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chore(logs): simplify log viewer XSS tests

Andras Bacsaicb6a2de5297e
diff --git a/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php b/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php
index 84463c17a5..bc1c3c634d 100644
--- a/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php
+++ b/resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php
@@ -115,10 +115,6 @@
const range = selection.getRangeAt(0);
return logsContainer.contains(range.commonAncestorContainer);
},
- decodeHtml(text) {
- const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(text, 'text/html');
- return doc.documentElement.textContent;
- },
highlightText(el, text, query) {
if (this.hasActiveLogSelection()) return;
@@ -436,14 +432,14 @@
$lineContent = (isset($line['command']) && $line['command'] ? '[CMD]: ' : '') . trim($line['line']);
$searchableContent = $line['timestamp'] . ' ' . $lineContent;
@endphp
- <div data-log-line data-log-content="{{ htmlspecialchars($searchableContent) }}"
+ <div data-log-line data-log-content="{{ $searchableContent }}"
@class([
'mt-2' => isset($line['command']) && $line['command'],
'flex gap-2 log-line',
])>
<span x-show="showTimestamps"
class="shrink-0 text-gray-500">{{ $line['timestamp'] }}</span>
- <span data-line-text="{{ htmlspecialchars($lineContent) }}"
+ <span data-line-text="{{ $lineContent }}"
@class([
'text-success dark:text-warning' => $line['hidden'],
'text-red-500' => $line['stderr'],
diff --git a/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php b/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php
index f5bc24fb8c..39938c4dfa 100644
--- a/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php
+++ b/resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php
@@ -139,10 +139,6 @@
const range = selection.getRangeAt(0);
return logsContainer.contains(range.commonAncestorContainer);
},
- decodeHtml(text) {
- const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(text, 'text/html');
- return doc.documentElement.textContent;
- },
applySearch() {
const logs = document.getElementById('logs');
if (!logs) return;
diff --git a/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php b/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php
index 98c5df3f16..0c682c13c5 100644
--- a/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php
+++ b/tests/Unit/LogViewerXssSecurityTest.php
@@ -1,427 +1,77 @@
<?php
-/**
- * Security tests for log viewer XSS prevention
- *
- * These tests verify that the log viewer components properly sanitize
- * HTML content to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
- */
-describe('Log Viewer XSS Prevention', function () {
- it('escapes script tags in log output', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;script&gt;');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<script>');
- });
-
- it('escapes event handler attributes', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<img src=x onerror="alert(\'XSS\')">';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;img');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('onerror');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('onerror="alert');
- });
-
- it('escapes javascript: protocol URLs', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<a href="javascript:alert(\'XSS\')">click</a>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;a');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('javascript:');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<a href=');
- });
-
- it('escapes data: URLs with scripts', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<iframe src="data:text/html,<script>alert(\'XSS\')</script>">';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;iframe');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('data:');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<iframe');
- });
-
- it('escapes style-based XSS attempts', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<div style="background:url(\'javascript:alert(1)\')">test</div>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;div');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('style');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div style=');
- });
-
- it('escapes Alpine.js directive injection', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<div x-html="alert(\'XSS\')">test</div>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;div');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('x-html');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div x-html=');
- });
-
- it('escapes multiple HTML entities', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<>&"\'';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toBe('&lt;&gt;&amp;&quot;&#039;');
- });
-
- it('preserves legitimate text content', function () {
- $legitimateLog = 'INFO: Application started successfully';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($legitimateLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toBe($legitimateLog);
- });
-
- it('handles ANSI color codes after escaping', function () {
- $logWithAnsi = "\e[31mERROR:\e[0m Something went wrong";
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($logWithAnsi);
-
- // ANSI codes should be preserved in escaped form
- expect($escaped)->toContain('ERROR');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('Something went wrong');
- });
-
- it('escapes complex nested HTML structures', function () {
- $maliciousLog = '<div onclick="alert(1)"><img src=x onerror="alert(2)"><script>alert(3)</script></div>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousLog);
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;div');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;img');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;script&gt;');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<script>');
- });
-});
-
-/**
- * Tests for x-text security approach
- *
- * These tests verify that using x-text instead of x-html eliminates XSS risks
- * by rendering all content as plain text rather than HTML.
