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TypeScript agentic-aiagentsaiai-agentsaiagentsdeveloper-toolsfunction-callinggpt-4javascriptjsllmllmopsmcppythonremote-mcp-serverssetypescript
fix(security): apply SEC-316 defense-in-depth to RemoteFile.save()
jkomyno7a3d30a37c9b
diff --git a/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py b/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.pyindex 78b2e6dcd..0d9f3c584 100644--- a/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py+++ b/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py@@ -142,13 +142,22 @@ class RemoteFile:If path is omitted, saves to ~/.composio/files/ using the filename."""content = self.buffer()- home = Path.home()save_path: Pathif path is not None:save_path = Path(path)else:- save_path = home / COMPOSIO_DIR / TEMP_FILES_DIRECTORY_NAME / self.filename+ # SEC-316 defense-in-depth: `self.filename` is `Path(mount_relative_path).name`,+ # so directory components are already stripped — but verify the resolved+ # default-location path stays inside the cache dir to reject residual `..`+ # cases (e.g. ``mount_relative_path == ".."`` keeps ``filename == ".."``).+ default_dir = Path.home() / COMPOSIO_DIR / TEMP_FILES_DIRECTORY_NAME+ save_path = default_dir / self.filename+ if not save_path.resolve().is_relative_to(default_dir.resolve()):+ raise ValidationError(+ f"Path traversal detected: filename {self.filename!r} resolves "+ "outside the intended output directory."+ )save_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)save_path.write_bytes(content)diff --git a/python/tests/test_tool_router_session_files.py b/python/tests/test_tool_router_session_files.pyindex 18d66d4ff..8f00d4927 100644--- a/python/tests/test_tool_router_session_files.py+++ b/python/tests/test_tool_router_session_files.py@@ -234,3 +234,23 @@ class TestRemoteFile:expected = tmp_path / ".composio" / "files" / "report.pdf"assert Path(out_path) == expectedassert expected.read_bytes() == b"pdf content"++ def test_save_default_location_rejects_dotdot_filename(self, tmp_path):+ """SEC-316 defense-in-depth: a server-controlled ``mount_relative_path``+ whose basename is ``..`` (e.g. ``"foo/.."``) must be rejected before+ any bytes touch the disk, not silently fail with ``IsADirectoryError``."""+ rf = RemoteFile(+ expires_at="2026-01-01",+ mount_relative_path="foo/..",+ sandbox_mount_prefix="/mnt/files",+ download_url="https://example.com/file",+ )+ assert rf.filename == ".." # `Path("foo/..").name == ".."`++ with patch.object(rf, "buffer", return_value=b"should not be written"):+ with patch("pathlib.Path.home", return_value=tmp_path):+ with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="Path traversal detected"):+ rf.save()++ # The check raises before mkdir/write, so nothing was written under tmp_path.+ assert not (tmp_path / ".composio").exists()