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Scale computer-use 2.0 with open-source drivers, cross-OS sandboxes, and benchmarks for training, evaluation, and data generation.

fix(cua-driver): request macOS permissions from running daemon (#2414)

Francesco Bonacci231839de8161
diff --git a/docs/content/docs/reference/cua-driver/mcp-tools.mdx b/docs/content/docs/reference/cua-driver/mcp-tools.mdx
index 78b3511142..2a1eeb8874 100644
--- a/docs/content/docs/reference/cua-driver/mcp-tools.mdx
+++ b/docs/content/docs/reference/cua-driver/mcp-tools.mdx
@@ -678,10 +678,11 @@ All parameters are optional; omit any you do not want to change.
Report TCC permission status for Accessibility and Screen Recording. By default also raises the system permission dialogs for any missing grants — Apple's request APIs are no-ops when the grant is already active, so this is safe to call repeatedly. Pass {"prompt": false} for a purely read-only status check.
-Returns: `accessibility` + `screen_recording` (booleans from the TCC preflight APIs), `screen_recording_capturable` (a live ScreenCaptureKit probe when `prompt` is true; null on read-only calls), `direct_capture_status` (`ready`, `unavailable`, `blocked_by_screen_recording`, or `not_checked`), and `source` (which TCC identity the booleans reflect: the CuaDriver daemon vs the launching terminal/IDE). macOS attributes grants to the responsible process, so a standalone call from a terminal reports the terminal's grants, not the driver's. The prompt-capable ScreenCaptureKit probe never runs when `prompt` is false.
+Returns: `accessibility` + `screen_recording` (booleans from the TCC preflight APIs), `screen_recording_capturable` (a live ScreenCaptureKit probe when `prompt` is true; null on read-only calls), `direct_capture_status` (`ready`, `unavailable`, `blocked_by_screen_recording`, or `not_checked`), and `source` (which TCC identity the booleans reflect: the CuaDriver daemon vs the launching terminal/IDE). macOS attributes grants to the responsible process, so a standalone call from a terminal reports the terminal's grants, not the driver's. The prompt-capable ScreenCaptureKit probe never runs when `prompt` is false. Pass `probe_direct_capture:false` with `prompt:true` to register/request only the two required TCC grants before separately explaining Tahoe's direct-capture consent.
**Arguments:**
+- `probe_direct_capture` (boolean, optional): When prompting and Screen Recording is granted, also run the live ScreenCaptureKit probe that may raise Tahoe's direct-capture consent. Default true. Set false for a staged Accessibility/Screen Recording request.
- `prompt` (boolean, optional): Raise the system permission prompts for missing grants. Default true.
### `health_report`
diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs
index 1704cda078..7f69574d1c 100644
--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs
+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs
@@ -2445,6 +2445,22 @@ fn permission_grant_needs_direct_capture(structured: &serde_json::Value) -> bool
&& !permission_flag(structured, "screen_recording_capturable")
}
+fn permission_check_request(
+ prompt: bool,
+ probe_direct_capture: bool,
+) -> crate::serve::DaemonRequest {
+ crate::serve::DaemonRequest {
+ method: "call".into(),
+ name: Some("check_permissions".into()),
+ args: Some(serde_json::json!({
+ "prompt": prompt,
+ "probe_direct_capture": probe_direct_capture,
+ })),
+ session_id: None,
+ observation_origin: Some(crate::serve::ToolObservationOrigin::Direct),
+ }
+}
+
/// Launch CuaDriver via LaunchServices so the permission prompt attributes to
/// com.trycua.driver, wait (user-paced) for the daemon to come up — its socket
/// only appears once the permissions gate passes, i.e. the grant was given —
@@ -2457,8 +2473,13 @@ fn run_permissions_grant() {
let app_path = crate::bundle::app_bundle_path();
let bundle_id = crate::bundle::bundle_id();
let socket = crate::serve::default_socket_path();
- if crate::serve::is_daemon_listening(&socket) {
+ let daemon_already_running = crate::serve::is_daemon_listening(&socket);
+ if daemon_already_running {
println!("{app_name} daemon already running — checking its permissions…");
+ println!(
+ "Requesting any missing Accessibility and Screen Recording grants now. \
+ macOS may show a prompt or add {app_name} to System Settings."
+ );
} else {
println!("Launching {app_name} to request permissions.");
println!(
@@ -2487,17 +2508,22 @@ fn run_permissions_grant() {
// and only a fresh process image sees a later grant. During each
// restart the socket briefly disappears, so tolerate transient
// connection failures rather than bailing on the first one.
- let req = crate::serve::DaemonRequest {
- method: "call".into(),
- name: Some("check_permissions".into()),
- args: Some(serde_json::json!({ "prompt": false })),
- session_id: None,
- observation_origin: Some(crate::serve::ToolObservationOrigin::Direct),
- };
+ let req = permission_check_request(false, false);
+ // A daemon that is already inside the permission gate may be a
+ // prompt-suppressed re-exec. Merely polling it cannot register a
+ // missing Screen Recording row. Re-raise the two required TCC requests
+ // through the daemon identity, but deliberately defer Tahoe's separate
+ // direct-capture probe until after the explanation below.
