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fix(cli): cap remote file downloads in tool uploads (SEC-908) (#4417)

Saransh Rana9d0cb2cf89ee
diff --git a/.changeset/read-response-body-export.md b/.changeset/read-response-body-export.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fb9394f29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/read-response-body-export.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+'@composio/core': patch
+---
+
+Export `readResponseBodyWithLimit` and `MAX_URL_UPLOAD_SIZE_BYTES` so downstream packages can apply the SDK's 100 MiB cap when they download a file from a user-supplied URL. The CLI's tool-input file uploads now use it instead of buffering the whole response.
diff --git a/ts/packages/cli/src/services/tool-file-uploads.ts b/ts/packages/cli/src/services/tool-file-uploads.ts
index a33102354..4b4ae2163 100644
--- a/ts/packages/cli/src/services/tool-file-uploads.ts
+++ b/ts/packages/cli/src/services/tool-file-uploads.ts
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
import type * as FileSystem from '@effect/platform/FileSystem';
import type * as Path from '@effect/platform/Path';
import type { Composio as RawComposioClient } from '@composio/client';
-import { assertSafeFileUploadPath } from '@composio/core';
+import { assertSafeFileUploadPath, readResponseBodyWithLimit } from '@composio/core';
import { ssrfSafeFetch } from '@composio/core/utils/ssrf-guard';
import { Cause, Data, Effect, Exit, Predicate } from 'effect';
import { guessToolkitFromToolSlug } from 'src/utils/toolkit-from-tool-slug';
@@ -155,7 +155,10 @@ const readFileFromUrl = async (path: Path.Path, url: string) => {
});
}
- const bytes = new Uint8Array(await response.arrayBuffer());
+ // Same cap as the core SDK's URL uploads: a remote server must not be able
+ // to exhaust memory with an oversized or never-ending body. Copied into a
+ // fresh ArrayBuffer-backed view for the same reason as readFileFromDisk.
+ const bytes = new Uint8Array(await readResponseBodyWithLimit(response));
const parsedUrl = new URL(url);
const fileName = path.basename(parsedUrl.pathname) || `file-${Date.now()}`;
diff --git a/ts/packages/cli/test/src/services/tool-file-uploads.test.ts b/ts/packages/cli/test/src/services/tool-file-uploads.test.ts
index e7913fc52..36b7c1e02 100644
--- a/ts/packages/cli/test/src/services/tool-file-uploads.test.ts
+++ b/ts/packages/cli/test/src/services/tool-file-uploads.test.ts
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { Composio as RawComposioClient } from '@composio/client';
import {
ComposioBlockedInternalUrlError,
ComposioSensitiveFilePathBlockedError,
+ MAX_URL_UPLOAD_SIZE_BYTES,
} from '@composio/core';
import { schemaHasFileUploadable, uploadToolInputFiles } from 'src/services/tool-file-uploads';
@@ -236,3 +237,46 @@ describe('uploadToolInputFiles — URL SSRF boundary', () => {
);
});
});
+
+describe('uploadToolInputFiles — URL download size cap', () => {
+ afterEach(() => {
+ vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+ vi.restoreAllMocks();
+ });
+
+ it.effect('rejects a remote file that declares a body above the cap before buffering it', () => {
+ const createPresignedURL = vi.fn();
+ const client = makeClient(createPresignedURL);
+ const oversized = String(MAX_URL_UPLOAD_SIZE_BYTES + 1);
+ vi.stubGlobal(
+ 'fetch',
+ vi.fn(
+ async () =>
+ new Response('not the real body', {
+ status: 200,
+ headers: { 'content-length': oversized, 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' },
+ })
+ )
+ );
+
+ return Effect.gen(function* () {
+ const fsApi = yield* FileSystem.FileSystem;
+ const pathApi = yield* Path.Path;
+
+ yield* Effect.promise(() =>
+ expect(
+ uploadToolInputFiles({
+ fs: fsApi,
+ path: pathApi,
+ toolSlug: 'GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL',
+ arguments_: { attachment: 'https://1.1.1.1/large.bin' },
+ inputSchema,
+ client,
+ })
+ ).rejects.toThrow(/exceeds maximum allowed size/)
+ );
+
+ expect(createPresignedURL).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ }).pipe(Effect.provide(Layer.mergeAll(BunFileSystem.layer, BunPath.layer)));
+ });
+});
diff --git a/ts/packages/core/src/index.ts b/ts/packages/core/src/index.ts
index 27ba21561..dbd491633 100644
--- a/ts/packages/core/src/index.ts
+++ b/ts/packages/core/src/index.ts
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ export {
isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath,
BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS,
} from './utils/sensitiveFileUploadPaths';
+// Bounded response reader for files fetched from user-supplied URLs. Exported
+// for the same reason as the denylist guard above: downstream packages read
+// remote files too, and every such read must enforce the same size cap.
+export { readResponseBodyWithLimit, MAX_URL_UPLOAD_SIZE_BYTES } from './utils/readResponseBody';
export {
sanitizeSchemaPropertyKeys,
restoreOriginalKeys,