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chore(logs): simplify log viewer XSS tests
Andras Bacsaicb6a2de5297e
diff --git a/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php b/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.phpindex 84463c17a5..bc1c3c634d 100644--- a/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php+++ b/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php@@ -115,10 +115,6 @@const range = selection.getRangeAt(0);return logsContainer.contains(range.commonAncestorContainer);},- decodeHtml(text) {- const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(text, 'text/html');- return doc.documentElement.textContent;- },highlightText(el, text, query) {if (this.hasActiveLogSelection()) return;@@ -436,14 +432,14 @@$lineContent = (isset($line['command']) && $line['command'] ? '[CMD]: ' : '') . trim($line['line']);$searchableContent = $line['timestamp'] . ' ' . $lineContent;@endphp- <div data-log-line data-log-content="{{ htmlspecialchars($searchableContent) }}"+ <div data-log-line data-log-content="{{ $searchableContent }}"@class(['mt-2' => isset($line['command']) && $line['command'],'flex gap-2 log-line',])><span x-show="showTimestamps"class="shrink-0 text-gray-500">{{ $line['timestamp'] }}</span>- <span data-line-text="{{ htmlspecialchars($lineContent) }}"+ <span data-line-text="{{ $lineContent }}"@class(['text-success dark:text-warning' => $line['hidden'],'text-red-500' => $line['stderr'],diff --git a/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php b/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.phpindex f5bc24fb8c..39938c4dfa 100644--- a/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php+++ b/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php@@ -139,10 +139,6 @@const range = selection.getRangeAt(0);return logsContainer.contains(range.commonAncestorContainer);},- decodeHtml(text) {- const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(text, 'text/html');- return doc.documentElement.textContent;- },applySearch() {const logs = document.getElementById('logs');if (!logs) return;diff --git a/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php b/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.phpindex 98c5df3f16..0c682c13c5 100644--- a/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php+++ b/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php@@ -1,427 +1,77 @@<?php-/**- * Security tests for log viewer XSS prevention- *- * These tests verify that the log viewer components properly sanitize- * HTML content to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.- */-describe('Log Viewer XSS Prevention', function () {- it('escapes script tags in log output', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<script>');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<script>');- });-- it('escapes event handler attributes', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<img src=x onerror="alert(\'XSS\')">';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<img');- expect($escaped)->toContain('onerror');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('onerror="alert');- });-- it('escapes javascript: protocol URLs', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<a href="javascript:alert(\'XSS\')">click</a>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<a');- expect($escaped)->toContain('javascript:');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<a href=');- });-- it('escapes data: URLs with scripts', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<iframe src="data:text/html,<script>alert(\'XSS\')</script>">';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<iframe');- expect($escaped)->toContain('data:');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<iframe');- });-- it('escapes style-based XSS attempts', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<div style="background:url(\'javascript:alert(1)\')">test</div>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<div');- expect($escaped)->toContain('style');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div style=');- });-- it('escapes Alpine.js directive injection', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<div x-html="alert(\'XSS\')">test</div>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<div');- expect($escaped)->toContain('x-html');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div x-html=');- });-- it('escapes multiple HTML entities', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<>&"\'';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toBe('<>&"'');- });-- it('preserves legitimate text content', function () {- $legitimateLog = 'INFO: Application started successfully';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($legitimateLog);-- expect($escaped)->toBe($legitimateLog);- });-- it('handles ANSI color codes after escaping', function () {- $logWithAnsi = "\e[31mERROR:\e[0m Something went wrong";- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($logWithAnsi);-- // ANSI codes should be preserved in escaped form- expect($escaped)->toContain('ERROR');- expect($escaped)->toContain('Something went wrong');- });-- it('escapes complex nested HTML structures', function () {- $maliciousLog = '<div onclick="alert(1)"><img src=x onerror="alert(2)"><script>alert(3)</script></div>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<div');- expect($escaped)->toContain('<img');- expect($escaped)->toContain('<script>');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<script>');- });-});--/**- * Tests for x-text security approach- *- * These tests verify that using x-text instead of x-html eliminates XSS risks- * by rendering all content as plain text rather than HTML.