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fix(cua-driver): background browser clicks reach pointer-driven rows (#5110)
Francesco Bonaccia7c4a0ea5e19
diff --git a/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/concepts/platform-support.mdx b/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/concepts/platform-support.mdxindex 5e7024e4f1..0397ab8ce5 100644--- a/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/concepts/platform-support.mdx+++ b/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/concepts/platform-support.mdx@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ Browser mutation always starts from an exact native `(pid, window_id)` binding.| Surface | Proven | Limit || --- | --- | --- || Chrome and Edge on Windows | Snapshot, navigate, type, trusted background click, DOM pointer actions, dialogs, file assignment, downloads, frames, multi-tab | Elevated-integrity targets refuse. |-| Chrome on macOS; Chrome and Edge on Linux X11 | The same, except trusted pointer input | Trusted pointer returns `browser_input_trust_unavailable`; Linux dialogs need foreground. |+| Chrome on macOS | The same | Trusted pointer input stays in the background, including inactive tabs. |+| Chrome and Edge on Linux X11 | The same, except trusted pointer input | Trusted pointer returns `browser_input_trust_unavailable`; dialogs need foreground. || Chrome on Sway | Exact binding when compositor identity and geometry agree | Generic GNOME or KDE Wayland is read-only. || Electron (Windows, macOS, X11, Sway) | Typed mutation while one native window maps to one page | A second page or window invalidates the route. || Brave, Vivaldi, Opera, Arc | Detected, not release-accepted | Use at your own risk. |diff --git a/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/guides/browsers.mdx b/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/guides/browsers.mdxindex f464d11fd9..47b9826e9f 100644--- a/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/guides/browsers.mdx+++ b/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/guides/browsers.mdx@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ end_session({"session": "research-1"})| Tool | Notes || --- | --- |-| `browser_click` | Trusted CDP input by default. Works fully in the background for Chrome and Edge on Windows; macOS and Linux return `browser_input_trust_unavailable` because the browser would activate. Pass `input_route: "dom_event"` for a synthetic DOM click that stays in the background but returns `effect: "unverifiable"`. |+| `browser_click` | Trusted CDP input by default. Works fully in the background for Chrome and Edge on Windows and Chrome on macOS, including inactive tabs; Linux returns `browser_input_trust_unavailable` because the browser would activate. Pass `input_route: "dom_event"` for a synthetic pointer, mouse and click sequence that stays in the background but returns `effect: "unverifiable"`. || `browser_type` | `insert_text` by default; `mode: "keystrokes"` for per-key events; `replace: true` to overwrite. || `browser_pointer` | `hover`, `right_click`, `double_click`, `scroll`, `drag` (with `destination_ref` in the same frame). || `browser_dialog` | `inspect`, then `accept` or `dismiss` the returned `dialog_id`. Linux needs `delivery_mode: "foreground"`. |diff --git a/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/reference/mcp-tools/browser-input.mdx b/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/reference/mcp-tools/browser-input.mdxindex a2a66ca34c..66e4039dfe 100644--- a/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/reference/mcp-tools/browser-input.mdx+++ b/docs/content/docs/cua-driver/reference/mcp-tools/browser-input.mdx@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Served by `cua-driver mcp`; see [MCP tools](/cua-driver/reference/mcp-tools) for## `browser_click`-Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode="foreground" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium and macOS Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route="dom_event" (synthetic el.click(), ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.+Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode="foreground" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route="dom_event" (synthetic pointer and mouse down/up/click sequence at the element's center, ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.Effect: mutating. Platforms: macOS, Linux, Windows.diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.md b/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.mdindex a2980d73c2..dce2cab2e6 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.md+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.md@@ -370,11 +370,12 @@ browser_clickBefore dispatch, the driver refreshes the element box and hit-tests the point.It refuses stale, covered, or ambiguous targets.