- */
-describe('x-text Security', function () {
- it('verifies x-text renders content as plain text, not HTML', function () {
- // x-text always renders as textContent, never as innerHTML
- // This means any HTML tags in the content are displayed as literal text
- $contentWithHtml = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($contentWithHtml);
-
- // When stored in data attribute and rendered with x-text:
- // 1. Server escapes to: &lt;script&gt;alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)&lt;/script&gt;
- // 2. Browser decodes the attribute value to: <script>alert("XSS")</script>
- // 3. x-text renders it as textContent (plain text), NOT innerHTML
- // 4. Result: User sees "<script>alert("XSS")</script>" as text, script never executes
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;script&gt;');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<script>');
- });
-
- it('confirms x-text prevents Alpine.js directive injection', function () {
- $maliciousContent = '<div x-data="{ evil: true }" x-html="alert(1)">test</div>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousContent);
-
- // Even if attacker includes Alpine directives in log content:
- // 1. Server escapes them
- // 2. x-text renders as plain text
- // 3. Alpine never processes these as directives
- // 4. User just sees the literal text
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('x-data');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('x-html');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<div x-data=');
- });
-
- it('verifies x-text prevents event handler execution', function () {
- $maliciousContent = '<img src=x onerror="alert(\'XSS\')">';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousContent);
-
- // With x-text approach:
- // 1. Content is escaped on server
- // 2. Rendered as textContent, not innerHTML
- // 3. No HTML parsing means no event handlers
- // 4. User sees the literal text, no image is rendered, no event fires
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;img');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('onerror');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img');
- });
-
- it('verifies x-text prevents style-based attacks', function () {
- $maliciousContent = '<style>body { display: none; }</style>';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($maliciousContent);
-
- // x-text renders everything as text:
- // 1. Style tags never get parsed as HTML
- // 2. CSS never gets applied
- // 3. User just sees the literal style tag content
+function renderedDataLineTextValue(string $logContent): string
+{
+ $escapedContent = e($logContent);
+ $html = '<span data-line-text="'.$escapedContent.'">'.$escapedContent.'</span>';
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;style&gt;');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<style>');
- });
-
- it('confirms CSS class-based highlighting is safe', function () {
- // New approach uses CSS classes for highlighting instead of injecting HTML
- // The 'log-highlight' class is applied via Alpine.js :class binding
- // This is safe because:
- // 1. Class names are controlled by JavaScript, not user input
- // 2. No HTML injection occurs
- // 3. CSS provides visual feedback without executing code
-
- $highlightClass = 'log-highlight';
- expect($highlightClass)->toBe('log-highlight');
- expect($highlightClass)->not->toContain('<');
- expect($highlightClass)->not->toContain('script');
- });
-
- it('verifies granular highlighting only marks matching text', function () {
- // splitTextForHighlight() divides text into parts
- // Only matching portions get highlight: true
- // Each part is rendered with x-text (safe plain text)
- // Highlight class applied only to matching spans
+ $document = new DOMDocument;
+ $document->loadHTML($html, LIBXML_HTML_NOIMPLIED | LIBXML_HTML_NODEFDTD);
- $logLine = 'ERROR: Database connection failed';
- $searchQuery = 'ERROR';
+ return $document->documentElement->getAttribute('data-line-text');
+}
- // When searching for "ERROR":
- // Part 1: { text: "ERROR", highlight: true } <- highlighted
- // Part 2: { text: ": Database connection failed", highlight: false } <- not highlighted
+describe('Log Viewer HTML Tag Preservation', function () {
+ it('lets Blade escape deployment log data attributes only once', function () {
+ $view = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php');
- // This ensures only the search term is highlighted, not the entire line
- expect($logLine)->toContain($searchQuery);
- expect(strlen($searchQuery))->toBeLessThan(strlen($logLine));
+ expect($view)
+ ->toContain('data-log-content="{{ $searchableContent }}"')
+ ->toContain('data-line-text="{{ $lineContent }}"')
+ ->not->toContain('data-log-content="{{ htmlspecialchars($searchableContent) }}"')
+ ->not->toContain('data-line-text="{{ htmlspecialchars($lineContent) }}"');
});
-});
-/**
- * Integration documentation tests
- *
- * These tests document the expected flow of log sanitization with x-text
- */
-describe('Log Sanitization Flow with x-text', function () {
- it('documents the secure x-text rendering flow', function () {
- $rawLog = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';
