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Align Linux sandbox names and docs with bubblewrap and seccomp (#52610)
Michael Bolinc63929af5051
diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.mdindex 95865ded74..b118931623 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ This crate is responsible for producing:- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI+The helper uses bubblewrap for filesystem and namespace isolation, and seccomp+for syscall filtering. `src/seccomp.rs` installs `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and the+seccomp filters; it also retains the legacy Landlock filesystem implementation.+`src/linux_run_main.rs` coordinates these stages through `LinuxSandboxCommand`.+End-to-end coverage lives in `tests/suite/sandbox.rs` and the other suite modules.+On Linux, Codex prefers the first `bwrap` found on `PATH`outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If `bwrap` ispresent but too old to support@@ -45,7 +51,10 @@ commands that would enter the bubblewrap path.`SandboxPolicy` model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or deniedcarveouts are preserved.- When bubblewrap is active, the helper applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a- seccomp network filter in-process.+ seccomp filter in-process after establishing the filesystem view. Restricted+ network policies block network syscalls; filesystem-restricted policies with+ otherwise unrestricted networking still block `AF_VSOCK` sockets. All filter+ modes block `io_uring` to prevent bypassing socket-family restrictions.- When bubblewrap is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.- When bubblewrap is active, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.- When bubblewrap is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for@@ -86,8 +95,10 @@ commands that would enter the bubblewrap path.- In managed proxy mode, the helper uses `--unshare-net` plus an internalTCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxyendpoints.-- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new- AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.+- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp allows IP sockets+ inside the isolated network namespace and blocks new standalone `AF_UNIX`+ sockets unless `dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` is granted. Unix socket+ pairs remain allowed for communication between related processes.- When bubblewrap is active, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default.If that mount is denied, it retains the inherited `/proc` and still creates aPID namespace, preserving the existing fallback. `--no-proc` also retains thediff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/lib.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/lib.rsindex 549527de21..fa75c702b2 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/lib.rs+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/lib.rs@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ mod exec_util;#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]mod fd_mount;#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]-mod landlock;-#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]mod launcher;#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]mod linux_run_main;@@ -26,6 +24,8 @@ mod proxy_lifecycle;#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]mod proxy_routing;#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]+mod seccomp;+#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]mod wslg;#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rsindex 5c08c8c39a..85bb0aaa80 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs@@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ use crate::bwrap::BwrapOptions;use crate::bwrap::WSL_INTEROP_DIR;use crate::bwrap::WSLG_DISTRO_ROOT;use crate::bwrap::create_bwrap_command_args;-use crate::landlock::apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread;use crate::launcher::exec_bwrap;use crate::launcher::initialize_bwrap_launcher;use crate::launcher::preferred_bwrap_supports_argv0;use crate::proxy_routing::activate_proxy_routes_in_netns;use crate::proxy_routing::prepare_host_proxy_route_spec;+use crate::seccomp::apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread;use codex_network_proxy::ManagedNetworkSandboxContext;use codex_protocol::error::Result as CodexResult;use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;@@ -86,10 +86,8 @@ enum ProtectedCreateRemoval {#[derive(Debug, Parser)]/// CLI surface for the Linux sandbox helper.///-/// The type name remains `LandlockCommand` for compatibility with existing-/// wiring, but bubblewrap is now the default filesystem sandbox and Landlock-/// is the legacy fallback.-pub struct LandlockCommand {+/// Uses bubblewrap for filesystem isolation and seccomp for syscall filtering.+pub struct LinuxSandboxCommand {/// It is possible that the cwd used in the context of the sandbox policy/// is different from the cwd of the process to spawn.