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fix(sdk): honor Fetch redirect semantics in both SSRF guards (#4387)
Alberto Schiabelba85f4d18306
diff --git a/.changeset/ssrf-redirect-semantics.md b/.changeset/ssrf-redirect-semantics.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..c872cfecf--- /dev/null+++ b/.changeset/ssrf-redirect-semantics.md@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@+---+'@composio/core': patch+---++Apply the Fetch standard's redirect rules in `ssrfSafeFetch`, which following redirects manually meant `fetch` never applied: a `303` now retries as a bodiless `GET` instead of replaying an upload's method and body at a result URL, a `301`/`302` does the same for a `POST`, and `307`/`308` keep replaying both. Only `301`, `302`, `303`, `307` and `308` count as redirects to follow, so a `304` or `305` carrying a `Location` is returned to the caller rather than followed.diff --git a/.changeset/ssrf-transition-ranges.md b/.changeset/ssrf-transition-ranges.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..89f6c7e47--- /dev/null+++ b/.changeset/ssrf-transition-ranges.md@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@+---+'@composio/core': patch+---++Close the IPv6 transition ranges the SSRF guard's address blocklist let through: 6to4 (`2002::/16`), Teredo and the rest of `2001::/23`, local-use NAT64 (`64:ff9b:1::/48`), `100::/64`, `2001:db8::/32` and site-local `fec0::/10` each carry or reach an arbitrary IPv4 address, so `2002:7f00:1::` was a public-looking literal for `127.0.0.1`. IPv4 multicast and the `192.88.99.0/24` 6to4 relay range are blocked too.diff --git a/.github/workflows/py.test.yml b/.github/workflows/py.test.ymlindex b1c4437c0..4ffb40084 100644--- a/.github/workflows/py.test.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/py.test.yml@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ jobs:- name: Check API keyid: api-key+ env:+ # A pull request from a fork cannot read repository secrets, so the+ # key is missing for a reason no contributor can fix. Skip the way+ # Dependabot does rather than failing their PR.+ IS_FORK_PR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork || false }}run: |if [ -z "$COMPOSIO_API_KEY" ]; thenecho "available=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"@@ -253,6 +258,10 @@ jobs:echo "::notice::Skipping secret-backed Python integration tests for Dependabot; missing COMPOSIO_API_KEY."exit 0fi+ if [ "$IS_FORK_PR" = "true" ]; then+ echo "::notice::Skipping secret-backed Python integration tests for a pull request from a fork; repository secrets are not available to it."+ exit 0+ fiecho "::error::COMPOSIO_API_KEY is not set"exit 1diff --git a/python/composio/utils/url_safety.py b/python/composio/utils/url_safety.pyindex af0ff979a..89608d21e 100644--- a/python/composio/utils/url_safety.py+++ b/python/composio/utils/url_safety.py@@ -47,7 +47,31 @@ _CONNECT_ERRORS = (urllib3.exceptions.NameResolutionError,)+# Ranges that must not be reachable from a user-supplied URL but that+# ``ipaddress.is_global`` does not reject on its own, because it only asks+# whether an address is private. The TypeScript guard blocks the same ones from+# its explicit CIDR list.+_ALSO_BLOCKED_NETWORKS = (+ ipaddress.ip_network("224.0.0.0/4"), # IPv4 multicast+ ipaddress.ip_network("192.88.99.0/24"), # 6to4 relay anycast (RFC 7526)+ ipaddress.ip_network("ff00::/8"), # IPv6 multicast+ ipaddress.ip_network("fec0::/10"), # IPv6 site-local (deprecated)+)+_REDIRECT_STATUS_CODES = frozenset({301, 302, 303, 307, 308})+# Headers that describe a request body, so they have to go when the body does.+# The Fetch standard's "request-body-header name" set, plus the two `requests`+# purges for the same reason (it recomputes both from the body it sends).