+ it('preserves literal html-like log text for client-side search reset and highlighting', function () {
+ $logContent = '<div>A</div>';
- // Step 1: Server-side escaping (PHP)
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($rawLog);
- expect($escaped)->toBe('&lt;script&gt;alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)&lt;/script&gt;');
-
- // Step 2: Stored in data-log-content attribute
- // <div data-log-content="&lt;script&gt;alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)&lt;/script&gt;" x-text="getDisplayText($el.dataset.logContent)">
-
- // Step 3: Client-side getDisplayText() decodes HTML entities
- // const decoded = doc.documentElement.textContent;
- // Result: '<script>alert("XSS")</script>' (as text string)
-
- // Step 4: x-text renders as textContent (NOT innerHTML)
- // Alpine.js sets element.textContent = decoded
- // Result: Browser displays '<script>alert("XSS")</script>' as visible text
- // The script tag is never parsed or executed - it's just text
-
- // Step 5: Highlighting via CSS class
- // If search query matches, 'log-highlight' class is added
- // Visual feedback is provided through CSS, not HTML injection
+ expect(renderedDataLineTextValue($logContent))->toBe($logContent);
});
- it('documents search highlighting with CSS classes', function () {
- $legitimateLog = '2024-01-01T12:00:00.000Z ERROR: Database connection failed';
-
- // Server-side: Escape and store
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($legitimateLog);
- expect($escaped)->toBe($legitimateLog); // No special chars
-
- // Client-side: If user searches for "ERROR"
- // 1. splitTextForHighlight() divides the text into parts:
- // - Part 1: "2024-01-01T12:00:00.000Z " (highlight: false)
- // - Part 2: "ERROR" (highlight: true) <- This part gets highlighted
- // - Part 3: ": Database connection failed" (highlight: false)
- // 2. Each part is rendered as a <span> with x-text (safe)
- // 3. Only Part 2 gets the 'log-highlight' class via :class binding
- // 4. CSS provides yellow/warning background color on "ERROR" only
- // 5. No HTML injection occurs - just multiple safe text spans
+ it('does not strip tags with DOMParser based html decoding', function () {
+ $views = [
+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php',
+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php',
+ ];
- expect($legitimateLog)->toContain('ERROR');
- });
-
- it('verifies no HTML injection occurs during search', function () {
- $logWithHtml = 'User input: <img src=x onerror="alert(1)">';
- $escaped = htmlspecialchars($logWithHtml);
-
- // Even if log contains malicious HTML:
- // 1. Server escapes it
- // 2. x-text renders as plain text
- // 3. Search highlighting uses CSS class, not HTML tags
- // 4. User sees the literal text with highlight background
- // 5. No script execution possible
-
- expect($escaped)->toContain('&lt;img');
- expect($escaped)->toContain('onerror');
- expect($escaped)->not->toContain('<img src=');
- });
-
- it('documents that user search queries cannot inject HTML', function () {
- // User search query is only used in:
- // 1. String matching (includes() check) - safe
- // 2. CSS class application - safe (class name is hardcoded)
- // 3. Match counting - safe (just text comparison)
-
- // User query is NOT used in:
- // 1. HTML generation - eliminated by switching to x-text
- // 2. innerHTML assignment - x-text uses textContent only
- // 3. DOM manipulation - only CSS classes are applied
-
- $userSearchQuery = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';
-
- // The search query is used in matchesSearch() which does:
- // line.toLowerCase().includes(this.searchQuery.toLowerCase())
- // This is safe string comparison, no HTML parsing
-
- expect($userSearchQuery)->toContain('<script>');
- // But it's only used for string matching, never rendered as HTML
+ foreach ($views as $view) {
+ expect(file_get_contents($view))
+ ->not->toContain('decodeHtml(text)')
+ ->not->toContain('DOMParser().parseFromString');
+ }
});
});
-/**
- * Tests for DoS prevention in HTML entity decoding
- *
- * These tests verify that the decodeHtml() function in the client-side JavaScript
- * has proper safeguards against deeply nested HTML entities that could cause DoS.
- */
-describe('HTML Entity Decoding DoS Prevention', function () {
- it('documents the DoS vulnerability with unbounded decoding', function () {
- // Without a max iteration limit, an attacker could provide deeply nested entities:
- // &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp; (10 levels deep)
- // Each iteration decodes one level, causing excessive CPU usage
-
- $normalEntity = '&amp;lt;script&gt;';
- // Normal case: 2-3 iterations to fully decode
- expect($normalEntity)->toContain('&amp;');
- });
-
- it('verifies max iteration limit prevents DoS', function () {
- // The decodeHtml() function should have a maxIterations constant (e.g., 3)
- // This ensures even with deeply nested entities, decoding stops after 3 iterations
- // Preventing CPU exhaustion from malicious input
-
- $deeplyNested = '&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;';
- // With max 3 iterations, only first 3 levels decoded
- // Remaining nesting is preserved but doesn't cause DoS
-
