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fix(release): drop stale changeset for ignored `@composio/cli` (#3861)

Alberto Schiabelac7ca020daf8
diff --git a/.changeset/cli-file-upload-denylist.md b/.changeset/cli-file-upload-denylist.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 249cccec5..000000000
--- a/.changeset/cli-file-upload-denylist.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
----
-'@composio/cli': patch
----
-
-Security: the CLI's tool file-upload path now enforces the sensitive-file denylist (issue #3746 / GHSA-hp3h-89pf-5q58). Previously `composio execute`/`composio run` read and uploaded any local path a tool argument pointed at — including `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, and `.env` files — enabling credential exfiltration in agentic workflows via prompt injection. The CLI now calls the shared `assertSafeFileUploadPath` guard from `@composio/core` at the lowest-level file read. URLs and `File` objects are unaffected.
-
-Unlike the core and Python SDKs (which expose a `sensitiveFileUploadProtection` / `sensitive_file_upload_protection` opt-out), the CLI enforces the denylist **unconditionally by design** — the primary attack vector is an agent prompt-injected into supplying its own tool arguments, so a CLI override flag would hand that attacker a trivial bypass. The block error carries CLI-appropriate remediation guidance instead of pointing at the SDK-only flag.
diff --git a/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md b/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md
index 8b1fafc84..35fb832f8 100644
--- a/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/ts/packages/cli/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
## 0.3.0
+### Security
+
+- fc17c37: Security: the CLI's tool file-upload path now enforces the sensitive-file denylist (issue #3746 / GHSA-hp3h-89pf-5q58). Previously `composio execute`/`composio run` read and uploaded any local path a tool argument pointed at — including `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, and `.env` files — enabling credential exfiltration in agentic workflows via prompt injection. The CLI now calls the shared `assertSafeFileUploadPath` guard from `@composio/core` at the lowest-level file read. URLs and `File` objects are unaffected.
+
+ Unlike the core and Python SDKs (which expose a `sensitiveFileUploadProtection` / `sensitive_file_upload_protection` opt-out), the CLI enforces the denylist **unconditionally by design** — the primary attack vector is an agent prompt-injected into supplying its own tool arguments, so a CLI override flag would hand that attacker a trivial bypass. The block error carries CLI-appropriate remediation guidance instead of pointing at the SDK-only flag.
+
### Minor Changes
- a0bef5d: Bump `@composio/client` to `0.1.0-alpha.74`.