+_BODY_HEADERS = frozenset(+ {+ "content-encoding",+ "content-language",+ "content-length",+ "content-location",+ "content-type",+ "transfer-encoding",+ }+)_MAX_REDIRECTS = 5@@ -68,6 +92,9 @@ def is_blocked_ip(value: str) -> bool:if embedded_ipv4 is not None:return is_blocked_ip(str(embedded_ipv4))+ if any(address in network for network in _ALSO_BLOCKED_NETWORKS):+ return True+return not address.is_global@@ -143,6 +170,28 @@ def parse_content_length(value: t.Optional[str]) -> t.Optional[int]:return size if size >= 0 else None+def _redirect_rewrite(status_code: int, method: str) -> t.Optional[str]:+ """The method the hop after a redirect uses, or ``None`` to replay as-is.++ A returned method also means the request body goes: these are the Fetch+ standard's redirect rules, which the TypeScript guard applies too and which+ following redirects by hand means applying by hand. ``303`` points at a+ result URL that has no use for the original body, so every method loses it+ and everything but ``HEAD`` becomes a ``GET``; ``301``/``302`` do the same+ to a ``POST`` only; ``307``/``308`` replay both.++ ``requests`` would have applied its own rules in ``resolve_redirects``, and+ they are not quite these: it downgrades ``302`` for every non-``HEAD``+ method, matching what browsers did before ``307`` existed. The two SDKs+ agreeing is worth more than matching that legacy, so the Fetch rules win.+ """+ if status_code == 303:+ return "HEAD" if method == "HEAD" else "GET"+ if status_code in {301, 302} and method == "POST":+ return "GET"+ return None++def safe_request(method: str,url: str,@@ -162,10 +211,17 @@ def safe_request(region redirect). Call sites that require a direct URL should use:func:`safe_get`, which rejects nothing but simply does not follow them.+ Following a redirect by hand also means rewriting the method and body by+ hand; see :func:`_redirect_rewrite` for the rules and why they are the+ Fetch standard's rather than the ones ``requests`` would apply.+:param max_redirects: Hops to follow before giving up.:raises BlockedInternalUrlError: If any hop fails validation, or theredirect chain is longer than ``max_redirects``."""+ # `requests` normalizes the method on the prepared request, and the+ # redirect rules below compare against it, so normalize once up front.+ method = method.upper()body = kwargs.get("data")current_url = url@@ -179,6 +235,26 @@ def safe_request(response.close()current_url = urljoin(current_url, location)+ # The next hop is whatever `Location` says, query string included, so+ # `params` must not be appended to it a second time — that is how+ # `requests` builds a redirected request, and it keeps a query-string+ # credential from being handed to a target that never asked for one.+ kwargs.pop("params", None)++ rewritten_method = _redirect_rewrite(response.status_code, method)+ if rewritten_method is not None:+ method = rewritten_method+ body = None+ for key in ("data", "json", "files"):+ kwargs.pop(key, None)+ if headers := kwargs.get("headers"):+ kwargs["headers"] = {+ name: value+ for name, value in headers.items()+ if name.lower() not in _BODY_HEADERS+ }+ continue+# `requests` rewinds the body itself when it follows a redirect; doing# it manually means doing that too, or a retried upload sends nothing.seek = getattr(body, "seek", None)diff --git a/python/tests/test_url_safety.py b/python/tests/test_url_safety.pyindex 0abbc93ac..73e5eb9d5 100644--- a/python/tests/test_url_safety.py+++ b/python/tests/test_url_safety.py@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport ioimport socket+import typing as tfrom unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patchimport pytest@@ -31,6 +32,19 @@ from composio.utils.url_safety import ("::169.254.169.254","64:ff9b::7f00:1","64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe",+ # Ranges the TypeScript guard's CIDR list blocks, so this one does too.+ "224.0.0.1",+ "233.252.0.1",+ "192.88.99.1",+ "ff02::1",+ "fec0::1",+ # Blocked here already; asserted so the two lists stay comparable.+ "2001::7f00:1",+ "2002:7f00:1::",+ "2002:c0a8:1::",+ "64:ff9b:1::7f00:1",+ "100::1",+ "2001:db8::1",],)def test_blocks_non_public_addresses(address: str) -> None:@@ -45,6 +59,11 @@ def test_blocks_non_public_addresses(address: str) -> None:"2606:4700:4700::1111","::8.8.8.8","64:ff9b::8.8.8.8",+ # Neighbours of the blocked ranges above, so neither list overreaches.