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fix(security): prevent path traversal in FileDownloadable.download() (SEC-316)

Zen Agentf60cdf1ebfe3
diff --git a/python/composio/core/models/_files.py b/python/composio/core/models/_files.py
index bef1095b6..b3f6215ce 100644
--- a/python/composio/core/models/_files.py
+++ b/python/composio/core/models/_files.py
@@ -547,8 +547,19 @@ class FileDownloadable(BaseModel):
s3url: str = Field(..., description="URL of the file.")
def download(self, outdir: Path, chunk_size: int = _DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE) -> Path:
- outfile = outdir / self.name
+ # SEC-316: `self.name` comes from the (potentially compromised or
+ # MITM'd) Composio API response. Strip directory components with
+ # `Path(...).name` so traversal sequences like `../../../foo` collapse
+ # to `foo`, then verify the resolved output stays under `outdir` so a
+ # name like `output_evil/foo` (sibling-prefix attack) is also rejected.
+ safe_name = Path(self.name).name
+ outfile = outdir / safe_name
outdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True, parents=True)
+ if not outfile.resolve().is_relative_to(outdir.resolve()):
+ raise ErrorDownloadingFile(
+ f"Path traversal detected: filename '{self.name}' resolves "
+ "outside the intended output directory."
+ )
response = requests.get(url=self.s3url, stream=True)
if response.status_code != 200:
raise ErrorDownloadingFile(f"Error downloading file: {self.s3url}")
diff --git a/python/tests/test_files.py b/python/tests/test_files.py
index 1d26fa958..08672564d 100644
--- a/python/tests/test_files.py
+++ b/python/tests/test_files.py
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import pytest
from composio.client.types import Tool, tool_list_response
from composio.core.models._files import (
+ FileDownloadable,
FileHelper,
FileUploadable,
_is_url,
@@ -1992,3 +1993,78 @@ class TestUrlSanitization:
url = "https://example.com/file.jpg"
sanitized = _sanitize_url_for_logging(url)
assert "[REDACTED]" not in sanitized
+
+
+class TestFileDownloadablePathTraversal:
+ """SEC-316: server-controlled `name` must not escape the output dir."""
+
+ def _mock_response(self, content: bytes = b"data") -> MagicMock:
+ response = MagicMock()
+ response.status_code = 200
+ response.iter_content = lambda chunk_size: [content]
+ return response
+
+ def test_relative_traversal_is_neutralized(self, tmp_path):
+ outdir = tmp_path / "safe"
+ # outdir does not need to exist yet — download() creates it.
+ f = FileDownloadable(
+ name="../../../PWNED.sh",
+ mimetype="application/octet-stream",
+ s3url="https://example.com/file",
+ )
+ with patch("composio.core.models._files.requests.get",
+ return_value=self._mock_response(b"#!/bin/sh\n")):
+ written = f.download(outdir)
+
+ # Traversal sequence collapsed to basename and stayed inside outdir.
+ assert written == outdir / "PWNED.sh"
+ assert written.resolve().is_relative_to(outdir.resolve())
+ assert not (tmp_path / "PWNED.sh").exists()
+ assert written.read_bytes() == b"#!/bin/sh\n"
+
+ def test_absolute_path_is_neutralized(self, tmp_path):
+ outdir = tmp_path / "safe"
+ f = FileDownloadable(
+ name="/etc/passwd",
+ mimetype="application/octet-stream",
+ s3url="https://example.com/file",
+ )
+ with patch("composio.core.models._files.requests.get",
+ return_value=self._mock_response(b"x")):
+ written = f.download(outdir)
+
+ # `Path('/etc/passwd').name == 'passwd'` — absolute path is stripped.
+ assert written == outdir / "passwd"
+ assert written.resolve().is_relative_to(outdir.resolve())
+
+ def test_dotdot_only_name_is_rejected(self, tmp_path):
+ """`Path('..').name == '..'`. Basename strip alone wouldn't catch it,
+ but the second-line `is_relative_to()` check does."""
+ from composio.exceptions import ErrorDownloadingFile
+
+ outdir = tmp_path / "safe"
+ f = FileDownloadable(
+ name="..",
+ mimetype="application/octet-stream",
+ s3url="https://example.com/file",
+ )
+ with patch("composio.core.models._files.requests.get",
+ return_value=self._mock_response()):
+ with pytest.raises(ErrorDownloadingFile, match="Path traversal detected"):
+ f.download(outdir)
+ # No file was written under the parent.
+ assert not (tmp_path / "x").exists()
+
+ def test_safe_filename_passes_through(self, tmp_path):
+ outdir = tmp_path / "safe"
+ f = FileDownloadable(
+ name="report.pdf",
+ mimetype="application/pdf",
+ s3url="https://example.com/file",
+ )
+ with patch("composio.core.models._files.requests.get",
+ return_value=self._mock_response(b"%PDF-1.4")):
+ written = f.download(outdir)
+
+ assert written == outdir / "report.pdf"
+ assert written.read_bytes() == b"%PDF-1.4"