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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { redactSensitiveText } from '../../src/telemetry/redact';

describe('redactSensitiveText', () => {
  it('returns empty/undefined input unchanged', () => {
    expect(redactSensitiveText(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
    expect(redactSensitiveText('')).toBe('');
  });

  it('redacts URL query strings while keeping the path', () => {
    const out = redactSensitiveText(
      'Failed to PUT https://s3.amazonaws.com/bucket/key?X-Amz-Signature=deadbeef&token=abc'
    );
    expect(out).toContain('https://s3.amazonaws.com/bucket/key?[REDACTED]');
    expect(out).not.toContain('deadbeef');
    expect(out).not.toContain('token=abc');
  });

  it('redacts Authorization bearer/basic credentials', () => {
    const auth = redactSensitiveText('Authorization: Bearer sk-live-1234567890')!;
    expect(auth).toContain('[REDACTED]');
    expect(auth).not.toContain('sk-live-1234567890');
    expect(redactSensitiveText('used Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz here')).toBe('used Basic [REDACTED] here');
  });

  it('redacts secret-like key/value pairs', () => {
    for (const sample of [
      'api_key=ck_abcdef123456',
      'x-api-key: "ck_secretvalue"',
      "client_secret: 'topsecret'",
      'password=hunter2',
      'access_token=ya29.a0Afoobar',
      'auth=app_key:pusher_signature',
    ]) {
      const out = redactSensitiveText(sample)!;
      expect(out, sample).toContain('[REDACTED]');
      expect(out, sample).not.toMatch(/ck_abcdef123456|ck_secretvalue|topsecret|hunter2|ya29/);
    }
  });

  it('preserves quotes around redacted values', () => {
    expect(redactSensitiveText('x-api-key: "ck_secretvalue"')).toContain('"[REDACTED]"');
  });

  // Serialized payloads are the common shape in error text: the key's own
  // closing quote sits between the name and the colon, so a pattern anchored on
  // `name` followed directly by `:` never matches.
  it('redacts secrets inside JSON payloads', () => {
    for (const [sample, secret] of [
      ['{"api_key": "ck_live_abc123"}', 'ck_live_abc123'],
      ['{"api_key":"ck_live_abc123"}', 'ck_live_abc123'],
      ['{"api_key" : "ck_live_abc123"}', 'ck_live_abc123'],
      ['{"refresh_token":"rt-abc.def-123"}', 'rt-abc.def-123'],
      ['{"auth":"app_key:pusher_signature"}', 'app_key:pusher_signature'],
      ['{"COMPOSIO_API_KEY":"prefixed-double-secret"}', 'prefixed-double-secret'],
      [`{'OPENAI_API_KEY': 'prefixed single secret'}`, 'prefixed single secret'],
      ['{"x-api-key":"ck_hdr","user":"bob"}', 'ck_hdr'],
      [`{'client_secret': 'cs_live_abc123'}`, 'cs_live_abc123'],
      ['{"password": "hunter2"}', 'hunter2'],
      ['{"password": "correct horse battery staple"}', 'correct horse battery staple'],
      [`{'client_secret': 'multi word secret'}`, 'multi word secret'],
    ] as const) {
      const out = redactSensitiveText(sample)!;
      expect(out, sample).toContain('[REDACTED]');
      expect(out, sample).not.toContain(secret);
    }
  });

  it('redacts a secret in a serialized error payload while keeping context', () => {
    const out = redactSensitiveText(
      'Error executing tool: request body was rejected: ' +
        '{"toolkit": "GMAIL", "arguments": {"api_key": "ck_live_CUSTOMER", "to": "[email protected]"}}'
    )!;
    expect(out).not.toContain('ck_live_CUSTOMER');
    expect(out).toContain('GMAIL');
  });

  it('preserves JSON keys and quoting, replacing only the value', () => {
    expect(redactSensitiveText('{"api_key": "ck_live_abc123"}')).toBe('{"api_key": "[REDACTED]"}');
    expect(redactSensitiveText('{"api_key":"secret","user":"bob"}')).toBe(
      '{"api_key":"[REDACTED]","user":"bob"}'
    );
  });

  it('redacts escaped quoted secrets in serialized messages', () => {
    const source = JSON.stringify({ error: 'password: "secret"' });
    const expected = JSON.stringify({ error: 'password: "[REDACTED]"' });
    expect(redactSensitiveText(source)).toBe(expected);
    expect(redactSensitiveText("password: \\'secret\\'")).toBe("password: \\'[REDACTED]\\'");

