses are not provably safe with the current parser"
- );
-
- // Disallowed redirection.
- assert!(
- !is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls > out.txt"])),
- "> redirection should be rejected"
- );
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn direct_powershell_words_use_windows_safelist() {
- let command = vec_str(&["Get-Content", "Cargo.toml"]);
-
- if cfg!(windows) {
- assert!(is_safe_powershell_words(&command));
- } else {
- assert!(!is_safe_powershell_words(&command));
- }
- }
-
- #[cfg(unix)]
- #[test]
- fn non_windows_safe_classification_does_not_spawn_repo_powershell_path() {
- use std::fs;
- use std::io::Write;
- use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
- use std::time::SystemTime;
- use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;
-
- let unique = SystemTime::now()
- .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
- .expect("system clock should be after unix epoch")
- .as_nanos();
- let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
- "codex-safe-command-pwsh-test-{}-{unique}",
- std::process::id()
- ));
- fs::create_dir(&temp_dir).expect("create temp dir for fake pwsh");
- let fake_pwsh = temp_dir.join("pwsh");
- let marker = temp_dir.join("marker");
- let quoted_marker = marker.to_string_lossy().replace('\'', "'\\''");
-
- let mut script = fs::File::create(&fake_pwsh).expect("create fake pwsh");
- writeln!(
- script,
- "#!/bin/sh\nprintf spawned > '{quoted_marker}'\nexit 0"
- )
- .expect("write fake pwsh");
- let mut permissions = fs::metadata(&fake_pwsh)
- .expect("stat fake pwsh")
- .permissions();
- permissions.set_mode(0o755);
- fs::set_permissions(&fake_pwsh, permissions).expect("make fake pwsh executable");
-
- assert!(!is_known_safe_command(&[
- fake_pwsh.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
- "-Command".to_string(),
- "Get-ChildItem".to_string(),
- ]));
- assert!(
- !marker.exists(),
- "non-Windows safety classification must not spawn a PowerShell-looking path"
- );
-
- fs::remove_dir_all(temp_dir).expect("remove temp dir");
- }
-}
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/mod.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/mod.rs
index 3225841e08..44d0103a9d 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/mod.rs
@@ -6,7 +6,4 @@ mod powershell_parser;
mod powershell_tree_sitter;
pub mod is_dangerous_command;
-pub mod is_safe_command;
-#[cfg(windows)]
-pub(crate) mod windows_safe_commands;
pub(crate) use powershell_tree_sitter::try_parse_powershell_commands;
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs
deleted file mode 100644
index 3395108d23..0000000000
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,503 +0,0 @@
-use crate::command_safety::try_parse_powershell_commands;
-use std::path::Path;
-
-/// On Windows, we conservatively allow only clearly read-only PowerShell invocations
-/// that match a small safelist. Anything else (including direct CMD commands) is unsafe.
-pub fn is_safe_command_windows(command: &[String]) -> bool {
- if let Some(commands) = try_parse_powershell_command_sequence(command) {
- commands
- .iter()
- .all(|cmd| is_safe_powershell_words(cmd.as_slice()))
- } else {
- // Only PowerShell invocations are allowed on Windows for now; anything else is unsafe.
- false
- }
-}
-
-/// Returns each command sequence if the invocation starts with a PowerShell binary.
-/// For example, the tokens from `pwsh Get-ChildItem | Measure-Object` become two sequences.
-fn try_parse_powershell_command_sequence(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
- let (exe, rest) = command.split_first()?;
- if is_powershell_executable(exe) {
- parse_powershell_invocation(exe, rest)
- } else {
- None
- }
-}
-
-/// Parses a PowerShell invocation into discrete command vectors, rejecting unsafe patterns.
-fn parse_powershell_invocation(executable: &str, args: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
- if args.is_empty() {
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh" and "powershell.exe" with no additional arguments.
- return None;
- }
-
- let mut idx = 0;
- while idx < args.len() {
- let arg = &args[idx];
- let lower = arg.to_ascii_lowercase();
- match lower.as_str() {
- "-command" | "/command" | "-c" => {
- let script = args.get(idx + 1)?;
- if idx + 2 != args.len() {
- // Reject if there is more than one token representing the actual command.
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command foo bar" and "powershell -c ls extra".
- return None;
- }
- return parse_powershell_script(executable, script);
- }
- _ if lower.starts_with("-command:") || lower.starts_with("/command:") => {
- if idx + 1 != args.len() {
- // Reject if there are more tokens after the command itself.
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command:dir C:\\" and "powershell /Command:dir C:\\" with trailing args.
