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fix(cua-driver-rs)(windows)(#1646): check_permissions reverts impersonation + uses explicit OpenProcess handle (#1647)
Francesco Bonaccia9d6769aa624
diff --git a/libs/cua-driver-rs/crates/platform-windows/src/tools/impl_.rs b/libs/cua-driver-rs/crates/platform-windows/src/tools/impl_.rsindex f348a12917..6572254324 100644--- a/libs/cua-driver-rs/crates/platform-windows/src/tools/impl_.rs+++ b/libs/cua-driver-rs/crates/platform-windows/src/tools/impl_.rs@@ -3129,18 +3129,60 @@ impl Tool for CheckPermissionsTool {//// TokenIntegrityLevel asks the kernel directly: what IL is this token// at? RID 0x3000 (High) or higher == elevated; anything below is not.- use windows::Win32::System::Threading::{GetCurrentProcess, OpenProcessToken};+ //+ // #1646: PR #1641's initial implementation called+ // `OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), ...)` and STILL misreported+ // High-IL daemons as Medium IL. Root cause: the named-pipe server's+ // handler thread can be left impersonating the connecting client+ // (cuademo's Medium-IL shell, in the failing case), and on Windows+ // the impersonation token leaks through `GetCurrentProcess()`'s+ // pseudo-handle in a way that returns the impersonation token's IL+ // rather than the primary token's. Two-part fix:+ // 1. `RevertToSelf()` at the top — drops any active impersonation+ // on this thread so subsequent token queries see the primary.+ // 2. `OpenProcess(GetCurrentProcessId())` — uses an explicit+ // handle to the daemon's own process, mirroring the working+ // C# diagnostic (Win32 OpenProcess + OpenProcessToken from a+ // Medium-IL shell against the daemon's pid). Avoids any+ // pseudo-handle quirks.+ use windows::Win32::System::Threading::{+ GetCurrentProcessId, OpenProcess, OpenProcessToken, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION,+ };use windows::Win32::Security::{- GetTokenInformation, TokenIntegrityLevel, TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL, TOKEN_QUERY,- GetSidSubAuthority, GetSidSubAuthorityCount,+ GetTokenInformation, RevertToSelf, TokenIntegrityLevel, TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL,+ TOKEN_QUERY, GetSidSubAuthority, GetSidSubAuthorityCount,};const HIGH_IL_RID: u32 = 0x3000;let il_rid: Option<u32> = unsafe {- let proc = GetCurrentProcess();+ // Drop any impersonation on this thread before we query. The+ // call returns BOOL — if there's nothing to revert it returns+ // FALSE with ERROR_NO_TOKEN, which is fine and not an error.+ let _ = RevertToSelf();++ let proc_handle = match OpenProcess(+ PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION,+ false,+ GetCurrentProcessId(),+ ) {+ Ok(h) => h,+ Err(_) => {+ // Should never happen — we always have rights to query+ // our own process. Bail and report Unavailable.+ return ToolResult::text("Process integrity level: Unavailable (OpenProcess on self failed)")+ .with_structured(json!({+ "elevated": false,+ "integrity_level": "Unavailable",+ "integrity_level_rid": serde_json::Value::Null,+ "uia": true,+ "post_message": true,+ }));+ }+ };let mut token = windows::Win32::Foundation::HANDLE::default();- if OpenProcessToken(proc, TOKEN_QUERY, &mut token).is_err() {+ if OpenProcessToken(proc_handle, TOKEN_QUERY, &mut token).is_err() {+ let _ = windows::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle(proc_handle);None} else {let mut needed: u32 = 0;@@ -3188,6 +3230,7 @@ impl Tool for CheckPermissionsTool {}};let _ = windows::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle(token);+ let _ = windows::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle(proc_handle);rid}};