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fix(database): tighten Postgres init script filename handling
Andras Bacsaia05d4e3a4b02
diff --git a/app/Actions/Database/StartPostgresql.php b/app/Actions/Database/StartPostgresql.phpindex 81cffeb940..52ff64ebfc 100644--- a/app/Actions/Database/StartPostgresql.php+++ b/app/Actions/Database/StartPostgresql.php@@ -301,9 +301,18 @@ class StartPostgresqlforeach ($this->database->init_scripts as $init_script) {$filename = data_get($init_script, 'filename');$content = data_get($init_script, 'content');++ // Normalise filename without rejecting legacy values so previously created+ // init scripts keep deploying. basename() strips any directory components+ // (path traversal) and escapeshellarg() contains every shell metacharacter+ // in the tee target. Livewire / API validate new filenames up front.+ $filename = basename((string) $filename);++ $target_path = "$this->configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$filename}";+ $escaped_target = escapeshellarg($target_path);$content_base64 = base64_encode($content);- $this->commands[] = "echo '{$content_base64}' | base64 -d | tee $this->configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$filename} > /dev/null";- $this->init_scripts[] = "$this->configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$filename}";+ $this->commands[] = "echo '{$content_base64}' | base64 -d | tee {$escaped_target} > /dev/null";+ $this->init_scripts[] = $target_path;}}diff --git a/app/Livewire/Project/Database/Postgresql/General.php b/app/Livewire/Project/Database/Postgresql/General.phpindex a9a4115fd1..b5fb854838 100644--- a/app/Livewire/Project/Database/Postgresql/General.php+++ b/app/Livewire/Project/Database/Postgresql/General.php@@ -358,9 +358,14 @@ class General extends Componentif ($oldScript && $oldScript['filename'] !== $script['filename']) {try {- // Validate and escape filename to prevent command injection- validateShellSafePath($oldScript['filename'], 'init script filename');- $old_file_path = "$configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$oldScript['filename']}";+ // New filename is user-supplied — must be safe before accepting the rename.+ validateFilenameSafe($script['filename'], 'init script filename');++ // Old filename may be a legacy value written before this validation existed.+ // basename() scopes the rm to the initdb.d directory; escapeshellarg() contains+ // any remaining shell-metachars. No validator — don't block cleanup of legacy rows.+ $old_filename = basename($oldScript['filename']);+ $old_file_path = "$configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$old_filename}";$escapedOldPath = escapeshellarg($old_file_path);$delete_command = "rm -f {$escapedOldPath}";instant_remote_process([$delete_command], $this->server);@@ -404,9 +409,11 @@ class General extends Component$configuration_dir = database_configuration_dir().'/'.$container_name;try {- // Validate and escape filename to prevent command injection- validateShellSafePath($script['filename'], 'init script filename');- $file_path = "$configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$script['filename']}";+ // Allow deletion of legacy rows with unsafe filenames so operators can clean up.+ // basename() scopes the rm to the initdb.d directory; escapeshellarg() keeps the+ // shell invocation safe regardless of the stored value.+ $safe_filename = basename($script['filename']);+ $file_path = "$configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$safe_filename}";$escapedPath = escapeshellarg($file_path);$command = "rm -f {$escapedPath}";@@ -443,8 +450,8 @@ class General extends Component]);try {- // Validate filename to prevent command injection- validateShellSafePath($this->new_filename, 'init script filename');+ // Validate filename to prevent path traversal and command injection+ validateFilenameSafe($this->new_filename, 'init script filename');} catch (Exception $e) {$this->dispatch('error', $e->getMessage());diff --git a/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php b/bootstrap/helpers/shared.phpindex 77ca64fbda..881211513d 100644--- a/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php+++ b/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php@@ -157,6 +157,73 @@ function validateShellSafePath(string $input, string $context = 'path'): stringreturn $input;}+/**+ * Validate that a filename is safe for use as a plain file name (no path components).+ *+ * Prevents path traversal attacks by rejecting directory separators, traversal+ * sequences, and null bytes, in addition to all shell metacharacters blocked by+ * validateShellSafePath(). Intended for user-supplied filenames such as PostgreSQL+ * init script names that are later written to a specific directory on the host.+ *+ * @param string $input The filename to validate+ * @param string $context Descriptive name for error messages (e.g., 'init script filename')+ * @return string The validated input (unchanged if valid)+ *+ * @throws Exception If dangerous characters or path traversal sequences are detected+ */+function validateFilenameSafe(string $input, string $context = 'filename'): string+{+ // First apply shell-metachar checks+ validateShellSafePath($input, $context);++ // Reject NUL bytes (can be used to truncate path strings in some contexts)+ if (str_contains($input, "\0")) {+ throw new Exception(+ "Invalid {$context}: contains null byte. ".+ 'Null bytes are not allowed in filenames for security reasons.'+ );+ }++ // Reject directory separators — filename must be a single path component+ if (str_contains($input, '/') || str_contains($input, '\\')) {+ throw new Exception(+ "Invalid {$context}: directory separators ('/' or '\\') are not allowed. ".+ 'Provide a plain filename without path components.'+ );+ }++ // Reject path traversal sequences (catches encoded or unusual forms)+ if (str_contains($input, '..')) {+ throw new Exception(+ "Invalid {$context}: path traversal sequence ('..') is not allowed."+ );+ }++ // Reject shell globbing / expansion metacharacters and whitespace that would+ // split the filename into additional shell arguments if ever interpolated+ // unquoted (defence in depth on top of escapeshellarg() at call sites).+ $shellExpansionChars = [+ ' ' => 'whitespace',+ '*' => 'glob wildcard',+ '?' => 'glob wildcard',+ '[' => 'glob character class',+ ']' => 'glob character class',+ '~' => 'tilde expansion',+ '"' => 'double quote',+ "'" => 'single quote',+ ];++ foreach ($shellExpansionChars as $char => $description) {+ if (str_contains($input, $char)) {+ throw new Exception(+ "Invalid {$context}: contains forbidden character '{$char}' ({$description})."+ );+ }+ }++ return $input;+}+/*** Validate that a databases_to_backup input string is safe from command injection.