+ "2001:4860:4860::8888",+ "2a00:1450:4001:80f::200e",+ "223.255.255.255",+ "192.88.100.1",],)def test_allows_public_addresses(address: str) -> None:@@ -177,6 +196,102 @@ def test_safe_request_follows_validated_redirect(mock_assert, mock_request) -> Nassert body.read() == b"payload"+# What the hop after a redirect is expected to carry: either the original body+# and the headers describing it, or neither.+_REPLAYED: t.Dict[str, t.Any] = {+ "data": b"payload",+ "headers": {"Content-Type": "application/octet-stream", "X-Test": "kept"},+}+_BODILESS: t.Dict[str, t.Any] = {"headers": {"X-Test": "kept"}}+++ ("status_code", "method", "expected_method", "expected_kwargs"),+ [+ (301, "POST", "GET", _BODILESS),+ (301, "PUT", "PUT", _REPLAYED),+ (302, "POST", "GET", _BODILESS),+ (302, "PUT", "PUT", _REPLAYED),+ (303, "POST", "GET", _BODILESS),+ (303, "PUT", "GET", _BODILESS),+ (303, "HEAD", "HEAD", _BODILESS),+ (307, "POST", "POST", _REPLAYED),+ (308, "PUT", "PUT", _REPLAYED),+ ],+)+@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.requests.Session.request")+@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.assert_safe_fetch_target")+def test_safe_request_applies_fetch_redirect_semantics(+ mock_assert,+ mock_request,+ status_code: int,+ method: str,+ expected_method: str,+ expected_kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],+) -> None:+ """The same rules `ssrfSafeFetch` gets from `fetch` in the TypeScript SDK.++ A 303 sends every method to a bodiless result request, 301/302 do that to a+ POST only, and 307/308 replay the original method and body.+ """+ mock_request.side_effect = [+ _response(status_code, "https://example.com/result"),+ _response(200),+ ]++ safe_request(method, "https://example.com/create", **_REPLAYED)++ assert mock_request.call_args_list[1] == call(+ expected_method,+ "https://example.com/result",+ allow_redirects=False,+ **expected_kwargs,+ )+ assert mock_assert.call_args_list[1] == call("https://example.com/result")+++@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.requests.Session.request")+@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.assert_safe_fetch_target")+def test_safe_request_keeps_the_downgrade_across_later_hops(+ mock_assert, mock_request+) -> None:+ """A hop after the 303 must not resurrect the method or the body."""+ mock_request.side_effect = [+ _response(303, "https://example.com/result"),+ _response(307, "https://example.com/final"),+ _response(200),+ ]++ safe_request("POST", "https://example.com/create", **_REPLAYED)++ assert mock_request.call_args_list[2] == call(+ "GET",+ "https://example.com/final",+ allow_redirects=False,+ **_BODILESS,+ )+++@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.requests.Session.request")+@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.assert_safe_fetch_target")+def test_safe_request_does_not_reapply_params_to_the_redirect_target(+ mock_assert, mock_request+) -> None:+ """`Location` carries its own query; re-appending would leak the original."""+ mock_request.side_effect = [+ _response(307, "https://other.example.com/elsewhere"),+ _response(200),+ ]++ safe_request("GET", "https://example.com/download", params={"token": "secret"})++ assert mock_request.call_args_list[1] == call(+ "GET",+ "https://other.example.com/elsewhere",+ allow_redirects=False,+ )++@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.requests.Session.request")@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.assert_safe_fetch_target")def test_safe_request_relative_redirect_is_resolved(mock_assert, mock_request) -> None:diff --git a/ts/packages/core/src/utils/ssrfGuard.node.ts b/ts/packages/core/src/utils/ssrfGuard.node.tsindex 28659925a..24c53073e 100644--- a/ts/packages/core/src/utils/ssrfGuard.node.ts+++ b/ts/packages/core/src/utils/ssrfGuard.node.ts@@ -40,6 +40,56 @@ import {const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;+/**+ * The Fetch standard's "redirect status" set. A 3xx outside it is not a+ * redirect to follow even when it carries a `location` — `304 Not Modified`+ * and `305 Use Proxy` most of all, and following those would replay the+ * request against a target the caller never asked for. The Python guard+ * follows the same set (`_REDIRECT_STATUS_CODES`).