    const doubleEncoded = JSON.stringify({ body: JSON.stringify({ api_key: 'secret' }) });
    const doubleEncodedExpected = JSON.stringify({
      body: JSON.stringify({ api_key: '[REDACTED]' }),
    });
    expect(redactSensitiveText(doubleEncoded)).toBe(doubleEncodedExpected);
  });

  it('preserves serialized adjacent keys with escapes', () => {
    const source = JSON.stringify({
      error: 'unknown field auth:',
      'quoted"key': 'safe',
      'path\\key': 'safe',
    });
    expect(redactSensitiveText(source)).toBe(source);
  });

  it('redacts unquoted secrets containing backslashes', () => {
    expect(redactSensitiveText('password=abc\\def')).toBe('password=[REDACTED]');
    expect(redactSensitiveText('password=\\leading')).toBe('password=[REDACTED]');
  });

  it('redacts many quoted secrets in one pass', () => {
    const source = Array.from({ length: 1_000 }, (_, index) => `password: "secret-${index}"`).join(
      ' '
    );
    const expected = Array.from({ length: 1_000 }, () => 'password: "[REDACTED]"').join(' ');
    expect(redactSensitiveText(source)).toBe(expected);
  });

  it('leaves a key name with no attached value untouched', () => {
    for (const benign of [
      'the password field is required',
      'no separator here "api_key" and nothing else',
    ]) {
      expect(redactSensitiveText(benign), benign).toBe(benign);
    }
  });

  it('leaves benign error text untouched', () => {
    const benign = 'TypeError: cannot read property foo of undefined at Object.<anonymous>';
    expect(redactSensitiveText(benign)).toBe(benign);
  });

  // Underscore before api_key is a word char, so a leading \b would miss these.
  it('redacts env-style prefixed API keys', () => {
    for (const [sample, secret] of [
      ['COMPOSIO_API_KEY=sk_live_9f3c', 'sk_live_9f3c'],
      ['OPENAI_API_KEY=sk_live_9f3c', 'sk_live_9f3c'],
      ['export COMPOSIO_API_KEY="sk_live_9f3c"', 'sk_live_9f3c'],
    ] as const) {
      const out = redactSensitiveText(sample)!;
      expect(out, sample).toContain('[REDACTED]');
      expect(out, sample).not.toContain(secret);
    }
  });

  it('does not match a secret name embedded in letters', () => {
    expect(redactSensitiveText('myapikey=sk_live_9f3c')).toBe('myapikey=sk_live_9f3c');
  });

  it('does not consume adjacent fields after key-like text', () => {
    for (const benign of [
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", "user": "bob"}',
      `{'note': 'unknown field auth:', "user": 'bob'}`,
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", "$schema": "safe"}',
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", "@type": "safe"}',
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", "üser": "safe"}',
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", ".well-known": "safe"}',
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", ":type": "safe"}',
      '{"error": "unknown field auth:", "?field": "safe"}',
    ]) {
      expect(redactSensitiveText(benign), benign).toBe(benign);
    }
  });

  it('redacts bare quoted values before punctuation or prose', () => {
    for (const [sample, secret] of [
      ['password: "punctuated secret";', 'punctuated secret'],
      ["client_secret='period secret'.", 'period secret'],
      ['api_key = "prose secret" followed by context', 'prose secret'],
      ['password: "escaped \\"secret\\" value"', 'escaped \\"secret\\" value'],
      [`can't connect password: "secret"`, 'secret'],
      [`users' password: "secret"`, 'secret'],
      [`Chris' password: "secret"`, 'secret'],
      [`Andrés' password: "secret"`, 'secret'],
      [`{"error":"request failed password: 'secret'"}`, 'secret'],
      ['5" from target password: "secret"', 'secret'],
      ['unmatched " before password: "secret"', 'secret'],
      ["unmatched ' before password: 'secret'", 'secret'],
      ['password: "}abc"', '}abc'],
      ['api_key: ",abc"', ',abc'],
    ] as const) {
      const out = redactSensitiveText(sample)!;
      expect(out, sample).toContain('[REDACTED]');
      expect(out, sample).not.toContain(secret);
    }
  });
});