Skip to content

Composio powers 1000+ toolkits, tool search, context management, authentication, and a sandboxed workbench to help you build AI agents that turn intent into action.

fix(python): block sensitive paths hidden by symlinks

jkomyno43545ec8891c
diff --git a/python/composio/utils/sensitive_file_upload_paths.py b/python/composio/utils/sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
index a5d411803..2de2c9e7c 100644
--- a/python/composio/utils/sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
+++ b/python/composio/utils/sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
@@ -25,19 +25,26 @@ _DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME = re.compile(
)
-def _normalize_path_segments(file_path: t.Union[str, Path]) -> t.List[str]:
- p = Path(file_path).expanduser()
- try:
- resolved = p.resolve()
- except OSError:
- resolved = p
- parts = [part for part in resolved.as_posix().split("/") if part]
+def _path_segments(path: Path) -> list[str]:
+ parts = [part for part in path.as_posix().split("/") if part]
if parts and parts[0].endswith(":"):
# Windows path: "C:/Users/..." -> drop drive letter segment
- parts = parts[1:]
+ return parts[1:]
return parts
+def _normalize_path_segments(
+ file_path: str | Path,
+) -> tuple[list[str], list[str]]:
+ """Return resolved and written segments so neither can hide a denied name."""
+ written = Path(file_path).expanduser().absolute()
+ try:
+ resolved = written.resolve()
+ except OSError:
+ resolved = written
+ return _path_segments(resolved), _path_segments(written)
+
+
def _get_block_reason(
file_path: t.Union[str, Path],
additional_deny_segments: t.Optional[t.Sequence[str]] = None,
@@ -46,23 +53,25 @@ def _get_block_reason(
deny: t.Set[str] = {s.lower() for s in BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS}
deny.update(s.lower() for s in extra)
- segments = _normalize_path_segments(file_path)
- # Case-insensitive segment match: lower each path component once per check.
- for seg, key in zip(segments, (s.lower() for s in segments), strict=True):
- if key in deny:
- return f'path segment "{seg}" is in the sensitive file upload denylist'
-
- if not segments:
- return None
- basename = segments[-1]
- if _SECRET_LIKE_BASENAME.search(basename) or _DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME.match(
- basename
- ):
- return (
- f'file name "{basename}" looks like a credential, env, or private key file'
- )
- if basename.lower() == "credentials":
- return 'file name "credentials" is often used for cloud/API credential stores'
+ resolved_segments, written_segments = _normalize_path_segments(file_path)
+ for segments in (resolved_segments, written_segments):
+ # Case-insensitive segment match: lower each path component once per check.
+ for seg, key in zip(segments, (s.lower() for s in segments), strict=True):
+ if key in deny:
+ return f'path segment "{seg}" is in the sensitive file upload denylist'
+
+ for segments in (resolved_segments, written_segments):
+ if not segments:
+ continue
+ basename = segments[-1]
+ if _SECRET_LIKE_BASENAME.search(
+ basename
+ ) or _DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME.match(basename):
+ return f'file name "{basename}" looks like a credential, env, or private key file'
+ if basename.lower() == "credentials":
+ return (
+ 'file name "credentials" is often used for cloud/API credential stores'
+ )
return None
diff --git a/python/tests/test_sensitive_file_upload_paths.py b/python/tests/test_sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
index 7580c05fb..ddf653f08 100644
--- a/python/tests/test_sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
+++ b/python/tests/test_sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
@@ -73,6 +73,49 @@ def test_blocks_after_symlink_resolves_to_sensitive_dir() -> None:
assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(link) is True
+def test_blocks_sensitive_symlinked_directory_with_plain_target(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ store = tmp_path / "state" / "claude"
+ store.mkdir(parents=True)
+ (store / "settings.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
+ home = tmp_path / "home"
+ home.mkdir()
+ link = home / ".claude"
+ try:
+ link.symlink_to(store, target_is_directory=True)
+ except OSError:
+ pytest.skip("symlinks not supported")
+
+ sensitive_path = link / "settings.json"
+ assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(sensitive_path) is True
+ with pytest.raises(SensitiveFilePathBlockedError):
+ assert_safe_local_file_upload_path(sensitive_path)
+
+
+def test_blocks_sensitive_symlinked_basename_with_plain_target(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ target = tmp_path / "plain-config"
+ target.write_text("SECRET=1", encoding="utf-8")
+ link = tmp_path / ".env"
+ try:
+ link.symlink_to(target)
+ except OSError:
+ pytest.skip("symlinks not supported")
+
+ assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(link) is True
+
+
+def test_allows_ordinary_file_through_symlinked_directory(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ store = tmp_path / "store"
+ store.mkdir()
+ (store / "document.pdf").write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
+ link = tmp_path / "docs"
+ try:
+ link.symlink_to(store, target_is_directory=True)
+ except OSError:
+ pytest.skip("symlinks not supported")
+
+ assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(link / "document.pdf") is False
+
+
def test_assert_safe_raises() -> None:
p = Path.home() / ".ssh" / "id_rsa"
with pytest.raises(SensitiveFilePathBlockedError):