+ */+const REDIRECT_STATUS_CODES = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308]);++/**+ * Headers that describe a request body, so they have to go when the body does:+ * the Fetch standard's "request-body-header name" set, plus the two the Python+ * guard also drops because `requests` recomputes them from the body it sends.+ */+const BODY_HEADERS = [+ 'content-encoding',+ 'content-language',+ 'content-length',+ 'content-location',+ 'content-type',+ 'transfer-encoding',+];++/**+ * The method the hop after a redirect uses, or `null` to replay as-is. A+ * returned method also means the request body goes.+ *+ * These are the Fetch standard's redirect rules, which following redirects by+ * hand (`redirect: 'manual'`) means `fetch` never applies for us: `303` points+ * at a result URL that has no use for the original body, so every method loses+ * it and everything but `HEAD` becomes a `GET`; `301`/`302` do the same to a+ * `POST` only; `307`/`308` replay both. Without this, a `303` answering an+ * upload would PUT the payload again at a URL that expects a GET. The Python+ * guard applies the same rules in `safe_request`.+ */+const redirectRewrite = (status: number, method: string): string | null => {+ if (status === 303) return method === 'HEAD' ? 'HEAD' : 'GET';+ if ((status === 301 || status === 302) && method === 'POST') return 'GET';+ return null;+};++const applyRedirectSemantics = (init: RequestInit, status: number): RequestInit => {+ const method = redirectRewrite(status, (init.method ?? 'GET').toUpperCase());+ if (method === null) return init;++ const headers = new Headers(init.headers);+ for (const name of BODY_HEADERS) headers.delete(name);+ return { ...init, method, body: undefined, headers };+};+/*** Whether the runtime would route `url` through an env proxy the SDK cannot* see into. Bun honors proxy environment variables automatically. Node's@@ -77,6 +127,7 @@ const IPV4_BLOCKED_CIDRS: ReadonlyArray<readonly [string, number]> = [['172.16.0.0', 12], // private['192.0.0.0', 24], // IETF protocol assignments['192.0.2.0', 24], // TEST-NET-1+ ['192.88.99.0', 24], // 6to4 relay anycast (deprecated, RFC 7526)['192.168.0.0', 16], // private['198.18.0.0', 15], // benchmarking['198.51.100.0', 24], // TEST-NET-2@@ -146,8 +197,20 @@ const isBlockedIpv6 = (ip: string): boolean => {return isBlockedIpv4Long((((h[6] << 16) >>> 0) | h[7]) >>> 0);}+ // Transition and tunnel ranges. Each one either carries an arbitrary IPv4+ // address in its low bits or is reserved, so a public-looking literal here+ // can still name internal space: `2002:7f00:1::` is 6to4 for `127.0.0.1`.+ // Blocking the whole range rather than decoding it matches the Python guard,+ // where `ipaddress.is_global` already rejects all of them.+ if (h[0] === 0x2001 && (h[1] & 0xfe00) === 0) return true; // IETF protocol assignments 2001::/23 (incl. Teredo)+ if (h[0] === 0x2001 && h[1] === 0x0db8) return true; // documentation 2001:db8::/32+ if (h[0] === 0x2002) return true; // 6to4 2002::/16+ if (h[0] === 0x0064 && h[1] === 0xff9b && h[2] === 0x0001) return true; // local-use NAT64 64:ff9b:1::/48+ if (h[0] === 0x0100 && h[1] === 0 && h[2] === 0 && h[3] === 0) return true; // discard-only 100::/64+if ((h[0] & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00) return true; // unique local fc00::/7if ((h[0] & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80) return true; // link-local fe80::/10+ if ((h[0] & 0xffc0) === 0xfec0) return true; // site-local fec0::/10 (deprecated)if ((h[0] & 0xff00) === 0xff00) return true; // multicast ff00::/8return false;@@ -221,7 +284,8 @@ export const assertSafeFetchTarget = async (rawUrl: string): Promise<string[]> =* connects to the address it validated, and re-validates and re-pins every* redirect hop (redirects are followed manually up to {@link MAX_REDIRECTS}).