- */-describe('x-text Security', function () {- it('verifies x-text renders content as plain text, not HTML', function () {- // x-text always renders as textContent, never as innerHTML- // This means any HTML tags in the content are displayed as literal text- $contentWithHtml = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($contentWithHtml);-- // When stored in data attribute and rendered with x-text:- // 1. Server escapes to: <script>alert("XSS")</script>- // 2. Browser decodes the attribute value to: <script>alert("XSS")</script>- // 3. x-text renders it as textContent (plain text), NOT innerHTML- // 4. Result: User sees "<script>alert("XSS")</script>" as text, script never executes-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<script>');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<script>');- });-- it('confirms x-text prevents Alpine.js directive injection', function () {- $maliciousContent = '<div x-data="{ evil: true }" x-html="alert(1)">test</div>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousContent);-- // Even if attacker includes Alpine directives in log content:- // 1. Server escapes them- // 2. x-text renders as plain text- // 3. Alpine never processes these as directives- // 4. User just sees the literal text-- expect($escaped)->toContain('x-data');- expect($escaped)->toContain('x-html');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div x-data=');- });-- it('verifies x-text prevents event handler execution', function () {- $maliciousContent = '<img src=x onerror="alert(\'XSS\')">';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousContent);-- // With x-text approach:- // 1. Content is escaped on server- // 2. Rendered as textContent, not innerHTML- // 3. No HTML parsing means no event handlers- // 4. User sees the literal text, no image is rendered, no event fires-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<img');- expect($escaped)->toContain('onerror');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img');- });-- it('verifies x-text prevents style-based attacks', function () {- $maliciousContent = '<style>body { display: none; }</style>';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousContent);-- // x-text renders everything as text:- // 1. Style tags never get parsed as HTML- // 2. CSS never gets applied- // 3. User just sees the literal style tag content+function renderedDataLineTextValue(string $logContent): string+{+ $escapedContent = e($logContent);+ $html = '<span data-line-text="'.$escapedContent.'">'.$escapedContent.'</span>';- expect($escaped)->toContain('<style>');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<style>');- });-- it('confirms CSS class-based highlighting is safe', function () {- // New approach uses CSS classes for highlighting instead of injecting HTML- // The 'log-highlight' class is applied via Alpine.js :class binding- // This is safe because:- // 1. Class names are controlled by JavaScript, not user input- // 2. No HTML injection occurs- // 3. CSS provides visual feedback without executing code-- $highlightClass = 'log-highlight';- expect($highlightClass)->toBe('log-highlight');- expect($highlightClass)->not->toContain('<');- expect($highlightClass)->not->toContain('script');- });-- it('verifies granular highlighting only marks matching text', function () {- // splitTextForHighlight() divides text into parts- // Only matching portions get highlight: true- // Each part is rendered with x-text (safe plain text)- // Highlight class applied only to matching spans+ $document = new DOMDocument;+ $document->loadHTML($html, LIBXML_HTML_NOIMPLIED | LIBXML_HTML_NODEFDTD);- $logLine = 'ERROR: Database connection failed';- $searchQuery = 'ERROR';+ return $document->documentElement->getAttribute('data-line-text');+}- // When searching for "ERROR":- // Part 1: { text: "ERROR", highlight: true } <- highlighted- // Part 2: { text: ": Database connection failed", highlight: false } <- not highlighted+describe('Log Viewer HTML Tag Preservation', function () {+ it('lets Blade escape deployment log data attributes only once', function () {+ $view = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php');- // This ensures only the search term is highlighted, not the entire line- expect($logLine)->toContain($searchQuery);- expect(strlen($searchQuery))->toBeLessThan(strlen($logLine));+ expect($view)+ ->toContain('data-log-content="{{ $searchableContent }}"')+ ->toContain('data-line-text="{{ $lineContent }}"')+ ->not->toContain('data-log-content="{{ htmlspecialchars($searchableContent) }}"')+ ->not->toContain('data-line-text="{{ htmlspecialchars($lineContent) }}"');});-});-/**- * Integration documentation tests- *- * These tests document the expected flow of log sanitization with x-text- */-describe('Log Sanitization Flow with x-text', function () {- it('documents the secure x-text rendering flow', function () {- $rawLog = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';+ it('preserves literal html-like log text for client-side search reset and highlighting', function () {+ $logContent = '<div>A</div>';- // Step 1: Server-side escaping (PHP)- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($rawLog);- expect($escaped)->toBe('<script>alert("XSS")</script>');-- // Step 2: Stored in data-log-content attribute- // <div data-log-content="<script>alert("XSS")</script>" x-text="getDisplayText($el.dataset.logContent)">-- // Step 3: Client-side getDisplayText() decodes HTML entities- // const decoded = doc.documentElement.textContent;- // Result: '<script>alert("XSS")</script>' (as text string)-- // Step 4: x-text renders as textContent (NOT innerHTML)- // Alpine.js sets element.textContent = decoded- // Result: Browser displays '<script>alert("XSS")</script>' as visible text- // The script tag is never parsed or executed - it's just text-- // Step 5: Highlighting via CSS class- // If search query matches, 'log-highlight' class is added- // Visual feedback is provided through CSS, not HTML injection+ expect(renderedDataLineTextValue($logContent))->toBe($logContent);});- it('documents search highlighting with CSS classes', function () {- $legitimateLog = '2024-01-01T12:00:00.000Z ERROR: Database connection failed';-- // Server-side: Escape and store- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($legitimateLog);- expect($escaped)->toBe($legitimateLog); // No special chars-- // Client-side: If user searches for "ERROR"- // 1. splitTextForHighlight() divides the text into parts:- // - Part 1: "2024-01-01T12:00:00.000Z " (highlight: false)- // - Part 2: "ERROR" (highlight: true) <- This part gets highlighted- // - Part 3: ": Database connection failed" (highlight: false)- // 2. Each part is rendered as a <span> with x-text (safe)- // 3. Only Part 2 gets the 'log-highlight' class via :class binding- // 4. CSS provides yellow/warning background color on "ERROR" only- // 5. No HTML injection occurs - just multiple safe text spans+ it('does not strip tags with DOMParser based html decoding', function () {+ $views = [+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php',+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php',+ ];- expect($legitimateLog)->toContain('ERROR');- });-- it('verifies no HTML injection occurs during search', function () {- $logWithHtml = 'User input: <img src=x onerror="alert(1)">';- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($logWithHtml);-- // Even if log contains malicious HTML:- // 1. Server escapes it- // 2. x-text renders as plain text- // 3. Search highlighting uses CSS class, not HTML tags- // 4. User sees the literal text with highlight background- // 5. No script execution possible-- expect($escaped)->toContain('<img');- expect($escaped)->toContain('onerror');- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img src=');- });-- it('documents that user search queries cannot inject HTML', function () {- // User search query is only used in:- // 1. String matching (includes() check) - safe- // 2. CSS class application - safe (class name is hardcoded)- // 3. Match counting - safe (just text comparison)-- // User query is NOT used in:- // 1. HTML generation - eliminated by switching to x-text- // 2. innerHTML assignment - x-text uses textContent only- // 3. DOM manipulation - only CSS classes are applied-- $userSearchQuery = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';-- // The search query is used in matchesSearch() which does:- // line.toLowerCase().includes(this.searchQuery.toLowerCase())- // This is safe string comparison, no HTML parsing-- expect($userSearchQuery)->toContain('<script>');- // But it's only used for string matching, never rendered as HTML+ foreach ($views as $view) {+ expect(file_get_contents($view))+ ->not->toContain('decodeHtml(text)')+ ->not->toContain('DOMParser().parseFromString');+ }});});-/**- * Tests for DoS prevention in HTML entity decoding- *- * These tests verify that the decodeHtml() function in the client-side JavaScript- * has proper safeguards against deeply nested HTML entities that could cause DoS.