*diff --git a/tests/Unit/PostgresqlInitScriptSecurityTest.php b/tests/Unit/PostgresqlInitScriptSecurityTest.phpindex 4f74b13a4d..2f85d11565 100644--- a/tests/Unit/PostgresqlInitScriptSecurityTest.php+++ b/tests/Unit/PostgresqlInitScriptSecurityTest.php@@ -74,3 +74,69 @@ test('postgresql init script accepts legitimate filenames', function () {expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath('setup_db.sql', 'init script filename'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);});++// Path traversal — GHSA-mv4c-9x67-rrmv regression tests+test('postgresql init script rejects path traversal with ../ sequence', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../../../etc/cron.d/pwn', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script rejects path traversal targeting /etc/cron.d', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../../../../../etc/cron.d/k4zrce', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script rejects absolute path', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('/etc/passwd', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script rejects filename with forward slash', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('subdir/evil.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script rejects filename with backslash', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('subdir\\evil.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script rejects double-dot without slashes', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('..', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script rejects null byte injection', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe("init.sql\0../../etc/passwd", 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('postgresql init script accepts legitimate filenames via validateFilenameSafe', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);++ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('01_schema.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);++ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init-script.sh', 'init script filename'))+ ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++// Write-site defence — basename() + escapeshellarg() keep legacy/bad rows safe+test('basename() strips path traversal from legacy filenames at write site', function () {+ expect(basename('../../../etc/cron.d/pwn'))->toBe('pwn');+ expect(basename('/etc/passwd'))->toBe('passwd');+ expect(basename('subdir/evil.sql'))->toBe('evil.sql');+});++test('escapeshellarg() neutralises shell metacharacters in tee target', function () {+ // Simulates how StartPostgresql::generate_init_scripts() builds the tee argument+ $configuration_dir = '/data/coolify/databases/abc123';+ $legacy_filename = basename('foo bar*.sql;rm -rf /');+ $target = "$configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$legacy_filename}";+ $escaped = escapeshellarg($target);++ // Single-quoted in POSIX sh means no expansion / no extra args regardless of contents.+ expect($escaped)->toStartWith("'")->toEndWith("'");+ expect($escaped)->toContain('foo bar*.sql;rm -rf');+});diff --git a/tests/Unit/ValidateFilenameSafeTest.php b/tests/Unit/ValidateFilenameSafeTest.phpnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..012059e050--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/Unit/ValidateFilenameSafeTest.php@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@+<?php++test('allows plain filenames without special characters', function () {+ $validNames = [+ 'init.sql',+ '01_schema.sql',+ 'setup-db.sql',+ 'create_test_db.sql',+ 'init-script.sh',+ 'UPPERCASE.SQL',+ 'mixed_Case-File.sql',+ 'file123.sql',+ 'a',+ ];++ foreach ($validNames as $name) {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe($name, 'init script filename'))+ ->not->toThrow(Exception::class, "Expected '{$name}' to pass");+ }+});++test('rejects path traversal with ../', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../../../etc/cron.d/pwn', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects path traversal with .. alone', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('..', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects path traversal embedded in filename', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo..bar', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects forward slash directory separator', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo/bar.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects backslash directory separator', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo\\bar.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects absolute path starting with slash', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('/etc/passwd', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects absolute Windows-style path', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects null byte injection', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe("init.sql\0../../etc/passwd", 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects shell command substitution (inherits from validateShellSafePath)', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('$(whoami).sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects backtick command substitution', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('`id`.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects semicolon command separator', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql;rm -rf /', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects pipe operator', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql|whoami', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects redirect operators', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql>/etc/passwd', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects mixed traversal and shell injection', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../etc/cron.d/$(id)', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('error message contains context string', function () {+ try {+ validateFilenameSafe('../evil', 'init script filename');+ expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown');+ } catch (Exception $e) {+ expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('init script filename');+ }+});++test('handles empty string without throwing', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('', 'init script filename'))+ ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects whitespace inside filename (would split into extra tee arg)', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo bar.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects glob wildcards', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init*.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);++ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init?.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects glob character class brackets', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init[abc].sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects tilde expansion', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('~/evil.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);++ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('~root', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});++test('rejects single and double quotes', function () {+ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe("foo'bar.sql", 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);++ expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo"bar.sql', 'init script filename'))+ ->toThrow(Exception::class);+});