* Intermediate redirect bodies are cancelled; non-redirect responses are- * returned unchanged.+ * returned unchanged. Each hop carries the method and body the Fetch standard+ * says it should — see {@link applyRedirectSemantics}.** A hop whose effective dispatcher is a configured route (caller-supplied* `init.dispatcher`, non-stock global dispatcher, env-proxy mode) is *not*@@ -233,6 +297,9 @@ export const ssrfSafeFetch = async (maxRedirects: number = MAX_REDIRECTS): Promise<Response> => {let currentUrl = rawUrl;+ // Rebound per hop: a redirect can drop the method and body (see+ // `applyRedirectSemantics`), and the following hops must send what is left.+ let currentInit = init;for (let hop = 0; hop <= maxRedirects; hop++) {const addresses = await assertSafeFetchTarget(currentUrl);@@ -241,7 +308,7 @@ export const ssrfSafeFetch = async (// Pinning replaces the connect target; through a configured route that// would dial the validated origin instead of the route's next hop (the// proxy), so those hops keep the pre-flight check only.- const callerDispatcher = (init as RequestInit & { dispatcher?: unknown }).dispatcher;+ const callerDispatcher = (currentInit as RequestInit & { dispatcher?: unknown }).dispatcher;const respectConfiguredRoute =callerDispatcher !== undefined ||envProxyApplies(new URL(currentUrl), isBun) ||@@ -253,14 +320,18 @@ export const ssrfSafeFetch = async (let response: Response;try {if (isBun && !respectConfiguredRoute) {- response = await pinnedHttpFetch(currentUrl, { ...init, redirect: 'manual' }, addresses);+ response = await pinnedHttpFetch(+ currentUrl,+ { ...currentInit, redirect: 'manual' },+ addresses+ );} else {// `dispatcher` is a Node-only extension to `RequestInit`.response = await fetch(currentUrl,(dispatcher === undefined- ? { ...init, redirect: 'manual' }- : { ...init, redirect: 'manual', dispatcher }) as RequestInit+ ? { ...currentInit, redirect: 'manual' }+ : { ...currentInit, redirect: 'manual', dispatcher }) as RequestInit);}} catch (error) {@@ -277,7 +348,7 @@ export const ssrfSafeFetch = async (}const isRedirect =- response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400 && response.headers.has('location');+ REDIRECT_STATUS_CODES.has(response.status) && response.headers.has('location');if (!isRedirect) {return response;}@@ -287,6 +358,7 @@ export const ssrfSafeFetch = async (await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);currentUrl = new URL(response.headers.get('location')!, currentUrl).toString();+ currentInit = applyRedirectSemantics(currentInit, response.status);}throw new ComposioBlockedInternalUrlError(diff --git a/ts/packages/core/test/utils/ssrfGuard.test.ts b/ts/packages/core/test/utils/ssrfGuard.test.tsindex f73c35f24..f4e4ec642 100644--- a/ts/packages/core/test/utils/ssrfGuard.test.ts+++ b/ts/packages/core/test/utils/ssrfGuard.test.ts@@ -43,13 +43,24 @@ describe('isBlockedIp', () => {'169.254.169.254', // cloud metadata'100.64.0.1', // CGNAT'0.0.0.0',+ '224.0.0.1', // multicast+ '233.252.0.1', // MCAST-TEST-NET+ '192.88.99.1', // 6to4 relay anycast (deprecated)]) {expect(isBlockedIp(ip), ip).toBe(true);}});it('allows public IPv4 addresses', () => {- for (const ip of ['8.8.8.8', '1.1.1.1', '93.184.216.34', '172.15.0.1', '172.32.0.1']) {+ for (const ip of [+ '8.8.8.8',+ '1.1.1.1',+ '93.184.216.34',+ '172.15.0.1',+ '172.32.0.1',+ '223.255.255.255',+ '192.88.100.1',+ ]) {expect(isBlockedIp(ip), ip).toBe(false);}});@@ -75,8 +86,35 @@ describe('isBlockedIp', () => {}});+ it('blocks the transition ranges that carry an arbitrary IPv4 address', () => {+ // A public-looking literal that still names internal space. The Python+ // guard rejects all of these through `ipaddress.is_global`.