-Standalone Chromium on macOS and Linux can activate its native window when-trusted CDP pointer input is used. CUA Driver detects that limitation and-returns `browser_input_trust_unavailable` before dispatch instead of claiming-background delivery. Windows Chrome and Edge have validated trusted-background delivery.+Standalone Chromium on Linux can activate its native window when trusted CDP+pointer input is used. CUA Driver detects that limitation and returns+`browser_input_trust_unavailable` before dispatch instead of claiming+background delivery. Chrome and Edge on Windows, and Chrome on macOS, deliver+trusted input in the background, including to an inactive (hidden) tab,+without activating or raising the browser window.When the application semantics allow a synthetic JavaScript click, request itexplicitly with a current ref:@@ -385,8 +386,11 @@ browser_click"input_route":"dom_event","session":"browser-run-1"}'```-`dom_event` calls the page element's click behavior without pretending that a-trusted pointer event occurred. It requires a ref and is the full-background+`dom_event` replays a primary-button click as synthetic DOM events at the+element's center: pointer and mouse over, move, down, up, then `click`. Apps+that open rows or menus from pointer or mouse down/up, as many React tables+do, respond to it; it does not pretend that a trusted pointer event occurred.+Controls that check `event.isTrusted` still need the trusted route. It requires a ref and is the full-backgroundalternative where supported. Dispatch is not proof that the control activated:trust-gated controls can ignore synthetic events, so refresh page state andverify the expected postcondition. Never silently change trust class ordiff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/MACOS.md b/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/MACOS.mdindex 04ce019572..888a8c6be2 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/MACOS.md+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/Skills/cua-driver/MACOS.md@@ -585,11 +585,11 @@ window, and PID-routes its bounded checkbox-pixel fallback. The same control'sstate must verify after mutation; unsupported appearance, scale, zoom,window-size, or toolbar geometry refuses without a click.-Standalone Chromium activates its window when CDP's trusted pointer route is-used on macOS. The driver therefore returns-`browser_input_trust_unavailable` before dispatch rather than falsely claiming-background delivery. Use `input_route:"dom_event"` only when synthetic click-semantics are acceptable. Embedded Electron has a separately bounded route;+CDP's trusted pointer route (the `browser_click` and `browser_pointer`+default) stays in the background on macOS Chrome: it delivers trusted events+to the bound tab, even an inactive one, without activating or raising the+browser window. Use `input_route:"dom_event"` only when synthetic events are+acceptable; controls that check `event.isTrusted` ignore it. Embedded Electron has a separately bounded route;do not infer that route for arbitrary WKWebView or Tauri hosts.For a declared session, typed browser click, type, and pointer mutations animatediff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/tools.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/tools.rsindex 4aed3981f4..ee333e2915 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/tools.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/tools.rs@@ -952,10 +952,10 @@ impl BrowserClickTool {(Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot \preserve standalone-browser background posture unless \delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may \- activate (including Linux Chromium and macOS Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; \+ activate (including Linux Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; \for example a browser inside a sandbox). \- input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic \- el.click(), ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; \+ input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic pointer and mouse \+ down/up/click sequence at the element's center, ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; \it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated \controls may ignore synthetic events. \Refused for heuristic bindings."@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ impl Tool for BrowserClickTool {"Runtime.callFunctionOn",json!({"objectId": object_id,- "functionDeclaration": "function() { this.click(); }",+ "functionDeclaration": DOM_EVENT_CLICK_SEQUENCE,}),).await@@ -1394,6 +1394,47 @@ fn quad_center(box_model: &Value) -> Option<(f64, f64)> {Some((xs.iter().sum::<f64>() / 4.0, ys.iter().sum::<f64>() / 4.0))}+/// Synthetic click for `input_route:"dom_event"`, evaluated ON the ref's node.