Composio powers 1000+ toolkits, tool search, context management, authentication, and a sandboxed workbench to help you build AI agents that turn intent into action.
TypeScript agentic-aiagentsaiai-agentsaiagentsdeveloper-toolsfunction-callinggpt-4javascriptjsllmllmopsmcppythonremote-mcp-serverssetypescript
fix(py): guard URL uploads and redact telemetry (#3823)
Alberto Schiabelc4071feab4d7
diff --git a/python/composio/core/models/_files.py b/python/composio/core/models/_files.pyindex 35985c5a8..f54d0eb2e 100644--- a/python/composio/core/models/_files.py+++ b/python/composio/core/models/_files.py@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from composio.exceptions import ()from composio.utils import mimetypesfrom composio.utils.json_schema import dereference_json_schema+from composio.utils.url_safety import assert_safe_fetch_targetfrom composio.utils.sensitive_file_upload_paths import (assert_safe_local_file_upload_path,)@@ -281,6 +282,8 @@ def _fetch_file_from_url(ResponseTooLargeError: If response exceeds max_sizeErrorUploadingFile: If fetch fails for other reasons"""+ assert_safe_fetch_target(url)+# Make request without following redirectstry:response = requests.get(diff --git a/python/composio/core/models/base.py b/python/composio/core/models/base.pyindex 24b4c2559..43d707573 100644--- a/python/composio/core/models/base.py+++ b/python/composio/core/models/base.py@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import typing as tfrom composio.__version__ import __version__from composio.client import HttpClient+from composio.utils.redaction import redact_sensitive_textfrom composio.utils.logging import WithLoggerfrom ._telemetry import Event, create_event, push_event@@ -56,8 +57,8 @@ def trace_method(method: t.Callable, name: str) -> t.Callable:_, payload = eventpayload["error"] = {"name": e.__class__.__name__,- "message": str(e),- "stack": traceback.format_exc(),+ "message": redact_sensitive_text(str(e)),+ "stack": redact_sensitive_text(traceback.format_exc()),}event = ("error", payload)raise ediff --git a/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py b/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.pyindex 2558f029d..1b990d93c 100644--- a/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py+++ b/python/composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ from composio_client.types.tool_router.session.file_list_response import (from composio.client import HttpClientfrom composio.exceptions import RemoteFileDownloadError, ValidationErrorfrom composio.utils.mimetypes import get_extension_from_mime_type+from composio.utils.url_safety import assert_safe_fetch_targetfrom composio.utils.uuid import generate_short_idDEFAULT_TOOL_ROUTER_SESSION_FILES_MOUNT_ID = "files"@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ def _is_url(value: str) -> bool:def _fetch_from_url(url: str) -> t.Tuple[bytes, str]:"""Fetch file content from URL. Returns (content, mimetype)."""+ assert_safe_fetch_target(url)try:response = requests.get(url,diff --git a/python/composio/exceptions.py b/python/composio/exceptions.pyindex 34286fcf6..f3f2d789b 100644--- a/python/composio/exceptions.py+++ b/python/composio/exceptions.py@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ class ErrorUploadingFile(FileError):pass+class BlockedInternalUrlError(FileError):+ """Raised when a URL file input resolves to a non-public network address."""++class SensitiveFilePathBlockedError(FileError):"""Raised when a local file path is refused before upload (sensitive directory or credential-like name)."""diff --git a/python/composio/utils/redaction.py b/python/composio/utils/redaction.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..c101d601c--- /dev/null+++ b/python/composio/utils/redaction.py@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@+"""Best-effort secret redaction for free-form telemetry text."""++from __future__ import annotations++import re++_REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"+_URL_QUERY = re.compile(r"(\bhttps?://[^\s?#'\"]+)\?[^\s'\"]*", re.IGNORECASE)+_AUTHORIZATION = re.compile(r"\b(bearer|basic)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+", re.IGNORECASE)+_SECRET_PAIR = re.compile(+ r"\b(authorization|api[-_]?key|apikey|x-api-key|access[-_]?token|refresh[-_]?token|client[-_]?secret|secret|password|passwd|pwd)\b(\s*[:=]+\s*)([\"']?)([^\s\"',}&]+)\3",+ re.IGNORECASE,+)+++def redact_sensitive_text(value: str) -> str:+ """Remove common URL, authorization, and key-value secret shapes."""+ value = _URL_QUERY.sub(rf"\1?{_REDACTED}", value)+ value = _AUTHORIZATION.sub(rf"\1 {_REDACTED}", value)+ return _SECRET_PAIR.sub(rf"\1\2\3{_REDACTED}\3", value)diff --git a/python/composio/utils/url_safety.py b/python/composio/utils/url_safety.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..0d68476d5--- /dev/null+++ b/python/composio/utils/url_safety.py@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@+"""SSRF protections for user-supplied URL file inputs."""++from __future__ import annotations++import ipaddress+import socket+from urllib.parse import urlparse++from composio.exceptions import BlockedInternalUrlError+++def is_blocked_ip(value: str) -> bool:+ """Return whether an address is non-publicly-routable."""