- // This test documents that the limit exists
- expect(strlen($deeplyNested))->toBeGreaterThan(10);
- });
-
- it('documents normal use cases work within iteration limit', function () {
- // Legitimate double-encoding (common in logs): &amp;lt;
- // Iteration 1: &<
- // Iteration 2: <
- // Total: 2 iterations (well within limit of 3)
-
- $doubleEncoded = '&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;';
- expect($doubleEncoded)->toContain('&amp;');
-
- // Triple-encoding (rare but possible): &amp;amp;lt;
- // Iteration 1: &amp;<
- // Iteration 2: &<
- // Iteration 3: <
- // Total: 3 iterations (exactly at limit)
-
- $tripleEncoded = '&amp;amp;lt;div&amp;amp;gt;';
- expect($tripleEncoded)->toContain('&amp;amp;');
- });
-
- it('documents that iteration limit is sufficient for real-world logs', function () {
- // Analysis of real-world log encoding scenarios:
- // 1. Single encoding: 1 iteration
- // 2. Double encoding (logs passed through multiple systems): 2 iterations
- // 3. Triple encoding (rare edge case): 3 iterations
- // 4. Beyond triple encoding: Likely malicious or severely misconfigured
-
- // The maxIterations = 3 provides:
- // - Protection against DoS attacks
- // - Support for all legitimate use cases
- // - Predictable performance characteristics
-
- expect(3)->toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3); // Max iterations covers all legitimate cases
- });
-
- it('verifies decoding stops at max iterations even with malicious input', function () {
- // With maxIterations = 3, decoding flow:
- // Input: &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp; (5 levels)
- // Iteration 1: &amp;amp;amp;amp;
- // Iteration 2: &amp;amp;amp;
- // Iteration 3: &amp;amp;
- // Stop: Max iterations reached
- // Output: &amp; (partially decoded, but safe from DoS)
-
- $maliciousInput = str_repeat('&amp;', 10).'lt;script&gt;';
- // Even with 10 levels of nesting, function stops at 3 iterations
- expect(strlen($maliciousInput))->toBeGreaterThan(50);
- // The point is NOT that we fully decode it, but that we don't loop forever
- });
-
- it('confirms while loop condition includes iteration check', function () {
- // The vulnerable code was:
- // while (decoded !== prev) { ... }
- //
- // The fixed code should be:
- // while (decoded !== prev && iterations < maxIterations) { ... }
- //
- // This ensures the loop ALWAYS terminates after maxIterations
+describe('Log Viewer XSS Prevention', function () {
+ it('keeps script-like log output as text in Blade rendered markup', function () {
+ $maliciousLog = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>';
+ $escapedLog = e($maliciousLog);
- $condition = 'iterations < maxIterations';
- expect($condition)->toContain('maxIterations');
- expect($condition)->toContain('<');
+ expect($escapedLog)
+ ->toContain('&lt;script&gt;')
+ ->not->toContain('<script>');
});
- it('documents performance impact of iteration limit', function () {
- // Without limit:
- // - Malicious input: 1000+ iterations, seconds of CPU time
- // - DoS attack possible with relatively small payloads
- //
- // With limit (maxIterations = 3):
- // - Malicious input: 3 iterations max, milliseconds of CPU time
- // - DoS attack prevented, performance predictable
+ it('keeps dangerous attributes as literal dataset text for textContent rendering', function () {
+ $maliciousLog = '<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">';
- $maxIterations = 3;
- $worstCaseOps = $maxIterations * 2; // DOMParser + textContent per iteration
- expect($worstCaseOps)->toBeLessThan(10); // Very low computational cost
+ expect(renderedDataLineTextValue($maliciousLog))->toBe($maliciousLog);
});
- it('verifies iteration counter increments correctly', function () {
- // The implementation should:
- // 1. Initialize: let iterations = 0;
- // 2. Check: while (... && iterations < maxIterations)
- // 3. Increment: iterations++;
- //
- // This ensures the counter actually prevents infinite loops
-
- $initialValue = 0;
- $increment = 1;
- $maxValue = 3;
-
- expect($initialValue)->toBe(0);
- expect($increment)->toBe(1);
- expect($maxValue)->toBeGreaterThan($initialValue);
- });
+ it('uses text nodes for search highlighting instead of injected html', function () {
+ $views = [
+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/application/deployment/show.blade.php',
+ __DIR__.'/../../resources/views/livewire/project/shared/get-logs.blade.php',
+ ];
- it('confirms fix addresses the security advisory correctly', function () {
- // Security advisory states:
- // "decodeHtml() function uses a loop that could be exploited with
- // deeply nested HTML entities, potentially causing performance issues or DoS"
- //
- // Fix applied:
- // 1. Add maxIterations constant (value: 3)
- // 2. Add iterations counter
- // 3. Update while condition to include iteration check
- // 4. Increment counter in loop body
- //
- // This directly addresses the vulnerability
+ foreach ($views as $view) {
+ $contents = file_get_contents($view);
- $vulnerabilityFixed = true;
- expect($vulnerabilityFixed)->toBeTrue();
+ expect($contents)
+ ->toContain('document.createTextNode')
+ ->toContain('mark.textContent')
+ ->not->toContain('innerHTML')
+ ->not->toContain('x-html');
+ }
});
});