+ for (const ip of [+ '2002:7f00:1::', // 6to4 for 127.0.0.1+ '2002:c0a8:1::', // 6to4 for 192.168.0.1+ '2002:8080:8080::', // 6to4 for a public address — the range goes as a whole+ '2001::7f00:1', // Teredo 2001::/32+ '2001:2::1', // benchmarking+ '2001:10::1', // ORCHID+ '2001:db8::1', // documentation+ '64:ff9b:1::7f00:1', // local-use NAT64 for 127.0.0.1+ '100::1', // discard-only+ 'fec0::1', // site-local (deprecated)+ ]) {+ expect(isBlockedIp(ip), ip).toBe(true);+ }+ });+it('allows public IPv6 and public IPv4-mapped/compat addresses', () => {- for (const ip of ['2606:4700:4700::1111', '::ffff:8.8.8.8', '::8.8.8.8', '::808:808']) {+ for (const ip of [+ '2606:4700:4700::1111',+ '::ffff:8.8.8.8',+ '::8.8.8.8',+ '::808:808',+ // Neighbours of the ranges above, so the list does not overreach.+ '2001:4860:4860::8888',+ '2a00:1450:4001:80f::200e',+ ]) {expect(isBlockedIp(ip), ip).toBe(false);}});@@ -338,4 +376,81 @@ describe('ssrfSafeFetch', () => {// maxRedirects = 2 => hops 0, 1, 2 are fetched before the budget throws.expect(cancel).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);});++ // `redirect: 'manual'` means `fetch` never applies its own redirect rules, so+ // the guard applies them: a 303 sends every method to a bodiless result+ // request, 301/302 do that to a POST only, and 307/308 replay both. The+ // Python guard follows the same table in `safe_request`.+ it.each([+ { status: 301, method: 'POST', expected: 'GET', replays: false },+ { status: 301, method: 'PUT', expected: 'PUT', replays: true },+ { status: 302, method: 'POST', expected: 'GET', replays: false },+ { status: 302, method: 'PUT', expected: 'PUT', replays: true },+ { status: 303, method: 'POST', expected: 'GET', replays: false },+ { status: 303, method: 'PUT', expected: 'GET', replays: false },+ { status: 303, method: 'HEAD', expected: 'HEAD', replays: false },+ { status: 307, method: 'POST', expected: 'POST', replays: true },+ { status: 308, method: 'PUT', expected: 'PUT', replays: true },+ ])(+ 'sends $method as $expected after a $status',+ async ({ status, method, expected, replays }) => {+ resolvesTo('93.184.216.34');+ mockFetch+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(+ new Response(null, { status, headers: { location: 'https://example.com/result' } })+ )+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response('data', { status: 200 }));++ await ssrfSafeFetch('https://example.com/create', {+ method,+ body: 'payload',+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream', 'X-Test': 'kept' },+ });++ const [url, init] = mockFetch.mock.calls[1];+ expect(url).toBe('https://example.com/result');+ expect(init.method).toBe(expected);+ expect(init.body).toBe(replays ? 'payload' : undefined);+ expect(new Headers(init.headers).get('content-type')).toBe(+ replays ? 'application/octet-stream' : null+ );+ // Only the headers that describe the body go with it.+ expect(new Headers(init.headers).get('x-test')).toBe('kept');+ }+ );++ it('keeps the downgrade across later hops', async () => {+ resolvesTo('93.184.216.34');+ mockFetch+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(+ new Response(null, { status: 303, headers: { location: 'https://example.com/result' } })+ )+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(+ new Response(null, { status: 307, headers: { location: 'https://example.com/final' } })+ )+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response('data', { status: 200 }));++ await ssrfSafeFetch('https://example.com/create', { method: 'POST', body: 'payload' });++ // A 307 replays whatever the request is *now*, not what it started as.+ expect(mockFetch.mock.calls[2][1].method).toBe('GET');+ expect(mockFetch.mock.calls[2][1].body).toBeUndefined();+ });++ it.each([300, 304, 305, 306])(+ 'returns a %i without following its location',+ async (status: number) => {+ resolvesTo('93.184.216.34');+ // Only 301/302/303/307/308 are redirects to follow; a `location` on any+ // other 3xx does not make it one.+ mockFetch.mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(null, { status, headers: { location: 'https://example.com/elsewhere' } })+ );++ const res = await ssrfSafeFetch('https://example.com/file.pdf');++ expect(res.status).toBe(status);+ expect(mockFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);+ }+ );});