- return None;
- }
- let script = arg.split_once(':')?.1;
- return parse_powershell_script(executable, script);
- }
-
- // Benign, no-arg flags we tolerate.
- "-nologo" | "-noprofile" | "-noninteractive" | "-mta" | "-sta" => {
- idx += 1;
- continue;
- }
-
- // Explicitly forbidden/opaque or unnecessary for read-only operations.
- "-encodedcommand" | "-ec" | "-file" | "/file" | "-windowstyle" | "-executionpolicy"
- | "-workingdirectory" => {
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -EncodedCommand ..." and "powershell -File script.ps1".
- return None;
- }
-
- // Unknown switch → bail conservatively.
- _ if lower.starts_with('-') => {
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -UnknownFlag" and "powershell -foo bar".
- return None;
- }
-
- // If we hit non-flag tokens, treat the remainder as a command sequence.
- // This happens if powershell is invoked without -Command, e.g.
- // ["pwsh", "-NoLogo", "git", "-c", "core.pager=cat", "status"]
- _ => {
- let script = join_arguments_as_script(&args[idx..]);
- return parse_powershell_script(executable, &script);
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh" and "powershell.exe -NoLogo" without a script.
- None
-}
-
-/// Tokenizes an inline PowerShell script and delegates to the command splitter.
-/// Examples of when this is called: pwsh.exe -Command '<script>' or pwsh.exe -Command:<script>
-fn parse_powershell_script(_executable: &str, script: &str) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
- try_parse_powershell_commands(script)
-}
-
-/// Returns true when the executable name is one of the supported PowerShell binaries.
-fn is_powershell_executable(exe: &str) -> bool {
- let executable_name = Path::new(exe)
- .file_name()
- .and_then(|osstr| osstr.to_str())
- .unwrap_or(exe)
- .to_ascii_lowercase();
-
- matches!(
- executable_name.as_str(),
- "powershell" | "powershell.exe" | "pwsh" | "pwsh.exe"
- )
-}
-
-fn join_arguments_as_script(args: &[String]) -> String {
- let mut words = Vec::with_capacity(args.len());
- if let Some((first, rest)) = args.split_first() {
- words.push(first.clone());
- for arg in rest {
- words.push(quote_argument(arg));
- }
- }
- words.join(" ")
-}
-
-fn quote_argument(arg: &str) -> String {
- if arg.is_empty() {
- return "''".to_string();
- }
-
- if arg.chars().all(|ch| !ch.is_whitespace()) {
- return arg.to_string();
- }
-
- format!("'{}'", arg.replace('\'', "''"))
-}
-
-/// Validates that a parsed PowerShell command stays within our read-only safelist.
-/// Everything before this is parsing, and rejecting things that make us feel uncomfortable.
-pub(crate) fn is_safe_powershell_words(words: &[String]) -> bool {
- if words.is_empty() {
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command ''" and "pwsh -Command \"\"".
- return false;
- }
-
- // Reject nested unsafe cmdlets inside parentheses or arguments
- for w in words.iter() {
- let inner = w
- .trim_matches(|c| c == '(' || c == ')')
- .trim_start_matches('-')
- .to_ascii_lowercase();
- if matches!(
- inner.as_str(),
- "set-content"
- | "add-content"
- | "out-file"
- | "new-item"
- | "remove-item"
- | "move-item"
- | "copy-item"
- | "rename-item"
- | "start-process"
- | "stop-process"
- ) {
- // Examples rejected here: "Write-Output (Set-Content foo6.txt 'abc')" and "Get-Content (New-Item bar.txt)".
- return false;
- }
- }
-
- let command = words[0]
- .trim_matches(|c| c == '(' || c == ')')
- .trim_start_matches('-')
- .to_ascii_lowercase();
- match command.as_str() {
- "echo" | "write-output" | "write-host" => true, // (no redirection allowed)
- "dir" | "ls" | "get-childitem" | "gci" => true,
- "cat" | "type" | "gc" | "get-content" => true,
- "select-string" | "sls" | "findstr" => true,
- "measure-object" | "measure" => true,
- "get-location" | "gl" | "pwd" => true,
- "test-path" | "tp" => true,
- "resolve-path" | "rvpa" => true,
- "select-object" | "select" => true,
- "get-item" => true,
-
- // Repository configuration can make even read-only Git commands execute helpers.
- "git" => false,
-
- "rg" => is_safe_ripgrep(words),
-
- // Extra safety: explicitly prohibit common side-effecting cmdlets regardless of args.
- "set-content" | "add-content" | "out-file" | "new-item" | "remove-item" | "move-item"
- | "copy-item" | "rename-item" | "start-process" | "stop-process" => {
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'Set-Content notes.txt data'" and "pwsh -Command 'Remove-Item temp.log'".
