Framework for orchestrating role-playing, autonomous AI agents. By fostering collaborative intelligence, CrewAI empowers agents to work together seamlessly, tackling complex tasks.
Fix symlink path traversal in skill archive extraction (#6235)
Rip&Tearfac3e3579bd5
diff --git a/lib/cli/src/crewai_cli/experimental/skills/main.py b/lib/cli/src/crewai_cli/experimental/skills/main.pyindex 81f9b3fc5..612b85d82 100644--- a/lib/cli/src/crewai_cli/experimental/skills/main.py+++ b/lib/cli/src/crewai_cli/experimental/skills/main.py@@ -378,12 +378,40 @@ class SkillCommand(BaseCommand, PlusAPIMixin):def _safe_extractall(tf: tarfile.TarFile, dest: Path) -> None:- """Path-traversal-safe extraction for Python < 3.12."""+ """Path-traversal-safe extraction for Python versions without tar filters.++ Validates both the member's own path and, for symlink/hardlink members,+ the link target. Without the link-target check a malicious archive can+ plant a symlink that escapes ``dest`` (e.g. ``link -> /home/user/.ssh``)+ followed by a regular member written *through* that link+ (``link/authorized_keys``), escaping ``dest`` even though every member+ name resolves inside it. This mirrors the protection that+ ``tarfile.extractall(..., filter="data")`` provides when available.+ """dest_resolved = dest.resolve()for member in tf.getmembers():member_path = (dest / member.name).resolve()if not member_path.is_relative_to(dest_resolved):raise ValueError(f"Blocked path traversal attempt: {member.name!r}")+ if not (member.isfile() or member.isdir() or member.issym() or member.islnk()):+ raise ValueError(f"Blocked unsupported tar member: {member.name!r}")+ if member.issym() or member.islnk():+ link_target = member.linkname+ # Absolute link targets always escape the destination.+ if os.path.isabs(link_target):+ raise ValueError(+ f"Blocked link target escaping destination: "+ f"{member.name!r} -> {link_target!r}"+ )+ # Hardlink names are relative to the archive root; symlink+ # targets are relative to the member's own directory.+ anchor = dest if member.islnk() else (dest / member.name).parent+ resolved_target = (anchor / link_target).resolve()+ if not resolved_target.is_relative_to(dest_resolved):+ raise ValueError(+ f"Blocked link target escaping destination: "+ f"{member.name!r} -> {link_target!r}"+ )tf.extractall(dest) # noqa: S202diff --git a/lib/cli/tests/skills/test_safe_extract.py b/lib/cli/tests/skills/test_safe_extract.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..f1083f5fa--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/cli/tests/skills/test_safe_extract.py@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@+"""Regression tests for path-traversal-safe archive extraction.++Guards against symlink/hardlink-based path traversal in the fallback used on+Python versions without tarfile extraction filters. The filtered path relies on+`tarfile.extractall(..., filter="data")`; the fallback must provide the same+protection by validating link targets, not just member names.+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import io+import tarfile+from pathlib import Path++import pytest++from crewai_cli.experimental.skills.main import _safe_extractall+++def _tar_from_members(build) -> tarfile.TarFile:+ """Build an in-memory tar archive via `build(tf)` and return it for reading."""+ buf = io.BytesIO()+ with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:+ build(tf)+ buf.seek(0)+ return tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="r")+++def test_blocks_symlink_escaping_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """A symlink whose target escapes dest, plus a file written through it,+ must be rejected before anything is extracted."""+ outside = tmp_path / "outside"+ outside.mkdir()+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("link")+ link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE+ link.linkname = str(outside) # absolute path outside dest+ tf.addfile(link)+ payload = b"pwned"+ info = tarfile.TarInfo("link/evil.txt")+ info.size = len(payload)+ tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)++ assert not (outside / "evil.txt").exists()+++def test_blocks_relative_symlink_escaping_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """A relative symlink (../..) that escapes dest is also rejected."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("sub/link")+ link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE+ link.linkname = "../../outside" # escapes dest from sub/+ tf.addfile(link)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)+++def test_blocks_hardlink_escaping_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """A hardlink whose target escapes dest is rejected."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("escape")+ link.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE+ link.linkname = "../outside.txt" # escapes archive root+ tf.addfile(link)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)+++def test_blocks_special_tar_member(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """Special tar members such as FIFOs are rejected."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ fifo = tarfile.TarInfo("pipe")+ fifo.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE+ tf.addfile(fifo)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported tar member"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)+++def test_allows_benign_relative_symlink(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """A symlink that stays within dest is permitted."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ payload = b"hi"+ info = tarfile.TarInfo("real.txt")+ info.size = len(payload)+ tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("alias.txt")+ link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE+ link.linkname = "real.txt" # stays inside dest+ tf.addfile(link)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)++ assert (dest / "real.txt").read_bytes() == b"hi"+ assert (dest / "alias.txt").is_symlink()+ assert (dest / "alias.txt").readlink() == Path("real.txt")+++def test_allows_benign_archive(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """An ordinary archive of regular files extracts correctly."