+///+/// `HTMLElement.click()` fires only a bare `click` with no coordinates, so+/// apps that open rows or menus from `pointerdown`/`mousedown`/`pointerup`+/// (common in React tables and grids) ignore it. This dispatches the sequence+/// a real primary-button mouse click produces, at the element's center and on+/// the hit-tested descendant there: hover, move, down, focus, up, click. Like+/// a real click, `preventDefault()` on `pointerdown` suppresses the+/// compatibility mouse events, and on `mousedown` suppresses the focus move.+/// The events stay untrusted (`isTrusted === false`).+const DOM_EVENT_CLICK_SEQUENCE: &str = "function() { \+ const el = this; \+ const doc = el.ownerDocument; \+ const view = doc.defaultView; \+ const r = el.getBoundingClientRect(); \+ const x = r.left + r.width / 2, y = r.top + r.height / 2; \+ const root = el.getRootNode(); \+ const hit = ('elementFromPoint' in root) ? root.elementFromPoint(x, y) : null; \+ const target = (hit && el.contains(hit)) ? hit : el; \+ const sx = x + (view.screenX || 0), sy = y + (view.screenY || 0); \+ const base = { bubbles: true, cancelable: true, composed: true, view, \+ clientX: x, clientY: y, screenX: sx, screenY: sy, button: 0 }; \+ const P = (type, buttons, extra) => target.dispatchEvent(new view.PointerEvent(type, \+ { ...base, buttons, pointerId: 1, pointerType: 'mouse', isPrimary: true, \+ width: 1, height: 1, pressure: buttons ? 0.5 : 0, ...extra })); \+ const M = (type, buttons, extra) => target.dispatchEvent(new view.MouseEvent(type, \+ { ...base, buttons, detail: 0, ...extra })); \+ P('pointerover', 0); P('pointerenter', 0, { bubbles: false, cancelable: false }); \+ M('mouseover', 0); M('mouseenter', 0, { bubbles: false, cancelable: false }); \+ P('pointermove', 0); M('mousemove', 0); \+ const compat = P('pointerdown', 1); \+ if (compat && M('mousedown', 1, { detail: 1 })) { \+ const focusable = target.closest('a[href],button,input,select,textarea,summary,[tabindex],[contenteditable=\"\"],[contenteditable=\"true\"]'); \+ if (focusable && typeof focusable.focus === 'function') focusable.focus({ preventScroll: true }); \+ } \+ P('pointerup', 0); \+ if (compat) M('mouseup', 0, { detail: 1 }); \+ M('click', 0, { detail: 1 }); \+ return true; \+}";+// ── browser_type ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────/// Editability check evaluated ON the ref's node (`this`), so focus isdiff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/v2_tests.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/v2_tests.rsindex 15c8c3085d..34b8f8ffba 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/v2_tests.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-core/src/browser/v2_tests.rs@@ -2680,7 +2680,38 @@ async fn trusted_click_refuses_when_standalone_background_posture_is_unavailable"{public}");assert!(public.get("status").is_none(), "{public}");- assert!(!recorded_calls(&f, "Runtime.callFunctionOn").is_empty());+ let dispatches = recorded_calls(&f, "Runtime.callFunctionOn");+ let click_sequence = dispatches+ .iter()+ .filter_map(|(_, params)| params["functionDeclaration"].as_str())+ .find(|declaration| declaration.contains("'pointerdown'"))+ .expect("dom_event click dispatches a pointer sequence, not a bare click()");+ // Apps that open rows from pointer/mouse down+up ignore a bare click(),+ // so the synthetic route must replay the whole primary-button sequence+ // at the element's center, in order.+ let order = [+ "'pointermove'",+ "'pointerdown'",+ "'mousedown'",+ "'pointerup'",+ "'mouseup'",+ "'click'",+ ];+ let positions: Vec<usize> = order+ .iter()+ .map(|event| {+ click_sequence+ .find(event)+ .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing {event}"))+ })+ .collect();+ assert!(+ positions.windows(2).all(|w| w[0] < w[1]),+ "{click_sequence}"+ );+ assert!(click_sequence.contains("clientX: x"), "{click_sequence}");+ assert!(!click_sequence.contains("this.click()"), "{click_sequence}");+ assert!(recorded_calls(&f, "Input.dispatchMouseEvent").is_empty());assert!(recorded_calls(&f, "Page.bringToFront").is_empty());assert!(recorded_calls(&f, "Target.activateTarget").is_empty());}diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-e2e/tests/standalone_browser_behavior_test.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-e2e/tests/standalone_browser_behavior_test.rsindex f33d10d60b..04ae655746 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-e2e/tests/standalone_browser_behavior_test.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver-e2e/tests/standalone_browser_behavior_test.rs@@ -2432,7 +2432,7 @@ fn run_trusted_click(spec: &BrowserSpec) {std::env::consts::OS,spec.name);- let case = if cfg!