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fix(web): bind change-password to live sessions and cap auth bodies
Jinpyd55b4c966acf
diff --git a/crates/dbx-web/src/auth.rs b/crates/dbx-web/src/auth.rsindex 9bddff2fd1..7f0c463265 100644--- a/crates/dbx-web/src/auth.rs+++ b/crates/dbx-web/src/auth.rs@@ -37,6 +37,18 @@ fn session_cookie_path(state: &WebState) -> &str {state.public_base_path.as_str()}+/// `Secure` is opt-in: LAN/HTTP deployments would otherwise never receive the+/// session cookie back. Reverse-proxy TLS deployments set DBX_WEB_COOKIE_SECURE=1.+fn cookie_secure_enabled() -> bool {+ static SECURE: std::sync::OnceLock<bool> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();+ *SECURE.get_or_init(|| matches!(std::env::var("DBX_WEB_COOKIE_SECURE").ok().as_deref(), Some("1") | Some("true")))+}++fn session_cookie(state: &WebState, token: &str) -> String {+ let secure = if cookie_secure_enabled() { "; Secure" } else { "" };+ format!("dbx_session={token}; Path={}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax{secure}", session_cookie_path(state))+}+fn api_path_suffix<'a>(path: &'a str, public_base_path: &str) -> Option<&'a str> {if let Some(suffix) = path.strip_prefix("/api/") {return Some(suffix);@@ -64,9 +76,12 @@ pub(crate) fn middleware_api_path_suffix<'a>(path: &'a str, public_base_path: &spub async fn login(State(state): State<Arc<WebState>>, Json(body): Json<LoginRequest>) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {let hash_guard = state.password_hash.read().await;let hash_str = match hash_guard.as_deref() {+ // No password configured: nothing to authenticate against. Answer+ // explicitly instead of an ok:true that reads as "authenticated" —+ // the API remains locked by the middleware until setup completes.Some(h) => h.to_string(),None => {- return Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(serde_json::json!({"ok": true}))).into_response());+ return Ok((StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, Json(serde_json::json!({"error": "setup_required"}))).into_response());}};drop(hash_guard);@@ -108,7 +123,7 @@ pub async fn login(State(state): State<Arc<WebState>>, Json(body): Json<LoginReqlet token = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();state.sessions.write().await.insert(token.clone());- let cookie = format!("dbx_session={token}; Path={}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax", session_cookie_path(&state));+ let cookie = session_cookie(&state, &token);Ok((StatusCode::OK, [("set-cookie", cookie.as_str())], Json(serde_json::json!({"ok": true}))).into_response())}@@ -147,7 +162,7 @@ pub async fn setup(State(state): State<Arc<WebState>>, Json(body): Json<LoginReqlet token = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();state.sessions.write().await.insert(token.clone());- let cookie = format!("dbx_session={token}; Path={}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax", session_cookie_path(&state));+ let cookie = session_cookie(&state, &token);Ok((StatusCode::OK, [("set-cookie", cookie.as_str())], Json(serde_json::json!({"ok": true}))).into_response())}@@ -168,8 +183,20 @@ pub async fn check(State(state): State<Arc<WebState>>, req: Request<axum::body::pub async fn change_password(State(state): State<Arc<WebState>>,+ headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,Json(body): Json<ChangePasswordRequest>,) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {+ // Session-bound: this endpoint used to sit outside the auth middleware,+ // giving unauthenticated callers an unlimited online guess at the admin+ // password with none of login's lockout. It now requires a live session+ // (defense in depth — the middleware gates it too) and, after a successful+ // change, revokes every OTHER session so a stolen old cookie cannot survive+ // a credential rotation.+ let current_token = session_token_from_headers(&headers).ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;+ if !state.sessions.read().await.contains(¤t_token) {+ return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);+ }+let hash_guard = state.password_hash.read().await;let hash_str = match hash_guard.as_deref() {Some(h) => h.to_string(),@@ -195,6 +222,9 @@ pub async fn change_password(state.app.storage.save_password_hash(&new_hash).await.map_err(|_| StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;*state.password_hash.write().await = Some(new_hash);+ // Rotation revokes sibling sessions; only the caller stays logged in.+ state.sessions.write().await.retain(|token| *token == current_token);+Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(serde_json::json!({"ok": true}))).into_response())}@@ -230,9 +260,11 @@ pub async fn auth_middleware(req: Request<axum::body::Body>,next: Next,) -> Response {- // Auth endpoints are always accessible.+ // Only the bootstrap auth endpoints are reachable without a session —+ // login/setup/check. change-password and logout require one: change-password+ // must not be an unauthenticated password oracle.let api_suffix = middleware_api_path_suffix(req.uri().path(), &state.public_base_path);- if api_suffix.is_some_and(|suffix| suffix.starts_with("auth/")) {+ if api_suffix.is_some_and(|suffix| matches!(suffix, "auth/login" | "auth/setup" | "auth/check")) {return next.run(req).await;}diff --git a/crates/dbx-web/src/main.rs b/crates/dbx-web/src/main.rsindex b0edc80a5a..79ac7a3b7d 100644--- a/crates/dbx-web/src/main.rs+++ b/crates/dbx-web/src/main.rs@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ use argon2::password_hash::rand_core::OsRng;use argon2::password_hash::SaltString;use argon2::{Argon2, PasswordHasher};use axum::extract::DefaultBodyLimit;++/// Login/setup payloads are one password field; 64 KiB is generous.+const AUTH_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode, Uri};use axum::middleware;use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Redirect, Response};@@ -507,10 +510,13 @@ async fn serve() {.route("/database-backups/{id}/files/{index}", get(routes::scheduled_backup::download)).route("/database-backups/{id}/files/{index}/restore", post(routes::scheduled_backup::prepare_restore))// Auth- .route("/auth/login", post(auth::login))+ // Auth payloads are tiny password strings: cap them far below the+ // global limit so the extractor cannot buffer an unauthenticated DoS+ // body before any rate limiting runs.+ .route("/auth/login", post(auth::login).layer(DefaultBodyLimit::max(AUTH_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES))).route("/auth/check", get(auth::check))- .route("/auth/setup", post(auth::setup))- .route("/auth/change-password", post(auth::change_password))+ .route("/auth/setup", post(auth::setup).layer(DefaultBodyLimit::max(AUTH_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES)))+ .route("/auth/change-password", post(auth::change_password).layer(DefaultBodyLimit::max(AUTH_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES))).route("/auth/logout", post(auth::logout))// Connection.route("/connection/test", post(routes::connection::test_connection))