Skip to content

armgit / codex

Public Imported from GitHub
0

Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal

Rust

Avoid materializing writable-root carveouts for presence checks (#39812)

chess969efa547085
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/safety.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/safety.rs
index 2e5441a078..7c93938c71 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/safety.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/safety.rs
@@ -102,11 +102,9 @@ fn patch_rejection_reason(
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &PathUri,
) -> &'static str {
- let has_no_writable_roots = cwd.to_abs_path().is_ok_and(|cwd| {
- file_system_sandbox_policy
- .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
- .is_empty()
- });
+ let has_no_writable_roots = cwd
+ .to_abs_path()
+ .is_ok_and(|cwd| !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path()));
match permission_profile {
PermissionProfile::Managed { .. }
if !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/sandbox_tags.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/sandbox_tags.rs
index 2973a5bf94..29d520e2d1 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/sandbox_tags.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/sandbox_tags.rs
@@ -48,10 +48,7 @@ pub(crate) fn permission_profile_policy_tag(
let file_system_policy = profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
if file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
"danger-full-access"
- } else if file_system_policy
- .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
- .is_empty()
- {
+ } else if !file_system_policy.has_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd) {
"read-only"
} else {
"workspace-write"
diff --git a/codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs b/codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
index bde83ad18b..1537230e0a 100644
--- a/codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
@@ -1167,6 +1167,18 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd_impl(cwd, WritableRootPathResolution::Effective)
}
+ /// Returns whether any effective writable root exists without materializing its carveouts.
+ pub fn has_writable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
+ !self.has_full_disk_write_access()
+ && self
+ .resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
+ .into_iter()
+ .any(|entry| {
+ entry.access.can_write()
+ && self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd)
+ })
+ }
+
/// Returns writable roots without following attacker-mutable path components.
///
/// Trusted top-level aliases such as `/tmp -> /private/tmp` are still
@@ -2173,6 +2185,44 @@ mod tests {
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn writable_root_presence_matches_materialized_roots() {
+ let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+ let writable_root = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("work", cwd.path());
+ let policies = [
+ FileSystemSandboxPolicy::read_only(),
+ FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
+ FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox(),
+ FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
+ writable_root.clone().into(),
+ FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+ )]),
+ FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+ FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
+ writable_root.clone().into(),
+ FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+ ),
+ FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(writable_root.into(), FileSystemAccessMode::Deny),
+ ]),
+ FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
+ FileSystemPath::Special {
+ value: FileSystemSpecialPath::unknown(
+ ":future_special_path",
+ /*subpath*/ None,
+ ),
+ },
+ FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+ )]),
+ ];
+
+ for policy in policies {
+ assert_eq!(
+ policy.has_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()),
+ !policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()).is_empty()
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
#[cfg(windows)]
#[test]
fn permission_paths_preserve_native_slash_unc_strings() {