(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos")) {+ let case = if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {refusal_case(&spec.name,"trusted_click",@@ -2459,7 +2459,7 @@ fn run_trusted_click(spec: &BrowserSpec) {"session": session,}),);- if cfg!(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos")) {+ if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {assert_eq!(click.action_effect(), Some("refused"), "{}", click.raw);assert!(click.text().contains("browser_input_trust_unavailable"),@@ -3536,7 +3536,7 @@ fn run_multi_tab(spec: &BrowserSpec) {"session": session,}),);- let trusted_clicks = if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {+ let trusted_clicks = if !cfg!(target_os = "linux") {assert_eq!(trusted.action_effect(),Some("unverifiable"),diff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/protocol_schema_test.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/protocol_schema_test.rsindex 8a0b00b9ca..a7633bb55a 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/protocol_schema_test.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/cua-driver/tests/protocol_schema_test.rs@@ -276,11 +276,10 @@ fn assert_tools_list_schema_shape(mut d: RawDriver) {.find(|tool| tool["name"] == "browser_click").expect("browser_click not found in tools/list");assert!(- browser_click["description"]- .as_str()- .is_some_and(|description| description- .contains("including Linux Chromium and macOS Chromium configurations")),- "browser_click description should name macOS and Linux: {}",+ browser_click["description"].as_str().is_some_and(+ |description| description.contains("including Linux Chromium configurations")+ ),+ "browser_click description should name Linux: {}",browser_click["description"]);let schema_tools: BTreeSet<&str> = toolsdiff --git a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/browser/platform.rs b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/browser/platform.rsindex f56ce6973e..5a97ce0bd6 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/browser/platform.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver/rust/crates/platform-macos/src/browser/platform.rs@@ -886,7 +886,15 @@ impl BrowserPlatform for MacOsBrowserPlatform {}fn standalone_trusted_input_background_limitation(&self) -> Option<&'static str> {- Some("Chromium's trusted CDP Input route activates its standalone browser window on macOS")+ // Measured on Chrome 155 with another app frontmost: CDP+ // Input.dispatchMouseEvent (with and without focus emulation) into a+ // hidden background tab, and into the active tab of a window behind+ // another app, delivered trusted events (isTrusted=true) without+ // changing the frontmost app or raising the browser window, including+ // clicks that focus inputs, buttons, links and selects. The+ // background click route never calls Page.bringToFront or+ // Target.activateTarget.+ None}fn existing_profile_attach_background_limitation(&self) -> Option<&'static str> {diff --git a/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.md b/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.mdindex 7ddd90977d..af3670ceae 100644--- a/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.md+++ b/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/BROWSER.md@@ -364,11 +364,12 @@ browser_clickBefore dispatch, the driver refreshes the element box and hit-tests the point.It refuses stale, covered, or ambiguous targets.-Standalone Chromium on macOS and Linux can activate its native window when-trusted CDP pointer input is used. CUA Driver detects that limitation and-returns `browser_input_trust_unavailable` before dispatch instead of claiming-background delivery. Windows Chrome and Edge have validated trusted-background delivery.+Standalone Chromium on Linux can activate its native window when trusted CDP+pointer input is used. CUA Driver detects that limitation and returns+`browser_input_trust_unavailable` before dispatch instead of claiming+background delivery. Chrome and Edge on Windows, and Chrome on macOS, deliver+trusted input in the background, including to an inactive (hidden) tab,+without activating or raising the browser window.When the application semantics allow a synthetic JavaScript click, request itexplicitly with a current ref:@@ -379,8 +380,11 @@ browser_click"input_route":"dom_event","session":"browser-run-1"}'```-`dom_event` calls the page element's click behavior without pretending that a-trusted pointer event occurred. It requires a ref and is the full-background+`dom_event` replays a primary-button click as synthetic DOM events at the+element's center: pointer and mouse over, move, down, up, then `click`. Apps+that open rows or menus from pointer or mouse down/up, as many React tables+do, respond to it; it does not pretend that a trusted pointer event occurred.