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ for name, body in (("SKILL.md", b"# skill"), ("scripts/run.py", b"print(1)")):+ payload = body+ info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)+ info.size = len(payload)+ tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)++ assert (dest / "SKILL.md").read_bytes() == b"# skill"+ assert (dest / "scripts" / "run.py").read_bytes() == b"print(1)"diff --git a/lib/crewai/src/crewai/experimental/skills/cache.py b/lib/crewai/src/crewai/experimental/skills/cache.pyindex e9752c4e8..065c2c521 100644--- a/lib/crewai/src/crewai/experimental/skills/cache.py+++ b/lib/crewai/src/crewai/experimental/skills/cache.py@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ from __future__ import annotationsfrom datetime import datetime, timezoneimport jsonimport logging+import osfrom pathlib import Pathimport tarfilefrom typing import TypedDict@@ -127,12 +128,36 @@ class SkillCacheManager:def _safe_extractall(tf: tarfile.TarFile, dest: Path) -> None:- """Path-traversal-safe extraction for Python < 3.12."""+ """Path-traversal-safe extraction for Python versions without tar filters.++ Validates both the member's own path and, for symlink/hardlink members,+ the link target. Without the link-target check a malicious archive can+ plant a symlink that escapes ``dest`` followed by a regular member written+ through that link, escaping ``dest`` even though every member name resolves+ inside it. This mirrors the protection that+ ``tarfile.extractall(..., filter="data")`` provides when available.+ """dest_resolved = dest.resolve()for member in tf.getmembers():member_path = (dest / member.name).resolve()if not member_path.is_relative_to(dest_resolved):raise ValueError(f"Blocked path traversal attempt: {member.name!r}")+ if not (member.isfile() or member.isdir() or member.issym() or member.islnk()):+ raise ValueError(f"Blocked unsupported tar member: {member.name!r}")+ if member.issym() or member.islnk():+ link_target = member.linkname+ if os.path.isabs(link_target):+ raise ValueError(+ f"Blocked link target escaping destination: "+ f"{member.name!r} -> {link_target!r}"+ )+ anchor = dest if member.islnk() else (dest / member.name).parent+ resolved_target = (anchor / link_target).resolve()+ if not resolved_target.is_relative_to(dest_resolved):+ raise ValueError(+ f"Blocked link target escaping destination: "+ f"{member.name!r} -> {link_target!r}"+ )tf.extractall(dest) # noqa: S202diff --git a/lib/crewai/tests/experimental/skills/test_cache.py b/lib/crewai/tests/experimental/skills/test_cache.pyindex 8b458bb3e..b6601dccf 100644--- a/lib/crewai/tests/experimental/skills/test_cache.py+++ b/lib/crewai/tests/experimental/skills/test_cache.py@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ import jsonimport tarfilefrom pathlib import Path-from crewai.experimental.skills.cache import SkillCacheManager+import pytest++from crewai.experimental.skills.cache import SkillCacheManager, _safe_extractalldef _make_tar_gz(files: dict[str, str]) -> bytes:@@ -35,6 +37,15 @@ def _make_tar_gz(files: dict[str, str]) -> bytes:return out.getvalue()+def _tar_from_members(build) -> tarfile.TarFile:+ """Build an in-memory tar archive via `build(tf)` and return it for reading."""+ buf = io.BytesIO()+ with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:+ build(tf)+ buf.seek(0)+ return tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="r")++class TestSkillCacheManager:def test_get_cached_path_missing(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:cache = SkillCacheManager(cache_root=tmp_path)@@ -113,3 +124,85 @@ class TestSkillCacheManager:dest = cache.store("acme", "my-skill", None, archive)meta = json.loads((dest / ".crewai_meta.json").read_text())assert meta["version"] is None+++def test_safe_extractall_blocks_symlink_escaping_cache_destination(+ tmp_path: Path,+) -> None:+ """A symlink whose target escapes dest is rejected before extraction."""+ outside = tmp_path / "outside"+ outside.mkdir()+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("link")+ link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE+ link.linkname = str(outside)+ tf.addfile(link)+ payload = b"pwned"+ info = tarfile.TarInfo("link/evil.txt")+ info.size = len(payload)+ tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)++ assert not (outside / "evil.txt").exists()+++def test_safe_extractall_blocks_hardlink_escaping_cache_destination(+ tmp_path: Path,+) -> None:+ """A hardlink whose target escapes dest is rejected."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("escape")+ link.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE+ link.linkname = "../outside.txt"+ tf.addfile(link)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)+++def test_safe_extractall_blocks_special_cache_tar_member(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """Special tar members such as FIFOs are rejected."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ fifo = tarfile.TarInfo("pipe")+ fifo.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE+ tf.addfile(fifo)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported tar member"):+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)+++def test_safe_extractall_allows_benign_cache_symlink(tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """A symlink that stays within dest is permitted."""+ dest = tmp_path / "dest"+ dest.mkdir()++ def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:+ payload = b"hi"+ info = tarfile.TarInfo("real.txt")+ info.size = len(payload)+ tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))+ link = tarfile.TarInfo("alias.txt")+ link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE+ link.linkname = "real.txt"+ tf.addfile(link)++ with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:+ _safe_extractall(tf, dest)++ assert (dest / "real.txt").read_bytes() == b"hi"+ assert (dest / "alias.txt").is_symlink()+ assert (dest / "alias.txt").readlink() == Path("real.txt")