- false
- }
-
- _ => {
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'Invoke-WebRequest https://example.com'" and "pwsh -Command 'Start-Service Spooler'".
- false
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Checks that an `rg` invocation avoids options that can spawn arbitrary executables.
-fn is_safe_ripgrep(words: &[String]) -> bool {
- const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS: &[&str] = &["--pre", "--hostname-bin"];
- const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS: &[&str] = &["--search-zip", "-z"];
-
- !words.iter().skip(1).any(|arg| {
- let arg_lc = arg.to_ascii_lowercase();
- // Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'rg --pre cat pattern'" and "pwsh -Command 'rg --search-zip pattern'".
- UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS.contains(&arg_lc.as_str())
- || UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS
- .iter()
- .any(|opt| arg_lc == *opt || arg_lc.starts_with(&format!("{opt}=")))
- })
-}
-
-#[cfg(all(test, windows))]
-mod tests {
- use super::*;
- use crate::powershell::try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking;
- use std::string::ToString;
-
- /// Converts a slice of string literals into owned `String`s for the tests.
- fn vec_str(args: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
- args.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect()
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn recognizes_safe_powershell_wrappers() {
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoLogo",
- "-Command",
- "Get-ChildItem -Path .",
- ])));
-
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "Get-Content",
- "Cargo.toml",
- ])));
-
- // pwsh parity
- if let Some(pwsh) = try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking() {
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&[
- pwsh.as_path().to_str().unwrap().into(),
- "-NoProfile".to_string(),
- "-Command".to_string(),
- "Get-ChildItem".to_string(),
- ]));
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn accepts_full_path_powershell_invocations() {
- if !cfg!(windows) {
- // Windows only because on Linux path splitting doesn't handle `/` separators properly
- return;
- }
-
- if let Some(pwsh) = try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking() {
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&[
- pwsh.as_path().to_str().unwrap().into(),
- "-NoProfile".to_string(),
- "-Command".to_string(),
- "Get-ChildItem -Path .".to_string(),
- ]));
- }
-
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- r"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-Content Cargo.toml",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn allows_read_only_pipelines() {
- let Some(pwsh) = try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking() else {
- return;
- };
-
- let pwsh: String = pwsh.as_path().to_str().unwrap().into();
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&[
- pwsh.clone(),
- "-NoLogo".to_string(),
- "-NoProfile".to_string(),
- "-Command".to_string(),
- "rg --files-with-matches foo | Measure-Object | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Count"
- .to_string()
- ]));
-
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&[
- pwsh.clone(),
- "-NoLogo".to_string(),
- "-NoProfile".to_string(),
- "-Command".to_string(),
- "Get-Content foo.rs | Select-Object -Skip 200".to_string()
- ]));
-
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&[
- pwsh,
- "-Command".to_string(),
- "Get-Item foo.rs | Select-Object Length".to_string()
- ]));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_git_commands() {
- for args in [
- vec_str(&["git", "status", "--short"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "log", "-p", "-1"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "diff"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "branch", "--show-current"]),
- vec_str(&["git", "--version"]),
- ] {
- assert!(!is_safe_powershell_words(&args));
- let script = args.join(" ");
- assert!(
- !is_safe_command_windows(&[
- "powershell.exe".to_string(),
- "-NoProfile".to_string(),
- "-Command".to_string(),
- script.clone(),
- ]),
- "Git must not be trusted from its arguments alone: {script:?}",
- );
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_stop_parsing_forms() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoProfile",
- "-Command",
- "rg --% pattern Cargo.toml",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_powershell_param_blocks() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoProfile",
- "-Command",
- "param([string]$path = (Get-Location)) Write-Output test",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_powershell_named_blocks() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoProfile",
- "-Command",
- "begin { Set-Content codex_poc.txt pwned } end { Get-Content Cargo.toml }",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_powershell_using_statements() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoProfile",
- "-Command",
- "using module ./codex_poc.psm1\nGet-Content Cargo.toml",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_powershell_trap_blocks() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoProfile",
- "-Command",
- "trap { Set-Content codex_poc.txt pwned; continue } Get-Content missing -ErrorAction Stop",
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_powershell_commands_with_side_effects() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoLogo",
- "-Command",
- "Remove-Item foo.txt",
- ])));
-
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-NoProfile",
- "-Command",
- "rg --pre cat",
- ])));
-
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Set-Content foo.txt 'hello'",
- ])));
-
- // Redirections are blocked
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "echo hi > out.txt",
- ])));
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-Content x | Out-File y",
- ])));
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Write-Output foo 2> err.txt",
- ])));
-
- // Call operator is blocked
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "& Remove-Item foo",
- ])));
-
- // Chained safe + unsafe must fail
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-ChildItem; Remove-Item foo",
- ])));
- // Nested unsafe cmdlet inside safe command must fail
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Write-Output (Set-Content foo6.txt 'abc')",
- ])));
- // Additional nested unsafe cmdlet examples must fail
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Write-Host (Remove-Item foo.txt)",
- ])));
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-Content (New-Item bar.txt)",
- ])));
-
- // Unsafe @ expansion.