+ let prompt_req = permission_check_request(true, false);
let poll_deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(180);
let mut ax = false;
let mut sr = false;
+ let mut required_prompts_requested = !daemon_already_running;
loop {
+ if !required_prompts_requested {
+ required_prompts_requested = crate::serve::send_request(&socket, &prompt_req)
+ .is_ok_and(|response| response.ok);
+ }
if let Some(structured) = crate::serve::send_request(&socket, &req)
.ok()
.filter(|r| r.ok)
@@ -2548,13 +2574,7 @@ fn run_permissions_grant() {
);
println!("Choose Allow to request and verify direct capture now…");
- let direct_req = crate::serve::DaemonRequest {
- method: "call".into(),
- name: Some("check_permissions".into()),
- args: Some(serde_json::json!({ "prompt": true })),
- session_id: None,
- observation_origin: Some(crate::serve::ToolObservationOrigin::Direct),
- };
+ let direct_req = permission_check_request(true, true);
let direct_deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(180);
let mut direct_status = None;
loop {
@@ -3651,6 +3671,24 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!permission_grant_is_ready(&incomplete));
}
+ #[test]
+ fn permission_grant_stages_required_prompts_before_direct_capture() {
+ let staged = permission_check_request(true, false);
+ let staged_args = staged.args.expect("staged request args");
+ assert_eq!(staged_args.get("prompt"), Some(&serde_json::json!(true)));
+ assert_eq!(
+ staged_args.get("probe_direct_capture"),
+ Some(&serde_json::json!(false))
+ );
+
+ let direct = permission_check_request(true, true);
+ let direct_args = direct.args.expect("direct request args");
+ assert_eq!(
+ direct_args.get("probe_direct_capture"),
+ Some(&serde_json::json!(true))
+ );
+ }
+
#[test]
fn sanitize_tool_name_passes_through_canonical_names() {
assert_eq!(sanitize_tool_name("click"), "click");
diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/tools/check_permissions.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/tools/check_permissions.rs
index 031c4b48c4..e513946c0b 100644
--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/tools/check_permissions.rs
+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/tools/check_permissions.rs
@@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ fn screen_recording_capturable() -> bool {
.unwrap_or(false)
}
-fn should_probe_direct_capture(should_prompt: bool, screen_recording: bool) -> bool {
- should_prompt && screen_recording
+fn should_probe_direct_capture(
+ should_prompt: bool,
+ screen_recording: bool,
+ probe_direct_capture: bool,
+) -> bool {
+ should_prompt && screen_recording && probe_direct_capture
}
/// (B) Which TCC identity the booleans in this response reflect.
@@ -145,13 +149,20 @@ fn def() -> &'static ToolDef {
booleans reflect: the CuaDriver daemon vs the launching terminal/IDE). \
macOS attributes grants to the responsible process, so a standalone call \
from a terminal reports the terminal's grants, not the driver's. The \
- prompt-capable ScreenCaptureKit probe never runs when `prompt` is false.".into(),
+ prompt-capable ScreenCaptureKit probe never runs when `prompt` is false. \
+ Pass `probe_direct_capture:false` with `prompt:true` to register/request only \
+ the two required TCC grants before separately explaining Tahoe's direct-capture \
+ consent.".into(),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"prompt": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Raise the system permission prompts for missing grants. Default true.",
+ },
+ "probe_direct_capture": {
+ "type": "boolean",
+ "description": "When prompting and Screen Recording is granted, also run the live ScreenCaptureKit probe that may raise Tahoe's direct-capture consent. Default true. Set false for a staged Accessibility/Screen Recording request.",
}
},
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -179,6 +190,7 @@ impl Tool for CheckPermissionsTool {
// `request_*` call sites, so both being gated makes prompts
// unreachable when embedded.
let should_prompt = args.bool_or("prompt", true) && !cua_driver_core::embedded_mode();
+ let probe_direct_capture = args.bool_or("probe_direct_capture", true);
if should_prompt {
let _ = request_accessibility();
let _ = request_screen_recording();
@@ -194,14 +206,15 @@ impl Tool for CheckPermissionsTool {
(None, "not_checked")
} else if !screen_recording {
(None, "blocked_by_screen_recording")
- } else if should_probe_direct_capture(should_prompt, screen_recording) {
+ } else if should_probe_direct_capture(should_prompt, screen_recording, probe_direct_capture)
+ {
let capturable = screen_recording_capturable();
(
Some(capturable),
if capturable { "ready" } else { "unavailable" },
)
} else {
- unreachable!("all non-probing direct-capture states were handled")
+ (None, "not_checked")
};
// (B) Which identity the booleans above belong to.
let source = permission_source();
@@ -230,11 +243,12 @@ impl Tool for CheckPermissionsTool {
"\n⚠️ Screen Recording reads granted but a live capture probe failed — \
the grant likely belongs to a different process, not this one.",
);
- } else if screen_recording_capturable.is_none() && !should_prompt {
+ } else if screen_recording_capturable.is_none() && (!should_prompt || !probe_direct_capture)
+ {
summary.push_str(
"\nℹ️ Direct ScreenCaptureKit readiness was not probed because this is a \
- read-only check. Run `cua-driver permissions grant` to request and \
- verify direct capture explicitly.",
+ staged or read-only check. Run `cua-driver permissions grant` to request \
+ and verify direct capture explicitly.",
);
}
// Make the attribution explicit when answering for a host or caller
@@ -311,10 +325,16 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn read_only_checks_never_run_the_prompt_capable_direct_capture_probe() {
- assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(false, false));
- assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(false, true));
- assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(true, false));
- assert!(should_probe_direct_capture(true, true));
+ assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(false, false, true));
+ assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(false, true, true));
+ assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(true, false, true));
+ assert!(should_probe_direct_capture(true, true, true));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn staged_prompt_never_runs_the_direct_capture_probe() {
+ assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(true, false, false));
+ assert!(!should_probe_direct_capture(true, true, false));
}
#[test]