- */-describe('HTML Entity Decoding DoS Prevention', function () {- it('documents the DoS vulnerability with unbounded decoding', function () {- // Without a max iteration limit, an attacker could provide deeply nested entities:- // &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp; (10 levels deep)- // Each iteration decodes one level, causing excessive CPU usage-- $normalEntity = '&lt;script>';- // Normal case: 2-3 iterations to fully decode- expect($normalEntity)->toContain('&');- });-- it('verifies max iteration limit prevents DoS', function () {- // The decodeHtml() function should have a maxIterations constant (e.g., 3)- // This ensures even with deeply nested entities, decoding stops after 3 iterations- // Preventing CPU exhaustion from malicious input-- $deeplyNested = '&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;';- // With max 3 iterations, only first 3 levels decoded- // Remaining nesting is preserved but doesn't cause DoS-- // This test documents that the limit exists- expect(strlen($deeplyNested))->toBeGreaterThan(10);- });-- it('documents normal use cases work within iteration limit', function () {- // Legitimate double-encoding (common in logs): &lt;- // Iteration 1: &<- // Iteration 2: <- // Total: 2 iterations (well within limit of 3)-- $doubleEncoded = '&lt;script&gt;';- expect($doubleEncoded)->toContain('&');-- // Triple-encoding (rare but possible): &amp;lt;- // Iteration 1: &<- // Iteration 2: &<- // Iteration 3: <- // Total: 3 iterations (exactly at limit)-- $tripleEncoded = '&amp;lt;div&amp;gt;';- expect($tripleEncoded)->toContain('&amp;');- });-- it('documents that iteration limit is sufficient for real-world logs', function () {- // Analysis of real-world log encoding scenarios:- // 1. Single encoding: 1 iteration- // 2. Double encoding (logs passed through multiple systems): 2 iterations- // 3. Triple encoding (rare edge case): 3 iterations- // 4. Beyond triple encoding: Likely malicious or severely misconfigured-- // The maxIterations = 3 provides:- // - Protection against DoS attacks- // - Support for all legitimate use cases- // - Predictable performance characteristics-- expect(3)->toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3); // Max iterations covers all legitimate cases- });-- it('verifies decoding stops at max iterations even with malicious input', function () {- // With maxIterations = 3, decoding flow:- // Input: &amp;amp;amp;amp; (5 levels)- // Iteration 1: &amp;amp;amp;- // Iteration 2: &amp;amp;- // Iteration 3: &amp;- // Stop: Max iterations reached- // Output: & (partially decoded, but safe from DoS)-- $maliciousInput = str_repeat('&', 10).'lt;script>';- // Even with 10 levels of nesting, function stops at 3 iterations- expect(strlen($maliciousInput))->toBeGreaterThan(50);- // The point is NOT that we fully decode it, but that we don't loop forever- });-- it('confirms while loop condition includes iteration check', function () {- // The vulnerable code was:- // while (decoded !== prev) { ... }- //- // The fixed code should be:- // while (decoded !== prev && iterations < maxIterations) { ... }- //- // This ensures the loop ALWAYS terminates after maxIterations+describe('Log Viewer XSS Prevention', function () {+ it('keeps script-like log output as text in Blade rendered markup', function () {+ $maliciousLog = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';+ $escapedLog = e($maliciousLog);- $condition = 'iterations < maxIterations';- expect($condition)->toContain('maxIterations');- expect($condition)->toContain('<');+ expect($escapedLog)+ ->toContain('<script>')+ ->not->toContain('<script>');});- it('documents performance impact of iteration limit', function () {- // Without limit:- // - Malicious input: 1000+ iterations, seconds of CPU time- // - DoS attack possible with relatively small payloads- //- // With limit (maxIterations = 3):- // - Malicious input: 3 iterations max, milliseconds of CPU time- // - DoS attack prevented, performance predictable+ it('keeps dangerous attributes as literal dataset text for textContent rendering', function () {+ $maliciousLog = '<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">';- $maxIterations = 3;- $worstCaseOps = $maxIterations * 2; // DOMParser + textContent per iteration- expect($worstCaseOps)->toBeLessThan(10); // Very low computational cost+ expect(renderedDataLineTextValue($maliciousLog))->toBe($maliciousLog);});- it('verifies iteration counter increments correctly', function () {- // The implementation should:- // 1. Initialize: let iterations = 0;- // 2. Check: while (... && iterations < maxIterations)- // 3. Increment: iterations++;- //- // This ensures the counter actually prevents infinite loops-- $initialValue = 0;- $increment = 1;- $maxValue = 3;-- expect($initialValue)->toBe(0);- expect($increment)->toBe(1);- expect($maxValue)->toBeGreaterThan($initialValue);- });+ it('uses text nodes for search highlighting instead of injected html', function () {+ $views = [+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php',+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php',+ ];- it('confirms fix addresses the security advisory correctly', function () {- // Security advisory states:- // "decodeHtml() function uses a loop that could be exploited with- // deeply nested HTML entities, potentially causing performance issues or DoS"- //- // Fix applied:- // 1. Add maxIterations constant (value: 3)- // 2. Add iterations counter- // 3. Update while condition to include iteration check- // 4. Increment counter in loop body- //- // This directly addresses the vulnerability+ foreach ($views as $view) {+ $contents = file_get_contents($view);- $vulnerabilityFixed = true;- expect($vulnerabilityFixed)->toBeTrue();+ expect($contents)+ ->toContain('document.createTextNode')+ ->toContain('mark.textContent')+ ->not->toContain('innerHTML')+ ->not->toContain('x-html');+ }});});