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0

Lightweight coding agent that runs in your terminal

Rust

Fail closed on deeply nested command wrappers (#39122)

Charlie Marshf97e77569352
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec_policy.rs b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec_policy.rs
index 042b96f48c..9bd3e0b3ee 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec_policy.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec_policy.rs
@@ -290,6 +290,68 @@ async fn granular_complex_forced_rm_requests_approval_when_allowed() -> Result<(
Ok(())
}
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn deeply_nested_forced_rm_is_rejected_before_execution_when_approvals_are_disabled()
+-> Result<()> {
+ skip_if_target_windows!(Ok(()), "uses a POSIX shell command fixture");
+
+ let server = start_mock_server().await;
+ let mut builder = test_codex();
+ let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
+ let sentinel = test.config.cwd.join("forced-rm-sentinel");
+ fs::write(&sentinel, "must not be deleted")?;
+ let call_id = "deeply-nested-forced-rm";
+ let args = json!({
+ "command": "env env env env env env env env env rm -rf forced-rm-sentinel",
+ "timeout_ms": 1_000,
+ });
+
+ mount_sse_once(
+ &server,
+ sse(vec![
+ ev_response_created("resp-deeply-nested-forced-rm-1"),
+ ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
+ ev_completed("resp-deeply-nested-forced-rm-1"),
+ ]),
+ )
+ .await;
+ let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
+ &server,
+ sse(vec![
+ ev_assistant_message("msg-deeply-nested-forced-rm", "done"),
+ ev_completed("resp-deeply-nested-forced-rm-2"),
+ ]),
+ )
+ .await;
+
+ submit_user_turn(
+ &test,
+ "run the deeply nested forced rm",
+ AskForApproval::Never,
+ PermissionProfile::Disabled,
+ /*collaboration_mode*/ None,
+ )
+ .await?;
+
+ wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
+ matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
+ })
+ .await;
+
+ let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
+ let output = output_item
+ .get("output")
+ .and_then(Value::as_str)
+ .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
+ assert!(
+ output.contains("rejected: blocked by policy"),
+ "unexpected output: {output}"
+ );
+ assert!(sentinel.exists(), "the rejected command must not execute");
+
+ Ok(())
+}
+
#[cfg(windows)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn unified_exec_disabled_windows_sandbox_rejects_managed_read_only_command() -> Result<()> {
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs
index 0574fcf7d7..59fce97566 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ fn dangerous_command_match_with_depth(
wrapper_depth: usize,
) -> Option<DangerousCommandMatch> {
if wrapper_depth > MAX_DANGEROUS_COMMAND_WRAPPER_DEPTH {
- return None;
+ return Some(DangerousCommandMatch::Other);
}
if let Some(dangerous_match) = dangerous_command_match_for_exec(command, wrapper_depth) {
@@ -288,6 +288,27 @@ mod tests {
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn deeply_nested_command_wrappers_fail_closed() {
+ for (depth, expected) in [
+ (
+ MAX_DANGEROUS_COMMAND_WRAPPER_DEPTH,
+ DangerousCommandMatch::ForcedRm,
+ ),
+ (
+ MAX_DANGEROUS_COMMAND_WRAPPER_DEPTH + 1,
+ DangerousCommandMatch::Other,
+ ),
+ ] {
+ let command = std::iter::repeat_n("env", depth)
+ .chain(["rm", "-rf", "/tmp/example"])
+ .map(str::to_owned)
+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ assert_eq!(dangerous_command_match(&command), Some(expected));
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn forced_rm_in_complex_shell_syntax_is_dangerous() {
for script in [