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fix(cua-driver): reject misplaced MCP permission flags (#3085)
Francesco Bonaccia5bc2651c10d
diff --git a/.github/scripts/cua-driver-mcp-compat/verify.mjs b/.github/scripts/cua-driver-mcp-compat/verify.mjsindex 7ad9afb24a..205d50896f 100644--- a/.github/scripts/cua-driver-mcp-compat/verify.mjs+++ b/.github/scripts/cua-driver-mcp-compat/verify.mjs@@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ const EXPECTED_OUTPUT_SCHEMA_COUNT =const DRIVER_ARGS = ["mcp","--direct",- "--dangerously-bypass-approvals",];const PROBE_ENV = {...process.env,+ CUA_DRIVER_PERMISSION_MODE: "unrestricted",+ CUA_DRIVER_DANGEROUSLY_BYPASS_APPROVALS: "1",CUA_DRIVER_RS_TELEMETRY_ENABLED: "false",CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: "1",DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER: "1",diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rsindex e531ed13dc..665c42d176 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/src/cli.rs@@ -233,6 +233,33 @@ const VALUE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &["--experimental-pip-geometry",];+/// Authorization selectors are trusted-daemon startup inputs. Direct MCP+/// accepts their environment-variable equivalents, while a daemon-backed MCP+/// client inherits the already-fixed profile through `--socket`. Silently+/// consuming these flags on `mcp` would leave the default profile active while+/// telling the operator nothing.+const SERVE_ONLY_AUTHORIZATION_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[+ "--permission-mode",+ "--capability-manifest",+ "--approve-capability-manifest",+ "--session-policy",+ "--approve-session-policy",+ "--dangerously-bypass-approvals",+ "--allow-legacy-existing-profile-approval",+ "--no-permissions-gate",+];++fn serve_only_authorization_flag(args: &[String]) -> Option<&'static str> {+ SERVE_ONLY_AUTHORIZATION_FLAGS.iter().copied().find(|flag| {+ args.iter().any(|arg| {+ arg == flag+ || arg+ .strip_prefix(flag)+ .is_some_and(|remainder| remainder.starts_with('='))+ })+ })+}+/// Classify the requested finite command without parsing its arguments. The/// parent process uses this before `parse_command` so invalid JSON and other/// parser exits are still observed as completed failures.@@ -655,6 +682,15 @@ pub fn parse_command() -> Command {}}+ if matches!(positionals.first().copied(), None | Some("mcp")) {+ if let Some(flag) = serve_only_authorization_flag(&args) {+ eprintln!("cua-driver mcp does not accept {flag}; authorization flags belong to `cua-driver serve`.");+ eprintln!("For direct MCP, use CUA_DRIVER_PERMISSION_MODE and the related CUA_DRIVER_* environment variables.");+ eprintln!("Otherwise start a configured daemon and connect with `cua-driver mcp --socket <path>`." );+ process::exit(64);+ }+ }+let claude_code_compat = args.iter().any(|a| a == "--claude-code-computer-use-compat");diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/permission_policy_startup_test.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/permission_policy_startup_test.rsindex e6b3007b9c..7dda802d8e 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/permission_policy_startup_test.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/permission_policy_startup_test.rs@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@//! Explicit permission-policy configuration must fail before a daemon exposes//! an action endpoint.-use std::process::Command;+use std::process::{Command, Stdio};fn test_socket(directory: &tempfile::TempDir, suffix: &str) -> String {#[cfg(unix)]@@ -35,6 +35,74 @@ fn rejected_serve(socket: &str, extra_args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {.expect("run rejected cua-driver serve configuration")}+#[test]+fn mcp_rejects_serve_only_authorization_flags() {+ let cases: &[(&[&str], &str)] = &[+ (+ &["mcp", "--direct", "--permission-mode", "bounded"],+ "--permission-mode",+ ),+ (+ &["mcp", "--capability-manifest", "unused.yaml"],+ "--capability-manifest",+ ),+ (+ &["mcp", "--approve-capability-manifest"],+ "--approve-capability-manifest",+ ),+ (+ &["mcp", "--dangerously-bypass-approvals"],+ "--dangerously-bypass-approvals",+ ),+ (+ &["mcp", "--session-policy", "unused.yaml"],+ "--session-policy",+ ),+ (+ &["mcp", "--approve-session-policy"],+ "--approve-session-policy",+ ),+ (&["--permission-mode=bounded"], "--permission-mode"),+ ];++ for (args, rejected_flag) in cases {+ let output = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_cua-driver"))+ .args(*args)+ .stdin(Stdio::null())+ .env("CUA_DRIVER_RS_TELEMETRY_ENABLED", "false")+ .output()+ .expect("run cua-driver mcp with a serve-only authorization flag");+ assert_eq!(output.status.code(), Some(64), "args={args:?}");+ let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);+ assert!(+ stderr.contains(&format!("does not accept {rejected_flag}")),+ "args={args:?}, stderr={stderr}"+ );+ assert!(+ stderr.contains("CUA_DRIVER_PERMISSION_MODE"),+ "args={args:?}, stderr={stderr}"+ );+ assert!(+ stderr.contains("mcp --socket"),+ "args={args:?}, stderr={stderr}"+ );+ }+}++#[test]+fn direct_mcp_still_reads_permission_profile_from_environment() {+ let output = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_cua-driver"))+ .args(["mcp", "--direct"])+ .stdin(Stdio::null())+ .env("CUA_DRIVER_PERMISSION_MODE", "bounded")+ .env("CUA_DRIVER_RS_TELEMETRY_ENABLED", "false")+ .output()+ .expect("run direct MCP with bounded profile from the environment");++ assert!(!output.status.success());+ assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).contains("requires --capability-manifest"));+}+#[test]fn missing_configured_policy_prevents_daemon_startup() {let directory = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary policy test directory");