+Controls that check `event.isTrusted` still need the trusted route. It requires a ref and is the full-backgroundalternative where supported. Dispatch is not proof that the control activated:trust-gated controls can ignore synthetic events, so refresh page state andverify the expected postcondition. Never silently change trust class ordiff --git a/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/MACOS.md b/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/MACOS.mdindex 496cbe8c57..10b24ed403 100644--- a/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/MACOS.md+++ b/libs/cua/skills/cua-driver/MACOS.md@@ -479,11 +479,11 @@ window, and PID-routes its bounded checkbox-pixel fallback. The same control'sstate must verify after mutation; unsupported appearance, scale, zoom,window-size, or toolbar geometry refuses without a click.-Standalone Chromium activates its window when CDP's trusted pointer route is-used on macOS. The driver therefore returns-`browser_input_trust_unavailable` before dispatch rather than falsely claiming-background delivery. Use `input_route:"dom_event"` only when synthetic click-semantics are acceptable. Embedded Electron has a separately bounded route;+CDP's trusted pointer route (the `browser_click` and `browser_pointer`+default) stays in the background on macOS Chrome: it delivers trusted events+to the bound tab, even an inactive one, without activating or raising the+browser window. Use `input_route:"dom_event"` only when synthetic events are+acceptable; controls that check `event.isTrusted` ignore it. Embedded Electron has a separately bounded route;do not infer that route for arbitrary WKWebView or Tauri hosts.For a declared session, typed browser click, type, and pointer mutations animatediff --git a/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-linux.json b/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-linux.jsonindex a5be6e6107..657428edad 100644--- a/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-linux.json+++ b/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-linux.json@@ -2557,7 +2557,7 @@"read_only": false},{- "description": "Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium and macOS Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic el.click(), ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.",+ "description": "Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic pointer and mouse down/up/click sequence at the element's center, ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.","destructive": false,"idempotent": false,"input_schema": {diff --git a/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-macos.json b/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-macos.jsonindex 755b65e64a..7acbb7af4f 100644--- a/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-macos.json+++ b/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-macos.json@@ -2204,7 +2204,7 @@"read_only": false},{- "description": "Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium and macOS Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic el.click(), ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.",+ "description": "Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic pointer and mouse down/up/click sequence at the element's center, ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.","destructive": false,"idempotent": false,"input_schema": {diff --git a/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-windows.json b/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-windows.jsonindex 989d2e8683..927cf82609 100644--- a/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-windows.json+++ b/scripts/docs-generators/cli-specs/cua-driver-mcp-windows.json@@ -2252,7 +2252,7 @@"read_only": false},{- "description": "Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium and macOS Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic el.click(), ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.",+ "description": "Click a page element (by ref) or viewport coordinates in an exactly-bound tab. Default route is trusted hardware-like input (Input.dispatchMouseEvent), and refuses where that route cannot preserve standalone-browser background posture unless delivery_mode=\"foreground\" accepts that the browser window may activate (including Linux Chromium configurations whose trusted route cannot stay in the background; for example a browser inside a sandbox). input_route=\"dom_event\" (synthetic pointer and mouse down/up/click sequence at the element's center, ref required) is used only when explicitly requested; it proves dispatch, not control activation, because trust-gated controls may ignore synthetic events. Refused for heuristic bindings.","destructive": false,"idempotent": false,"input_schema": {