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security: SEC-9 — bound untrusted config/oracle JSON slurps
KingIcyCreamProjectsdf644dc1f758
diff --git a/c/glm.c b/c/glm.cindex 4043d8f1..f1308260 100644--- a/c/glm.c+++ b/c/glm.c@@ -1332,12 +1332,25 @@ static void rope_interleave(float *v, int pos, const Cfg *c){}/* ---------- config ---------- */+/* SEC-9: bounded slurp for untrusted config/oracle JSON. config.json arrives from+ * unverified mirrors (see qt_check_fmt threat model); an unbounded ftell->malloc+ * gave a hostile file a load-time OOM or, on malloc failure, a NULL deref via+ * b[got]=0. Cap the size, NULL-check the alloc, require a full read. Returns a+ * malloc'd NUL-terminated buffer, or NULL on any failure. Mirrors tok.h tk_read_file. */+#define CFG_MAX_BYTES (256ll<<20) /* config/oracle JSON is KB-MB in practice */+static char* cfg_slurp(const char *path){+ FILE *f=fopen(path,"rb"); if(!f) return NULL;+ fseek(f,0,SEEK_END); long n=ftell(f); fseek(f,0,SEEK_SET);+ if(n<0 || (long long)n>CFG_MAX_BYTES){ fclose(f); return NULL; }+ char *b=malloc((size_t)n+1); if(!b){ fclose(f); return NULL; }+ size_t got=fread(b,1,(size_t)n,f); fclose(f);+ if((long)got!=n){ free(b); return NULL; }+ b[got]=0; return b;+}static jval* cfg_root(const char *snap, char **arena){char p[2048]; snprintf(p,sizeof(p),"%s/config.json",snap);- FILE *f=fopen(p,"rb"); if(!f){perror(p);exit(1);}- fseek(f,0,SEEK_END); long n=ftell(f); fseek(f,0,SEEK_SET);- char *b=malloc(n+1); size_t got=fread(b,1,n,f); b[got]=0; fclose(f);- if((long)got!=n) fprintf(stderr,"warning: short read on %s (%ld of %ld)\n",p,(long)got,n);+ char *b=cfg_slurp(p);+ if(!b){ fprintf(stderr,"%s: cannot read config.json (missing, unreadable, short, or > %lld bytes)\n",p,(long long)CFG_MAX_BYTES); exit(1); }return json_parse(b,arena);}static int gi(jval*r,const char*k){ jval*v=json_get(r,k); return v?(int)v->num:0; }@@ -6528,10 +6541,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv){/* altrimenti: validazione contro l'oracolo (ref_glm.json) */const char *refpath=getenv("REF")?getenv("REF"):"ref_glm.json";- FILE *f=fopen(refpath,"rb"); if(!f){perror(refpath);return 1;}- fseek(f,0,SEEK_END); long n=ftell(f); fseek(f,0,SEEK_SET);- char *b=malloc(n+1); size_t got=fread(b,1,n,f); b[got]=0; fclose(f);- if((long)got!=n) fprintf(stderr,"warning: short read on %s (%ld of %ld)\n",refpath,(long)got,n);+ char *b=cfg_slurp(refpath);+ if(!b){ fprintf(stderr,"%s: cannot read oracle file (missing, unreadable, short, or > %lld bytes)\n",refpath,(long long)CFG_MAX_BYTES); return 1; }char *ar=NULL; jval *ref=json_parse(b,&ar);int np=0,nfull=0; int *prompt=read_arr(ref,"prompt_ids",&np); int *full=read_arr(ref,"full_ids",&nfull);if(!prompt||!full||np<1||nfull<np){ fprintf(stderr,"ref file missing prompt_ids/full_ids or empty\n"); return 1; }