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fix(cua-driver-rs)(macos): guard AppKit init so `mcp` runs headless instead of SIGABRT-ing (#1724) (#1781)
Francesco Bonacci57722f709174
diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/cursor/overlay.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/cursor/overlay.rsindex 4dcdb7c68c..034e51ec90 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/cursor/overlay.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/cursor/overlay.rs@@ -145,6 +145,21 @@ pub fn run_on_main_thread() {loop { std::thread::park(); }}+ // AppKit's `+[NSApplication sharedApplication]` registers the process with+ // the Window Server and ABORTS the whole process (SIGABRT in+ // `_RegisterApplication`) when there's no graphic-session access — e.g.+ // `mcp` run as a stdio child from SSH, a LaunchDaemon, or headless CI.+ // Detect that without touching AppKit and run headless: the MCP server+ // keeps serving on its background thread while this thread just parks,+ // exactly as it does when the overlay is disabled. See issue #1724.+ if !crate::session::has_graphic_access() {+ tracing::warn!(+ "no Window Server / graphic-session access — skipping cursor \+ overlay and running headless (issue #1724)"+ );+ loop { std::thread::park(); }+ }+// ------------------------------------------------------------------// AppKit setup (all on the main thread).// ------------------------------------------------------------------diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/lib.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/lib.rsindex bee67dc831..d91743adb9 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/lib.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/lib.rs@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ pub mod recording_hooks;pub mod video_sckit;#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]pub mod pip;+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]+pub mod session;use cua_driver_core::tool::ToolRegistry;diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/session.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/session.rsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..80a444c913--- /dev/null+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/session.rs@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@+//! Security-session capability probe.+//!+//! AppKit's `+[NSApplication sharedApplication]` registers the process with+//! the Window Server (`_RegisterApplication`). When the calling process has+//! no graphic-session access — `cua-driver mcp` spawned as a stdio child from+//! an SSH session, a `LaunchDaemon`, or a headless CI runner — that+//! registration **aborts the whole process with SIGABRT** before any error+//! reaches the caller (issue #1724).+//!+//! `SessionGetInfo` answers "can this session talk to the Window Server?"+//! *without* touching AppKit, so we can gate overlay init on it and degrade+//! to a headless MCP server instead of crashing. This is the macOS analogue+//! of the Session-0 short-circuit guard used on Windows.++// `SecuritySessionId` and `SessionAttributeBits` are both 32-bit ints in+// <Security/AuthSession.h>.+type SecuritySessionId = i32;+type SessionAttributeBits = u32;++/// `callerSecuritySession` — the session of the calling process.+const CALLER_SECURITY_SESSION: SecuritySessionId = -1;+/// `sessionHasGraphicAccess` — the session can use the Window Server.+const SESSION_HAS_GRAPHIC_ACCESS: SessionAttributeBits = 0x0010;++#[link(name = "Security", kind = "framework")]+extern "C" {+ fn SessionGetInfo(+ session: SecuritySessionId,+ session_id: *mut SecuritySessionId,+ attributes: *mut SessionAttributeBits,+ ) -> i32; // OSStatus; errSecSuccess == 0+}++/// Whether the current security session can use the Window Server (and thus+/// safely initialize AppKit). On any failure we return `false` — skipping the+/// overlay is always recoverable, but a wrong `true` re-introduces the+/// `_RegisterApplication` SIGABRT (issue #1724).+pub fn has_graphic_access() -> bool {+ let mut session_id: SecuritySessionId = 0;+ let mut attributes: SessionAttributeBits = 0;+ let status =+ unsafe { SessionGetInfo(CALLER_SECURITY_SESSION, &mut session_id, &mut attributes) };+ status == 0 && (attributes & SESSION_HAS_GRAPHIC_ACCESS) != 0+}++#[cfg(test)]+mod tests {+ use super::*;++ /// The probe must resolve the `Security` symbol and return a `bool`+ /// without aborting. We can't assert the value: it's `true` on a dev GUI+ /// session and `false` on a headless CI runner — which is exactly the+ /// distinction the guard relies on (issue #1724).+ #[test]+ fn graphic_access_probe_does_not_abort() {+ let _ = has_graphic_access();+ }+}