#[arg(long = "sandbox-policy-cwd")]@@ -166,7 +164,7 @@ pub struct LandlockCommand {/// 2. Apply in-process restrictions (no_new_privs + seccomp)./// 3. `execvp` into the final command.pub fn run_main() -> ! {- let LandlockCommand {+ let LinuxSandboxCommand {sandbox_policy_cwd,command_cwd,permission_profile,@@ -178,7 +176,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {no_proc,inherit_pid_namespace,command,- } = LandlockCommand::parse();+ } = LinuxSandboxCommand::parse();let allow_network_for_proxy = managed_network.is_some();if command.is_empty() {@@ -348,7 +346,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {);}- // Legacy path: Landlock enforcement only, when bwrap sandboxing is not enabled.+ // Legacy pipeline: apply in-process restrictions without bubblewrap.if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(&permission_profile,&sandbox_policy_cwd,diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rsindex 79a0dca040..3d47173014 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--proxy-route-spec"));assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "{\"routes\":[]}"));- let parsed = LandlockCommand::try_parse_from(args)+ let parsed = LinuxSandboxCommand::try_parse_from(args).expect("inner command should preserve the managed network policy");assert_eq!(parsed.managed_network, Some(managed_network));}@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {#[test]fn managed_network_policy_alone_enables_proxy_mode() {- let parsed = LandlockCommand::try_parse_from([+ let parsed = LinuxSandboxCommand::try_parse_from(["codex-linux-sandbox","--sandbox-policy-cwd","/tmp",@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ fn managed_network_policy_alone_enables_proxy_mode() {#[test]fn malformed_managed_network_policy_is_rejected() {- let error = LandlockCommand::try_parse_from([+ let error = LinuxSandboxCommand::try_parse_from(["codex-linux-sandbox","--sandbox-policy-cwd","/tmp",@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {});assert!(!args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--proxy-route-spec"));- let parsed = LandlockCommand::try_parse_from(args)+ let parsed = LinuxSandboxCommand::try_parse_from(args).expect("unmanaged inner command should preserve ordinary sandbox mode");assert_eq!(parsed.managed_network, None);}diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/seccomp.rssimilarity index 96%rename from codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rsrename to codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/seccomp.rsindex 140daaf8af..7aecf5a7a1 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/seccomp.rs@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@//! In-process Linux sandbox primitives: `no_new_privs` and seccomp.//!//! Filesystem restrictions are enforced by bubblewrap in `linux_run_main`.-//! Landlock helpers remain available here as legacy/backup utilities.+//! The legacy Landlock filesystem implementation is retained here, but the+//! helper rejects legacy mode for filesystem-restricted policies.use std::collections::BTreeMap;use std::path::Path;@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ use seccompiler::apply_filter;/// - enabling `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` when restrictions apply, and/// - installing seccomp restrictions for network isolation and VM sockets.///-/// Filesystem restrictions are intentionally handled by bubblewrap.+/// Filesystem restrictions are normally handled by bubblewrap. The legacy+/// Landlock implementation is only selected by `apply_landlock_fs`.pub(crate) fn apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,cwd: &Path,@@ -142,8 +144,8 @@ fn set_no_new_privs() -> Result<()> {/// # Errors/// Returns [`CodexErr::Sandbox`] variants when the ruleset fails to apply.///-/// Note: this is currently unused because filesystem sandboxing is performed-/// via bubblewrap. It is kept for reference and potential fallback use.+/// Retained for the legacy pipeline. The helper currently rejects legacy mode+/// for filesystem-restricted policies, so filesystem sandboxing uses bubblewrap.fn install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,) -> Result<()> {diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/mod.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/mod.rsindex 8044edf2ad..31e89b5f0f 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/mod.rs+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/mod.rs@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@// Aggregates all former standalone integration tests as modules.mod bundled_bwrap;mod bwrap_path;-mod landlock;mod managed_proxy;+mod sandbox;diff --git a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/sandbox.rssimilarity index 99%rename from codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rsrename to codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/sandbox.rsindex fa22e7a1e4..e0167df88c 100644--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/sandbox.rs@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@+//! End-to-end Linux sandbox coverage for filesystem isolation and syscall filtering.+#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]use codex_core::exec::ExecCapturePolicy;