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fix(release): drop stale changeset for ignored `@composio/cli` (#3861)
Alberto Schiabelac7ca020daf8
diff --git a/.changeset/cli-file-upload-denylist.md b/.changeset/cli-file-upload-denylist.mddeleted file mode 100644index 249cccec5..000000000--- a/.changeset/cli-file-upload-denylist.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@-----'@composio/cli': patch------Security: the CLI's tool file-upload path now enforces the sensitive-file denylist (issue #3746 / GHSA-hp3h-89pf-5q58). Previously `composio execute`/`composio run` read and uploaded any local path a tool argument pointed at — including `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, and `.env` files — enabling credential exfiltration in agentic workflows via prompt injection. The CLI now calls the shared `assertSafeFileUploadPath` guard from `@composio/core` at the lowest-level file read. URLs and `File` objects are unaffected.--Unlike the core and Python SDKs (which expose a `sensitiveFileUploadProtection` / `sensitive_file_upload_protection` opt-out), the CLI enforces the denylist **unconditionally by design** — the primary attack vector is an agent prompt-injected into supplying its own tool arguments, so a CLI override flag would hand that attacker a trivial bypass. The block error carries CLI-appropriate remediation guidance instead of pointing at the SDK-only flag.diff --git a/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md b/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.mdindex 8b1fafc84..35fb832f8 100644--- a/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@## 0.3.0+### Security++- fc17c37: Security: the CLI's tool file-upload path now enforces the sensitive-file denylist (issue #3746 / GHSA-hp3h-89pf-5q58). Previously `composio execute`/`composio run` read and uploaded any local path a tool argument pointed at — including `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, and `.env` files — enabling credential exfiltration in agentic workflows via prompt injection. The CLI now calls the shared `assertSafeFileUploadPath` guard from `@composio/core` at the lowest-level file read. URLs and `File` objects are unaffected.++ Unlike the core and Python SDKs (which expose a `sensitiveFileUploadProtection` / `sensitive_file_upload_protection` opt-out), the CLI enforces the denylist **unconditionally by design** — the primary attack vector is an agent prompt-injected into supplying its own tool arguments, so a CLI override flag would hand that attacker a trivial bypass. The block error carries CLI-appropriate remediation guidance instead of pointing at the SDK-only flag.+### Minor Changes- a0bef5d: Bump `@composio/client` to `0.1.0-alpha.74`.