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "ls @(calc.exe)"
- ])));
-
- // Sub-expressions are rejected even if they contain otherwise safe commands.
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Write-Output $(Get-Content foo)"
- ])));
-
- // Empty words from the parser (e.g. '') are rejected.
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "''"
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn accepts_constant_expression_arguments() {
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-Content 'foo bar'"
- ])));
-
- assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-Content \"foo bar\""
- ])));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn rejects_dynamic_arguments() {
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Get-Content $foo"
- ])));
-
- assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
- "powershell.exe",
- "-Command",
- "Write-Output \"foo $bar\""
- ])));
- }
-}
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs
index ec4523ac70..898965e937 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs
@@ -9,4 +9,3 @@ pub mod parse_command;
pub mod powershell;
pub use command_safety::is_dangerous_command;
-pub use command_safety::is_safe_command;
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/parse_command.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/parse_command.rs
index e91fa3c472..180e1c23c1 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/parse_command.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/parse_command.rs
@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@ fn is_valid_sed_n_arg(arg: Option<&str>) -> bool {
fn sed_read_path(args: &[String]) -> Option<String> {
let args_no_connector = trim_at_connector(args);
- if !args_no_connector.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-n") {
+ if has_in_place_flag(&args_no_connector) || !args_no_connector.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-n") {
return None;
}
let mut has_range_script = false;
@@ -2200,16 +2200,20 @@ fn xargs_is_mutating_subcommand(tokens: &[String]) -> bool {
return false;
};
match head.as_str() {
- "perl" | "ruby" => xargs_has_in_place_flag(tail),
- "sed" => xargs_has_in_place_flag(tail) || tail.iter().any(|token| token == "--in-place"),
+ "perl" | "ruby" | "sed" => has_in_place_flag(tail),
"rg" => tail.iter().any(|token| token == "--replace"),
_ => false,
}
}
-fn xargs_has_in_place_flag(tokens: &[String]) -> bool {
+fn has_in_place_flag(tokens: &[String]) -> bool {
tokens.iter().any(|token| {
- token == "-i" || token.starts_with("-i") || token == "-pi" || token.starts_with("-pi")
+ token == "-i"
+ || token.starts_with("-i")
+ || token == "-pi"
+ || token.starts_with("-pi")
+ || token == "--in-place"
+ || token.starts_with("--in-place=")
})
}
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/powershell.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/powershell.rs
index d1d0ed8775..0b668eb494 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/powershell.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/powershell.rs
@@ -72,9 +72,8 @@ pub fn extract_powershell_command(command: &[String]) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
/// Parse the script body from a top-level PowerShell wrapper into argv-like commands.
///
-/// This is intentionally narrower than the Windows safe-command parser: it only unwraps the
-/// `-Command`/`-c` body from a PowerShell invocation we already recognize, then lowers the
-/// script in-process.
+/// This only unwraps the `-Command`/`-c` body from a PowerShell invocation we
+/// already recognize, then lowers the script in-process.
pub fn parse_powershell_command_into_plain_commands(
command: &[String],
) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
diff --git a/codex-rs/utils/cli/src/approval_mode_cli_arg.rs b/codex-rs/utils/cli/src/approval_mode_cli_arg.rs
index 255ff6ea59..8349deffd2 100644
--- a/codex-rs/utils/cli/src/approval_mode_cli_arg.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/utils/cli/src/approval_mode_cli_arg.rs
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, ValueEnum)]
#[value(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum ApprovalModeCliArg {
- /// Only run "trusted" commands (e.g. ls, cat, sed) without asking for user
- /// approval. Will escalate to the user if the model proposes a command that
- /// is not in the "trusted" set.
- Untrusted,
-
/// The model decides when to ask the user for approval.
OnRequest,
@@ -23,7 +18,6 @@ pub enum ApprovalModeCliArg {
impl From<ApprovalModeCliArg> for AskForApproval {
fn from(value: ApprovalModeCliArg) -> Self {
match value {
- ApprovalModeCliArg::Untrusted => AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
ApprovalModeCliArg::OnRequest => AskForApproval::OnRequest,
ApprovalModeCliArg::Never => AskForApproval::Never,
}