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ci: overlay restart probe reads the exe sha of a capability-holding daemon (#5844)
Francesco Bonacci7e40d7dfe8ed
diff --git a/libs/cua/crates/cua-sdk/src/native/overlay.rs b/libs/cua/crates/cua-sdk/src/native/overlay.rsindex 7217c30a14..2d06995e79 100644--- a/libs/cua/crates/cua-sdk/src/native/overlay.rs+++ b/libs/cua/crates/cua-sdk/src/native/overlay.rs@@ -150,20 +150,42 @@ fn sq(s: &str) -> String {/// Shell helpers. `cua_exe PID` prints a process's executable (from/// `/proc/PID/exe`, else its argv[0]: root in gVisor may not read another/// user's `exe` link), without a ` (deleted)` suffix. `cua_exe_sha PID`-/// prints the sha256 of what it runs (as its owner when root cannot read-/// it). `cua_daemon` prints `<pid> <exe>` of the running cua-spacesd (the-/// exec's parent first).+/// prints the sha256 of what it runs. The kernel lets a caller read+/// `/proc/PID/exe` only as the process's owner holding every capability the+/// process holds (or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE), so when a plain read fails it+/// retries as the owner, then as the owner with the process's permitted+/// capabilities (the image starts cua-spacesd as `cua` with CAP_SETUID,+/// CAP_SETGID and CAP_KILL, which neither plain root nor a plain `runuser`+/// satisfies). `cua_daemon` prints `<pid> <exe>` of the running cua-spacesd+/// (the exec's parent first).const FIND_DAEMON: &str = r#"cua_exe() {e=$(readlink "/proc/$1/exe" 2>/dev/null) || e=""[ -n "$e" ] || e=$(tr '\0' '\n' <"/proc/$1/cmdline" 2>/dev/null | head -n1) || true[ -n "$e" ] || return 1echo "${e% (deleted)}"}+cua_caps() {+ h=$(sed -n 's/^CapPrm:[[:space:]]*//p' "/proc/$1/status" 2>/dev/null | head -n1)+ [ -n "$h" ] || return 0+ v=$((0x$h)); n=0; l=""+ while [ "$v" -ne 0 ] && [ "$n" -lt 63 ]; do+ [ $((v & 1)) -eq 0 ] || l="$l,+cap_$n"+ v=$((v >> 1)); n=$((n + 1))+ done+ echo "${l#,}"+}cua_exe_sha() {s=$(sha256sum "/proc/$1/exe" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f1)- if [ -z "$s" ] && [ "$(id -u)" = 0 ]; then- u=$(stat -c %U "/proc/$1" 2>/dev/null)- s=$(runuser -u "$u" -- sha256sum "/proc/$1/exe" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f1)+ if [ -z "$s" ]; then+ R=""+ if [ "$(id -u)" != 0 ]; then R="sudo -n"; $R true 2>/dev/null || { echo ""; return 0; }; fi+ u=$(stat -c %U "/proc/$1" 2>/dev/null) || u=""+ [ -n "$u" ] || { echo ""; return 0; }+ s=$($R runuser -u "$u" -- sha256sum "/proc/$1/exe" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f1)+ c=$(cua_caps "$1")+ if [ -z "$s" ] && [ -n "$c" ]; then+ s=$($R setpriv --reuid "$u" --regid "$u" --init-groups --inh-caps "$c" --ambient-caps "$c" -- sha256sum "/proc/$1/exe" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f1)+ fifiecho "$s"}@@ -605,7 +627,11 @@ async fn restart_daemon(if pid != old_pid && sha == sha256 {return Ok(how);}- last = format!("pid {pid} runs sha256 {}", &sha[..sha.len().min(12)]);+ last = if sha.is_empty() {+ format!("pid {pid}: its executable's sha256 could not be read")+ } else {+ format!("pid {pid} runs sha256 {}", &sha[..sha.len().min(12)])+ };}Err(e) => last = e.to_string(),}@@ -738,6 +764,58 @@ mod tests {}}+ /// The image starts cua-spacesd as `cua` holding CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETGID and+ /// CAP_KILL (permitted 0xe0). The kernel then refuses `/proc/PID/exe` to+ /// plain root and to the owner alike; only the owner holding the same+ /// capabilities may read it.+ #[cfg(unix)]+ const UNREADABLE_EXE: &str = r#"+sed() { case "$*" in *CapPrm*) echo 00000000000000e0;; *) command sed "$@";; esac; }+sha256sum() { return 1; }+stat() { echo cua; }+runuser() { return 1; }+setpriv() {+ [ "$*" = "--reuid cua --regid cua --init-groups --inh-caps +cap_5,+cap_6,+cap_7 --ambient-caps +cap_5,+cap_6,+cap_7 -- sha256sum /proc/30/exe" ] || return 1+ echo "new /proc/30/exe"+}+"#;++ #[cfg(unix)]+ #[test]+ fn daemon_identity_reads_an_exe_only_its_capabilities_open() {+ let process = [("30", "/usr/local/bin/cua-spacesd", "", "unused")];+ let root = format!("id() {{ echo 0; }}\n{UNREADABLE_EXE}");+ let out = daemon_shell(&process, &root, DAEMON_IDENTITY);+ assert!(out.status.success(), "{out:?}");+ assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim(), "30 new");++ // Not root: the same read goes through passwordless sudo.+ let sudo = "id() { echo 1000; }\nsudo() { [ \"$1\" = -n ] && shift; \"$@\"; }";+ let out = daemon_shell(+ &process,+ &format!("{sudo}\n{UNREADABLE_EXE}"),+ DAEMON_IDENTITY,+ );+ assert!(out.status.success(), "{out:?}");+ assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim(), "30 new");+ }++ #[cfg(unix)]+ #[test]+ fn daemon_identity_is_empty_when_the_exe_cannot_be_read() {+ let process = [("30", "/usr/local/bin/cua-spacesd", "", "unused")];+ // Root, but neither the owner nor the owner with its capabilities can.+ let root = format!("id() {{ echo 0; }}\n{UNREADABLE_EXE}\nsetpriv() {{ return 1; }}");+ let out = daemon_shell(&process, &root, DAEMON_IDENTITY);+ assert!(out.status.success(), "{out:?}");+ assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim(), "30");+ // Not root and no sudo: nothing to retry with.+ let user = format!("id() {{ echo 1000; }}\nsudo() {{ return 1; }}\n{UNREADABLE_EXE}");+ let out = daemon_shell(&process, &user, DAEMON_IDENTITY);+ assert!(out.status.success(), "{out:?}");+ assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim(), "30");+ }+#[cfg(unix)]#[test]fn daemon_selection_accepts_serving_roles_and_aliases() {