+ try:+ address = ipaddress.ip_address(value)+ except ValueError:+ return True++ if isinstance(address, ipaddress.IPv6Address):+ embedded_ipv4 = address.ipv4_mapped+ if embedded_ipv4 is None and address.packed[:12] in {+ b"\x00" * 12,+ b"\x00d\xff\x9b" + b"\x00" * 8,+ }:+ embedded_ipv4 = ipaddress.IPv4Address(address.packed[-4:])+ if embedded_ipv4 is not None:+ return is_blocked_ip(str(embedded_ipv4))++ return not address.is_global+++def assert_safe_fetch_target(url: str) -> None:+ """Refuse non-HTTP(S) URLs and hosts that resolve to internal addresses."""+ parsed = urlparse(url)+ if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:+ raise BlockedInternalUrlError("Refusing to fetch a non-http(s) URL")++ try:+ addresses: set[str] = set()+ for result in socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, None):+ address = result[4][0]+ if not isinstance(address, str):+ raise BlockedInternalUrlError(+ f'Could not resolve host "{parsed.hostname}"'+ )+ addresses.add(address)+ except socket.gaierror as error:+ raise BlockedInternalUrlError(+ f'Could not resolve host "{parsed.hostname}"'+ ) from error++ for address in addresses:+ if is_blocked_ip(address):+ raise BlockedInternalUrlError(+ f'Refusing to fetch "{parsed.hostname}" because it resolves to a non-public address'+ )diff --git a/python/tests/test_files.py b/python/tests/test_files.pyindex 4b924b230..bbccb57c2 100644--- a/python/tests/test_files.py+++ b/python/tests/test_files.py@@ -2204,8 +2204,9 @@ class TestTruncateFilename:class TestFetchFileFromUrlWithTruncation:"""Test cases for _fetch_file_from_url with filename truncation."""+ @patch("composio.core.models._files.assert_safe_fetch_target")@patch("composio.core.models._files.requests.get")- def test_fetch_truncates_long_filename(self, mock_get):+ def test_fetch_truncates_long_filename(self, mock_get, _mock_safe_fetch_target):"""Long filenames from URLs should be truncated."""mock_response = MagicMock()mock_response.ok = True@@ -2244,8 +2245,11 @@ class TestFetchFileFromUrlWithTruncation:assert filename == "photo.jpg"+ @patch("composio.core.models._files.assert_safe_fetch_target")@patch("composio.core.models._files.requests.get")- def test_fetch_truncates_after_adding_extension(self, mock_get):+ def test_fetch_truncates_after_adding_extension(+ self, mock_get, _mock_safe_fetch_target+ ):"""Truncation should happen after extension is appended."""mock_response = MagicMock()mock_response.ok = Truediff --git a/python/tests/test_redaction.py b/python/tests/test_redaction.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..ddce4a7ba--- /dev/null+++ b/python/tests/test_redaction.py@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@+"""Tests for telemetry secret redaction."""++from composio.utils.redaction import redact_sensitive_text+++def test_redacts_url_queries_authorization_and_secret_pairs() -> None:+ redacted = redact_sensitive_text(+ "https://example.com/file?signature=secret Bearer token123 api_key=abc password: hunter2"+ )++ assert "signature=secret" not in redacted+ assert "token123" not in redacted+ assert "api_key=abc" not in redacted+ assert "password: hunter2" not in redacted+ assert redacted.count("[REDACTED]") == 4diff --git a/python/tests/test_url_safety.py b/python/tests/test_url_safety.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..17eef45d3--- /dev/null+++ b/python/tests/test_url_safety.py@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@+"""Regression tests for URL file-upload SSRF protections."""++from __future__ import annotations++import socket+from unittest.mock import patch++import pytest++from composio.exceptions import BlockedInternalUrlError+from composio.utils.url_safety import assert_safe_fetch_target, is_blocked_ip+++ "address",+ [+ "127.0.0.1",+ "10.0.0.5",+ "169.254.169.254",+ "100.64.0.1",+ "::1",+ "fc00::1",+ "::ffff:127.0.0.1",+ "::127.0.0.1",+ "::7f00:1",+ "::169.254.169.254",+ "64:ff9b::7f00:1",+ "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe",+ ],+)+def test_blocks_non_public_addresses(address: str) -> None:+ assert is_blocked_ip(address) is True+++ "address",+ [+ "8.8.8.8",+ "93.184.216.34",+ "2606:4700:4700::1111",+ "::8.8.8.8",+ "64:ff9b::8.8.8.8",+ ],+)+def test_allows_public_addresses(address: str) -> None:+ assert is_blocked_ip(address) is False+++ "url", ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://example.com/file", "not a url"]+)+def test_rejects_non_http_urls(url: str) -> None:+ with pytest.raises(BlockedInternalUrlError):+ assert_safe_fetch_target(url)+++@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.socket.getaddrinfo")+def test_rejects_internal_dns_answers(mock_getaddrinfo) -> None:+ mock_getaddrinfo.return_value = [+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0)),+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0)),+ ]++ with pytest.raises(BlockedInternalUrlError):+ assert_safe_fetch_target("https://example.com/file.pdf")+++@patch("composio.utils.url_safety.socket.getaddrinfo")+def test_allows_public_dns_answers(mock_getaddrinfo) -> None:+ mock_getaddrinfo.return_value = [+ (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0)),+ ]++ assert_safe_fetch_target("https://example.com/file.pdf")